



**NETAJI SUBHAS OPEN UNIVERSITY**

STUDY MATERIAL

**PG : POLITICAL SCIENCE  
(PGPS)**

PAPER - VII  
(English Version)

MODULES : 1-4  
(All Units)

**POST GRADUATE  
POLITICAL SCIENCE**



## PREFACE

In the curricular structure introduced by this University for students of Post-Graduate degree programme, the opportunity to pursue Post-Graduate course in any subject introduced by this University is equally available to all learners. Instead of being guided by any presumption about ability level, it would perhaps stand to reason if receptivity of a learner is judged in the course of the learning process. That would be entirely in keeping with the objectives of open education which does not believe in artificial differentiation.

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The accepted methodology of distance education has been followed in the preparation of these study materials. Co-operation in every form of experienced scholars is indispensable for a work of this kind. We, therefore, owe an enormous debt of gratitude to everyone whose tireless efforts went into the writing, editing and devising of a proper lay-out of the materials. Practically speaking, their role amounts to an involvement in 'invisible teaching'. For, whoever makes use of these study materials would virtually derive the benefit of learning under their collective care without each being seen by the other.

The more a learner would seriously pursue these study materials, the easier it will be for him or her to reach out to larger horizons of a subject. Care has also been taken to make the language lucid and presentation attractive so that they may be rated as quality self-learning materials. If anything remains still obscure or difficult to follow, arrangements are there to come to terms with them through the counselling sessions regularly available at the network of study centres set up by the University.

Needless to add, a great deal of these efforts is still experimental-in fact, pioneering in certain areas. Naturally, there is every possibility of some lapse or deficiency here and there. However, these do admit of rectification and further improvement in due course. On the whole, therefore, these study materials are expected to evoke wider appreciation the more they receive serious attention of all concerned.

**Professor (Dr.) Subha Sankar Sarkar**  
Vice-Chancellor

# PREFACE

The primary purpose of this book is to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date account of the current state of research in the field of [unintelligible]. The book is intended for students and researchers alike, and is designed to be a valuable resource for anyone interested in this area of study. The book is divided into several chapters, each of which covers a different aspect of the field. The chapters are written in a clear and concise style, and are intended to be accessible to a wide range of readers. The book is also designed to be a useful reference work, and includes a comprehensive bibliography of the literature in the field.

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New Syllabus (w.e.f. July, 2015)

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### **Module-1**

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### **Theories of International Relations**

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- Unit 2     Systems Theory
- Unit 3     Marxist and other Radical and Neo-Radical Approaches
- Unit 4     Post Structuralist and Post-Modernist Approaches

Paper-VII

Module-I

International Relations

Theories of International Relations

- Unit 1  Liberal and Neo-liberal Approaches: Realism and Neo-Realist Critique of Liberalism
- Unit 2  Systems Theory
- Unit 3  Marxist and other Radical and Neo-Radical Approaches
- Unit 4  Post-Structuralist and Post-Modern Approaches

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# Unit 1 □ Liberal and Neo-liberal Approaches: Realist and Neo-realist Critique of Liberalism

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## Structure

- 1.0 Objectives
- 1.1 Introduction
- 1.2 Evolution
- 1.3 Features of Liberalism
- 1.4 Typology of Liberal Theory in International Liberalism
- 1.5 Neo-liberalism
- 1.6 Critique of Liberalism and Neo-Liberalism from Realist and Neo-realist Perspectives
- 1.7 'Neo-Neo' Debate
- 1.8 Conclusion
- 1.9 Summary
- 1.10 Questions
- 1.11 Suggested Reading

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## 1.0 Objectives

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The study seeks to explain

1. The major features of Liberalism.
2. The different trends of International Liberalism.
3. The doctrine of Neo liberalism: its root & major features.
4. A critical analysis of both Liberalism & Neo liberalism.

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## 1.1 Introduction

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Broadly speaking, one can identify three major theoretical trends in international relations: Realism and Neo-realism, Liberalism and Neo-liberalism, and Marxist and Neo-Marxist theories of International Relations. During the last decade of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century, constructivism established as another major trend in International Relations. In this chapter, we shall mainly be concerned with liberal trends in International Relations - first of all, we shall try to look into the origin of this theory. This will be followed by a discussion of its major postulates and ultimately, we shall try to analyse how this theory has been transformed into neo-liberal theory.

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## 1.2 Evolution

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At the very beginning it must be mentioned that development of liberalism in the field of International Relations is nothing but a reflection of general development of liberal political ideas.

The emergence of new political ideas during the end of the sixteenth century and beginning of the seventeenth century subsequently influenced the development of liberalism in International Relations. The decline of feudalism at the end of the sixteenth century, emergence of middle class, beginning of conflicts between church and the state, beginning of reformation movement likely emergence of the state system as well as the increasing influence of scientific thinking awareness about state sovereignty and the beginning of modernity provided the background of liberal political thinking.

What are the major ideas of liberalism? It involves the following: democratization, consolidation of market economy, growth of rationalism, human development through application of scientific knowledge and technology. Two different trends can be identified: according to one school of thought the state is a necessary evil. To them, socio-economic development and individual progress can be ensured exclusively through individual efforts and individual entrepreneurships. This is known as laissez-faire liberalism. John Locke (1632 - 1704), Voltaire (1694 - 1778) Benjamin Constant (1767 - 1830), von Humboldt (1769 - 1859) happen to be the major spokesmen for this school of thought. Another group of thinkers consider state as an important institution - according to this view, state through its welfare activities can redistribute power and economic wealth and ensure progress for human civilization. Ethical development of human beings appears to be a major agenda for this group of thinkers. John Locke (1632-1704), Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712 - 1778), T. H. Green (1836 - 1882), Wilhelm Friedrich Georg Hegel (1770 - 1831) represent this tradition. This tradition has been described as democratic or interventionist liberalism.

It may be true that these scholars have exerted not much influence on liberal thinking so far as is concerned in the field of International Relations. However, one need not overlook the fact that these scholars do not completely ignore international relations. John Locke, for example, in a chapter entitled 'Of Conquest' in his classic *Two Treatises of Government* (1689), shows how economically powerful states behave towards economically less powerful states. He mentions that such behaviour is based on natural law traditions. He also mentions that prudence seems to be the basic principle of foreign policy. Rousseau appears to be sceptic towards the notion of natural law - still he believes that it is only through the establishment of 'confederate republic' international peace can be ensured.

Ever since the end of the eighteenth century, liberalism occupied a more optimistic position. Immanuel Kant (1724 - 1804), in his classic *Perpetual Peace* (1795), makes clear cut statement about liberalism in International Relations. First, the future of international peace lay in the emergence of republican states. Members of the republican states are aware of the fact how war is capable of destroying human lives and civilization. Secondly, 'spirit of commerce' gives emphasis on the importance of mutual dependence, co-operation and international legal framework and, at the same time, such spirit tends to focus on the establishment of peaceful international system. Besides Kant, several other thinkers such as Thomas Paine (1737 - 1809), Jeremy Bentham (1748 - 1832) have also emphasized the possibility of establishing a peaceful world through adoption of laissez faire principles by several states. Keeping this tradition in mind David Ricardo (1772 - 1823), James Mill (1773 - 1836), John Stuart Mill (1806 - 1873) and Richard Cobden (1804 - 1865) have reached these conclusions: First, international peace, stability and prosperity can be achieved only through following laissez faire principles. Secondly, an

enlightened, entrepreneurial, and individual oriented economic system can ensure human progress. Thirdly, such an economic structure can be most successful in a democratic society. In other words, democracy, individual ownership and laissez faire can bring about an interdependent and peaceful world order.

In the first part of the twentieth century, John Hobson (1858 - 1940) and Norman Angell (1872 -1967) have, more or less, expressed same opinions. Hobson, on the one hand, expresses his concern about alliance between imperialist, aristocracy and business class - to him, such an alliance can pose threats to international peace and stability. But, on the other hand, he talks about international peace through cooperation among different states. Norman Angell in his book *The Great Illusion* (1910) mentions that revolution in production, transportation and communication has brought an international system based on increasing economic cooperation. To him, war and vested interest can destroy such cooperative economic structure - although he believes that any effort by the vested interest to destroy the system will ultimately fail. To him, increasing cohesiveness and cooperation among international economic elites will keep the environment of international economic interdependence intact.

It can be stated that historically speaking, liberal thinkers have argued that democratization, free trade and elimination of war can ensure human progress. However, in the backdrop of two world wars, they have realized the need for establishing international organizations and ensure collective security measures. It is in this intellectual background Woodrow Wilson initiated the establishment of the League of Nations. Its failure gave birth to the United Nations after World War II. But behind the establishment of these two international organizations, there lies one conscious realization: a violence free, peaceful environment can establish an interdependent, progressive international system.

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### 1.3 Features of Liberalism

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No consensus exists among the scholars of International Relations regarding major features of liberalism. Rather, this theory is diverse in nature and even identification of its major features may give rise to debates. Despite such possibility, we tend to identify a few features of this theory. First, human civilization can move from one stage of development to another only through national security, economic development, individual freedom and free trade. Such progress can be exemplified through elimination of war, economic development of individuals and communities, democratization and recognition of human rights. According to Robert Keohane if realism fails to recognize progressive development of human civilization, liberalism looks for cumulative progress in human history.

Secondly, according to this theory, international peace, security, progress and justice can be ensured only through international cooperation. Such cooperation, in turn, can be achieved only through recognition of certain moral values at the international level, observance of international law and collaboration among different international organizations. Thirdly, peace, prosperity, social justice and cooperation at the international level are dependent upon the degree of international interdependence. This happens to be the major feature of modernity. In fact,

development in the field of technology has made war obsolete and the world has become borderless. The main elements of such modern world order are: liberal democracy, economic and military interdependence, cognitive progress, social integration and international organizations.

Fourthly, liberalism tends to emphasise free trade, liberal democracy, sense of morality etc. and all these factors tend to move towards one observation. This observation recognizes that individual, and not the state, should be considered as the basic unit of analysis. This does not mean that states are not important actors in international relations - in fact, the champions of this theory consider state as just one of the many actors in the field of international relations. This theory tends to project the image of a society in which individuals play a significant role - but, at the same time, it does not fail to recognize the significance of interconnectedness between an individual and a the society as a whole. Fifthly, liberalism believes that goals of states are diverse in nature and those goals are constantly changing. It is true that a state gives emphasis on its national interests at the international level - similarly, a state does not want to pose threats to international necessities and requirements. In other words, the major objective of state under liberalism is to coordinate between national and international interests.

Sixthly, those who believe in liberalism argue that individual interests and national interests are products of interaction between international and domestic environments of a particular state. On the one hand, a country's foreign policy is determined, to a large extent, by its domestic state structure, nature of various social, economic and political groups as well as its cultural system. On the other hand, external variables such as development of technology, degree of interdependence, effectiveness of international organizations etc. also shape foreign policy responses of a country. Finally, according to the champions of liberalism, the probable impact of state interests and its capability to inflict damage on international system will depend, to a large extent, on the nature of the state system - and, such probability is always progressive in nature and evolutionary in character. Immanuel Kant argues that democratic states do never go to war among themselves -rather, they always resort to peaceful means for sorting out their differences. This theory is known as Democratic Peace Theory in International Relations. One can infer, on the basis of this theory, that world peace will be established only when democratic values will be universally accepted - but, one must also infer that such a process will be necessarily a long drawn one and can take place only through evolutionary means.

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## **1.4 Typology of Liberal Theory in International Relations**

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Marc W. Zacher and Richard A. Matthew in one of their articles, published in the mid-1990s, have identified six different trends of international liberalism. The first one has been described as Republican Liberalism. According to this argument, peace has been established through democratic processes imply that the notion of liberal peace remains inherent in an ethical system where state relations are based on mutual trust. Besides, inter-state conflicts under such system are solved through peaceful means. Again, these states believe that international peace can be established only through free trade among them.

The second variety is called Commercial Liberalism. This variety tends to argue that in the context of increasing trade and commerce among different states, degrees of interdependence will increase and at the same time possibilities of anarchy and conflicts will also be reduced. The other side of this theory is : this increasing economic interdependence will invite demands for common international economic policies. The inevitable consequence will be: economic policies, which have long been considered as integral part of domestic politics, will either become an integral part of international arena or be viewed as inherently global in nature.

The third trend has been described as military liberalism. According to Zacher and Matthew, roots of this variety can be traced back to two different books. One is *The Absolute Weapons* (1946), written by Bernard Brodie, and the other one is *International Politics in Atomic Age* (1959) by John Herz. Another book, entitled *Retreat from Doomsday: the Obsolescence of Major War* (1989), by John Mueller, also contains some insights into this type of liberalism. This theory has two major arguments: First, developments of military technology and economic interdependence have generated possibilities of mutual cooperation among different states. Secondly, economic cooperation can be strengthened if possibility of military confrontations and urge for mutual destruction can be reduced. For example, many experts believe that possibilities of nuclear attack have been reduced to a large extent because of economic interdependence.

The fourth variety of international liberalism is called cognitive liberalism. The main question of this variety is: can reason, education and knowledge change priorities of nation states and move them towards adopting cooperative projects? In other words, one can raise this question in a different way: how can different units engaged in international interaction apply their knowledge, rationality and learning processes for establishing cooperative international system? Those who believe in neo-functionalism argue that processes of international cooperation begin at much smaller and apparently insignificant issues. Experiences acquired by different units may encourage them to adopt policies in the sphere of more important issue-areas. This is what has been described as 'spillover effects' in International Relations. According to some scholars consciousness about international interdependence may help policy-makers not to resort to unilateral actions. Such realization may broaden the avenues for mutual cooperation and indicate possibilities for elimination of uncertainties at the international level.

The fifth variety may be described as sociological liberalism. This variety has three different trends: First, Karl Deutsch has shown how communication among citizens of different countries may influence processes of cultural interaction, political autonomy of individual citizens in different countries and possibilities of regional integration. Secondly, neo-functionalists have argued that exchanges among elites of different countries may lead to the formation of regional organizations. Thirdly, Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye and James Rosenau have shown that cooperative interactions among different non-governmental organizations have considerably influenced inter-state behaviour and compelled democratic state to cooperate.

Finally, we come to what has been described as liberal institutionalism. The main argument of this model is that inter-state or international values, international regimes as well as international organizations can strengthen liberal values at the international level. One of the major schools in this tradition is the English School. Hedley Bull, who is considered as the founder of this

school of thought, argues that when various nation-states become conscious about their uniform value patterns and interests, and agree to be guided by common international legal norms and regulations, the possibility of emergence of international society becomes imminent. Another trend of liberal institutionalism can be found in the formation of human rights regime - in fact, the whole notion of human rights revolves around international morality and value system. A few scholars believe that ever increasing consciousness about mutual interdependence may also lead to introduction of universal value system, consciousness, rights and responsibilities and thereby define inter-state relations in different way.

In conclusion of this typology, one may refer two other upcoming developments. First, Zacher and Matthew believe that in future a different version of liberalism, known as ecological liberalism, will emerge. Secondly, the main objective of international liberalism is to see how individual freedom, security and development can be ensured; how many nations can do that and how successfully they can do it.

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## 1.5 Neo-liberalism

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It is difficult to specify exactly at what point liberalism has been transformed into neo-liberalism. Charles Kegley has identified roots of neo-liberalism in Woodrow Wilson's idealism during the early part of the twentieth century. Robert Jackson and George Sorensen have identified its roots in the functionalist theory of Earnest Hass and in the theory of interdependence, as formulated by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. However, this theory becomes very prominent within the theoretical traditions of International Relations after the collapse of Soviet Union in the late twentieth century and subsequent publication of Francis Fukuyama's famous but controversial article 'The End of History?' in the journal *National Interest* in 1989.

Charles Kegley has identified the following features of neo-liberalism: evolution of democracy, right of self determination of nations, importance of economic interdependence and consequent insignificance of state boundaries, disarmament, increasing importance of economics in international relations, revival of international organizations, conflict resolution through international legal norms and regulations, emphasis on bilateral and multilateral diplomacy and consideration of morality as foundation of inter-state relations. A look at Kegley's features of neo-liberalism will reveal the fact that these are just extended versions of liberalism. However, a closer look will reveal that there are certain unique features of neo-liberalism: First, according to Kegley foreign policy of a neo-liberal state is an extension of its domestic economic politics. Secondly, this theory does not completely ignore the role of the state. It is true that the state has retreated from its traditional role under the impact of globalization, but still it continues to play a significant role through coordination of various interest groups. Thirdly, international economic development and international stability can be maintained only through free trade and reduction of tariff barriers. Finally, increasing importance of international organizations is likely to strengthen collective security system in the future.

Andrew Moravcsik has identified three major features of neo-liberalism. First, ever increasing



dynamism of globalization has encouraged common people and various communities to raise their demands at different international forums. This reflects that various communities have been trying to fulfil their social, political, economic and cultural demands through international efforts. Secondly, states generally represent the interests of various groups living within their respective territorial jurisdictions. Based on such demands, states identify their preferences, communicate those preferences to the international system and try to fulfil those demands through international mechanisms. In other words, contemporary states try to take full advantages of globalization through involvement in international activities. Thirdly, international interdependence appears to a product of such state preferences - and, such interrelationship between interdependence and state preferences tends to shape inter-state behaviour at the global level. In other words, dynamics of neo-liberalism is based on three major factors: nature of different social organizations and communities living within the territorial jurisdiction of a particular state; nature of the state; and nature of the international system.

Gerry Simpson mentions three different trends of neo-liberalism. First, in order to analyse neo-liberalism in the sphere of international relations, one can set aside the Utopian goals of liberalism and concentrate on state preferences, strategic calculations among different preferences, interaction among rational decision-makers within a particular state, nature of state priorities within its domestic society and nature of state preferences at the international level. Andrew Moravcsik's article, entitled 'Taking Preferences Seriously: a liberal theory of international politics', published in *International Organization* (1997), represents this trend.

The second trend, as identified by Gerry Simpson, is based on two different arguments. On the one hand, a group of scholars tend to distinguish between liberal and illiberal states. States which are inclined to observe international law are considered as liberal states, while those who refuse to be guided by such international law should be defined as illiberal state. On the other hand, those who believe in transgovernmentalism tend to derecognize any effort of imposing liberal values over illiberal states —instead, they emphasize inter-state judicial decisions, informal relations among like-minded states, cooperation among members of various legislatures across different countries and arrangement of formal discussion at institutional levels. Anne-Marie Slaughter's book *A New World Order*, published in 2004, provides some insights into this trend.

This third trend projects an idea about the future and at the same time provides a tentative framework for arriving at such a world. According to this school of thought one can move towards a better world order through both economic cooperation and military interventions, if necessary. It gives emphasis more on liberty rather than on social justice and views legal regulations can ensure individual liberty. It does not ignore inadequacies of contemporary international organizations, but argues that through liberal reforms such inadequacies can be removed. Keeping these objectives in mind, this trend identifies establishment of mature liberal democracies and recognition of responsibility to protect as ultimate goals of neo-liberalism. These ideas have been reflected in a book entitled *Forging a World of Liberty under Law* (2006) by John Ikenberry and Marie Anne-Slaughter. This is product of a larger project known as the Princeton Project.

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## 1.6 Critique of Liberalism and Neo-Liberalism from Realist and Neo-Realist Perspectives

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Before we concentrate on criticisms levelled against both liberalism and neo-liberalism by the realist and neo-realist thinkers, let us identify very briefly the features both realism and neo-realism. Hans J. Morgenthau has mentioned six major principles of political realism. One, human beings are exclusively guided by self-interests. This same assumption can be applied to the field of international relations where nation states are exclusively guided by their own national interests. Secondly, incessant search for power and urge for establishing domination over others continue to be the major dynamics of international relations. Thirdly, the state is the basic unit of analysis in international relations and always gives exclusive emphasis on national interest. Fourthly, since anarchy is the dominant feature of international relations, nation-state must rely on military power to protect its sovereignty. Fifthly, it is only through balance of power, international peace and stability can be maintained. Finally, this theory holds a negative attitude towards international law and organizations as mechanisms for maintaining international peace and stability.

Those who believe in neo-realism continue to accept the basic assumptions of political realism. The anarchical nature of the international system and balance of power as the only mechanism for maintain international peace and stability are equally accepted facts for neo-realist thinkers. Kenneth Waltz, one of the major proponents of this theory, argues that international system has two different spheres: unit and structure. The nature of international system is shaped by interactions between these two different spheres. Secondly, they believe that power is means which helps to consolidate national security. Thirdly, champions of this theory consider both military and economic powers as important variables in the field of international relations. Finally, too much dependence on military power and the absence of any supra-national authority in the sphere of international relations have created what is known as the problem of 'security dilemma' for political realism. Similarly, too much emphasis on interactions between units and structure has raised another problematic for neo-realism: which one of the two - unit or structure - is more dominant or powerful as explanatory variable in international relations? This is known as the 'agent structure problematic' in International Relations.

The question is: how can we criticize liberal and neo-liberal approaches in International Relations from these two power-centric approaches? First, those who believe in liberal tradition in International Relations are of the opinion that international system has been constantly moving towards progress, peace and stability. The question remains: even if it is true that democratic countries normally do not get involved either in war or in war like situation, this does not necessarily mean that they will not get involved in such situations in future. Besides, many democratic countries have resorted to war vis-a-vis non-democratic countries - US-Iraq war is a classic example. It will not be irrelevant to say that so-called democratic countries - whom Jerry Simpson has described as 'liberal coalitions' - have entered into direct confrontation with many countries in the name of 'War on Terror' or humanitarian interventions. The point is: war may not have taken place in terms of international legal practices, but a regime of violence has not yet been eliminated.

Secondly, can economic interdependence give rise to political integration and unification? Once we look into the dynamics of European Union, we have to admit that complexities involved in the processes of economic coordination have weakened the possibility of political unification. The recent economic crisis in Greece and subsequent role of Germany in compelling Greece to accept austerity measures indicate that economically less powerful countries have little option other than to accept the dictates of the more powerful ones even within the same economic union. In other words, international economic inequality stand in the way of complete political integration and far less unification.

Thirdly, neo-liberals may talk about the probable retreat of the state in the face of advancing globalization. However, it is difficult to accept this logic as the state continues to play a significant role even today. In fact, those who represent their respective states in various international forums continue to be guided by their respective national interests. Despite multiplication of international organizations in the post World War II era, it can hardly be admitted that those organizations have been able radically to change the role of the states in international relations.

Fourthly, one can see a contradiction within the neo-liberal agenda. On the one hand, they argue, that the line of demarcation between domestic and global is very thin and subtle. On the other hand, they believe, that state preferences are the products of interactions among priorities, demands and goals of various domestic groups and organizations. Here comes the question: if a state has already decided its preferences in response to interactions of its domestic groups, can such preferences be changed subsequently? To the neo-liberals, such changes are possible only when domestic groups of a state will change their preferences and priorities. Neo-liberals tend to reject realist claims regarding universal, unalterable and unequivocal character of state preferences. The question, then, is: why do neo-liberals give too much emphasis on domestic politics in an age of liberalization and globalization?

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## 1.7 'Neo—Neo' Debate

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Based on the discussion, one can raise the following question: How can one distinguish between neo-realism and neo-liberalism? David Baldwin has identified the following differences between these two theories: First, according to the neo-realists, anarchy happens to be the major feature of international relations. Neo-liberals do not completely ignore the anarchical nature of the international system, but they try not to overemphasize the issue of survival for nation-states. To them, neo-realism has tried to underestimate the necessities of interdependence, globalization and importance of international regimes. Secondly, to the neo-realists, international cooperation is possible only when states initiate such cooperative ventures. It is difficult to initiate the processes of international cooperation, but it is more difficult to maintain such initiatives. The neo-liberals, on the contrary, argue that international cooperation is possible only when interests of states become complementary to one another. Thirdly, the neo-liberals believe that international cooperation becomes successful only when states will gain absolutely. The neo-realists, however, believe that states do not see any of their counterparts will be absolutely powerful - in other

words, they believe that relative gain constitutes the core of cooperation. Fourthly, neo-realism emphasises that a state will always aim at achieving relative gain, maintaining its security and keeping its existence beyond doubt. The neo-liberalism, however, puts emphasis on economic prosperity, dynamics of international political economy and non-military issues, such as environmental issues, human rights regime etc. Fifthly, neo-realism gives emphasis on the capabilities of the states rather than their intentions. Since a state is not sure about intentions of its adversaries, it continues to increase its capabilities. On the contrary, neo-liberals are more on identifying priorities, intentions and preferences of a modern nation-state. Finally, neo-liberalism believes that establishment of international organizations and international regimes are crucial for establishing international peace and stability. In contrast, neo-realism does not recognise the importance either of international organization or international regime as essential for controlling international anarchy.

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## 1.8 Conclusion

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In conclusion, we can make following observations: First, both liberal and neo-liberal theories tend to concentrate on individuals and their collectivities as the major foundations of international relations. State and non-state actors together can build up international relations on the basis of cooperation. Secondly, both these theories reflect a bright future for the human civilization as a whole - they emphasize that human civilization can move towards progress in an evolutionary way. Thirdly, neo-liberalism tends to give emphasis on international political economy. Its major argument is that only through cooperation in political, economic and military spheres, international relations tend to move towards eternal peace. The possibility of international tensions and conflicts will be eliminated - or at least be reduced - if states do not feel threatened, militarily or otherwise, from the uncertainties and iniquities of the international system. Fourthly, according to these theories, there are three mechanisms through which peace can be ensured: peace through commerce, peace through democracy and peace through international organizations. An increase in trade will reduce the possibility of application of military forces; economic liberalization will increase degrees of interdependence and multiplications of international organizations will globalize peace and prosperity. Fifthly, keeping these things in mind, theories of global governance have flourished in contemporary global system. These theories give emphasis not so much on keeping the state away from public life - but they try to put emphasis on development of reforms of democratic institutions, strengthening of democratic institutions and making non-state organizations more active and more creative.

In conclusion, it can be stated that both liberalism and neo-liberalism appear to be important theories for analyzing and understanding international relations. Both these theories refuse to accept predominance of military forces in international relations and at the same time urges humanity to look forward to a peaceful world order.

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## 1.9 Summary

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In this chapter, we have briefly outlined the evolution of liberal political thought - because, present trends towards liberalism can be traced back to its earlier historical development. We have mentioned major features of international liberalism, such cumulative nature of progress, importance of cooperation at the international level, linkages between modernity and liberalism, importance of individual, role of state in coordinating national and global interests, importance of coordination between domestic and international system, and, probable role of democratization as precondition of peace. A typology of liberalism has been made - this includes republican liberalism, commercial liberalism, cognitive liberalism, military liberalism, sociological liberalism and institutional liberalism. In order to examine how transition from liberalism to neo-liberalism has taken place, we have made an outline of origin, features, assumptions and different trends of neo-liberalism. Through a discussion of realism and neo-realism, we have attempted a critique of both liberalism and neo-liberalism. A modest effort has been made to analyse what is known as 'neo-neo' debate in contemporary international relations. In conclusion, we have briefly pointed out how this theory can pave the way for a better world order.

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## 1.10 Questions:

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### Essay Type Questions:

1. Write an essay on the evolution of liberal theory in International Relations.
2. Describe, in detail, the main features of liberalism in International Relations.
3. Examine the major features of neoliberal approach to the study of International Relations.

### Medium Type Questions:

1. How do you define Republican Liberalism?
2. What are the features of either Military Liberalism or Cognitive Liberalism? Discuss briefly.
3. Write a note either on Commercial Liberalism or Institutional Liberalism.
4. Write briefly the core assumptions of new liberalism, as described by Andrew Moravcsik.
5. What is meant by 'neo-neo' debate in International Relations?

### Short Type Questions:

1. What is the title of the chapter in which John Locke talked about International Relations? What did he say about International Relations?
2. Who is the author of the book Perpetual Peace? What did the author of the book say about International Relations?
3. Distinguish between liberal state and illiberal state.
4. Write a short note on the Princeton Project.

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## 1.11 Suggested Reading

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1. Baylis, John, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens eds. *The Globalization of World Politics* (Oxford University Press), chapters 6 and 7.
2. Jackson, Robert and Georg Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches* (Oxford University Press), chapter 4.
3. Kegley, Charles Jr. ed., *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenges* (New York: St. Martin's Press), chapters 1, 5 and 6.
4. Reus-Smit, Christian and Duncan Snidal eds, *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations* (Oxford University Press), chapters 13 and 14.

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## Unit 2 □ Systems Theory

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### Structure

- 2.0 Objectives
- 2.1 Introduction
- 2.2 Definition of System
- 2.3 Basic Principles and Features of General Systems Theory
- 2.4 General Systems Theory and views of International Relations Scholars
- 2.5 Critique of General Systems Theory in International Relations
- 2.6 Conclusion
- 2.7 Summary
- 2.8 Questions
- 2.9 Suggested Readings

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## 2.0 Objectives

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The present study focus on the following:

1. An analysis of the different definitions of System.
2. The underlying principles & the basic features of the General Systems Theory.
3. The view of different scholars in International Relations on System Theory.
4. A critical assessment of the theory.

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## 2.1 Introduction

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The discipline of Political Science experienced behavioural revolution during the 1950s and the discipline of International Relations, an integral part of Political Science, saw a debate between traditionalism and scientism in the middle of the 1960s. General Systems Theory (GST) in the field of International Relations emerged in the backdrop of these twin forces. By the end of the 1970s, influence of this theory declined considerably. However, with the publication of Kenneth Waltz's classical work *Theory of International Politics* in 1979, this theory re-emerged in the field of International Relations. Kenneth Waltz made a devastating criticism of the concept of 'system', as had been used in International Relations, and brought about a new theoretical approach in International Relations known as Neo-realism or Structuralism. In this chapter, we shall try to define the term 'system'. This will be followed by a discussion of the general principles and basic features of this theory. Efforts will be made to analyse and examine how theorists of International Relations have tried to develop this theory. Finally, we shall offer a critique of this theory with special emphasis on Kenneth Waltz's sharp criticism of this theory.

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## 2.2 Definition of System

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Jay S. Goodman wrote an article, entitled 'The Concept of System in International Relations Theory', in *Background*. The article, which was published in 1965, contained three different

types of definition of the concept of 'system'. First, he described 'system' as 'system-as-description'. According to this formulation, international relations is the result of certain interactions - those interactions have their own patterns and such patterns are easily identifiable. This trend has been reflected in the writings of James Rosenau who argues that system continues to be inherent in its environment and maintains its identity through interaction among its different variables. Naturally, 'system' tends either to maintain its identity or transforms itself through such structures and processes. John Herz's collective security system, George Liska's 'system for maintenance of equilibrium' and Merton Kaplan's different models of international system represent this first definition.

Secondly, Goodman views 'system-as-explanation'. According to this version system refers to certain types of arrangements and such arrangements are crucial for explaining functions of different units and interactions among such units. Kenneth Waltz's 'Third Image' and Merton Kaplan's 'Loose Bipolar System' belong to this category.

Finally, Goodman considers system as 'processes'. According to this notion, system, which is a major analytic concept in International Relations, emphasizes how different units of international relations enter into specific arrangements, interact among themselves, and how specific behavioural patterns occur within a specific unit. In this sense, 'system' can introduce causal relations and produce various typologies - it can discuss international relations at macro levels, and, at the same time, it can concentrate at sub-system level. Charles MacClelland's concept of 'organized complexity' and Merton Kaplan's application of game theory reflect this third variant of the concept of 'system'.

According to Goodman, the concept of 'system' has been used in International Relations in a somewhat haphazard manner, without being properly defined by the scholars who have used the concept. Inis L. Claude, for example, has used the concept in his famous book *Power and International Relations* without defining it clearly. Again this concept can be used indiscriminately if a scholar views this concept exclusively as a process. For example, those who adopt historical-sociological approach generally use this concept very frequently - but it remains unclear regarding what they actually mean by this term 'system'. It will not be inappropriate if one raises the question about Wallerstein's frequent reference to this terminology. To Goodman, 'system-as-description' is not theoretically much relevant. However, once we use this concept either as 'explanation' or as 'process', the concept becomes more theoretically and empirically relevant. After all, such usages imply that there exist certain patterns and arrangements in international relations that, in turn, produce certain international outcomes. Merton Kaplan, Richard Rosecrance and Kenneth Waltz have engaged themselves in identifying such arrangements, patterns and outcomes in International Relations.

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## **2.3 Basic Principles and Features of General Systems Theory**

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The major thrusts of systems theory in International Relations have been derived from General Systems Theory. Professor Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyaya identifies three major assumptions of GST: First, system consists of certain elements; secondly, these elements are consistently involved into mutual interactions and such interactions are easily observable; and, finally, these elements can also act independently and in an autonomous fashion. In other words, system generally produces link effects with certain causes; inputs are transformed into outputs. This argument, however, appears to be the simplest statement of GST.



Joseph Frankel, while applying these assumptions in the field of International Relations, has identified the following features of system theory: First, the major elements of international political system are the states; secondly, structure, dynamics and functions of international system are determined through interactions among these variables; thirdly, various agenda of different units and their functions are influenced by the environment of the international system - environment, in this context, refers to various surroundings, such as international political, economic, cultural systems.

Following Oran Young, Joseph Frankel has identified certain concepts in the sphere of international system. First, a general agreement exists among the followers of this approach regarding variables which are the units or actors, structures, processes and context. Secondly, all systems can be divided into certain sub-systems — such divisions can be based on geographical demarcations, such as south Asia, Eurasia etc.; or it can be based on functional differentiation, such as SAARC, ASEAN etc. Thirdly, Frankel has also made a distinction between context and environment - for example, if we try to deal with international political system, the other systems - such as economic, cultural etc - will constitute its context; however, once one tries to deal with a specific regional system, the other regional systems will become its environment. This distinction, however, is strictly methodological.

Since systems theory is mainly concerned with establishing causal relations in international relations, questions inevitably arise as to what elements constitute dependent and what would act as independent variables within this theoretical framework. Broadly speaking, units, structures, processes and context can be described as independent variables. Units generally refer to those organized elements which actively participate in the international system and are not apparently subordinate to any other organizations. States, multinational corporations, transnational organizations belong to this category. Structures refer to the 'characteristic relationships among the actors across time'. Blocs, balance of power etc. can be included within this category. These can be described as structures because they emerge at a particular moment as consciously built framework of interactions among various units. Processes refer to 'forms and modes of interaction instead of characteristic relationship and they encompass individual interactions'. Processes are different from the 'context' in the sense that it refers to certain regularities across time - processes reflect various forms of interactions among different units. Context refers to various forms of economic, political, cultural as well as technological order, while processes can viewed through different modes, such as, bilateral or multilateral, various instruments, such as diplomatic, economic etc., and degrees of cooperation and conflict. We describe these variables as independent because these variables continue to be stable for significant period of time and they can bring about changes in the international system. However, it should be noted that these independent variables are not static but may also change over time. Thus one must note that distinctions between dependent and independent variables are also, to certain extent, methodological.

Frankel identifies five different types of dependent variables. Power appears to be the first, and probably the most crucial, variable for understanding international relations. Power has many connotations - but, broadly speaking, it implies whether and to what extent one unit or state can be influenced by the directions or persuasions of another unit or state. Power can either be a

possession, moving force or interrelated - it is sometimes potential, sometimes actual, and, again sometimes putative. If a state produces nuclear weapons, it becomes its possession; whether it will use the same against its neighbour's indicates its moving force; and, possession of nuclear weapons by a state shows its probable relationship with another state.

'Management of power' has been described as the second dependent variable. Its main purpose is to see how power is managed and controlled at the international level. According to the realists and neo-realists power is managed through balance of power system, while the liberals and neo-liberals believe that power can be managed through mutual consultation and/or collective security measures. 'Stability' has been considered as the third dependent variable. It can take two different forms - 'structural stability' which indicates that certain variables are more or less stable; 'dynamic stability' refers to the possibility of moving towards equilibrium even in the midst of disturbances. One point is clear: there must be certain mechanisms for managing power at the international level. The fourth dependent variable is the possibility of change. It should be noted that this variable can be both dependent and independent. However, this variable raises certain questions: what will be the extent of change? What will be its direction? Will it be smooth or abrupt and sudden? How much will it influence other systems? These questions become significant and crucial after the end of the cold war and the emergence of a so-called uni-polar system in place of a bipolar and/or multi-polar system. Frankel describes 'system transformation' as the last dependent variable in his analysis of international system. This does not refer to the breakdown of the international system - rather, it refers to qualitative changes that can take place at the international systemic level. One can argue, in the present context, whether globalization has strengthened the forces of interdependence and heralded an era of the retreat of the state etc. The point is: does globalization bring about certain qualitative changes in the international system?

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## 2.4 General Systems Theory and Views of International Relations Scholars

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Merton Kaplan's book *System and Process in International Politics* (1957) has been considered as one of the most prominent statements of systems theory in International Relations. The main purpose of this book is to explain international politics theoretically and scientifically. To him, international politics has certain inherent features such as regularities, uniform patterns, interdependence of variables, and interaction with other systems like international economic, cultural, technological systems and so on. To him, it is possible to identify certain models of international politics and they are testable in the light of empirical facts. Despite his belief that events in international politics can hardly be predicted because of complexities and multiplicities of variables, he argues that there are occasions when likely behaviour of the international system, its probable changes and possibility of stability can be anticipated. Kaplan's theory is based on three basic assumptions: First, there are specific situations when probable behaviour of the international system can be explained; secondly, statesmen are generally aware of various

information and take decisions on the basis of such information; finally, this theory can explain and anticipate the probable outcomes in international relations.

Based on these assumptions, Kaplan has developed *six models of international system*. The first model is called the "balance of power" model. Kaplan uses this model within a quotation mark because he considers this model as metaphoric in character. He prescribes certain rules for its successful operation. These rules are: '(a) increase capabilities, but negotiate rather than fight; (b) fight rather than fail to increase capabilities; (c) stop fighting rather than eliminate an essential actor; (d) oppose any coalition or single actor that tends to assume a position of predominance within the system; (e) constrain actors who subscribe to supranational organization; and, (f) permit defeated or constrained essential national actors to re-enter the system as acceptable role partners, or act to bring some previously inessential actor within the essential actor classification'. To him, balance of power system can produce the following consequences: First, alliance will be formed among various nation states for a brief period of time and it will change in accordance with the dynamics of national interests of various nation states. Secondly, Even if there is a war between two blocks, it will be a short lived one. Thirdly, even if a state decides to be more powerful than its counterparts, it should always keep an eye on other countries regarding their increasing capabilities to challenge its own predominance. Kaplan, however, does not forget to mention that violation of rules of the balance of power system by any of the states may lead to the collapse of the system itself.

The second model Kaplan mentions is known as loose bipolar system - under this system, supranational organizations, such as the United Nations or NATO, play active role to maintain the balance of power. The main feature of this model is that the supranational organizations, instead of supporting any one of the contesting groups, try to play the role of mediators to regulate and maintain the balance of power. According to Kaplan, since this model generally involves two broad groupings, any change in military capabilities may lead to its instability. Under this situation, he recommends possession of second-strike nuclear capability by both blocks may lead to stability within the system. The third - and the exact opposite of this model - is known as tight bipolar system. Under this model, non-block members as well as universal actors either disappear completely or cease to be significant. Kaplan refrains himself from further elaborating this model.

The fourth and fifth models, as developed by Kaplan, have been described as universal system and hierarchical system respectively - although Kaplan does not deal with these models extensively. The universal system has been described as a sub-system of the international system. This system may develop either as a confederation or as an integrated system. The hierarchical system tends to embrace a political system where 'functional lines of organization are stronger than geographical lines'. Kaplan, however, gives more emphasis on what he describes as unit veto system. This model assumes that some of the countries possess nuclear capabilities but none of them have the incredible first strike capability. Under this model, the possibility of nuclear war has not been ruled out, but no one expects counter-value attack or counter-force attack. The major restraint over possible war under this model is nothing but the fear of escalation.

Apart from these six models, Kaplan has tried to identify a few more models in his subsequent article entitled 'Varieties of Six Models of the International System' - the article was published

in 1966. These new additional models are: Very Loose Bipolar System, the Detente System, the Unstable Bloc System, and Incomplete Nuclear Diffusion System. Under very loose bipolar system, it has been argued that no state will conduct its international relations based on its past experience, culture and degree of economic development - this model has been developed keeping in mind the likely behaviour of emerging decolonized countries. If the detente system has been developed keeping in mind the likely rapprochement between the United States and Soviet Union, the unstable bloc system reflects some assumptions in case of deepening of conflicting behaviours between those two super powers. It should be stated that these two models have become redundant and meaningless in the post-cold war era. The last model is an extension of the unstable bloc system. The main question of this model is: What will happen if smaller power acquire nuclear capabilities and enter into alliances with major powers, what will be the likely outcome? To Kaplan, under such scenario, the possibility of war will be limited, probability of conflict will be high and the role of supranational organizations will be significant. The present day world order may replicate this model.

Kaplan's analysis of system theory has influenced large number of scholars in the field of International Relations. Richard Rosecrance, for example, has identified four different variables in his book *Action and Reaction in World Politics* (1963). These variables are: First is input - here he considers states as disrupters; his second variable is regulator - to him, various international organizations - such as the Concert of Europe or the League of Nations - have played this role in maintain international stability at different historical junctures; he describes 'environment' as the third variable - this generally refers to certain situations or factors which tend to influence international system; finally, he refers to output. To Rosecrance the main purpose of system theory is to explain how these different variables can bring about changes in the international system. Stanley Hoffman views international system as interaction among different variables and those interactions are major determinants of various trends in international relations. To him, system theory is an 'intellectual construct' which helps us explain and analyse international relations - and one can understand the processes of the emergence of international system through an analysis of historical sociological perspective. Michael Sullivan discusses various aspects of system theory and argues that power constitutes an important variable in influencing and shaping international behaviour. Based on extensive analysis of writings of Karl Deutsch, Dinna Zinnes and David Singer, he argues that power is neither a goal nor an explanation of a specific situation - but rather, analysis of power may help one in predicting the future. Professor Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyaya tries to understand international relations in terms of system theory. In his book *A General Theory of International Relations* (1993), he identifies four different levels: foreign policy micro system, Nation-State macro system, inter-state meta system and international mega system. According to this view, Kaplan's failure to analyse the first two systems lead to inadequate explanation of system theory.

During the late-1970s, Kenneth Waltz makes a devastating critique of this theory and at the same time tries to develop what is known as neo-realism today on the basis of the concept of 'system'. In his classic *Theory of International Politics* (1979), he identifies two different meanings of 'system' in international relations. In one sense, it refers to interaction among

certain units; in another sense, it consists of a structure and certain interacting units. The main purpose of this theory is to explain how these two different stages operate and influence each other. To him, system theory has two different agenda in the field of international relations - first, to identify and explain how, and to what extent, various elements of international system try to maintain durability and stability of a system; and, secondly, to what extent international dynamics have been influenced and shaped through interactions between structure and units. He describes system theory, as analysed by Kaplan, Rosecrance and Hoffman, as simply 'reductionist' and tries to formulate three assumptions to get rid of such reductionism. These three assumptions are as follows: First, contemporary international system is based on anarchy and decentralization; despite apparent inequality among different units, one cannot describe as 'hierarchical' - rather, interaction among those units generally take place on an equal basis. Secondly, since all units act on an equal basis, all of them generally perform the same functions - for example, each unit considers protection of its own interest is of utmost importance. Finally, it is true that one can identify the existence of differences in the distribution of capabilities among different units - but such differences emerge mainly from the structure. To him, changes in any one of these variables will bring about changes in the international system. The first element, that is, anarchy and decentralization, appear to be more or less permanent and stable. The second element is comparatively less important since the international system is generally anarchical, most of the members tend to behave in the same way. The third variable - distribution of capabilities appears to be most important as it is changeable. Based on this analysis, Waltz identifies a few features of the international system: First, bipolarity seems to be more capable of keeping uncertainty at bay, and this is why it is more stable than any other outcome. Secondly, in the twentieth century, there is a declining trend towards mutual dependence on nuclear weapons. Finally, stability at the international level can be achieved more through competition for nuclear weapons rather than eliminating such weapons. No doubt, all these assumptions will invite huge criticisms from contemporary international relations scholars.

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## 2.5 Critique of General Systems Theory in International Relations

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Kenneth Waltz offers a vehement criticism of Kaplan's theory. First, Kaplan does not introduce any concept in his argument that can explain complex realities of the present day international system. In fact, he introduces a typology, but has not developed any theoretical framework. He talks about interaction between international system and its environment, but he does not indicate any line of demarcation between the two. He also fails to describe which system will be cooperative or competitive towards international system.

Secondly, Kaplan constantly mentions the existence of certain 'essential rules' and argues that if there is a change in the environment, these 'essential rules' will automatically change and systemic transformation will take place. The question is: if a unit continues to follow those 'essential rules', will the system change? Under what circumstances will those 'essential rules'

change? Kaplan does not provide any answer to such questions.

Thirdly, Kaplan argues that every system has its own identities and these identities transform themselves depending on time and circumstances. One will have to see when and how these identities get transformed and which variables bring about such transformations. But Kaplan has failed to discuss those variables in detail - in fact, he identifies certain models which at best can help one to understand the system, but not its transitions. Fourthly, Kaplan has equated interaction among states as interaction among units. In reality, this interaction happens at both state and non-state levels, though states may choose to mediate or hinder such non-state level interactions. Fifthly, while talking about balance of power system, Kaplan has described roles of five big countries as essential for maintaining such system. He has probably forgotten that in any self-help system, consisting of two or more units, balance of power system will automatically emerge.

Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyaya, while criticizing Kaplan's system theory, has identified a shadow of political realism - to him, in the backdrop of studying international system from a scientific viewpoint, Kaplan has actually extended a hidden support to political realism. Robert Jackson and George Sorensen have described Kaplan's theory as merely descriptive and normative. It is descriptive in the sense that Kaplan's balance of power is actually describes how nation states actually behave under balance of power system. It is normative in the sense that the same model tends to prescribe how nation states should behave under specific situation. The point is: facts and norms are not the same, and, any effort to integrate both facts and norms together will only invite disaster. Both these scholars believe that Kaplan has tried to incorporate history as part of behavioural project - but in the process, he tries to make history just a 'laboratory'. In fact, it is very difficult to explain and predict historical changes. Did anyone forecast the end of the cold war? History is a complex process and it can hardly be reproduced.

Kenneth Waltz's theory has also faced serious criticisms. Broadly speaking, one can identify four different criticisms: First, it is very difficult to identify and describe interests and preferences of various units in the international system. In fact, these interests and preferences do not necessarily originate in the international system - rather, many of them are embedded in the domestic politics and ideological commitments of many units. Naturally, it becomes difficult for predicting the likely directions of interests and preferences of various units. Secondly, Waltz's identification of various dimensions of the system is so simple or generalized that hardly they can either explain or predict probable system change and transformation. Thirdly, Waltz has neglected multidimensional effects of international interdependence in an age of globalization. Again, his approach towards nuclear problematic is unique but does not appear to be realistic. Both these positions are hardly acceptable. Fourthly, Waltz has described changes in the distribution of capabilities as the only source of transformation in the international system. US-Soviet relations in the post World War II period can be attributed to this variable. But beyond that one can identify different possibilities -they could have avoided confronting each other; they could have established their own zones of influence; or, even they could have engaged in another world war. But none of these possibilities had taken place. The question is: why? Answers to these questions require an in-depth analysis of both countries' domestic politics. In other word, changes in the distribution of capabilities may be viewed as a single, but not the only, variable for explaining

system-transformation. Finally, it should be mentioned that Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyay's systemic approach towards international relations is eclectic and lacks empirical evidence. Beyond that, his application of mathematics is praiseworthy, but makes his analysis abstract.

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## 2.6 Conclusion

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In conclusion, it must be noted that Kaplan has made system theory very popular among some scholars in International Relations. However, it raises certain problematic that cannot be resolved through application of this theory. Kenneth Waltz's theory has undoubtedly brought about radical changes in the study of International Relations - though this too, does not go beyond criticisms. However, this theory has raised a few interesting questions in our discipline. First, which of the two systems - bipolar or multi-polar - will bring about stability in the international system? Waltz supports bipolarity, while Kaplan is in favour of multi-polarity. The question is: Is it possible to look into the dynamics of uni-polar world, as has been described by some following the end of cold war, in terms of this theory? Secondly, Kenneth Waltz in his *Man, State and War* (1959) has identified three images of international relations - these are: human nature and behaviour (Image I), economic and political structure of states (Image II) and interstate system (Image III). Which one of these images is most important? Waltz has obviously extended his support to the third image. This problem is actually raising the issue of level-of-analysis problem in International Relations. J. David Singer, in his article 'The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations' (1961), has raised the same issue. Which one - nation-state or international system - should be the basic unit of analysis in International Relations? These analyses by Kaplan, Singer and Waltz have raised certain questions for contemporary international relations. First, how many levels are there in International Relations and which one of them is most important for our analysis? Secondly, which criteria should one use to identify, and ultimately to differentiate, these levels? Thirdly, even if these problems are solved, how can we adopt a holistic approach to International Relations? This has become a real problematic today. Besides, this level-of-analysis problem, another issue has emerged recently. Is it possible to solve some of the problems of system theory through application of complexity theory? Can four different dimensions of this theory - self-organization, non-linear movement, openness and co-evolution - throw some light on different issues linked with system theory? Let us draw conclusion on the basis of a comment made by Heinz Eulau who says: "An empirical science is built by the slow, modest, and piecemeal cumulation of theory, methods and data - [it is] a gradual expansion of knowledge" (cited in Robert Jackson and George Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and approaches*, p. 232).

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## 2.7 Summary

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In this chapter we have tried to categorize different definitions of 'system' and analysed them. It has been followed by a discussion of basic principles, concepts and features of system

theory. Subsequently, we have tried to see how scholars in International Relations have viewed and analysed this theory. We have given main emphasis Morton Kaplan's viewpoints - Kenneth Waltz's arguments have been added to this analysis. Critiques of this theory have been offered. In conclusion, we have identified argued very briefly some of the issues that this theory has raised.

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## 2.8 Questions

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### Essay Answer Type Questions:

1. Describe three different types of definition of 'system', as enlisted by Jay Goodman.
2. Analyse the major features of Systems theory in International Politics.
3. Mention and analyse the different types of models of systems, as identified by Morton Kaplan.
4. Make an assessment of Systems theory in International Relations.

### Medium Answer Type Questions:

1. Describe, in brief, different concepts that are used in Systems theory in International Relations.
2. Explain the rules of "balance of power" model, as described by Morton Kaplan.
3. Examine Kenneth Waltz's concept of International system.
4. Write, in brief, contributions of System theory in International Relations.

### Short Answer Type Questions:

1. What do you mean by 'system as description'?
2. Distinguish between 'system as explanation' and 'system as method'.
3. How do you distinguish between dependent and independent variables?
4. What is meant by 'universal veto system'?
5. How does Kenneth Waltz describe three images of international relations?

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## 2.9 Suggested Reading

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1. Bandyopadhyay, Jayantanuja, *General Theory of International Relations* (Allied Publishers), pp. 39-78 and pp. 218-221.
2. Booth, Ken and Steve Smith eds. *International Relations Theory Today*, ( Polity Press), chapter 8 and 11.
3. Frankel, Joseph, *Contemporary International Relations Theory and the Behaviour of States* (Oxford University Press), pp. 33 -41.
4. Goodman, Jay S, 'The Concept of "System" in International Relations Theory Today', *Background*, vol. 8, no.4, February 1965, pp. 257 - 268.
5. Hoffman, Stanley ed. *Contemporary Theory in International Relations* (Prentice Hall), pp. 104 -123.
6. Rosenau, James N ed. *International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory* (The Free Press), chapter 27.



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## Unit 3 □ Marxist and other Radical and Neo-Radical Approaches

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### Structure

- 3.0 Objectives
- 3.1 Introduction
- 3.2 International Relations: views of Marx and Lenin
- 3.3 Marxism and International Relations: Major Features
- 3.4 World System Theory
- 3.5 Critical Theory
- 3.6 Neo-Marxist Theories
- 3.7 Conclusion
- 3.8 Summary
- 2.9 Questions
- 2.10 Suggested Reading

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### 3.0 Objectives

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The major objectives are:

1. To identify the features of International Relations based on the writing of Karl Marx & V.I. Lenin.
2. To point out the differences between Marxist approach to International Relations & other dominant approaches.
3. To analyse the Critical Theory in International Relations based on the observation of Robert Cox & Andrews Linklater.
4. To trace and analyse the tradition of Neo Marxism which evolved in International Relations since the 1960s.

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### 3.1 Introduction

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Marxism-Leninism appears to be somewhat neglected in the study of International Relations. Lenin's famous pamphlet *Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, published in 1916, may provide the basic foundation of Marxist-Leninist approach in International Relations. But unfortunately, conflict between democracy and socialism in the twentieth century, emergence of a bipolar world in the post-World War II era, and acceptance of power politics as accepted tact of international life have cast a shadow over the analytic and conceptual prowess of Marxism-Leninism. However, the emergence of third world countries in the post-World War II era, increasing income inequality between the North and the South, urge for rapid state-building and international economic crises and its impact on the developing world have exerted tremendous influence on the application and understanding of Marxism-Leninism. The end of Cold War, re-assessment of geopolitics in a supposedly uni-polar world and absence of so-called dictates from the Soviet Union open up avenues for reinterpreting Marxism-Leninism and applying it in

the field of International Relations. Such an approach has not only raised questions about the relevance of contemporary theories of International Relations, but has also provided new impetus for explaining and understanding International Relations from a very different outlook. At the beginning we shall briefly sketch how Marx and Lenin have perceived the dynamics of International Relations. This will be followed by a discussion of certain features this approach to our discipline. We shall subsequently identify and discuss theories which have been influenced by Marx and Lenin's viewpoints. It seems world system theory and critical theories occupy special positions in this schema. At the end we shall identify how neo-Marxist thinkers have tried to explain international relations from Marxist-Leninist perspectives during the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first centuries.

In this chapter, we tend to study how Marxism-Leninism has evolved over the years for offering new insights in the field of international Relations. At the beginning we shall briefly sketch how Marx and Lenin have perceived the dynamics of International Relations. This will be followed by a discussion of certain features this approach to our discipline. We shall subsequently identify and discuss theories which have been influenced by Marx and Lenin's viewpoints. It seems world system theory and critical theories occupy special positions in this schema. At the end we shall identify how neo-Marxist thinkers have tried to explain international relations from Marxist-Leninist perspectives during the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first centuries.

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### 3.2 International Relations: Views of Marx and Lenin

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Karl Marx (1818 - 1883) has rarely made any effort to analyse international relations in detail. He realized the probable worldwide effects of capitalism, mentioned those probabilities very briefly but remained more or less silent about its worldwide reactions. In the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (1848), he and Friedrich Engels (1820 - 1895) argued that the bourgeoisie in every country would be able to provide universal character to the production system in each and every country. This would become possible because of revolution in communication and transportation system across the world. The whole has been compelled to accept this system. In the first volume of his classic *Das Capital*, Marx had mentioned the emergence of international division of labour. Such division had been created for the purpose of serving the interests of advanced industrialized countries - one part of the world would continue to provide raw materials to these countries, which, in turn, would convert those raw materials into manufactured goods (*Capital*, vol. 1, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977 reprint, p.425). But Marx had never elaborated this point.

However, this viewpoint of Karl Marx had influenced both Lenin and Bukharin to formulate theories of imperialism in subsequent days. In fact, Marxian approach to International Relations continues to be centred on the whole notion of imperialism. The major argument of this thesis is that expansion of capitalism has created an uneven world order - and this unevenness has created an unequal relationship between developed and underdeveloped countries. Vladimir Ilich Ulianov Lenin (1870-1924), in his small pamphlet entitled *Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism* has tried to identify the causes of First World War. In order to do so, he identifies a few features of imperialism. First, during this period, export of capital became more important than export of manufactured goods. Secondly, concentrations of capital and production system

lead to the emergence of monopolies. Thirdly, finance capital, which was essentially a combination of bank capital and industrial capital, was owned by small group of capitalists. Fourthly, those who established the monopoly over capital tended to divide the whole world among them. Finally, such processes of division of the world among them ultimately sowed the seeds of conflict among these countries. Nikolai Bukharin, in his book *Imperialism and World Economy* (1915) almost offered the same arguments. To him, the roots of imperialist projects could be traced in the processes of raw material collections, selling of manufactured products in distant countries and reinvestment of capital in far flung areas. Such expansionism ultimately led to the emergence of an international division of labour. On the one hand, one could see the existence of a solid, consolidated, organized and developed group of countries; and, on the other hand, one could see the emergence of agriculture-based or semi agrarian underdeveloped countries. The world had become polarized between developed and underdeveloped countries and a regime of uneven economic development was established.

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### 3.3 Marxism and International Relations: Major Features

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The question is: What kind of features we can identify following application of Marxism-Leninism in the field of International Relations? First, in case of either realism or liberalism, the state appears to be the basic unit of analysis. In case of Marxism, however, systemic level seems to be the basis of analysis. Secondly, the realists give emphasis on the state; the liberals tend to concentrate on both state and non-state organizations, while the Marxists are more concerned with international capitalism, relations of productions and class relations within and across nation-states. Thirdly, realism may be described as an example of billiard ball game where the rules of the game are based on action-reaction model. Liberalism has been described as cobweb model where all units are interconnected and interdependent. But Marxism describes international relations as an Octopus model - here, dominant powers or organizations do not allow less powerful organizations and units to go out of their control. Fourthly, realism considers state as a cohesive and unitary actor. Liberalism views it just as one of the many actors in the field of international relations. Marxism, however, describes state as a representative of dominant class or classes. Fifthly, according to Marxism, the dynamics of international relations depend, to a large extent, on the processes of interaction among different classes and the mechanisms as well processes through which domination is established both at domestic and global levels. Realism considers state exclusively as a rational actor and its sole purpose is to protect, preserve and further its national interests. Liberals also emphasise national interests but argue that such interests can be preserved and protected through constant bargaining, negotiations and treaty-making. Sixthly, realists are concerned mainly with national security, while liberals aim at multilateralism - but the Marxists are concerned with economic causal relations that account for domination by the powerful over the weak. The state mediates this domination whether internally or externally. Seventhly, to the realists, foreign policy is based on objective analysis of inter-state relations; to the liberals, such decisions are concentrated mainly in the hands of decision-making agencies. Marxists, however, believe that foreign policy decisions generally reflect economic calculations of dominant economic groups in every society. Eighthly, realism argues that there

are certain eternal rules which guide and shape international relations - they remain unchanged over the years. Liberalism argues that human civilization moves from one stage of development to a higher stage through development of, and interactions among, various ideas. Marxism, on the contrary, argues that international relations moves in accordance with certain basic principles which, more or less, remain static over the years. International system can be changed only through revolution. Ninthly, realism has viewed international system as a sphere of constant conflict and rivalry. Liberals have perceived as a space for cooperation. Marxism, however, has viewed the place for class struggle both at interstate and intra-state levels. Finally, realism believes in an unalterable international system, liberalism keeps faith on an ever changing and continuously progressing world order. Marxism emphasises that changes at the international level can take place only through revolution and such radical transformation will bring about a better and progressive world order.

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### 3.4 World System Theory

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It seems Marxism offers a new insight into the discipline of International Relations. It tends to focus on one somewhat neglected aspect of International Relations: How does imperialism influence development of the dynamics of economic and political development of underdeveloped countries? In fact, emergence of those countries as under-developed can be traced back to the long historical development of and interaction among political economic forces at the international level. Immanuel Wallerstein in his three volume book - published in 1974, 1980 and 1985 respectively - has tried to answer this question.

He identifies the following features of this theory: First, the modern world system is one single cohesive unit - it is characterized by one international division of labour and multiple cultural systems. Secondly, he identifies two different world systems - one is called 'World Empires' and the other is called 'World Economies'. The pre-modern civilizations, such as China, Egypt, Rome etc., represent 'world empires', while so-called modern civilized nations such as, Britain, France and other European countries represent what has been described as 'world economies'. Thirdly, one can identify certain qualitative changes in the feudal economic system and the emergence of a new economic system in the sixteenth century Europe. Such transition resulted in the initial expansion of European colonialism towards Latin America - subsequently, imperialist expansion engulfed the whole world. Fourthly, such expansion, according to Wallerstein, produced three different types of countries. He has called them 'core', 'periphery' and 'semi-periphery'. 'Core' countries refer to developed capitalist countries of the world; 'periphery' includes economically underdeveloped and backward countries; and 'semi-periphery' stands in between these two. The last mentioned category is also exploited by the 'core countries', but at the same time these semi-peripheral countries exploit peripheral countries.

Wallerstein considers the whole world as a single unit. To him, the evolution of sovereignty can be explained by looking into the dynamics of interaction among different states within this single unit. This is called 'world-system' as it is bigger than any single political unit; and, it is called 'system' as all these units are closely interconnected and any changes in one unit will

result in changes in other units. Wallerstein argues that this system has passed through certain phases. The first phase is called 'mini-system' - this phase existed during ten thousand years before Christ, and international division of labour within this system was confined only within a small group. In the second phase, which stood between 10,000 B.C and 1500 AD, centres used to control the periphery and provide security in exchange. This period is called the 'World Empire'.

The period, which extends from the sixteenth century till today, has been described by Wallerstein as the era of 'World Economy'. The major features of this period are: expansion of international trade and commerce, accumulation of capital and maximization of profit. Increasing competition among different political units results in increasing polarization among various classes and different regions. The result is the emergence of 'core', 'periphery' and 'semi-periphery'. It should be noted that Wallerstein does not recognize that economic competition and political confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union during cold war period has been responsible for the emergence of bipolarity between these two countries. To him, it was impossible for Soviet Union to go beyond the world system - thus, the end of cold war does not necessarily indicate the ultimate victory of capitalism. Rather, such a situation will generate more economic conflicts and competition between the United States and the other developed countries within the world system.

This theory has been criticized from different viewpoints: First, Wallerstein has tried to explain and examine conflicts among different countries in terms of their respective positions within the hierarchy of the international system. What has either been ignored or understated is that international conflicts may occur due to class configuration within domestic boundaries of nation states, class relations within each political unit and the nature of class structure at the international level. Secondly, Anthony Brewer argues that there is a necessary contradiction between development of capitalism and its dynamics. Such contradictions can generate both crises and changes in any country. This contradiction remains absent in this thesis. Thirdly, this theory does not consider the possible transformation of different types of systems it mentions. What will happen if a periphery transforms itself into a semi-peripheral country? How will it operate within the structure of international hierarchy? How will it exploit and extract resources from other peripheral countries? Answers to these questions remain unanswered. Fourthly, this theory gives emphasis on the relationship between developed and underdeveloped countries. However, it does not provide any guideline for understanding relations among peripheral countries. For example, countries such as Brazil, China, India, Russia and South Africa, which may be considered as semi-peripheral countries, have come together and have established a trans-regional economic organization known as BRICS. Can these semi-peripheral countries bargain with developed countries? Or, will they remain subordinate to those core countries? Also, what if a semi-peripheral country with strong potential of growth becomes an economic power house and develops one-on-one bargaining relationship with the developed 'core'? The World System theory does neither explain nor open up the possibilities of such transformations.

We can conclude discussion on this theory by mentioning two facts: First, this theory offers a detailed discussion on how capitalism has evolved over centuries. Secondly, Wallerstein thinks

that the world system is moving towards its ultimate demise. But he is not sure how and when this change will take place.

### 3.5 Critical Theory

Ever since the 1980s, this theory occupies a very important position within the domain of International Relations. The origin of this theory can be traced back to the writings of Antonio Gramsci (1891 - 1937) and thinkers belonging to the Frankfurt School. According to Gramsci, states represent a particular group or groups and international activities of states are aimed at coordinating interests of these various groups and attaining their goals and objectives. However, in order to do so, powerful groups may coordinate their interests with the interests of various less powerful groups within a given society. Because of coordination between internal policies and requirements of different groups across different states, an absolutely 'new, unique and historically concrete combinations' may emerge. The question remains: can internal policies of a country influence foreign policy of a different country or vice versa? To Gramsci, under this circumstance, one will have to distinguish between roles of powerful and less powerful countries - in fact, a powerful country is comparatively more capable of maintaining its autonomy in the international sphere than a less powerful country. What is more significant is the question relating to the capability of a powerful group to control the behaviour of less powerful groups through exclusive use and application of physical force. Gramsci has used the concept of 'hegemony' to explain this situation. To him, dominant groups do not necessarily use state forces to compel masses to support their agenda - rather, they try to spread moral, cultural and political values of the ruling class through several mechanisms among the masses in such a way that masses internalize those values in a spontaneous manner. They get dominated without realizing the same either clearly or immediately.

The Frankfurt School, whose origin can be traced back to the 1920s and 1930s, does not give much emphasis on Marxian economic determinism - instead, it gives importance to the 'superstructure' such as culture and culture industry, bureaucracy as well as authoritarianism etc. However, from the viewpoint of critical theory, the most important variables are: review of theories of knowledge, search for emancipation and inquiry into ethical foundations of political groups. According to Jurgen Habermas (1929 —) emancipation can be attained only through communication establishment of radical democracy.

Critical Theory in International Relations has become prominent through the writings of two scholars - Robert Cox and Andrew Linklater. Cox has been influenced by Gramsci's viewpoints, while Linklater has been influenced by the writings of Habermas. One can identify the following features in the writings of Robert Cox. First, Cox distinguishes between two types of theories in International Relations - one is called the problem solving theory and the other one is called the critical theory. In case of problem solving theory, one will have to accept the parameters, identified by scholars, such as states, war, balance of power etc. as given and unchangeable. On the contrary, in case of critical theory, scholars will have to interrogate the parameters that

have been considered as permanent and irrefutable by the problem solving theorists. For example, if war is an inevitable fact of international life, problem solving theorists will try to identify mechanisms through which war can be eliminated. Critical theorists will, however, raise questions regarding historical and socio-economic roots of war and will try to identify directions through which world can be made free from war. Secondly, Cox has used Gramscian notion of 'hegemony' to understand the dynamics of international relations - to him, states, major political ideas and dominant structures of the international system will have to be made acceptable to individuals, and once it is done, consent of the masses will be spontaneous. In fact, in international relations, dominant countries have tried to transform the world after their own images. Those dominant may have used physical forces to establish their supremacy, but they relied extensively on projecting their ideas about the world order before the less dominant countries of the world. In this context, it can be mentioned that in one of his articles 'Social Forces, States and World Order', published in 1981, Cox makes a famous comment which states: "Theory is always for someone, and for some purpose". Finally, Cox argues that a theory will fulfil its purpose only when it will prescribe policies to provide directions towards achieving emancipation from domination. Contemporary reactions against effects of globalization among less powerful and peripheral countries, consensus among elites of marginalized countries regarding unequal distribution of resources etc, — all reflect the possibility of a 'counter-bloc formation'. However, Cox remains sceptic about the likely positive outcome of such blocs and their future directions.

Andrew Linklater, on the other side, develops his critical theory with the goal of enabling human civilization to reach a higher stage of development through realization of freedom. To him, humanity's major problems originate with the emergence of the concept of the state. The idea of 'bounded community', as propounded by the state, leads to an artificial distinction between insiders and outsiders. Those who will remain inside the state will be considered as citizens, while those who will remain outside the boundary of a specific state will be considered as non-citizens and outsiders.

Such distinctions have led to the emergence of what has been described as politics of inclusion and exclusion. The main features of Linklater's arguments are as follows: First, this theory is based on normative foundations. This theory seeks to develop an ideal international society based on realization of principles of conscience and rationality. Like Robert Cox, he also believes that the ultimate goal of humanity is to achieve emancipation. By emancipation he means the freedom of giving consent as well as the freedom to enter into dialogue with others. In other words, one can identify three different phases of emancipation: one, to prepare stages for social interaction through mutual dialogue and consent in place of application offeree; two, to establish a speech community which will constantly increase its membership and will have the possibility of being globalized; and, three, to ensure preconditions for establishing a socio-economic order in which members of such community will participate effectively. Such an ambitious project can be successful if the study of International Relations gives emphasis on the following: reflections on the nature of consent and dialogue, reflections on uniformities and differences; and, reflections on moral implications of state sovereignty.

The second feature of Linklater's critical theory is the rejection of status quoist orientation

of the discipline of International Relations - that is, the emphasis on the notion of 'what happens will happen' should be replaced by an emphasis on how does a particular thing happen and what should have happened. In other words, this theory tends to give emphasis not so much on 'why' questions—rather it concentrates on questions involving the issues of 'how' and 'ought'. In order to mention the likely methodology for studying such questions, Linklater refers to the methodology of historical sociology. Thus the major research orientation in this theoretical framework will revolve around the issue of how different phases of human civilization have given emphasis on unity and universal behavioural patterns and how the projects of modernity, enlightenment and globalization have been thwarted by the states in the name of uncertain and anarchical world order. Here, he thinks such analysis will be successful only when scholars of International Relations will recommend certain pragmatic action oriented strategies and policies. Unfortunately, Linklater does not discuss this possibility in detail. To him, the 'practical philosophy' of critical theory consists of a normative review of the present, projection of the future in terms of better world order based on higher political ideals, and, undertaking the responsibility of making the present generation conscious about the necessity of praxis for transforming the international system. The first step towards realizing this goal is to formulate a project for creating ideal global citizens.

Undoubtedly, this theory seems to be both idealist in nature and somewhat revolutionary in character. However, it has certain problems. First, Robert Keohane - who describes this theory as an example of reflectivism - argues that no concrete research program has so far been initiated along lines prescribed by this theoretical framework. The result is: this theory remains abstract. Secondly, John Mearsheimer and Christian Reus-Smit feel that this theory has either failed or remained passive in explaining realities of international relations - and, thereby, this does not come out of the world of abstractions and mere consciousness. Despite such arguments, one can argue that this theory has developed an alternative framework for understanding international relations and raises questions and doubts about existing theories of International Relations.

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### 3.6 Neo-Marxist Theories

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Apart from World System Theory and Critical Theory, several scholars, following Marxist traditions, have started theorizing international relations ever since the 1960s. Among them, Andre Gunder Frank appears to be the most prominent thinker. As an exponent of dependency theory, he talks about what he has described as 'development of underdevelopment'. To him, historically speaking the whole world is tied by an economic chain - at the top of this chain, one can see the existence of certain developed countries and, at the other end of this chain, one can identify the existence of large number of underdeveloped countries. Frank describes these economically developed and advanced countries as 'metropolises', and the marginalized countries as 'satellite' countries. This economic chain goes down to the remotest part of the marginalized countries. According to Frank, there are countries which exist between advanced and marginalized countries - he describes those middle level countries as 'sub-imperialist' countries. Failure on the



part of the marginalized countries to utilize their surpluses, exploitation by the developed countries and its consequent polarization lead to underdevelopment. Such underdevelopment is further reinforced through international division of labour which in turn creates class divisions and political systems compatible with the requirements of a capitalist world economy. Following this tradition, Walter Rodney and Samir Amin have tried to explain the underdevelopment of African economies and societies. Walter Rodney argues that because of increasing deepening of mechanisms for economic exploitation by the developed countries, African countries have become more and more pauperized. Samir Amin's analysis concentrates on trends towards 'development of underdevelopment', nature of international capitalism and the regime of exploitation that has been unleashed by the developed countries over the marginalized countries.

From the middle of the 1960s through the end of the 1980s, neo-Marxist thinking has taken a prominent position for explaining the nature as well as dynamics of the international system. This trend has somewhat slowed down following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of globalization as a major economic force in during the 1990s. However, ever since the late 1990s Marxism has started to regain its position as an approach to the study of International Relations. Adverse effects of globalization, ever increasing economic crises, increasing US hegemony appear to be responsible for the re-emergence of Marxism in the late twentieth century. Alex Callinicos, Leo Panitch, Peter Gowan and other neo-Marxist thinkers tend to argue that US expansionism and its political interference during the 1980s and 1990s appear to be responsible for the development of neo-liberal economic ideas and practices all over the world. Such trend has been further reinforced by the establishment of what is known as dollar-Wall Street regime as well as the role played by international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in the name of global financial management. Fred Halliday has tried to explain international relations in terms of interaction among forces such as states, international capitalism and inter-state relations. Bene Teschke describes how geopolitical conflicts among various political units across the world have shaped the emergence and evolution of modern capitalism. David Harvey has identified two types of international political systems. One is called the 'territorial logic of power' which implies that the nature of international relations depends on how state leaders and decision-makers will control and organize state activities. The other one has been described as 'capitalist logic of power'. According to this logic, international relations will be guided and shaped by the requirements of international capitalism. To him, despite apparent dissimilarities between these two systems, historically speaking, both these systems have played complementary role to each other in different historical contexts.

However, an explicit description of Marxist International Relations can be found in the writings of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. In their book *Empire*, they have argued that the origin of modern sovereignty can be traced back to Europe. This idea of sovereignty becomes universal only through contacts between European and other countries of the world. To them, internal development of Europe and politico-economic control over colonies by the European powers are nothing but two sides of the same coin. The purpose seems to be the expansion and consolidation of capitalism across the world. They argue that international relations have evolved through constant interactions among states, society and international events. The Westphalia

system has introduced the concept of division between insiders and outsiders - and, imperialism has further reinforced such division. Contemporary form of globalization has been trying to reverse the system and making the world open and borderless. In other words, under globalization, sovereignty has become de-centred and de-territorialized. Because of this change, capital has become more mobilized, and popular ideas and individual thinking has become more globalized. The question is: under this circumstance, will capitalism be more people friendly? And, if it cannot, who will be the agent of change in future? According to Hardt and Negri, 'multitude' will be the agent of future transformation, although they do not provide us with a clear definition of such 'multitude'. It may be noted that in International Relations, no one has tried to explain the role of masses. Hardt and Negri, however, have tried to that. Again, both realism and liberalism have given importance on stability, rather than change, in international relations. Hardt and Negri have tried to come out of such stereotypes and have identified 'multitude' as representative of change. Like critical theorists, they have also tried to convey the message of emancipation. It is true that none of these two scholars have clearly predicted the picture of a future, but both of them have come out of the project of survival and tried to visualize a new and bright way of life.

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### 3.7 Conclusion

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In conclusion, we intend to mention the following: First, it is true that Marx and Engels did not explain in detail nature of inter-state, inter-geographical relations - that was probably beyond their project. Naturally, such geographical deficiency has created problem for developing a theory of International Relations, based on their philosophical thinking. Such deficiency can be eliminated only when scholars will concentrate on analysis of evolution of production relations, inter-state and inter-geographical relations from historical perspective. Secondly, in order to provide an alternative to the study of 'logic of anarchy', as undertaken by the realists, and the study of 'logic of capital', as explained by the liberals, the Marxist scholars should concentrate on analysis of different types of geopolitical competition and cooperation. Thirdly, both Marxist and neo-Marxist scholars have introduced schemes of new possibilities in the field of International Relations. They have gone beyond the world of anarchy and self interests and projected the image of a better international system. But simultaneously this theory has raised the age old issue of what Marx has said in his *Theses on Feuerbach* (1845) that philosophers have only interpreted the world; the point is how to change it. The question is: how can one bring about such transformation? Marxists and neo-Marxists have tried to answer this question, but in a very sketchy way.

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### 3.8 Summary

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In this chapter efforts have been made to identify features of International Relations on the basis of writings by Marx and Lenin. Differences between Marxist approach to International Relations and other dominant approaches, particularly realists and liberal, have been briefly identified. We have also examined how Immanuel Wallerstein, based on Marxism-Leninism, has

described the world from historical perspective and developed his world system theory - a critique has also been offered. A detailed analysis of Critical Theory, as developed by Robert Cox and Andrew Linklater in the 1980s, has been made. Besides, a brief analysis has been made of neo-Marxian tradition that has evolved in International Relations since the 1960s through the beginning the first decade of the twenty-first century. Finally, we have mentioned that this neo-Marxian tradition in International Relations has the possibility of opening up new avenues for explaining and changing the present world order.

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### 3.9 Questions

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#### Essay Answer Type Questions:

1. How do you distinguish between Marxist theories of International Relations and Realist and Liberal perspectives of International Relations? Discuss.
2. Analyse the major features of World System theory, as propounded by Immanuel Wallerstein.
3. Make an assessment of World System theory, as developed by Immanuel Wallerstein.
4. Analyse the major features of critical theory as developed by Robert Cox.
5. Write an essay on Andrew Linklater's views on critical theory.
6. Discuss the main arguments of Empire theory, as developed by Hardt and Negri.

#### Medium Answer Type Questions:

1. Discuss the major features of Lenin's views on Imperialism.
2. How does Wallerstein distinguish between World Empire and World Economy?
3. How do you distinguish between critical theory and problem-solving theory?
4. Describe the major features of 'development of underdevelopment' thesis, as developed by Andre Gunder Frank.

#### Short Answer Type Questions:

1. State in brief the essence of what Marx and Engels said about international relations.
2. How do you differentiate between core and periphery?
3. What is meant by 'semi-periphery'?
4. What is meant by emancipation in international relations?
5. Distinguish between 'territorial logic of power' and 'capitalist logic of power'.
6. What is meant by 'multitude'?

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### 3.10 Suggested Reading

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1. Baylis, John, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens eds. *The Globalization of World Politics* (Oxford University Press), chapter 8.
2. Reus-Smit, Christian and Duncan Snidal eds. *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations* (Oxford University Press), chapters 9, 10, 19 and 20.
3. Smith, Steve, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski eds. *International Theory: Positivism and beyond* (Cambridge University Press), chapter 13.

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## Unit 4 □ Post Structuralist and Post-Modernist Approaches:

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### Structure

- 4.0 Objectives
  - 4.1 Introduction
  - 4.2 Origin of and similarities between Post Modernism and Post Structuralism
  - 4.3 Features and applications of Post Modernism and Post Structuralism
  - 4.4 Criticisms and Contributions
  - 4.5 Conclusion
  - 4.6 Summary
  - 4.7 Questions
  - 4.8 Suggested Readings
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### 4.0 Objectives

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The present chapter helps us

1. To analyse briefly if post modernism & post structuralism are equivalent.
  2. To understand the essential features of both post structuralism & post modernism
  3. To make an evaluation of both.
  4. To identify the outcomes of these two approaches in our discipline.
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### 4.1 Introduction

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Scholars in International Relations are divided over the issue regarding similarities between postmodernism and post structuralism. Some scholars believe that post-structuralism is an integral part of philosophical thinking and a depository of knowledge. It did not originate at any particular moment of history—rather, historically speaking, it is an extension of and improvement over structuralism. On the contrary, post modernity reflects a new and different trend in literature, culture and sculpture during post-World War II period. It has become a fashion in recent years to add 'post—'before any kind of empirical knowledge. Those who oppose this line of argument argue that there lie subtle differences between these two different trends in knowledge. To them, postmodernism represents a new historical epoch—and reflect progress and evolution of that epoch. Post-structuralism, on the other hand, is a new approach which tries to understand International Relations from a very different perspective—different from its structural orientation. This orientation was part of both conventional and non-conventional approaches in International Relations.

It needs to be noted that both these approaches have certain similarities—be it theoretical, conceptual or methodological. Both these approaches tend to interrogate both 'real' and 'given' facts from certain ethical dimensions, try to dissect their 'hidden' meanings, and search for any underlying power-games, if there are any, behind those facts and apparent realities. Following

Anthony Burke, in this chapter we shall try to analyse how these approaches have influenced each other and made efforts to develop and formulate more or less similar ideas, concepts and methodologies.

In this chapter, we shall first discuss various similarities between post-structuralism and postmodernism. In the next section we shall discuss how those features and similarities have influenced the study of International Relations. This will be followed by a discussion of various critiques against these approaches, their replies and contributions to the study of our discipline. Finally, we shall briefly identify whether any new trends have emerged in International Relations through adoption of these approaches.

## **4.2 Origin of and similarities between Post Modernism and Post Structuralism**

We shall first discuss those concepts and methodologies which are commonly followed by advocates of post-structuralism and post-modernism in International Relations. First, both these approaches have been influenced by Ferdinand de Saussure's (1857 - 1913) views on linguistics. To Saussure, linguistic styles have two components: one is called the 'signifier and the other is described as 'signified'. These imply that every statement that we make or write contains certain meanings and it conveys messages for a given society. For example, when we say that 'those who have come across the border...', we can immediately understand that those who come from across the border are foreigners and those who remain inside the border are citizens of a particular country. In other words, this apparently simple statement indicates a much bigger difference between so-called 'insiders' and 'outsiders'. According to Saussure, it is only through interpretations of styles and composition of sentences we can identify differences among various facts, goals and perspectives inherent in specific situations and events.

Secondly, these groups of scholars have probably used extensively the concept of 'deconstruction', as developed by Jacques Derrida (1930 - 2004). According to him, it is difficult to find out meanings in any statement as such meanings may be changed depending on the circumstances, context, time and space. Again the purpose of deconstruction is not to interpret what we consider as 'real' in a different way. Its major objective is to describe the 'real' in such a way that such 'real' can constitute its own identity, generates its own typology and in the process, becomes 'meaningful'. For example, when United States describes certain states as 'rogue states', it simply implies capabilities of certain developing countries to acquire and produce nuclear weapons. But such inference may be partial. Those who adopt deconstruction as a method will argue that this method will examine in more detail whether that particular definition of 'rogue states' reflects any hierarchy in the international system and generates a dichotomy. A deeper analysis of this particular concept, as used by the United States, would reveal that the United States tends to brand those new nuclear states as delinquents in international sphere and tries to project them as dangerous and as such unacceptable in the spheres of international interaction. In other word, these two simple words - 'rogue states' - reflect the existence of one hierarchy at the international level and desire of a particular nation-state to establish hegemony at the global level.

This brings us to the third concept that has been frequently used by the followers of these

two approaches. This is known as discourse analysis, and, this concept has given rise to what is known as 'power-knowledge' nexus. Michael Foucault (1926 - 1980) happens to be its major proponent. Rather than defining a concept, Foucault has given more emphasis on how a particular concept has evolved in a particular social context, how it has been attempted to be socially internalized through social institutional structures, and how such processes have tried to establish certain 'truths' for given societies. For example, an individual can be described as 'freedom fighter' as well as a 'terrorist' almost simultaneously. But meanings and acceptance of those concepts will depend on the context in which they have been used and the institutions by which they have been stated. To Foucault, there is nothing as universal truth—one can see too many truths and their meanings are always context-dependent, time-bound and society oriented. Here one should remember that while making his analysis, Foucault does not exclusively rely on statements and written documents—he is of the opinion that 'regimes of truth' can also be established through social practices, representations, and interpretations. Based on such regimes of truth, identities are constructed, social relations are established, and, political and ethical values are generated. Scholars of International Relations have tried to understand the dynamics of global politics, including its conceptual, theoretical and methodological foundations, through application of discourse and counter - discourse analysis. Side by side, they have tried to dissect meanings and goals of hidden truth through application of genealogy and deconstruction. The main objectives of genealogy include: painful reinvention of struggles, attack on dominant discourses, reinvention of subordinated, local and specific knowledge structure, challenging the dominant truths and encouraging critique and ongoing struggles. For example, international relations scholars engaged in studying environment would inevitably raise questions such as: are, and to what extent, contemporary discourses as well as practices related to development responsible for environmental pollution? Why do some states keep themselves away from such discussions and why have some countries been compelled to remain away from such discussions? Which countries are the victims of such pollutions? How do they resist strategies of developed countries and how are their voices silenced? The major emphasis of this approach is to raise questions relating to 'hows'—rather than 'whys'.

Finally, one will have to look briefly to the concept of 'intertextuality' which has become prominent these days as part of postmodernist/post-structuralist analysis of International Relations. This idea is rooted in the writings of Saussure, Mikhailovich Bakhtin (1895 - 1975) and Julia Kristeva (1941 —). The main argument of this approach is that we can look at any international event as a 'text'. Following Bakhtin, one can say reading of any text or international event means that one will have to come across different historical moments, memories that get exposed through different time frames, and such memories reveal their stories to one another. According to Kristeva, a text does not tell its own stories - rather, it also borrows from other texts as well and tries to neutralize one another. When we read the Charter of the United Nations, we also read Covenants of the League of Nations and other documents which have tried to overcome the tragic-events of war and establish a regime of universal peace - simultaneously, we try to negate our unwanted experiences and failures, and make efforts towards positive gains and outcomes. The main objectives of intertextuality are: invention of different texts inside one particular text, explanation of international events through analysis of

several texts, their coexistence and conflicts and dissection of their inner meanings. 'On Diplomacy' (1987) and 'Anti-Diplomacy' (1990) by James der Derian and 'International/Intertextual Relations' (1989), edited by Michael Schapiro and James der Derian, are classic examples of this approach.

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### 4.3 Features and Applications of Post Modernism and Post Structuralism

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The question is: what are the major features of post modernism and/or post structuralism, and how do scholars of International Relations have incorporated them in our discipline? First, those who believe in these lines of thinking do not consider modernity is the ultimate goal of civilization. To them, there does not exist one singular truth - but, rather, there are several truths. They do not consider linkages between domestic and international as 'differentiated', 'of different types' and 'unique'. Richard Ashley, for example, has deconstructed the concept of sovereignty, as described by the realists. To the realists, sovereignty is cohesive, organized and unique. Ashley, however, has argued that reality does not correspond to such description of sovereignty. R.B.J. Walker, in his book *Inside/Outside: International Relations*, has argued that state sovereignty has two different aspects: one is spatial whereby domestic dimension of citizens are projected - security and maintenance of law and order are considered as universal aspects of such internal order. Beyond that the whole world or the 'outside' is characterized by lawlessness, insecurity and hostility. The other dimension of sovereignty is temporal. From this perspective, one can consider justice, democracy and progress as integral part of internal aspect of state sovereignty. However, in case of external world, the only reality is anarchy, conflict, and warfare. According to Walker, in the field of international relations, sovereignty has been projected as a permanent institution through creation of an artificial line of demarcation between inside and outside. To him, the concept of sovereignty has been introduced in the seventeenth century and in a particular historical context — its major objective has been to organize international system in accordance with the principle of sovereignty. In other words, sovereignty is nothing but a historical construct and a mechanism for resolving contradictions between a state-citizen and a member of the larger international community.

Secondly, according to these lines of thinking, a particular decision or perspective of international relations, which has been projected as universal, is nothing but one of the several dimensions of international system. There are several other possibilities which have neither been considered nor accepted for reasons beyond comprehension. Several scholars have shown how states have denied certain rights to minority groups living within their jurisdictions and prevented them from raising their demands before international organizations. Paul Real and William Connolly have supported this viewpoint.

Thirdly, according to post-modernists and post-structuralists, reality is a social construct. Aaron Beers Simpson has argued that both Kenneth Waltz and Alexander Wendt have projected international system as a primitive system. As such, there are two directions which international system will have to adopt - either, it will have to follow the status quo or it will have to be

civilized. This means that international system will, have to follow the western socio-econom model of interactions. To Sampson, Waltz has actually followed Emile Durkheim's theoretic orientation. The major argument of Durkheim revolves around the idea that major objectives imperial rulers and administrators have been to adopt policies for controlling their respective empires, and in this process they have tried to impose western values as much as possible. Waltz has followed this pattern to explain the dynamics of international relations and has given emphasis on power than progress, importance on balance of power than competition, and priority on prevention than cure.

Fourthly, those who believe in these theoretical frameworks argue that it is almost impossible to ensure objective knowledge in the field of International Relations. In fact, to them, the concept of paradigm, as introduced by the positivists, is nothing but a reflection of power relations in any given society. Richard Ashley, in his famous article "The Poverty of Neo-realism" (1984), has argued that how this theory has expanded the agenda of control, analysed the rationale for the extension of the logic of power and ignored limitations of power. To these scholars neither the concept of paradigm nor their narrations reflect realities - after all, most of the data on which such narrations are based appear to be reflections of partial truths.

Fifthly, the question which becomes crucial at this stage is: how do these theories perceive the issue of morality at international level? Apparently, it is true that both these theories tend to emphasize morality and ethics in the field of International Relations. But at the same time it has to be admitted that since both these theories have tried to interrogate all international problems naturally they could not either highlight or formulate any universal standard of morality in international relations. For example, when these scholars challenge the concept of sovereignty they become strong advocates of cosmopolitanism. But when they try to analyze a specific problem in its historical context, it brings them closer to what can be described as communitarian school of thought in International Relations. Despite such contradictions, one cannot deny the fact that several scholars in these traditions of thought have tried to highlight ethical dimensions in international relations. Judith Butler, for example, has argued that 'self cannot be established without connecting oneself with the 'other'. Campbell refers to necessities of fulfilling responsibilities beyond the barriers of place, culture and borders. Michael Schapiro has referred to 'ethics encounter' which implies that one must welcome others even if such act hampers one's identity and existence. Besides, these theories have encouraged various studies in several fields of international relations including human rights, humanitarian interventions, refugee problems, and terrorism. It should also be mentioned that these theories have somehow adopted negative attitudes towards probable emergence of a peaceful world order or establishment of international organizations as prelude to such order, as prescribed and championed by cosmopolitan thinkers.

Finally, it should be noted that both post-modernism and post-structuralism tend to deconstruct the concept of sovereignty, give emphasis on differences between national and international relations and how such dualities can bring about political changes in international relations through application of the same method of deconstruction. Besides, none of these theories seem to believe in a kind of universal discourses because they are of the opinion that each and every discourse somehow reflects power relations in any given society.



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## 4.4 Criticisms and Contributions

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Post modernism and post structuralism have been mainly criticized from methodological viewpoints. Undoubtedly, these scholars have tried to make in-depth analysis of problematic of international relations. Such analysis has opened up new and diverse avenues of research in this discipline. However, while discussing problems related to identity, culture, norms, rules and ideals, these theories have made little effort to establish causal relations on the basis of adequate data and information. Secondly, in order to offer challenges to dominant theories of International Relations and embracing new frameworks and theories, both these theories have become somewhat unsettled and depoliticized. Finally, these theories have a negative side. If all theories and methodologies reflect power knowledge relationship, then all such theories and methodologies become irrelevant and redundant. Again, if all theories are products of power relations, then the inevitable question is: Can post-modernism and post structuralism be exceptions to such possibilities? Besides, these can bring about a sense of scepticism in the analysis of International Relations. Neither do these theories provide suitable explanations of realities nor do they prescribe concrete policies and strategies to overcome situations that are unacceptable and uncertain.

Against such accusations, post modernist and post structuralist thinkers tend to provide the following replies. First, Lane Hansen, while analysing Bosnian crisis in terms of discourse analysis, has argued that so-called causal relations, as prescribed by the positivists and rationalists, appear to be too narrow in scope and too static in explaining realities. The major problem of such causal relations is that they tend to project the idea that nothing exists beyond the domain of causality. Causality can be seen as more expansive (i.e. beyond one-to-one linkage) and also as more complex, allowing for deviations and uncertainties on the path of causality. This is why causal relations cannot be the sole monopoly of the positivists and ratiomatists. In fact, linguistic analyses as well as discourse analysis, especially in the field of foreign policy studies, help one to disclose hidden meanings and objectives of foreign policy decisions. Secondly, the champions of these schools of thought argue that analysis of international events and situations by champions of dominant theories tend to remain either reluctant or incompetent to raise apparently hidden issues and causes behind those events and situations. According to Ernesto Laclau, several facts involved in the processes of social evolution remain either neglected or not considered while dealing with international events. Question like this has seldom been asked: why does a particular leader follow a specific course of action and ignore other alternatives available to him? In other words, conventions, perceptions, institutions and their foundations remain beyond interrogation. Post modernism and post structuralism tend to fill this vacuum.

Finally, it may be argued that these theoretical frameworks have opened certain broad areas of research in International Relations. Richard Ashley in one of his articles entitled *The Achievements of Post Structuralism* has listed these areas. Some of those areas are: problematic of representation and its contradictions in the present day state system; reassessment of roles of agencies, power and resistance; alternative modes of analysis regarding knowledge, memory and history; discussion and understanding of interrelationship between time and space, border and borderless or movement and stability; interrelationship between partial and totality, local and

the whole, individualization and institutionalization; role of subaltern and marginalized groups in contemporary international relations, their modes of resistance and nature of state control over such resistances etc. From this long list of research problematic, one can easily infer that both these approaches have encouraged scholars in International Relations to engage themselves in diverse areas of research.

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## 4.4 Conclusion

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In conclusion, it is important to point out that post modernism and post structuralism have opened up two major avenues for research. One of them is known as post colonialism and the other one has been described as International Political Sociology approach. The first trend concentrates on how power, hierarchy and domination have been associated with imperialism describes how imperialism has influenced local, national and global events and how dynamic of imperialism has shaped power structures both at domestic and global levels. This theory has also challenged the assumption that western model of development is not the only viable model of development for post colonial countries. Besides, following post modernist and post structuralist approaches, this theory tends to understand various international problematic such as the nature of representation, interrelationship within race and gender respectively, nature of world capitalism and class formation at the global level, foundations and recovery of post colonialism and strategies of resistance and engagement.

The second trend, known as International Political Sociology approach, has its roots in the backdrop of war on terror in the United States. Many have described it as Paris School of thought. The basic question of this trend is: Are there any differences among state security agencies, police agencies and private militia regarding their nature and functions? A major spokesman of this theoretical trend Didier Bigo argues that one can hardly distinguish between repressive role of domestic police forces and that of international military alliances today. To him no binary division exists between security and insecurity - no one can say that one is positive and the other one is negative in nature. This view has some similarity with what realists have described as 'security dilemma' —however, difference between the two is that while realists have considered 'security dilemma' essentially as a crisis of the state, Bigo has argued that such dilemma appears to be a crisis jointly created by the state and non-state units.

Apart from these two trends, one may refer to another trend which has been influenced by post modernism and post structuralism. This trend has been described as exceptionalism. This theory essentially challenges the argument that 'exceptional situations call for exceptional responses' - an argument that has been propagated and made popular in the backdrop of terrorism. Influenced by Walter Benjamin's (1892 - 1927) argument, Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben has argued that counter terrorist policies have blurred the distinctions between democracy and dictatorship. Just to arrest someone on the pretext of his involvement in terrorist activities and put him behind bar without normal judicial protection make the difference between a citizen and a foreigner absolutely obsolete. To him, recognition of exceptional responses on the part

the state in the name of exceptional situations has become 'normal' politics today—'our private body has now become indistinguishable from our body politic'. This simply implies what Walter Benjamin has realized long time back that 'exceptional' situations have put individuals in a permanent regime of insecurity.

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## 4.6 Summary

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At the beginning of this chapter we have briefly analysed whether post modernism and post structuralism are equivalent. Through a brief discussion on Saussure, Derrida and Foucault, we have tried to analyse evolution of these two approaches and identify their similarities. This has been followed by a discussion of several features - such as, non-recognition of modern civilization as the end of progress, existence of multiple truths, diverse nature of decisions and their various possibilities, reality as social reconstruction, existence of power-knowledge relationship in the backdrop of objectivity and value neutrality, as projected by the positivists, relativity in the sphere of international ethics and morality—which have been shared by both these theories. We have also identified methodological limitations of these theories, replies against such criticisms by post modernist and post structuralist thinkers and their contributions in the field of International Relations. Finally, we have briefly analysed features of post colonialism, international political sociology and exceptionalism as outcomes of these two approaches in our discipline.

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## 4.7 Questions

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### Essay Answer Type Questions:

1. Discuss the concepts and methodologies that give rise to post-modernist and post-structuralist approaches in International Relations.
2. Describe, in detail, the major features of post-modernism and post-structuralism in International Relations.
3. Write a critique of post-modernism and post-structuralism in International Relations. How do you reply to those criticisms?

### Medium Answer Type Questions:

1. What is meant by discourse analysis? How has it been applied in International Relations?
2. Write a note on Ferdinand de Saussure and Jacque Derrida's views as sources of post-structuralist and postmodernist approaches in International Relations.
3. How do post-modernist and post-structuralist thinkers look at ethics in International Relations? Discuss.
4. Describe the features of various schools of thought that have emerged in International Relations because of post-structuralist and post modernist influences.

### **Short Answer Type Questions:**

1. Do you think that differences between post-modernism and post-structuralism are real? Argue briefly.
2. Identify some of the contributions of post-modernism and post-structuralism in International Relations.
3. Write a brief note on Paris School.
4. State briefly Giorgio Agamben's views on exceptionalism.

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### **4.8 Suggested Readings**

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1. Baylis, John, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens ed. *The Globalization of World Politics* (Oxford University Press), Chapters 10 and 11.
2. Booth, Ken and Steve Smith eds. *International Relations Theory Today* (Polity Press) Chapter 10.
3. Jackson, Robert and Georg Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches* (Oxford University Press), Chapter 9.
4. Peoples, Columba and Nick Vaughan-Williams, *Critical Security Studies* (Routledge), Chapter 4.
5. Reus-Smit, Christian and Duncan Snidal eds. *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations* (Oxford University Press), Chapters 21 and 22.
6. Smith, Steve, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski eds., *International Theory: Positivism and beyond* (Cambridge University Press), Chapter 11.

## **Paper-VII**

### **Module-2**

## **International Relations**

### **Contemporary Issues**

- Unit 1  U.S Policy in the Post-Cold War Era
- Unit 2  Europe in Contemporary World Politics
- Unit 3  China in Contemporary World Politics
- Unit 4  Russia in Contemporary World Politics

Paper VII

Models

International Relations

Contemporary Issues

- 1. The Role of the United Nations in the Post-Cold War Era
- 2. The Impact of Globalization on World Politics
- 3. The Role of the United States in World Politics
- 4. The Role of the European Union in World Politics

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# Unit 1 □ U.S Policy in the Post-Cold War Era

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## Structure

- 1.0 Objectives
- 1.1 Introduction
- 1.2 America in a Unipolar World
- 1.3 Post-Cold War Challenges
- 1.4 War on Terror
- 1.5 Current Status of the U.S.
- 1.6 Summary
- 1.7 Questions
- 1.8 Suggested Reading

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## 1.0 Objectives

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The present study seeks to explore

1. Position of America in a unipolar world.
2. The unforeseen problems which made foreign policy making extremely challenging for US.
3. How international terrorism at times exposed the limits of American power thereby questioning its dominant leadership in the contemporary world.

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## 1.1 Introduction

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The United States of America is unquestionably the most important political, economic and military power in the contemporary world though some analysts identify the U.S as a declining power in the early 21st century in contrast to the stature it enjoyed as a superpower during the cold war era and even during the first decade of the post-cold war period as the only superpower after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. A relatively new civilisation on earth though a tried and resilient democracy the U.S had followed a policy of isolationism since its foundation in the late 18th century and became active in international affairs (with the brief exception of the First World War) only from the time of the Second World War. The post second World era witnessed the emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union as the two superpowers with the eclipse of all the major European powers such as Britain, France Germany and Italy. The world was soon plunged into a cold war between the two superpowers with the U.S seeking to uphold free market capitalism against the perceived ideological threat from Soviet Communism. The principal pillar of U.S foreign policy during the cold war period came to be known as 'containment of Communism'. The world became divided between two blocs with the U.S

providing leadership to the western capitalist countries and the Soviet Union forming its own bloc which included, a part from the Soviet Union, the communist countries of East and Central Europe. The cold war which was essentially an ideological confrontation between capitalism and communism never culminated into an all out military conflict between the two super- powers though there were many crisis situations involving the two countries which threatened such a conflict. The cold war finally ended when the Soviet Union was confronted with unprecedented economic and structural crises in the soviet system of governance during the 1980s leading to the collapse of the communist governments in East and Central Europe in 1989 and the disintegration of the USSR itself in 1991. The bipolar international order gave way to a unipolar world dominated by the U.S.

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## 1.2 America in a Unipolar World

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The collapse of the Soviet Union left the United State in a unique unrivalled position of power and stature in the immediate aftermath of the end of the cold war. Scholars, particularly American ones, were quick to describe the global political system as a unipolar world. There was a lot of debate among international relations experts about the exact, nature of this unipolarity. The fact remained that while during the cold war period the U.S. was not unrivalled, events after 1991 left America as the sole superpower of the world. Militarily and also economically the U.S. undoubtedly emerged as the most formidable power. With the eclipse of soviet communism there was some debate in some circles within the U.S as to whether the country should return to its old policy of isolationism though the majority of Americans were not in favour of it and wanted their government to play an active role in world affairs. With the removal of Soviet power America certainly felt more secure. Though on the surface US power appeared unchallenged a lively debate has raged over the last two decades as to whether America is a declining power and it has been argued as to whether American bid for hegemony would not be viewed by the rest of the world as a threat and some major countries like Russia and China as well as some of America's European allies were beginning to view dealing with America as their most serious foreign policy problem. So far as the US foreign policy establishment was concerned the overriding objective was to prevent the rise of a rival centre of power. Traditionally America has sought to dominate the Western hemisphere while not permitting another great power to dominate Europe and Northeast Asia, A Pentagon report of 1992 further re-iterated this line of thinking by seeking to refocus US strategy on precluding the emergence of any potential future global competitor. The following objectives outline the US foreign policy strategy in the post-cold war era as reflected in the pentagon report.

- \* If the American security interests are challenged Washington should use diplomacy where it can, but force if it must.
- \* The US must remain engaged to address the new dangers, challenges as well as opportunities. There would be no security for the country in a policy of isolationism and the country would not prosper in a policy of protectionism.



- \* The US must send military troops to defend vital national interests and values, if these are at stake.
- \* When important, but not vital, security interests are involved, appropriate cost-benefit analysis should be made.
- \* Defence capability should be maintained to address regional contingencies and the US military presence should continue to enhance American security.

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### 1.3 Post-Cold War Challenges

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Keeping in mind the aforesaid objectives of post-Cold war US foreign policy outlined in the 1992 Pentagon report the foreign policies of the three administrations of President Bill Clinton, President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama have to be evaluated. As foreign policy is bi-partisan both Democratic and Republican administrations have essentially clung to the broad objectives of American foreign policy outlined above though there have been differences of emphasis and approach as warranted by situational contexts. For instance the Democrats have traditionally been more concerned with the protection and promotion of human rights and democratic values abroad than the Republicans. Simultaneously the Democrats, like the Republicans, have not flinched from using American military power when it was considered necessary to safeguard US national interest as perceived by the concerned Administration. For instance Democratic President Bill Clinton actively deployed the American military overseas while he was President. In 1993 US military forces which had already been deployed in Somalia by the previous Bush administration took part in the so called Battle of Mogadishu to capture the notorious local warlord Mohamed Farah Aidid though the outcome was disastrous from the American point of view as American troops were killed by the Somalis while 73 US soldiers were injured. Following this setback US troops were withdrawn from Somalia. In 1994 Clinton despatched troops to Haiti to stop the bloody civil war there and restore the duly elected President Jean Bertrand Aristide to power again though Aristide was basically a left winger and often adopted anti-American positions. In 1995 Clinton despatched troops to the Balkans in Europe ostensibly to restore peace and security in the strife-torn region following the five Year long civil war in Yugoslavia. Though US troops were sent to the Balkans for a limited period of one year they ultimately ended up staying there for a period of nine years. President Clinton also used US military force in the Kosovo-Serbian conflict as a part of a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) operation in 1999 besides military attacks against Islamic extremists in Sudan and Afghanistan. On the other hand in spite of his ostensible commitments to human rights the US did not intervene or take any steps to end the horrendous Rwandan Civil war in 1994 which was essentially a genocide that took the lives of one million people. Later Clinton admitted that he had not been able to recognise the nature and gravity of the crisis. One of the major achievements of the Clinton administration was the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993 which ensured free trade in North America. Though the initiative for NAFTA had been taken by the previous Republican administration Clinton, after his election in 1992 appreciated the benefits it could bring to the US and extended his whole-hearted support to the venture in spite of opposition by some Republicans and the powerful protectionist lobby in the country led by a man called Ross Perot.

After the end of his tenure Bill Clinton identified the Oslo Pact between Israel and Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) as the most successful achievement of his foreign policy. Clinton's mediation was crucial in signing of the pact on 13 September 1993 which institutionalised talks between Israel and the PLO. Subsequent developments over the next two decades belied the promises held out by the Oslo Pact and both President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama were unable to extricate US foreign policy from the pro-Israeli stance that America has pursued since the creation of Israel. Clinton made a bold bid to resolve the conflict which proved futile in the context of the deep rooted complexities of the Arab-Israeli problem.

The objectives of US foreign policy outlined in the Pentagon report of 1992 found, more powerful manifestation during the Presidency of Republican President George W. Bush.

Traditionally the Republicans have the tendency to be more hawkish in the pursuit of what they consider vital American national interests. This tradition was very much reflected in the formulation of the Bush foreign policy whose basic maxim was to evolve an international system which would bring together other countries and organisations under American leadership to ensure the predominance of US national interests and values there by guaranteeing international peace and security. The American objective, was to procure unstinted support and co-operation of the rest of the world in dealing with the threats posed by international terrorism, nuclear proliferation and the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The US realized that if this objective was to succeed the support and backing of other major powers such as Russia and China was vital.

The Bush presidency witnessed a very significant improvement in US relations with the Russia which received a filip at the outset of Bush's tenure when, following the post world terrorist attacks on the US, Russian President Vladimir Putin came out with the strongest possible condemnation of the outrage perpetrated on America and assured all support to Washington in the efforts to deal with international terrorism. Bush and Putin also struck up a close personal chemistry which enabled the two former rivals to forge a more co-operative relationship. In the pursuit of the same strategy the US also sought to incorporate China and India in the contemporary international system. One instance of this was President Bush's praise for China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) and Beijing's support against terrorism. So far as India was concerned a new chapter was initiated under Bush in the relationship between the two largest democracies in the world. Victims of terrorism themselves, the two countries sought to converge their policies in tackling this menace.

The Bush administration's basic objective was to establish American primacy in the world. To ensure this, it was decided that past US enmity with certain countries should not come in the way. The US also recognised that while it was desirable to enlist as many countries as possible in the US scheme of things some states may not wish to join it due to their geopolitical and domestic compulsions. Another element of this strategy was that since world security was dependent on American military power the US would not hesitate to 'go it alone' in the event of non-co-operation or even opposition from other states. The Bush administration did not make any secret of its belief that American Security interests, US values and beliefs and its way of life must prevail over everything else. No doubt critics have identified such an approach as a form of American imperialism.

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## 1.4 War on Terror

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On 2nd September 2001 terrorists, reportedly an Al Qaeda outfit, launched a devastating attack on the twin towers of New York's World Trade Centre reducing the two giant buildings to dust by using hijacked aircraft. They also attacked the Pentagon in Washington killing in the two attacks a total of more than 3000 people. The Bush administration which had only been in power for 8 months came out with a vigorous response by launching an attack on Afghanistan where the Taliban regime had been sheltering Osama-Bin-Laden, the founder of the Islamic terrorist organisation Al Qaeda which had carried out the audacious attack of 2nd September 2001, America's European and other allies joined in the Afghan operation which culminated in the ousting of the Taliban regime and the installation of a government of America's choice led by Hamid Karzai. This was the beginning of what the Bush administration termed the "War on Terror" which was viewed by Washington as another form of cold war. President Bush described it as an ideological war against an enemy which wanted to destroy freedom and impose an authoritarian set up. Bush promised that the US was committed to use all its force to win this new war which was aimed at bringing the enemy to justice as well as spread the ideals of freedom.

The attacks of September (also known as 9/11) 2001 opened a new chapter in post-cold; war international relations. The most important reason for the emergence of extremism and terrorism in some parts of the Islamic world was undoubtedly the deep seated grievance of a radicalised group against the all pervasive hegemony of the West especially the US, in all spheres of life, particularly strategic political, economic and cultural fields. The American hegemony is bitterly resented by the Islamic .especially the Arab world which has been feeding radicalism and extremism of all variety. While the strategy of the Bush administration was to counter terrorism it appeared to the people of the Islamic world as an assault on Islam itself and Islamic values. To many this seemed to be evident when the Bush administration did not remain satisfied by subduing Afghanistan but targetted Saddam Hussein of Iraq arguably as an accomplice of Al Qaeda.

Iraq has been the focus of attention in international politics in recent years. It has the second largest reserves of oil after Saudi Arabia. American policy towards Iraq has taken several twists and turns since the 1980s Iraq had been ruled by Saddam Hussein during this period and his record of authoritarianism, human rights violations especially against the Shias. Hussein himself was a Sunni and his aggressions against neighbours like Iran (in 1980s) and invasion and occupation of Kuwait in August 1990 brought him into limelight as a threat to regional peace and security. During the 1980s the US and its European allies were prime backers of Hussein as their target at that time, was Iran which had undergone a radical transformation after its Islamic revolution in 1979. The US had cut off all relations with Iran and backed Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988. However the situation changed in 1990 when Iraq occupied Kuwait, another oil rich country. Iraqi intransigence ultimately culminated in the first Gulf war of January 1991 when the US and its European allies launched a military action, with the backing of the UN, to evict Iraq

from Kuwait. Subsequently the UN, at the behest of the US, initiated action to strip Iraq of its alleged possession of chemical and biological weapons as well as its long range missiles and successfully terminated its incomplete nuclear weapons programme. George W. Bush after coming to power branded Iraq along with Iran and North Korea as the 'Axis of Evil' and as already mentioned targetted Saddam Hussein, after 9/11 as a backer of Al Queda. He launched an invasion of Iraq along with the UK and several other European allies (in spite of the opposition of France and Germany) on the pretext that Saddam Hussein was stockpiling weapons of mass destruction though the UN inspectors refused to ratify such a claim. The war turned out to be a catastrophe for the Iraqi people millions of whom died though the US was able to achieve its objective of ousting the Saddam regime. Like in Afghanistan a pro-American regime was installed in Baghdad and Iraq came under US occupation till Bush's successor Barack Obama decided to withdraw American troops from Iraq. No so called weapons of mass destruction were found and the critics suggested that the real American motive was to capture the Iraqi oil reserves and to entrench US hegemony in the strategic oil rich region. The US also wanted to reduce the power of Saudi Arabia, the largest oil reserve in the world and turn Iraq into a pivot in controlling the world oil industry and especially oil prices. In effect Iraq has been a catastrophe for American, foreign policy with Iraq, along with Syria, having turned into a hotbed of Islamic terrorism.

The foreign policy Bush's successor Democratic President Barack Obama inherited was therefore full of challenges. As a senator Barack Obama labelled the Iraq episode as "dumb war" of choice. He also ran for the Presidency by declaring his opposition to the invasion of Iraq. Obama arrived in the White House with a clear vision of a more humble America narrowly focussed on core interests, like healing domestic and social maladies which needed addressing following the severe economic recession that gripped the world economy in 2008. However while Obama promised to withdraw American troops from Iraq within a short span of time he would not shy away from taking on the terrorist challenge and throw a harder punch at Taliban in Afghanistan; at the same time he also presented himself as a conciliator and a peacemaker.

From the start of his presidency Obama pronounced in a series of speeches, delivered from Washington to Prague to Cairo to usher in a transformed world order-'a revolutionary world'-so to say, where America could still do "improbable, sometimes impossible things", Critics were doubtful whether with the harsh economic, reality-deep in debt and with its financial sector in a tailspin-the US could afford an interventionist foreign policy. But Obama seemed genuinely sincere when he spoke of starting a dialogue of "mutual respect" with Iran and to other rivals he promised to extend a hand of co-operation provided they too reciprocated. A similar attitude was to be seen in Obama administration's rapprochement with post-Fidel Cuba. Reason would replace raw power and the neoconservative vision would be revoked. It was hope and change on a global scale.

The reality however turned out to be otherwise. Obama was able to keep his promise on Iraq and successfully withdrew US troops from that country within a short span of time leaving Iraq to its fate which has, since, become the playground for Al Queda terrorists who have murdered hundreds of thousands of innocent Iraqis since the US pullout. However the Middle East turned

a new chapter with the onset of the Arab Spring in January 2011. From Tunisia to Jordan the whole Arab world was gripped by a 'fever of democratic aspirations and several authoritarian Arab regimes tumbled, Egypt being the most important of them. The process of democratisation in the Arab world has remained incomplete; at the same time it has often unleashed dangerous religious and tribal passions across the Middle East. The hope has fermented into fear the change into danger, Obama has been confronted with new challenges in a region which has confounded 'residents for decades and where US security stakes are highest, the greatest dilemma for Obama has been whether to intervene in the catastrophic civil war in Syria which has witnessed unprecedented barbarities, including chemical attacks which brought horrible deaths to men, women and children, even infants. As an irony Obama too faced the prospect of military action in the Middle East over weapons of mass destruction,

Events in the Arab world over the past three years and US response to them have brought Obama both bouquets and brickbats. Obama's critics have accused him of timidity and weakness. Even President Bill Clinton faced similar charges when he refused to intervene in the Balkan crisis in the early 1990s. A senior State Department official had complained in 1993 "We simply don't have the leverage, we don't have the influence (or) the inclination to use military force." Obama too has had to face a variety of critics who wanted him to stop the military coup in Egypt when the democratically elected Egyptian President was overthrown; humanitarian critics wanted him to stop the war in Syria. Meanwhile US allies in Europe and the Arab world have been complaining that they cannot count on the US any more.

Obama's defenders on the other hand point out that he has done the best with a poisoned inheritance-from anti-Americanism abroad to tight budgets and rising isolationism at home. Another factor is the growing-public opposition to pay in blood and treasure to solve far-away problems that often look unsolvable. There is increasing realization that the US cannot impose its will on every problem in the world.

As a credit it has to be admitted that Obama did not begin on a defensive note. While he was opposed to the Iraq war and made good on his pledge to withdraw US troops from that country at an early date in his first term he pronounced a policy of firmness on Afghanistan which was the birth place of Al Qaeda terrorism. He increased the number of American troops in Afghanistan and extended all possible support to the regime of Afghan President Hamid Karzai. He spared no effort, at least initially, to cultivate good relationship with Pakistan, a longstanding American ally which seemed to hold the key to the Afghan problem. However as time passed by and American and European contributed troops were somewhat successful to stabilise Afghanistan, casualties began to mount in the face of determined Taliban insurgency. The realisation began to dawn on the Obama administration that the US would have to withdraw from Afghanistan as well. Pakistan was also proving to be a perfidious ally which was proved when American seals killed Osama Bin Laden in a secret operation in Pakistan in May 2011. Pakistan had been denying the existence of Osama on Pakistani soil and even after Osama's killing it continued to deny that they were aware of Osama's secret hide out at Abotabad in their country. Even before his first term ended Obama announced that American troops, barring a token force, would leave Afghanistan by December 2014. The European countries like the UK,

Germany, Italy, Spain and a few others also expressed the same intent and their governments were under public pressure to withdraw. However in order to ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a haven for terrorists following the western withdrawal and to also forestall a Taliban takeover two security pacts were signed between Afghanistan (which elected Ashraf Ghani as the next President of the country) on the one hand and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) on the other. The US-Afghan pact, known popularly as the Bilateral Security Agreement which was signed in Kabul on 30 September 2014, commits America to station 9800 soldiers through 2015 which will be halved next year and will taper off to a token presence by end-2016. Under the NATO-Afghan pact 4000 to 5000 troops will remain in the country after 2014. Therefore the total number of foreign troops immediately remaining in the country could be notionally down to 14800. The explicit intent of the US-Afghan pact is to permit the US to continue training Afghanistan's nearly 350000 security forces. Obviously the pact intends to ensure that an outright Taliban takeover does not take place militarily in Afghanistan. Whether it has its intended effect will become known in the near future.

Yet another event which has exposed the limits of American power in 2014 was the developments in Ukrain. Essentially what triggered off the crisis in Ukrain was the coming onto the surface a divided loyalty within the country with the ethnic Ukrainians seeking a closer relationship with the European Union and the west in general as against the desire of the Russian-speaking people in the East of the country wishing to maintain closer ties with Russia. In fact the Russian speaking Crimean peninsula voted overwhelmingly in favour of joining Russia in February 2014 following which Russia annexed Crimea in March 2014. The Russian action triggered off a huge crisis in Ukrain as also between Russia and the West including the US which responded by imposing sanctions on Russia. The mainly Russian speaking eastern Ukrainians also rose in revolt against the -Ukrainian government leading to a civil war in the country.

Ukrainian crisis is a clear manifestation of the fact that Russia would not tolerate the creeping western encroachments in- an area that Russia has traditionally considered to be its sphere of influence. The world media started talking about the beginning of another cold war between Russia and the West. The US and EU imposed sanctions but they have not had any impact on Russian policy. The stand off continues.

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## 1.5 Current Status of the United States

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The United States presents a contrasting picture in the early 21st century. On the one hand the US continues to maintain world wide interests and follows policies designed to retain American hegemony in the world. For instance the US is militarily present in numerous areas of the world; in spite of its declared commitments to freedom and human rights Washington continues to support authoritarian regimes in different parts of the world; the US advocates free trade but keeps protectionist policies in place to support domestic industries, its aid to the developing countries, compared to the European countries, lags behind. In spite of its pronouncements in defence of environmental protection the US did not ratify the Kyoto protocol.

The US continues to retain a large defence budget and its defence preparedness is designed to ensure that it can prevent any nuclear attack on America from any part of the world. It continues to retain its hold on the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. It also maintains its status as a technological superpower.

On the other hand many analysts argue that the US is a declining power. It is the world's largest debtor nation and financial analysts have projected that China will overtake the US as the world's largest economy by 2050. Other limits on American power have already been discussed in the earlier section. Iran-especially the Iranian nuclear programme-and North Korea continue to be a serious headache for the US. Some analysts argue that the biggest potential rival for the US in the 21st century-especially in Asia-will be China. China's economic and military power is continuously on the rise. Respect and moderation in US policy towards China is noteworthy though the very deep Chinese dependence on the US economy and market will act as a barrier against any conflict, between the two nations in the near future. In conclusion it can be said that the US is no longer the undisputed single superpower as it was at the beginning of the post-cold war world in the early 1990s. While it still remains the single most power awesome militarily and economically as well as in many other fields of human activity the sheer complexity of the present world and the myriad constraints-both domestic and international-from which the US suffers have contributed to dent American power in the early 21st century.

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## 1.6 Summary

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The end of the Cold war and the disintegration of the Soviet Union witnessed the emergence of the United States as the sole superpower in a unipolar world. With the largest economy and the strongest military force America reigned supreme in the 1990s. The post-cold war period saw three Presidencies-that of Bill Clinton, George W.Bush and the current incumbent Barack Obama. Right from the outset the US foreign policy planners aimed at establishing American primacy in the world and all three President's foreign policy objectives were tailored to this grand plan. However all of them found that in reality the post-cold war era which was expected to be more orderly and secure since the cold war had ended turned out to be more complex and difficult. Ethnic conflicts, terrorism, environmental crisis and many other unforeseen problems made foreign policy making extremely challenging for the US. Dealing with international terrorism, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, the 'Arab Spring' and the unresolved Palestine-Israel conflicts among a host of other issues exposed the limits of American power. The steady emergence of China as an economic and military power and the confrontation with Russia over Ukraine and the US failure to deal successfully with many of these challenges has put a question mark on continued American leadership in the contemporary world.

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## 1.7 Questions

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### Essay Type Questions

1. Discuss the nature of American power in a unipolar world.
2. Discuss briefly the foreign policy initiatives during the Presidency of Bill Clinton
3. Why did the United States launch the war on terror? Was it successful?

### Medium type Questions

1. What is the present position of the United States in the World?
2. Do you think Barack Obama's Presidency has been a failure so far as US foreign policy is concerned? Give reasons.

### Short Questions

1. Mention the four major objectives of the foreign policy of USA.
2. Write short notes on NAFTA, PLO, NATO, WMD.

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## 1.8 Suggested Readings

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1. James F. Hoge, Gideon Rose, *American Foreign Policy : Cases and Choices*, Council on Foreign Relations, 2000.
2. Invan Eland, *The Empire has no Clothes: US Foreign Policy Exposed*, 2004.
3. F. Cameron, *US Foreign After Cold War*, Routledge.
4. Bruce W. Jentleson, *American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century*.
5. Seymore Hersh, *The Price of Power*.
6. Purusottam Bhattacharya and Anindyojoti Majumder, ed. *Antarjatik Samparker ruprekha*, Setu, 2007 (in Bengali)



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## Unit 2 □ Europe in Contemporary World Politics

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### Structure

- 2.0 Objectives
- 2.1 Introduction
- 2.2 First Moves for Unity
- 2.3 Treaty of Rome-Establishment of the EEC
- 2.4 Nature of the EEC
- 2.5 Enlargement of the EEC
- 2.6 EU as a Global Actor
- 2.7 Challenges facing the EU
- 2.8 Summary
- 2.9 Questions
- 2.10 Suggested Readings

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### 2.0 Objectives

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The objectives of the present unit are

1. To see how Europe reemerged from its devastating conditions since the second world war.
2. To analyse the nature and role of European Economic Community.
3. To view the challenges faced by EU

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### 2.1 Introduction

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The re-emergence of Europe as a centre of power in international affairs-political and economic-has been one of the most remarkable developments since the end of the Second World War. Prior to the war Europe had been the nerve centre of world politics which was largely controlled by such European great powers as Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia and, even to a lesser extent, Italy.

However the Second World War turned out to be a virtual graveyard for European powers such as Germany, France and Italy. It also witnessed the emergence of two extra-European super-powers-the United States and the Soviet Union-who had enormous territorial, mineral and demographic resources at their command and by virtue of which Washington and Moscow came to be in a position to almost dictate the pace of international affairs in the post-war period.

The end of the war not only signalled the loss of great power status by the major European states; six years of ruinous warfare had virtually devastated the entire continent. Above all the

war had exposed the real problem faced by Europe—the perils of unrestrained aggressive nationalism. It is correct to say that the two world wars in the Twentieth Century were the culmination of the unabated and unbridled nationalist rivalry involving the great powers of Europe.

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## 2.2 First Moves for Unity

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It is in this background that the first moves for European Unity have to be evaluated. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, thinking Europeans were convinced that the only solution to the age-old rivalry which had bedevilled Europe was to forge unity through a consensus that took into account the prevailing post-war realities. Following the onset of the Cold War Europe became divided—the western part came under the leadership of the United States and the eastern part became a zone dominated by the Soviet Union. The division of the continent nipped in the bud any possibility of the emergence of a united Europe. Hence the first moves for unity were confined to Western Europe. The first move for co-operation in Western Europe was the creation of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) which was established in 1948. The primary purpose of the OEEC was to provide a co-operative framework for the disbursement of the Marshall Aid from the United States which was designed to bring about the much needed economic reconstruction of post-war Europe. In the process the OEEC laid the foundations for the subsequent development of wider European economic co-operation. Nearly all the Western European states became its members. Subsequently with the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958 the economic activities of the OEEC were largely overshadowed.

Europe was however in need of a more radical method of co-operation than merely the inter-governmental approach which the OEEC represented. France, West Germany, Belgium, Netherlands and Italy were the votaries of such an approach. They felt that mere creation of forums such as trade and industry, business competition, energy, transport and the like would not be enough. What was needed was the creation of an institution which would be able to adopt common policies in some of the areas earlier agreed upon among the participating states and which the member states would be duty-bound to implement within their respective territorial jurisdictions.

This idea found its most fruitful manifestation in the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. The basic idea of the plan for the ECSC was to find a solution to the German problem. The Franco-German conflict was at the root of the problems of modern Europe and in the reconciliation of this rivalry lay the key to a peaceful, united and prosperous Europe. The ECSC provided an opportunity for such a reconciliation besides binding a potentially powerful and resurgent Germany within the confines of a uniting Europe. Thus under the 'Schuman Plan' (so named after the French Foreign Minister who had taken the initiative under the guidance of the French statesman Jean Monnet) which was announced in May 1950, France and Germany were both to place the control of their coal and steel production under a single

High Authority; other countries were also welcomed to adhere to the scheme if they wished. Consequently Belgium, Netherlands, Luxemburg and Italy also joined the venture while Britain refused to participate in it because in its opinion the plan was an encroachment on national sovereignty and was therefore contrary to British interests.

The ECSC which was established in April 1951 was designed to remove all barriers in the trade of coal, coke, steel, pig and scrap iron among the six member states. The High authority, the original executive of the ECSC, was explicitly given powers which were no longer in domestic jurisdiction, with the right to fix coal and steel prices and impose fines on those infringing treaty rules. Financial aid was provided by the ECSC to resettle and retrain workers who found themselves out of work due to technical developments and restructuring of coal and steel industries. Funds necessary for the purpose were raised by levies on coal and steel production; the rates for these levies were set annually.

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## 2.3 Treaty of Rome-Establishment of the EEC

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The idea of a European Common Market had been in circulation for quite some time. The success of the ECSC experiment provided fresh encouragement for new efforts in this direction and the Benelux governments (Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg) presented a memorandum, containing the suggestion of a "European Common Market to the governments of France, Germany and Italy on 20 May 1955. The Foreign Ministers of the six countries met at Messina in Italy on 2 June 1955 to consider the proposal and an inter-governmental committee was set up to prepare a detailed plan. A report was submitted in the spring of 1956 which provided the basis for the treaties establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Agency (EURATOM). These treaties were signed in Rome on 25 March 1957 and ratified by the six in the following months. The two bodies came into formal existence on 1 January 1958.

The EEC pledged to "establish the foundations of an ever closer union among the European peoples". Article 1 of the Treaty of Rome establishing the EEC states that the Community was set up for certain purposes and meanings. The EEC was designed to embrace all areas of economic and social endeavour within a 'Community' concept. Its purpose was not simply to promote economic self-interest of the member states but also to commit them to a commonality of interest. Under article 237 any European state was free to accede to the Community provided they were ready to identify themselves with the goals and purposes of the venture.

The EEC's broad aims are spelt out in Article 2 of the Rome Treaty. "The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a Common Market and progressively approximating the economic policies of member states, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the states belonging to it".

The member states creating the Community gave an undertaking to participate in common institutions, to establish a customs union (A customs union is an arrangement whereby the participating states agree to abolish duties and other trade restrictions among themselves and to

adopt common commercial policies towards third countries as well as common policies in the sphere of agriculture, transport and business competition). They also agreed to a framework for free movement of persons, services, capital and goods, procedures for the coordination of economic and social policies and measures regarding approximation of laws. Undertaking was also given for participation by the member states in a wide range of Community financial institutions as well as an association of overseas countries and territories having special links with the member states.

It has to be noted here that the EEC treaty was essentially a framework agreement which kept out political issues from its purview as the member states still jealously guarded their political sovereignty. Within the parameters of the treaty the member states were to construct, with varying degrees of specificity, the common policy planks of their collective endeavour. In the pursuit of the EEC's broad aims the member states also agreed to the basic principle of widening areas of co-operation.

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## 2.4 Nature of the EEC

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As explained earlier the establishment of the European Community was an effort to move beyond the traditional method of inter-governmental co-operation. This was reflected in the creation of the Community institutions which enjoy a great deal of autonomy and play a critical role in the decision-making process and the general functioning of the EEC. Its institutional structure and policy-making process is one of the distinguishing features of the European Community.

The Community has at its apex the European Council which consists of the Heads of Governments and states of the member states. The European Council meets every six months and sets the agenda for the next six months of the summit. The European Council is headed by a President who is appointed for a period of two and a half years. The President of the European Commission together with national foreign ministers and a member of the Commission also attend the meetings of the European Council. It is a forum for policy formulation at a political level and for resolving any matters on which the Council of the European Union has been unable to reach agreement.

Besides the European Council the Community has four other principal institutions—the Council of the European Union, the Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice; in addition there is an Economic and Social Committee and a Court of Auditors. Policy formulation in the Community is a product of an intensive dialogue between the Commission, the Council and the Parliament; the Economic and Social Committee exercises primary consultative roles in this process. The Court of Justice has jurisdiction on the overall process and the Court of Auditors scrutinizes the Community's budget, it should be noted that policy-making is a result of two-way process—interaction between the various institutions themselves and their relationship to the member states.

The Council of the European Union is placed at the centre of the Community's decision-making process. The Council, generally referred to as the Council of Ministers, is the forum

where the national interests of the member states are reflected and sought to be converted into a common set of Community-based interests one. The Council has one representative minister from each member state; the minister concerned who represents his country varies according to the agenda under discussion. Most of the meetings are attended by Foreign Ministers though Ministers of Agriculture, Finance, Transport, Foreign Trade and Energy participate in discussions pertaining to their respective areas. While the Rome treaty implied that the Council will function on the basis of majority voting, the unanimity rule prevailed since 1965-66 after France boycotted the institutions of the Community for nine months following the adoption on the basis of a majority decisions which Paris considered to be injurious to vital French national interests. In recent years a qualified majority voting procedure has been instituted in certain areas of decision-making though the principle of unanimity has been retained in some areas of critical national importance. The Council operates on the basis of a rotating Presidency at six-monthly intervals. The member state holding the Presidency at a given time has the opportunity to exert significant influence on the pace and shape of Council decisions.

A unique organ which received its inspiration from the High Authority of the ECSC the European Commission is considered by many analysts as the embryo of a future transnational Community. It is the initiator co-ordinator of EC legislation. Besides its supervision of the application or implementation of community legislation the Commission also oversees the application and day to day running of EC policies, including the various Community funding programmes. In addition the Commission also has extensive decision-making powers of its own in certain specific areas, particularly in competition policy. After the latest round of enlargement in July 2014 which increased the number of member states of the Community, renamed the European Union (from 1 November 1993) the Commission consists of 28 members ("Commissioners") nominated by national governments-one each from the 28 member states. As per the Treaty of Rome the members of the Commission are not selected to promote or represent the interests of the respective member state; rather they are chosen on account of their general competence and independence. After their appointment which has to be confirmed by the European Parliament the Commission members are supposed to act completely independently of their national governments in the common community interests. While the member states have been empowered to nominate the Commissioners the Commission, as a body, is collectively answerable to the European Parliament which alone can dismiss the Commission. The Commission is headed by a President and is appointed for a term of five years. Each Commission member is entrusted with special responsibility for one or more areas of Community activity. However in spite of this division of responsibility the Commission acts as a "college" and is therefore collectively responsible for all its acts.

The European Parliament is the only directly elected EC institution. Prior to 1979 the members (MEP) used to be nominated by the respective national Parliaments on the basis of select country quotas. However since 1979 the MEPs are directly elected by the voters of the respective member states. The member states are allocated a fixed number of MEPs according to the size of their population. The European Parliament is located in Strasbourg and was given limited powers by the Rome treaty. It was given an essentially advisory and supervisory role

though its powers have been increased significantly by the recent treaties. The Parliament now has an important role in legislation by a procedure called "co-decision". It has the right to be consulted on proposed legislation and to put forward amendments. It is now a part and parcel of the decision-making process of the European Union. The EP is also important in other respects. Its opinions, mainly given in the form of resolutions, do carry weight and it has influenced many areas of EU functioning, especially on relations with developing countries.

The Court of Justice (ECJ) located in Luxembourg, is the final arbiter on issues of EU law. In a set up where democratic control is lacking, judicial supervision is very important. A central judicial body usually acts as final arbiter of both the rights and obligations of constituent units and those of any central institutions which may have been created. The ECJ performs this role within the EU. Arguably the most powerful Community institution it acts as the ultimate judge of conflicting interests and enjoys the sole rights to definitively interpret the Treaties and subsequent legislation.

The ECJ consists of 28 judges who are appointed by common agreement between the member states for a renewable term of six years. Usually each member state appoints a judge of its nationality to the ECJ. Over the years the role performed by the ECJ in interpreting EU law has been identified as a fount of political power. The principal function of the ECJ is to ensure observance of EU law. In the cases adjudicated by the ECJ its judgements are binding on all parties including governments. In ensuring the uniform interpretation of EU law throughout the Union the ECJ has also proved to be one of the driving forces towards European integration.

It is evident from the analysis so far that the Treaty of Rome created a new legal order independent of the member states and whose acts have direct legal effect on them. Generally precedence has to be given to community law over national law, leading to the conclusion that EU membership emphatically impinges on the sovereignty of the member states in a more immediate and more extensive fashion than in the case with other nations treaty commitments. Nowhere is this reality more evident than in the process of community legislation. While a distinctive role exists for all the EU institutions the legislative process is essentially centered on a dialogue between the Commission and the Council of Ministers. The national as well as the Community element is involved at every stage of the process. There is an extensive process of consultation by the Commission more so than in national legislation. The ultimate objective is to achieve a broad consensus in formal proposals in the formulation of which the European Parliament is also deeply involved. Opinions are then given on these proposals by other agencies such as the Economic and Social Committee and the Commission's proposals are then considered by the Council of Ministers along with these opinions.

In spite of the critical national input in the process of legislation the member states tend to interpret their collective role in an EU context and regard the Community as an important framework for common endeavour. The most important manifestation of it has been the creation of the customs union. By mid-1969 the original six members—France, Germany (West), Italy, Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg—succeeded in abolishing all customs duties and quotas on trade between themselves and by mid-1977 barriers to trade had been removed between the then nine member states. The EU is now a customs union within which goods can move freely

inside a common central tariff. All imported industrial goods coming from outside the Community face the same duties and non-tariff barriers whether they pass through Liverpool, Marseilles or Rotterdam. Likewise there is also free movement of agricultural products throughout the Community while the domestic EU market is protected against imports by agricultural levies.

Another integral aspect of the EU endeavour is the free movement of people. Citizens of any of the member states may move freely to seek or take up employment in another member state and normally there can be no discrimination in employment policy solely on the ground of nationality. Likewise the self-employed also can move freely throughout the Community to offer their services. The Rome treaty also provides for free movement of capital though member states have taken advantage of treaty provisions for curtailment of free movement of capital in the event of balance of payments difficulties. The Commission has taken action in case of abuse of this provision.

The core of the integration process has been the common policies. Provision for a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and a Common External Trade Policy had been made by the EEC treaty itself. Subsequently bases for common action regarding social policy, transport policy, aids to depressed regions, energy, fisheries, the environment, consumer protection and business competition (to name a few) were laid by the member states. The basic objective of these common policies was linked to the original idea of co-operation at the regional level i.e. problems faced by the states in Western Europe were essentially transnational in character and could be tackled effectively only with a community level participation.

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## 2.5 Enlargement of the EU

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The preamble to the Treaty of Rome provided for "the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe". The founding fathers of the Community had made it clear that though the EU was beginning its journey with only six member states it would be their earnest endeavour to bring together other countries of Western, Northern, Central and eventually Eastern Europe within the fold as well. Keeping this perspective in mind the Community has undergone seven enlargements to date, the first enlargement took place 1973 when Britain, Denmark and Ireland joined the EU. In 1981 Greece joined followed by Spain and Portugal in 1986. Austria, Sweden and Finland in 1995, ten Eastern and Central European states in 2004, Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 and Croatia in 2014.

The steady expansion of the Community over the past nearly six decades reflects certain realities of the European integration movement. Britain and the Scandinavian countries had kept aloof during the initial period due to their reservations regarding the acceptability of sovereignty which Community membership entailed. Their subsequent decision to join was prompted by the desire to derive economic benefits and the realization that the Community did not impinge on sovereignty as much as was anticipated at the time of its foundation. The membership of Greece, Spain and Portugal was considerably facilitated following their transition from dictatorship to democracy during the 1970s and early 1980s. States like Sweden, Finland and Austria had

been unable to join due to, besides other factors, their neutral status. The end of the Cold war and the achievements of the Community as the most successful European organisation for regional co-operation prodded them to reverse their earlier positions and move into the EU.

A new situation arose in Central and Eastern Europe following the replacement of the Communist governments there by non-communist ones during the course of 1989. Soon the major governments in the EU-especially Germany-realized that the EC experiment had begun on the premise that any European state was eligible for membership of the Union provided it met the twin criteria of democracy and a free market economy. In the eyes of the EU the post-Communist states in Central and Eastern Europe had achieved these objectives over a period of time and membership of the EU could no longer be denied to them in principle. Consequently a breakthrough was achieved at the summit held in Nice, France in December 2000 which paved the way for the incorporation of the ten new members from Eastern and Central Europe in 2004 and three more members in 2007 and 2014 respectively.

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## 2.6 EU as a Global Actor

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The Rome Treaty formula had provided for a framework of economic and commercial cooperation among the member states as political issues had proved to be contentious. However the concept of political co-operation continued to be one of the corner stones which guided the philosophy of the Community since its inception. The area of such co-operation was foreign policy and the objective was that the Community would increasingly speak with one voice in international affairs. This was further necessitated in the 1960s as the EU had to respond to events such as the East-West detente, emergence of China and Japan as significant international actors and increasing volatility in regions such as the Middle East and Southern Africa. This process which crystallized under the rubric of European Political Co-operation (EPC) in 1970 came to consist of foreign policy co-ordination among the member states of the Community conducted outside the framework of the Rome Treaty.

However, the real boost in the direction of a Common foreign policy was received when the Maastricht agreement of December 1991 led to the first concrete move at institutionalization of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The principal objectives of the CFSP are to safeguard the fundamental foreign policy interests, in particular, the independence and security of the Union taking into consideration the possibility of a common defence policy and common defence, to preserve peace and consolidate democracy, the role of law and human rights. The instruments used to put CFSP into practice are common position and joint actions, coordinated voting and joint positions in international organizations and conferences, joint representations, joint investigative missions and merger of diplomatic and Community instruments. Common positions on foreign policy issues have been adopted by the Council of Ministers on issues such as the developments in the Balkans to East Timor and from the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons to counter-terrorism. Once they are adopted the member states are required to adhere to common positions which the Presidency of the Council has to defend at the United Nations and



in other international forums. In recent years the Union has made increasing efforts to evolve a Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) within the CFSP framework to emphasise European self-reliance in the field of defence. The success achieved however is of a limited nature.

So far as the challenges of making an impact on the international scene are concerned a two-dimensional role for the EU has emerged. In the first instance, as history has demonstrated, in areas where member states of the EU perceive that they have a common interest such as commercial, development and environment policies they usually act in unison. A suitable illustration would be the parleys connected with the multilateral trade negotiations under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in which the EU has acted, under its common commercial policy, as a bloc with one voice. The same is true with development co-operation with the countries of the South or the negotiations designed to evolve a global environmental regime. These are incidentally the areas where EU integration has reached significant depth.

In contrast, integration in the fields of foreign affairs and security policy has been much slower and did not reach the kind of depth desired. The unsatisfactory role played by the EU in international crises such as the Yugoslav civil war in the 1990s and the Iraq war of 2003 bears testimony to this reality. It has been argued that the efficacy or role of the EU in international politics is hampered not by the lack of integration in foreign affairs and the security area but a lack of common interests and by low and close up operational capability. It can be said that the EU is likely to continue to play, as it has been doing for sometime, the role of a powerful actor in the global scene so far as international economic issues such as trade and commerce, intellectual property rights and investment measures are concerned. However, with regard to foreign and security affairs, EU integration of a significant magnitude is yet to be achieved and an EU international role in this field, commensurate with its economic and commercial stature, will in all likelihood remain hostage to the differences of interest that exist between its major states.

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## 2.7 Challenges facing the EU

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The European unity movement of the last six decades is a shining example of success in combating the many problems relating to economic transformation, political co-operation and conventional as well as non-conventional security in Europe. European states were able to evolve a unique set of institutional arrangements in tackling the grave problems they were confronted with in the aftermath of the Second World War. Examples may be cited of the single market (which was introduced on 31 December 1992) and the single currency (which was introduced in 1999) for economic transformation, the Common Foreign and Security Policy for political and security co-operation and co-operation in the field of Justice and Home affairs. The most notable contribution of the unity movement is the termination of the longstanding conflict and the emergence of a climate of trust and fellow-feeling among the European great powers. There has also been an increase in the level of awareness regarding the limits of sovereignty in post-Second World War international relations. However it has become clear with the passage of time that the European nation states are not ready to abandon their national identity altogether

and the dream of the founding fathers to establish a European federation through economic cooperation is unlikely to come true at least in the near future. The realization that the process of integration will have to be carried forward keeping the national identities in tact as much as possible is an established fact today.

It is also a fact that there are disagreements among members regarding the extent and the depth to which integration can be taken forward. For instance, the hesitation with regard to inclusion of Turkey, a predominantly Muslim State, in a community bound so long by the common bond of Christianity shows a certain unstated preference for religio-cultural uniformity. More seriously and this has become evident recently with UK government expressing serious reservations about the EU policy to admit refugees from war raged Syria, to the extent even of threatening to quit the Union unless refugee intake policies were 'rationalized' Earlier also Britain showed serious reservations concerning the introduction of Euro as a common currency for all EU members. These serve to indicate the great strains which the EU must somehow withstand.

Integration in Europe has reached a crossroad now. While even its critics applaud the phenomenal success achieved by the EU in reaching many of the goals set by its founding fathers the challenges faced by the movement in a vastly changed European and international scenario are indeed formidable. The size of the Union has increased from 6 to 28 and it is no longer a compact group. Consequently the institutional framework and its functioning has become more problematic as has been the difficulties in reaching greater depth in integration. The recent sovereign debt crisis which affected Greece, Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Italy and the weakness of the single currency Euro in the world financial market, the high unemployment and the stagnant economies of the Eurozone have exposed the EU to a new set of economic and financial challenges. How the Union sets about in meeting these challenges will ultimately determine the future course of European integration as well as the survival of the group itself.

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## 2.8 Summary

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The Second World war resulted in considerable reduction in the power and influence of West European countries like France, Germany and Italy and consequently the European Unity Movement was born as a result of the far sightedness of thinking Europeans like Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman. After a lot of debate the EEC was established in 1958 which sought to combine retention of national sovereignty by the member states as well as autonomous functioning of the institutions of the Community.

This unique organization has four principal organs-the Council of the European Union, the European Commission, European Parliament and the Court of Justice. As per the treaty of Rome the member states have handed over their sovereign jurisdiction in specific areas to the EU institutions to frame policies. The member states are obliged to abide by these policies. As a part of the principal institutional framework a common market has been founded whose notable feature is the free movement of goods, people, services and capital within the member states. Another important feature of the EU is the framing of common policies in specific issue areas agreed upon by the member states.

A new era started in the field of European integration following the end of the Cold War in 1989. The success of the Community continued to attract other European countries including the erstwhile Soviet-bloc states and its size has now increased from the original six to the present 28 and there are candidate countries waiting for membership. As a result the EU is faced with the challenges of framing and consolidating its policies. The recent financial and economic crisis has also posed more challenges for the EU integration and consolidation in the near future.

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## 2.9 Questions

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### Essay type questions.

1. Trace briefly the circumstances that led to the emergence of the European Unity Movement.
2. What were the principal objectives of the Treaty of Rome?
3. Briefly discuss the nature and principal characteristic features of the European Union

### Medium type questions.

1. Write a brief note on the enlargement of the European Union.
2. What are the principal challenges faced by the European Union in recent years?

### Short type questions.

1. Write short notes on Marshal Aid, ECSC & The Court of Justice.
2. What is the basic objective behind European Unity Movement?

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## 2.10 Suggested Readings

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1. Desmond Dinan, *Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration*, Palgrave Macmillan.
2. Richard Vaughan, *Post-War Integration in Europe*.
3. Stephen George and Ian Bache, *Politics in the European Union*, Oxford University Press.
4. Rajendra K Jain, ed. *The European Union in a Changing World*, Radiant Publisher.
5. Juliet Lodge, ed. *European Union: The Community in Search of a Future*, Macmillan.
6. Purusottam Bhattacharya and Anindyojoti Majumder, ed. *Antarjatic Samparker ruprekha*, Setu, 2007 (in Bengali)

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## Unit 3 □ China in Contemporary World Politics

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### Structure

- 3.0 Objectives
- 3.1 Introduction
- 3.2 Chinese Foreign Policy during Cold War
- 3.3 Chinese Foreign Policy during the Post-Cold War era
- 3.4 Summary
- 3.5 Questions
- 3.6 Suggested Readings

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### 3.0 Objectives

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The present study seeks to understand

1. The long years of struggle which ended the dynastic rule in China and the emergence of People's Republic of China.
2. The Chinese Foreign Policy during Cold War & Post Cold War era.
3. The enhanced role of China in its intention of building a multipolar world

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### 3.1 Introduction

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It was on 1 October, 1949 People's Republic of China was born after long years of struggle under the leadership of Mao Ze Dong. If one looks at the history of China it can be found that for thousands of years China was under different dynasties like Shang, the Chou and the Manchu dynasties. It was in 1911 under the leadership of Sun Yat Sen with the revolutionary uprising taking place, the Chinese dynastic rule under the Manchus came to an end. In 1912 a temporary government was established in Nanking with Sun Yat Sen as its President. Afterwards, he had to handover the power to Yuan Shi Kai under pressure. Sun Yat resigned and established a Kuomintang Government or a nationalist government after unifying some nationalist forces. In 1916 with the death of Yuan, situations became tensed and warlords became powerful. There was instability and disturbances which were going out of control. Sun Yat Sen in 1919 amidst such chaotic situation declared a republican government led by the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) in Canton as the real nationalist government.

Meanwhile after the First World War China felt betrayed by the Allied powers by their false promises and tacit consent to Japanese authority over China. Against the imperialist aggression of Japan and western attitude on May 4, 1919, a huge mass revolution was organized in which a large section of intellectuals and students participated. In Russia already in 1917 the Bolshevik

revolution had taken place under the leadership of Communist Party of Russia. This had a great impact on the intellectuals and workers in China. As a result in different places communist and socialist leagues started to be formed. On 1 July, 1921 in Shanghai, the first Party Congress of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was held. This Party Congress officially declared the establishment of Chinese Party. After the conclusion of proceedings of national congress, Mao Ze Dong was elected as the Chairman of CCP of Hunan district. Since then Mao steadily moved centre stage in Chinese Politics.

At around this time, in 1925 Sun Yat Sen died & was succeeded by Chiang Kai-shek as the leader of Kuomintang. Soon after assuming power Chiang came down heavily on the Communists. He started persecuting the Communists yet under Mao's leadership the Communists started organizing rebellions in different places. On 1 August, 1927, the first Communist armed forces, the Red Army was formed and it organized peasants' rebellions in different places. In 1930 after such an uprising Chiang wanted to crush the Communists completely. However, in 1931 with the Japanese attack on China, he got busy in repelling the Japanese attacks. During 1932-1936 it could be seen that under Mao both the Communist Party and the 'Red Army' was growing from strength to strength. In 1935 Mao Ze Dong was elected as the Chairman of the Politburo of the in Communist Party. In 1936 Mao proposed to Chiang to unite and resist Japan but he rejected it outright. When Chiang was unable to resist Japan's massive attack on China he had to comply with Mao's proposal and deployed Red Army. But after fighting a few battles Chiang again began his policy of opposing Communist Party and deployed his forces to encircle and attack the popular forces.

With the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and Japanese surrender, the Second World war came to an end and with it China breathed a sigh of relief as the enemy was denigrated. Soon after the enemy being removed from the scenario, Chiang again, with the intent of eliminating the Communist Party, launched massive attacks on liberated areas under the sway of Communist forces. At the end, however, the Red Army stood victorious and captured more than 5 lakhs Kuomintang troops. Red Army in January 1949 captured Beijing and Nanking as well as a greater part of China. Ultimately on 1 October, 1949, Mao Ze Dong proclaimed in Peking the formation of People's Republic of China. Chiang Kai-shek had no other option but to flee to Formosa (Taiwan). He fled protected by the American 7th fleet to Formosa and formed the government of Republic of China (ROC) there.

Since 1949 Mao has been an unparalleled leader in Chinese politics. Almost from 1949 to 1976, Chinese foreign policy had followed the course as shown by Mao. This module therefore, focuses on the Chinese foreign policy during Mao days as well as China's role in international politics in the Post-Mao era. For the purpose of understanding the role of China in contemporary world politics, the module has been divided into sections on Chinese Foreign Policy during Cold War and Chinese Foreign Policy during the Post-Cold War era. Under these sections Chinese foreign policy during Mao and under Mao's successors have been discussed with special emphasis on China's relation with other major powers of the world.

### 3.2 Chinese Foreign Policy during the Cold War

The emergence of People's Republic of China (PRC) after a long bloody struggle and ascent of Mao Ze Dong as an unparalleled leader is a noteworthy event which took place in the international sphere. The international domain was already engulfed by the Cold War taking place between USA and USSR. PRC was born amidst the heydays of Cold war. Thus they confronted the question of joining one of the two blocs. Given its sufferings due to imperialistic designs of the West during the First and the Second World War, China grew a strong opposition towards the imperialist powers. In fact, US was singled out as a major adversary especially because of US role in Taiwan. China therefore, initially drew closer to Soviet Union and other socialist countries especially with the outbreak of the Korean crisis of 1950 and American response. However, the bonhomie with Soviet Union was short-lived and soon both were engaged in hostilities. The year 1962 marked the beginning of bitter relations with the Soviet Union. On one hand the placement of missiles in Cuba targeting American cities by Russia resulting in the Cuban Missile crisis was not supported by China. On the other hand both these countries got involved in border skirmishes along the Ussuri River in 1962. Thus the two powers drifted apart from 1962 onwards. Further, China declared itself as a nuclear powered state after conducting a nuclear explosion in Cop Nor desert in 1964. In 1968, the Soviet troops invaded Czechoslovakia, on the ground of crushing a democratic movement when Alexander Dubchek wanted to move away from Soviet-style repressive communism and usher in democratic principles. This was known as 'Prague Spring' which was brutally crushed by Soviet Union. Already a staunch critic of Soviet grip over the global communist movement China vehemently opposed such a move of the Soviet Union. Therefore, it can be said that in 1950s and early 1960s China aligned with the Soviet Union to balance USA and from 1962 onwards it started sending feelers to USA to balance off Soviet Union.

In the international sphere too there were certain changes which helped to smoothen the relationship between USA and China. PRC longed for entry into the United Nations as well as a permanent seat in the Security Council. Till 1970, Nationalist China or Taiwan enjoyed this position in the UN. Due to American opposition PRC was not being able to make entry into the UN. It was on 1 January, 1971, that PRC was recognized as member of UN and got a permanent seat in the UNSC in place of Taiwan. Thereafter, relationship between the two went for further betterment. Both send their Ping Pong players as a symbol of diplomatic good relation which came to be known as 'Ping Pong Diplomacy'. This marked the beginning of Sino-US detente. In 1972 Nixon-Kissinger duo took real interest to establish relations with China on a better track. It was due to Kissinger's (the Secretary of State) earnest efforts that Nixon visited Beijing which formally marked the beginning of detente between the two countries. In a joint statement both sides pledged to establish diplomatic level contacts very shortly.

There were sure compulsions which became motivations for both sides to improve relations. China wanted to balance Soviet Union by coming closer to USA. USA on its part wanted a dignified exit from the Vietnam War as well as wanted to keep Russia under pressure which forced US to nurture better relations with China. China also had its own realization about the

doctrinaire pursuit of communism after the failure of the 'Great Leap Forward' and 'Cultural Revolution' around 1966-1969. China also felt that it cannot benefit much if it remains isolated in world economy, just for the sake of being anti-imperialist in its policies.

China wanted to establish contacts with third world countries too. With this objective in mind, China supported Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) though initially, it was opposed to NAM as viewed it as policy of 'leaning of one side'. However, it changed its mind and supported NAM in order to gradually solidify its position as a leader of this bloc. China participated in the Bandung Conference of NAM in 1955. However, with countries like India, Indonesia, Yugoslavia, African states like Burundi, Ghana and Central African Republic, Kenya and even some Latin American countries, China gradually severed its relations. China tried to become friendly with Cuba but without much success as Cuba remained committed to the Soviet Union even after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.

Specifically with India, China estranged its relation following the Indo-China war of 1962. India was badly defeated in the war and though the war ended but the relation between the two was damaged. China's clandestine activities of supplying nuclear fissile materials to Pakistan have embittered India's relation with China. Border dispute with China is still a non-resolved issue. In 1960 China's aggression on Tibet and Dalai Lama's flight to India and asylum here created bitterness between the two. Further, during 1965 Indo-Pak war China went against India and 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War and India's role in it was opposed by China. In 1974 India's Pokhran explosion made it a nuclear empowered state and though this had not made China take India seriously yet, the relation between the two hardly improved.

In South-East Asia Chinese foreign policy attitude is viewed by many countries of this region as an effort to expand its hegemony. Vietnam has been a point of antagonism and Soviet Union's backing which helped in the anti-Pol Pot interventions over Cambodia by Vietnam angered China. Even with its border with Vietnam China had problems.

The foreign policy of China under Mao, if examined closely, it will be difficult to discern and identify any determinate course. China wanted to assume the leadership of Third world but without much success. Overall the impression that can be made is that China became a loner and almost an isolated country. China though had established relations with USA but on a greater part was critical about US imperialistic policies. It was opposed to Soviet Union as a perpetrator of Socialist imperialism. Thus it was not an easy relationship with both the Super powers. China was estranged in international relations and as well as existed as an inscrutable power which did not benefit China politically or economically.

Post-Mao, when Deng Xiao Ping assumed leadership, though not formally, accepting any position of the state but as the Chairman of CPPCC National Committee in March 1978, changed the whole course of Chinese foreign policy as well as economy. Under his guidance Chinese foreign policy became more realistic. He realized that isolationism in world politics will not bring either political or economic dividends to PRC. The developed economies had reservations for the 'closed economy' model of Chinese economy. Deng gave a new face to China economy with his Socialist Market Economy (SME) model which could be said to be in line with international politics and economy. The success of the state-controlled liberal economy in China, manifested

through its economic growth rate, made China very attractive destination for foreign investment. China also recorded a high economic growth rate.

Thus from 1980s it can be seen that economic performance of Chinese economy helped it play a significant role in global politics. With the Soviet aggression of Afghanistan in 1979, Chinese reaction grew increasingly critical. China also had bitterness with USA over American supply of weapons to Taiwan. China at long last turned towards improving relations with the Soviet Union. Around 1982 Brezhnev was also eager to normalize the tense relation between the two countries. This was followed by a number of high level meetings between the leaders of USSR and China. These meetings led to the conclusion of a number of agreements for economic, technical, and scientific cooperation. In 1986 a significant accord was signed through which both sides agreed to increase cooperation in the areas of science, culture, health and sports. In the same year Soviet Union in another bid to normalize relations with China offered to withdraw 6000 troops from Afghanistan. Both countries concluded a treaty for mutual contact and cooperation. Subsequently, Soviet Union was permitted to open its Consulate General in Shanghai after a very long time. In 1989 the Sino-Soviet relations took a new height when Soviet Union not only gave an indication of withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan but also announced the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. It must be noted at this point that the normalization of relation between the two was possible because of ascendancy of Mikhail Gorbachev as the President of Russia and his 'New Thinking'. Gorbachev paid an official visit to China in May 1989. Prior to his visit, Soviet Union declared the withdrawal of around 5,00,000 troops from its border with China which further improved the relation of the two countries.

Simultaneously, China made efforts to improve relations with the US. Both countries made endeavours to forge cooperation in economic, commercial and military fields. As a result both concluded a five-year agreement in 1983 by which China and US pledged to upgrade the bilateral trade, including textile exports. The two countries strengthened their relations and a number of major US oil companies signed off shore oil exploration contracts. In 1984 during US President Ronald Reagan's visit to China a number of major agreements for greater cooperation in the economic and scientific fields were signed. In the military sphere too there was a great deal of cooperation. USA agreed in principle to sell TOW anti-tank and Hawk anti-aircraft missiles to China. However, American arms sales to Taiwan and delay of the US Senate to ratify the NPT created little bit of irritation between the two.

1988 saw another bout of tense relation between the two countries following the Tiananmen Square massacre by the Government forces over innocent protesters. President Bush ordered suspension of all government to government sales and commercial exports of weapons to China. He not only suspended visit between senior US officials and Chinese military personnel but also threatened to ask the international institutions to suspend new loans to China. However, Sino-US relations showed improvement around 1990s when most of the sanctions against China were withdrawn by the US. Chinese foreign Minister was also invited to Washington and Chinese officials held trade talks with their Chinese counterpart. This improvement of relations was possible because China endorsed the US sponsored UN SC resolution sanctioning the use of force on Iraq to pressurize Iraq to pull out its forces from Kuwait.



Around this time international scenario was witness to an unprecedented historic event and that was the disintegration of Soviet Union. With the collapse of Soviet Union the Cold War was thought to have ended. By this time China has proved itself to be a power to reckon with in the international sphere. In the post-Cold War era, America too takes cognizance of China as an important power because undoubtedly China enjoys substantial economic leverage in the contemporary international political economy.

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### 3.3 Chinese Foreign Policy during the Post-Cold War era

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In the Post-Cold War era the Chinese economy registered a spectacular economic growth. During the 1958-59 'Great Leap Forward' devastated agriculture. Consequently the GDP started falling in 1960-62. Again in 1967-68 production was undermined by the 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution' which was initiated by Mao in mid-1966. However, in 1969-70 Chinese economy registered high growth rate following restoration of order after the 'Cultural Revolution'. With Deng Xiao Ping's SME model the economy got a boost in a big way. By 1983-85 double digit real GDP growth accompanied the first wave of foreign investment into China and development of non-state enterprises. Even during the global economic crisis since 2008, Chinese economy is showing a robust performance. During 2010-11 China's GDP stood at 10.4%, 2011-12 it stood at 9.35, 2012-13 GDP was 7.7% and during 2013-14 China's GDP was 7.7%. This economic performance of China has been an integral factor behind its assumption of major role in international politics. In a unipolar world after the collapse of Soviet Union, America is a major factor in world politics but China tries to maintain a balancing relation with both America and Russia at present.

Even before the collapse of Soviet Union, both the countries were taking initiatives to normalize their relations. The initiatives took shape in the form of high level visits and meetings. From Kosygin to Gorbachev, various Heads of States of Russia paid official visit to China and has taken efforts to ease tensions between the two countries on several critical bilateral issues like border related problems. In 1991 the Sino-Russian Border Agreement was signed apportioning territory that became controversial and caused a serious border conflict during the Cold War. In 1994 they signed seven accords relating to administering border, economic and scientific cooperation, maritime transport and environment pollution control and other important sectors. Further improvement of relation took place when Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev visited China in 1995. Events took a positive turn especially in the year 1996 when Russian President Boris Yeltsin visited China in April 1996. 14 agreements were concluded between the two countries. In December 1996 Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng visited Russia and indicated a desire of creating a multipolar world and in this effort expressed solidarity with Russia.

Therefore, relations became quite cordial in the Post Cold War era. The positive spirit was taken forward by Valdimir Putin when he became the President of Russia from 2000. Putin visited China in 2000 and signed three important economic and trade agreements with China. Infact Russia became the largest supplier of defence equipments to China since 2001. In 2001

again Russia and China signed a very significant agreement and their relation was formalized with the Treaty of Good Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation'. Further, both countries in 2001 created the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with the Central Asia Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The prime motive behind the formation of SCO is to ward off growing American/Western influence in this region and to balance off the West especially the US.

At the same time China was also keen not to complicate its relations with America. Though China's policy towards Taiwan and its advocacy of 'One China Policy' is incompatible with American policy of supplying arms to Taiwan and America's continuous backing of Taiwan in its disputes with China yet both countries are careful in nurturing good relations with each other. The Tiananmen massacre had embittered the relations between the two but later ratification of NPT by China in 1992 and enlargement of economic cooperation between the two countries helped to establish a better relation between them. Chinese exports to the U.S. rose from \$100 billion in 2000 to \$296 billion in 2009, while imports rose from \$16 billion to \$70 billion and in 2014 exports to the U.S. was about \$ 124 billion and imports was \$466 billion.

In 2001 with the American support China made an entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). Barack Obama during his official visit to China in 2009 acknowledged the growing importance of China in international sphere.

With Japan too China tried to improve its relations and for this serious diplomatic endeavours were made. Consequently, in 1992, Japanese Emperor Akihito visited China and this was the first of any Japanese Emperor to China. In 1993 Japan expressed regrets on behalf of its people for Japan's aggression over China during the Second World War. This gesture was enough to mould Chinese attitude towards Japan. Thereafter, relations improved and as per 2008 figures Japan has become the second largest trading partner of China after USA with a total volume of US\$266.8 billion.

As far as relation with India is concerned there have been several ups and downs. Several unresolved disputes involving border demarcation, Arunachal Pradesh, China's Policy towards Pakistan among other issues are irritants in their bilateral relations. Despite such complications in their neighbourhood, China has accommodated India in SCO to maintain stability in Central Asia and balance off US presence in this region. Even in BRICS, China with India and Russia are playing major role in international politics. In 2012 UNSC resolution to establish no-fly zone over Libya was not supported By Russia, China and India and all abstained from voting. China with its ambition of assuming regional leadership seems to have designs to make inroads into SAARC. Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh are lobbying hard for China's entry. However India has put up a strong opposition to any such move.

In contemporary international relations China's tactics and foreign policy initiatives are revealing the desire of China to assume a position of leadership in global politics. With this aim to balance off India, China is nurturing strategic relations with India's neighbours. Even in South East Asia it is making strong footsteps and therefore trying to establish contacts and enlarge political and economic cooperation with the states of this region. It has made its entry into ASEAN not only as an observer state but China is also an integral part of ASEAN+3, EAS and China-ASEAN 10+1 mechanism.

However, China's relations with the South east Asian states are not that cordial. There prevails a long standing dispute over rival and competing claims over South China Sea among these countries with China. China even has staked its claims almost over the entire 'Spratly Islands'. In 1974 it took away 'Paracel Islands' from Vietnam and still maintains its hold over this territory till today. Huge reserves of oil and natural gas has made South China Sea a lucrative region and also a hot bed of tensions. America is also making its presence felt in the South China Sea. It has increased its military presence in the Asia-Pacific. In future, that this region will be a hotspot of rivalry is unquestionable.

In conclusion it can be said that in the Post-Cold war era there has been an enhanced role of China and gradually it has come to acquire the status of a major power in world politics. China is intent on building up a multipolar world as well as establish a balance of power system where its primacy is acknowledged. With this objective China is playing an important role in BRICS, SCO, United Nation, Climate Conferences and other international fora. The main architect of an economically strong China of course is Deng Xiao Ping. China now has such an economic and political leverage in global politics that America has been forced to acknowledge the growing importance of China.

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### 3.4 Summary

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After a long bloody struggle under the leadership of Mao Ze Dong People's republic of China emerged on 1 October, 1949. Since 1949 Mao has been an unparalleled leader in Chinese politics. Chinese foreign policy during Mao days had followed the course as shown by Mao. China was born at a time when Cold War between the two Super powers has already started. Therefore, China had to be calculative regarding its attitude towards both the blocs. Initially, China leaned towards Soviet Union but with the border skirmishes along the Ussuri River in 1962, China became more interested in developing relations with America.

Post-Mao China saw Deng Xiao Ping become the leader of CPPCC National Committee. He changed Mao's policy to a great extent whether in terms of economy or in terms of political courses. Chinese economy showed a healthy performance and from 1980s onwards China began to play significant role in international politics. With the Super powers China had both sweet and sour relations. In the Post-Cold War era China has emerged politically and economically as an important power. To maintain its clout in international politics China is bent on creating a multipolar world and a balance of power system just to contain American hegemonism.

Therefore in various international fora China is playing an important role. China is making an all out effort to maintain its emerging role of a super power in the forth coming centuries.

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### 3.5 Questions

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#### Essay Type Questions

1. What were the main directions of Chinese Foreign Policy during cold war era?

2. Discuss the changes in Chinese Foreign Policy during the Post Cold War era.
3. Examine the guiding principles of Chinese Foreign Policy during Mao's era.
4. 'Chinese Foreign Policy during Post Mao's era underwent significant changes'–Enumerate the major changes.

#### **Medium type Questions**

1. Write the major features of Chinese Foreign Policy during Cold War era.
2. Discuss the role of China in the Post cold War World.

#### **Short Questions**

1. What was the strategy adopted by China to establish its relations with the other Third World Countries?
2. Write short notes on Koumintang & Tienanmen Square Massacre.

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### **3.6 Suggested Readings**

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1. Lampton David M., "The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000", Stanford University Press, 2001.
2. Nau Henry R. & Ollapally Deepa M., "Worldviews of Aspiring Powers: Domestic Foreign Policy Debates in China, India, Iran, Japan and Russia", Oxford University Press, 2010.
3. Sharif Shuja, "Pragmatism in Chinese Foreign Policy", *Contemporary Review*, Vol.2 No. 1684, Spring 2007.
4. Venkat Raman, G., "India in China's Foreign Policy", *China: An International Journal*, Vol. 9, No. 2, September 2011.
5. Mosca Matthew W., "From Frontier Policy to Foreign Policy: The Question of India and the Transformation of Geopolitics in Qing China", Stanford University Press, 2013.
6. Lanteigne Marc, "Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction", Routledge, New York, 2008.

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## Unit 4 □ Russia in Contemporary World Politics

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### Structure

- 4.0 Objectives
- 4.1 Introduction
- 4.2 Russian Foreign Policy during Cold War Days
- 4.3 Yeltsin and Russia's Foreign Policy
- 4.4 Putin and Russia in contemporary world politics
- 4.5 Summary
- 4.6 Questions
- 4.7 Suggested Readings

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### 4.0 Objectives

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The present study focuses on the following:

1. Russian Foreign Policy during the cold war days.
2. How the post world war foreign policy was determined largely by Cold War calculations?
3. With Putin in power how Russia made its sturdy presence in the international politics.

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### 4.0 Introduction

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On 25 December 1991, with the disintegration of former USSR the Russian Federation emerged. Many identify 1991 as the end of the Cold War. In the context of the end of the Cold War it is important to ascertain the role of Russia under these changed circumstances. In the present unipolar world Russia is determined to hold on its erstwhile global leadership position. With this objective in mind the contemporary international relations has adopted various strategies and postures in its foreign policy orientation. The supremacy of the US and the emergence of China as an important power have forced Russia to give a fresh thought regarding its foreign policy and strategic moves. The emergence of international fora like the G-20, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), BRICS, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and others have been playing important role in international political economy. In such a context the stance of Russia must be examined. International organizations like the United Nations Organizations have witnessed an increased role of Russia in the Security Council. Moreover, Russia's relations with its neighbouring countries especially those which were part of erstwhile Soviet Union are also a subject of interest for many. The Russian animosity with Ukraine and also the shooting of the Malaysian airliner (2014) have triggered reactions in international politics.

Russia was fast in accepting the treaty obligations and bilateral relations of erstwhile Soviet

Union; yet in the initial stage Russia was staggering to find a proper and cognizable foreign policy. Gradually, Russia over the years have moved towards a matured foreign policy. Thus many a times USA and Russia are again finding themselves at loggerhead on various issues. This reminds one of the Cold War days. Therefore, under such complex situation it is important to analyze the role of Russia in contemporary politics. This unit will go into discussing Russia's foreign policy during Cold War days, post-Cold War days and doing so will analyze Yeltsin days and Putin's Presidency and Russian foreign policy have been analyzed.

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## 4.1 Russian Foreign Policy during Cold War Days

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Before going into details about contemporary Russian foreign policy it will be pertinent to examine the Russian foreign policy during the Cold War days. Immediately after the end of Second World War, once allies and fighting on the Allied side, US and USSR became the worst of enemies as they got entangled in the Cold War. Both were aspiring to acquire global leadership.

With the beginning of the Cold War the world witnessed a division along the lines of the two Super Powers. Both became aggressively interested in maintaining their 'sphere of influence' and likewise pursued ingenious policies/strategies. The world politics came to have the beginning of bipolarism which continued till the disintegration of Soviet Union. West European states like West Germany, Sweden, Austria and others were under the sway of America whereas East European Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Finland and others were under Russian influence. To contain communism, USA introduced 'Truman Doctrine' and 'Marshall Plan' to induce East European states to come under its 'sphere of influence' in the name of development financial aid for development and economic reconstruction. Russia's answer to these was 'Molotov Plan'. Further, the already bitter relations became worst with the Berlin Blockade of 1948. The ultimate result was the formation of a military pact under the leadership of USA in 1949—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The animosity between these two Super Powers were not limited to Europe only. It extended to other parts of the world too. Asia was another hotbed of super-power rivalry. In 1950, the two super powers had tensed relations regarding the Korean crisis. Added to this was the crisis in Indo-China especially Vietnam and China's involvement, US policy towards Taiwan and Suez Crisis which further fuelled the animosity between the two. During this time a number of security and military agreements were signed. The noteworthy among them were ANZUS (1951), South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO, 1954), Middle East Defence Organization (MEDO, 1955), Baghdad Pact (1955) among others. These were all formed under the American initiative. An answer to these was Soviet sponsored WARSAW Pact signed in 1955.

However, relations between the two Super Powers became explosive in 1962 and the world was almost on the verge of another world war and this time a nuclear war. The looming danger of imminent war centred around Cuba. This episode is known in history as the 'Cuban Missile Crisis'. Sanity prevailed at the end and the world was saved from a nuclear holocaust. Both super powers realized the futility of war and ushered in an era of temporary peace or detente.

From 1962-1979 can be said to be the period of detente. Still there were tensions even during the period of detente. Tensions cropped up centering around Czechoslovakia (1967), India-Pakistan war (1965-66) and Arab-Israeli war (1973). In 1979 with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan detente came to an end and there started the New Cold War. Around this time relations became worst due to Soviet activities in Angola, Mozambique and Namibia. Under the US President Ronald Reagan the New Cold War reached new heights with his Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) or Star Wars and Reagan identified Russia as an 'Evil Empire'.

With the coming of Gorbachev as the Russian President and his 'New Thinking' the relations between the two Super Powers gradually eased. He not only tried to bring in economic reform but also political reform too. His policies of 'Glasnost' and 'Perestroika' made him acceptable towards the US. His new thinking induced Russia to loosen control over East European states. Russia also tried to mend fences with China and USA. As a result in October 1986 Reagan and Gorbachev met at the Reykjavik Summit and discussed important issues regarding global politics as well as bilateral relation. Following this Summit, in 1987, during his visit to USA, Gorbachev signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty (INF). In 1991 during the Moscow Summit two countries signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START).

However, things started moving fast in Russia's domestic politics. Dramatically, Gorbachev was deposed by a bloodless military coup and Boris Yeltsin became the President of Russia. Simultaneously, troubles started fermenting in the countries on southern periphery of Russia. Gradually, Russia headed towards disintegration as one after another Armenia, Azerbaijan, Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia and others declared their independence. Even after disintegration of Soviet Union, the Russian Federation is still the largest state in the world and in contemporary international relations also no one can deny the important role being played by Russia.

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## 4.2 Yeltsin and Russia's Foreign Policy

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Boris Yeltsin became the first Russian President in the post-disintegration Russia. It can be said in the post-Cold War era he became the first leader to set the tone of the Russian Foreign policy. However, an analysis of his initial stages of foreign policy posture will show that Russian foreign policy lacked direction and in many cases failed to come out of the shadow of former Soviet Union. In the post-Cold War era the prerogatives for Russia were efforts to tide of domestic economic crisis as well as finding a respectable position in global politics as it lost the earlier position of being a Super Power and the world became unipolar.

The first step which Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev took in 1992 was sidelining Gorbachev's 'New Thinking' and formulating foreign policies in a different way. Therefore, democratic principles rather than socialist principles became the guiding principles. National interest was to be the determinant rather than socialist principles of former Soviet Union. Keeping these in mind Russia became eager to establish good relations with the West especially with the US. Yeltsin wanted to go far beyond 'rapprochement' and establish 'partnership' with the US. The compulsion of such 'Atlanticist' leaning was obviously the economic burden.

Therefore, in the initial stages it can be seen that Russia had a pro-Western foreign policy outlook. In 1992 Yeltsin and Bush (Sr.) signed the 'Charter of Russian-American Partnership and Friendship'. The objective of this Treaty was 'indivisibility of the security of North America and Europe' and a joint resolution was adopted which aimed at 'democracy, the supremacy of law...and support for human rights.' However its pro-West policy failed to reap benefits and American aid was too little to tide over the economic crisis. Therefore, there was severe criticism from different quarters for unclear direction less foreign policy which failed to deliver good to the society.

Thus in 1992, Kozyrev presented before the Russian Parliament or 'Supreme Soviet' a draft foreign policy thinking with his concept of **three main foreign policy objectives** but it was rejected. He made another attempt to pass another draft plan but that too faced severe criticisms.

Ultimately in April 1993 the Inter Departmental Foreign Policy Commission, a creation of 'Security Council', finalized an idea of Russia's foreign policy which got a nod from the Parliament. According to the 1993 foreign policy concept, the foreign policy priorities can be enumerated as: ensuring national security through diplomacy; protecting the sovereignty and unity of the state, with special emphasis on border stability; protecting the rights of Russians abroad; providing favorable external conditions for internal democratic reforms; mobilizing international assistance for the establishment of a Russian market economy and assisting Russian exporters; furthering integration of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and pursuing beneficial relations with other nearby foreign states, including those in Central Europe; continuing to build relations with countries that have resolved problems similar to those that Russia faces; and ensuring Russia an active role as a great power.

Russia now concentrated on its relation with the CIS countries. As these states were formerly parts of the 'Southern periphery' of erstwhile Soviet Union. With the loss of these states Russia lost control over the territory, natural outlets and access to sea lanes. Thus with the new foreign policy in place in 1993 there was a growing intention of creating a consolidated strong 'Unified Military Strategic Space' within the CIS. The sole objective was to protect Russia's national interest in these areas.

Still there was lack of direction and over all consistency was missing from Russian foreign policy. The trend which is discernable is that during the initial phase, that is in the early nineteen nineties Russia followed a policy of appeasement towards the West especially towards the West. In the second stage around 1993-1994, Russia's foreign policy became more nationalistic. The involvement of Russia in the Bosnian and Serbian crisis were quite contrary to the stance adopted by the West. However, Yeltsin, under domestic pressure as well as international pressure following NATO attacks on Kosovo he agreed to the peace process. In next stage, that is from 1995-96 Russia reverted to its policy of appeasement towards the West. Around this time Russia also thought of developing better relations with the international fora like the G-7, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), United Nations and NATO too. Still Russia got worried about the expansion of NATO trying to gradually get the Central Asian Republics into its fold. Russia, however, aimed at building a 'real partnership in all directions' and likewise



started cultivating relations with the US, European states, China, India and South Africa. Yeltsin made it clear that between the CIS states and the West, Russia will follow a 'balance of interest' in its foreign policy.

The new age in Russian foreign policy started with re-election of Yeltsin in 1996. Now in the office of Foreign Minister Kozyrev and Defence Minister Pavel Grachev, Yury Primakov was appointed as Foreign Minister and General Alexander Lebed as National Security Advisor. With their appointment Russian foreign policy became more realistic. However due to high ambition and attempted coup d'etat, General Lebed was removed later. Primakov continued as Foreign Minister till 1998 and from 1998 he became the Prime Minister of Russia. Despite his best efforts he found it difficult to conduct Russian foreign policy due to lack of coordination among the administrative units of Yeltsin. Still Yeltsin administration formulated a draft foreign policy objectives of Russia which highlighted the intention of Russia to drop the idea of achieving strategic and military parity with the US, nuclear disarmament and concept of collective security within the CIS.

Around this time Russian foreign policy got a jolt because of the Kosovo war and NATO bombing and relations with the West became bitter. From 1994 the problem with Chechnya and lack of control on Grozny had already created tensions with the West. Ultimately under international pressure Yeltsin announced cease fire with Chechnya in 1996.

Yeltsin was also disturbed by the sad state of economy and therefore, he started a second wave of privatization with an objective of cash infusion into the economy. As a result very few influential persons got hold of government property at a really low price. They became the 'oligarchs' in the Russian economy and became very powerful. Economy could not be retrieved and conditions continued to be precarious. Situations slipped out of control of Yeltsin and under him Russia failed to play the role of Super Power in international politics. The transition from socialism to democratic system was not a successful one. At the end, suddenly on 31 December, 1999, Boris Yeltsin declared his resignation. It was Vladimir Putin who succeeded Yeltsin as the next President of Russia.

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### 3 Putin and Russia in Contemporary World

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Putin became the President of Russia after Yeltsin from 2000-04, 2004-08 and 2010-till today. He is keeping his mark as a strong statesman in global arena. Only during a brief period from 2007-09-10 he was the Prime Minister of Russia during the Presidency of Medvedev.

Putin brought out his foreign policy ideas in his 'Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation' (FPCR). On 28 June, 2000 by a Presidential consent FPCR was accepted. The main points of this concept were that in a unipolar world the unilateral strategies might create disturbances and instability so Russia would put its efforts to create a multipolar world. Thus Russia under Putin was trying to regain its lost position. Putin quite strongly put his reins on the domestic politics as well as foreign relations. He also made efforts to revitalize the economy and took several reformative measures.

Yeltsin already had been carrying on measures for liberalizing economy of Russia. Thus Putin could take advantage of the new market policies of Yeltsin era. In 1999 Russia's GDP touched 6.4%. From 2000 Putin started his second generation market reforms. His innovative tax reform, small to medium industry policies and agricultural policies had helped to reinvigorate the Russian economy. Simultaneously, Russian economy also got a boost from the soaring price of crude oil which increased the earnings for the economy. In reality, Russia was earning from sale of oil, natural gas, electricity and above all arms to different countries of the world. This gave a sigh of relief to the Russian economy. However, around 2003-04, the economy got a jolt as Putin started to move away from the reforms. This had a negative impact on the economy. He began another round of 'renationalization' programme. By using this policy he took over huge oil companies, like the Yukos Oil Company which was brought under governmental control. Till 2008 Russian economy was standing somewhat at a standard level. With the global melt beginning in 2008 and the ensuing worldwide economic crisis Russian economy trembled. In 2013 Russia's GDP stood at 1.3%. In 2014 with the accession of Crimea into Russia there was a fresh round of international antagonism which was followed by a bout of economic sanctions. The ultimate result was that Russia's already staggering economy became more paralyzed by such sanctions. Putin obviously lost no time to show that these were steps taken by the West to put him into trouble.

As far as international politics is concerned from 2000 onwards Russia had started to play an important role. In 2001 soon after the September 9/11 attacks on the US and in the event of the 'War on Terror' and attacks on Afghanistan, Russia allowed US and its allies to establish military bases in Central Asia. However, with the US readying up for an attack upon Iraq, Russia raised its voice and also wanted the US to remove sanctions from Iraq. After some time in reality America conceded to the Russian demand and removed the sanctions on Iraq partially. On 26 May, 2002, Russia and America signed the 'Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT) or the 'Moscow Treaty'.

Russia was not prepared to accept the cessation of Kosovo from Serbia and this created differences with the West. Added with this was the apprehension about the expansion of NATO to the Central Asian states. The huge reserve of oil and gas in the Central Asian states and the Caspian Sea region have made the West especially the US interested in this region. To materialize its designs in this region the US using the NATO is gradually intruding into this area. Under the NATO initiative 'Partnership for Peace (PFP) Programmes' have started with some Central Asian states. 'Individual Partnership Actions Plans' (IPAPS) have started with Georgia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Russia has become apprehensive of such activities of NATO in this region and it got entangled in some sort of conflict with the states of this region. Thus in 2008 Russia-Georgia minor war was fought over South Ossetia. In 2014 Crimea has been a hot bed of tension between Ukraine and Russia. Till 1954 Crimea was a part of Russia. Till 1954 Crimea was within Russia but was kept as a part of Ukraine. When Soviet Union disintegrated Crimea became an 'Autonomous Republic of Crimea' within Ukraine. On 11 March 2014 through a lot of conflictual process and a referendum Crimea acceded to Russia. The West and the US were antagonized by the entire process. They have retaliated by imposing a series of economic sanctions on Russia.

Chechnya has also been a longstanding problem and a point of bitterness with the West. The First Chechen War began in 1994, when Russian forces entered Chechnya to "restore

constitutional order” and this was condemned by the West. The Second Chechen War is said to have started during 1999-2000 which ultimately stopped after the establishment of a pro-Russian government in Chechnya and in 2003, a referendum was held on a constitution that reintegrated Chechnya within Russia with limited autonomy. However, actions of Putin’s officials were ruthless in establishing order behind the lines in the early months of his campaign in Chechnya and it was like genocide. The West has been critical of storming of Grozny by Russian troops.

In 2011 with the ‘jasmine revolution’ taking place in North Africa and ensuing troubles in these countries especially like Libya, Syria and Yemen, the US wanted the UNSC to take actions against them. As the US wanted to move a proposal for taking actions by the UNSC over Libya, Russia along with China, India and a few other countries abstained from voting. In case of US sponsored UNSC proposals against Syria, Russia and China had vetoed in recent past. Again under the Russian initiative a number of international organizations/arrangements are playing important role in international political economy. To mention a few like Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), NATO-Russia Council, BRICS, Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), G-8, G-20, AP’EC and the United Nations.

Coming to recent times the Ukrainian crisis and the shooting of the Malaysian plane was critically viewed by the West and the US. Thus during the G-20 Summit in Australia, Putin had to face many uncomfortable moments as well as remarks. Post accession of Crimea into Russia and ensuing economic sanctions has created again tensions with the US and the West. Therefore, it is to be seen how future relations between Russia and the West take shape.

A point to be noted is that although Indo-US relations are showing an upswing yet Russia has not taken any radical policy towards India. On his visit to India in December 2014, Putin made it clear that friendship with India is a time-tested one and established on solid base, on the other hand, Iran’s nuclear programme and Russia’s debatable role have always been a bitter point between the US and Russia. Still Russia neither has taken up any aggressive stance nor has it gone into conflict with the US. Thus what seems to be clear that while Russia might have a number of contentious issues with the West especially the US yet it has kept off from any sort of conflictual relations with them. On the other hand to counter the American hegemony Russia is trying to create a balance of power by teaming up with countries like China and India.

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## 4.4 Summary

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On 25 December 1991 the erstwhile Soviet Union collapsed and the Russian Federation was born. This signaled the end of Cold war in international politics. In a unipolar world initially Russia faced troubles to adjust its changing stature in international sphere but gradually it has moved towards a matured foreign policy posture and has been successful in making its presence felt in international politics.

Post-Second World War Russia’s foreign policy to a great extent was determined by Cold war calculations as both the Super powers got entangled in a scuffle for conquering the world and establishing their own sphere of influences. However, Gorbachev’s ascendancy as the

Russian President ushered in a new era in the US-Soviet relationship with his 'New Thinking'. With the sudden removal of Gorbachev and assumption of office by Yeltsin, the relationship between the two countries reached new levels. Meanwhile in 1991 Soviet Union had collapsed and Post-disintegration, the first President of Russian Federation was Boris Yeltsin. During his time the Russian foreign policy seemed to be directionless and confused. However, with the coming of Putin to power, Russia is making a strong presence in international politics. Russian is playing quite a significant role in various international fora and is cooperating with India and China to balance off American hegemony. Recently, annexation of Crimea into Russia and the ongoing conflict with Ukraine has embittered Russia's relations with the West especially with the US. This has been ascribed by many analysts as the return of the Cold war.

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## 4.5 Questions

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### Essay Answers Type Questions

1. Discuss Russian Foreign Policy during Cold War Days.
2. Discuss Russia's Foreign Policy during Yeltsin's Presidency.

### Middle Answer Type Questions

1. Discuss Putin and Russia's role in contemporary world politics.
2. Discuss Russia's role in contemporary world politics.

### Short Answers Type Questions

1. What came to be known as 'Supreme Soviet'?
2. Write short notes on SCO, BRICS & CIS.
3. What was the compulsion behind Russia is adopting an 'Atlanticist' leaning in its formulation of foreign policy?

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## 4.6 Suggested Readings

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1. Nalbandov Robert "Not by Bread Alone: Russian Foreign Policy under Putin", Potomac Books, 2016.
2. Oliker Olga, Crane Keith, Schwartz Lowell H., Yusupov Catherine, "Russian Foreign Policy: Sources and Implications" Rand, 2009.
3. Emmanuelle Armandon, "Popular Assessments of Ukraine's Relations with Russia and the European Union under Yanukovich", *Demokratizatsiya*, Vol. 21, No. 2, Spring 2013.
4. Mankoff Jeffrey, "Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power", Rowman and Littlefield publishing Group, Inc., Maryland, 2009.
5. Sergunin Alexander (ed.), "Explaining Russian Foreign Policy Behavior: Theory and Practice", ibidem Press, Germany, 2016.
6. Kordonsky Simon, "Socio-Economic Foundation of the Russian Post-Soviet Regime: The Resource-Based Economy and Estate-Based Social Structure of Contemporary Russia", ibidem Press, Germany, April 2016.

## **Paper-VII**

### **Module-3**

## **International Relations**

### **Foreign Policy**

- Unit 1  Conceptual framework for understanding of Foreign Policy
- Unit 2  Determinants of Foreign Policy
- Unit 3  Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy- Interest Groups and Bureaucracy
- Unit 4  Decision Making in Foreign Policy

Paper-11  
Abstract  
International Relations

Foreign Policy

- 1. The government's foreign policy is based on the principle of non-alignment.
- 2. The government's foreign policy is based on the principle of peaceful co-existence.
- 3. The government's foreign policy is based on the principle of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.
- 4. The government's foreign policy is based on the principle of equality and mutual benefit.
- 5. The government's foreign policy is based on the principle of peaceful settlement of international disputes.

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# Unit 1 □ Conceptual Framework for Understanding Foreign Policy

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## Structure

- 1.0 Objectives
- 1.1 Introduction
- 1.2 Relevance of Foreign Policy Analysis in International Relations.
- 1.3 Definition(s) and Nature of Foreign Policy
- 1.4 Conceptual Frameworks of Understanding Foreign Policy
  - 1.4.1 Approaches stemming from a Structural Perspective
    - 1.4.1.1 Realism
    - 1.4.1.2 Neo-liberal Institutionalism
    - 1.4.1.3 Organizational Process Approaches
  - 1.4.2 Approaches grounded in an agency-based perspective
    - 1.4.2.1 Psychological and Cognitive Approaches
    - 1.4.2.2 Prospect Theory
    - 1.4.2.3 Bureaucratic Politics Approach
    - 1.4.2.4 Liberal Approach
  - 1.4.3 Approaches rooted in a Social-Institutional perspective
  - 1.4.4 Approaches rooted in an Interpretative Actor perspective
- 1.5 Other Typologies of Conceptual Frameworks of Foreign Policy
- 1.6 Problems and Possibilities of Synthesis of the Conceptual Framework
- 1.7 Summary
- 1.8 Questions
- 1.9 Suggested Readings

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## 1.0 Objectives

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The main objectives of studying this unit are—

- Helping you to understand the importance and relevance of Foreign Policy as a major subfield or sub-area of the greater theoretical field of International Relations.
- Making you aware of the present status of foreign policy in the greater arena of International Relations.
- Informing you about the nature of foreign policy in the light of up-to-date literature.

- Making you aware of the major conceptual frameworks for understanding foreign policy, and providing a conceptual grid for that.
- Apprising you of the approaches to foreign policy stemming from a structural perspective
- Apprising you of the approaches to foreign policy rooted in an agency based perspective
- Apprising you of the approaches to foreign policy anchored in a social institutional perspective
- Apprising you of the approaches to foreign policy arising from an interpretative act perspective.
- Informing you about the potentials and possibilities of various theories of International Relations like
- Underlining the difficulties and possibilities of a synthesis of these perspectives from a met-theoretical angle.

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## 1.1 Introduction

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Foreign policy is one sub-discipline of the general field of International Relations that concerns not only statesmen, politicians, bureaucrats, and elites; but even the common man whose fate is decided by often hidden activities in closed corridors of power. So it is necessary to gain knowledge of how, under what constraints, impulses and compulsions foreign policies arise and decisions are made. Alongside, one needs to know the major determinants of foreign policy making, and what are the types of politics involved in it are essential for students of International Relations. In this unit we would first introduce the concept of foreign policy, after which we would discuss different conceptual frameworks on offer for understanding foreign policy. This will help us trace out the most comprehensive and suitable conceptual framework for ourselves. But first we have to make it clear why in the disciplinary field of Political Science and especially in International Relations (IR) foreign policy analysis constitutes a very important area.

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## 1.2 Relevance of Foreign Policy Analysis in International Relations.

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A few words about the relevance of foreign policy as a subfield or sub-area is more important than it would appear to the uninitiated. This is because, as Walter Carlsnaes points out, in the 'magisterial' eight-volume *Handbook of Political Science*, published in 1975, the chapter on foreign policy written by Bernard C. Cohen and Scott A. Harris appeared not in the volume on International Politics, but in that on Policies and Policymaking'. And writing as late as in 2000 Carlsnaes had to admit that even after the naive optimism about the potentials of the field of IR, and the set-belief of the foreign policy analysts that 'they belong squarely to the scholarly domain of International Relations rather than to any of the policy sciences', it was difficult to say that 'the study of foreign policy currently enjoys an undisputed professional domicile within IR'. In support of his position Carlsnaes pointed out that in the contents of journals during the



previous decade there were few titles in which the concept of foreign policy figured in a big way. Rather, while enthusiasm for development of theory in IR spawned ever new theories and approaches at great speed, foreign policy never formed an important part of them 'in its own right'. The marginalization of foreign policy is evident in Alexander Wendt's claim that theories of international politics need to be distinguished from those concerned with 'explaining the behaviour of individual states or "theories of foreign policy". For instance, Kenneth Waltz, the famous proponent of neo-Realism, his preoccupation was with international politics and never foreign policy (Wendt, 1999: 11, in Carlsnaes: 2002, 331). Even some foreign policy scholars themselves are doubtful if their domain was still a dominant 'sub-field of International Relations', or if it had been rendered outmoded by other more sophisticated approaches seeking to understand and explain state behaviour (Brian White, 1999: 37, *ibid*, 331-323). German scholar finds the domain of foreign policy study the victim of a 'conceptual crisis' and caught up in a theoretical 'standstill' (Schneider, 1997: 332, *ibid*).

But in spite of these denunciations, and (self) doubts, foreign policy analysis has not been exiled from the theoretical precincts of IR. While in the Sage Handbook where Carlsnaes himself wrote, it has found a place in the section on 'Substantive Issues in International Relations', in the *Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, published six years later, foreign policy has received due disciplinary attention in the section on 'Bridging the Subfield Boundaries' together with International Political Economy', Strategic Studies', 'International Ethics', and 'International Law' (Christian Reus-Smit and Duncon Snidal, eds., 2008). Moreover, here the contributor has shown it as one of the most popular subfields of the discipline, for five reasons that will surprise prophets of gloom. The first is that study of foreign policy decision-making has an intrinsic attraction and appeal for IR students who are immensely interested in knowing how some momentous decisions which have shaped or changed the face of the world were or are taken (Stuart, 2008: 576).

In Stuart's view the second reason why foreign policy decision making claims a place in IR more important than other subfields of it, is its 'explicitly interdisciplinary nature'. It is subject to cross-fertilization from four social sciences, each of which supplies conceptual insights to it: power from Political Science; bureaucracy and authority from Sociology; planning, implementation and agency from Public Administration; and motives, personality types, group dynamics, perception and cognition from psychology. Besides, foreign policy decision making offers a fertile field for scholars of neuroscience and evolutionary biology to sharpen their analytical tools in an allied area.

The third reason why researches in foreign policy decision making may be appealing and helpful to IR scholars is that they draw attention to what we call 'middle range' theories, or 'manageable' theoretical 'slices' that exist between grandiose theories and rank empiricism.

The fourth reason why foreign policy studies have an edge over other subfields of IR as a dominant subfield is its extreme malleability to both changes in the international system and disciplinary responses of IR. The first generation of foreign policy scholars had discovered that their subject matter lay at an intersecting point between domestic politics and international relations. To that extent Kenneth Waltz's Neo-realist claim that of the three 'levels of analysis'

or 'images' of IR—the individual, the state, and the international system — the third was the proper field of disciplinary research, did not affect the legitimacy of foreign policy studies, since it could engage all the three levels. And when the state-centric model of IR started losing its primacy and appeal, it did not cripple studies of foreign policy. This is because the core of studies of foreign policy, its decisional dimension, was applicable equally to subnational, supranational and international levels, and scholars could adapt their methodologies and conceptual presuppositions to non-state, subnational and transnational actors without sacrificing their primary concern with international behaviour of sovereign states.

Fifthly, foreign policy decision making analysis proved ideally capable of building bridges between the 'academia and the policy making community'. Unlike many other subfields born and hatched in the academia and viewed with contempt and distrust by practitioners in the real world of politics— both domestic and external— foreign policy studies have had their roots in and recruits from both the academic and the political world (ibid, 576-77). This is quite natural because, the question 'Why do states — or, more precisely, those acting in the name of states— act as they do in the international arena?', is asked not only by students and scholars, but by policy makers as well, and this is one of the knottiest questions they all seek answer to. Jacobson and Zimmermann also add that whether this question is posed in the context of specific events or 'in the most general terms', it is as important for the 'academic specialist', as for the 'foreign policy practitioner', and for the common citizen who seeks to influence 'the practitioner's behavior' (Jacobson and Zimmermann: 3).

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### 1.3 Definition(s) and Nature of Foreign Policy

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But before progressing any further we should clarify what foreign policy means. For, unless we make the meaning of the concept or term clear enough for ourselves and our readers, all discussions of conceptual framework, determinants, sources of, and decision making in foreign policy will be mired in confusion. We know that short definitions are likely to be hollow or inane. But still we will start with one bare and minimal, offered by Ernest Petrić, and then compare it with richer definitions. Petrić defines foreign policy as 'an activity of the state with which it fulfils its aims and interests within the international arena'. His aim is to provide explanations and additions from other authors to complement this minimal definition. These state that foreign policy is:

- A process and a system of activities initiated by a community of people organized by a State within the international arena, to influence it on lines with the aims and objectives of its political activities tied to its interests (Vladimir Benko).
- Decisions and activities that mainly concern relations between one particular State and the others (Peter Calvert).
- Systematic decision making on the part of constitutionally empowered officials of particular states, intended to sustain or alter the state of affairs in the international system in sync with the objectives they themselves or their superiors have fixed (James N. Rosenau).

- An organized activity of a State through which it seeks to optimize its values and interests vis-à-vis those of other States and subjects operating in the foreign environment (Radovan Vukadinovic).
- Interaction between 'national objectives' or goals and the 'means' of attaining them through 'statesmanship' (Cecil V. Crabb).
- Sum total of official foreign relations managed by an independent actor, like a State, in international relations, or by an 'independent factor', like the EU, when it is not by a State (Christopher Hill).
- Strategy adopted by a national government to attain its goals in its dealings with external entities (Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, Tim Dunne).
- Institution for conducting a State's relations with other States, aimed at preserving its independence and furthering the social, economic and cultural interests of its citizens (Brockhaus Encyclopaedia).
- A network of communications linking with other areas of politics and subsuming a wide range of activities, stretching from summit meetings to formal and informal exchanges among diplomats at political or social gatherings.
- Those actions which, expressed in the form of Activities aimed at achieving the aims fixed by official representatives of sovereign communities in their name and directed towards objectives and players located outside their legitimate territorial jurisdiction which they still seek to influence (Walter Carlsnaes; all cited in Petrić, 2013: 3-5 ).

We see that many of these numerous definitional inputs go much beyond the oft-quoted definition of foreign policy offered by Joseph Frankel. He says that 'Foreign Policy consists of decisions and actions which involve to some appreciable extent relations between one state and others' (Frankel, 1963:1). If we tease out all the significations of the above definitions, it would be clear that first of all foreign policy involves not just decisions, but actions; and activity means a continuous process of taking steps to influence activities of other States and international organizations or respond to initiatives from them. Secondly, apart from States there are a large number of actors who make their presence felt in the globalized international world of today. But even though their actions greatly influence foreign policies of different states. Those do not necessarily qualify as foreign policy. If the activities of all these non-state actors were regarded as foreign policy, then the term would have been conceptually fuzzy, and would have absolved States from their responsibility of protecting the interests and welfare of their citizens. Besides, this would have made it extremely difficult to distinguish and demarcate foreign policy from all other activities in the international arena. Thirdly, foreign policy is basically a state-centric concept. It is conducted in the name of the State and for the State by organs or bodies authorized through constitutional or legal structures. Other organs or actors of the state or factors of the polity may influence foreign policy, but it bears the final signature of some empowered bodies (Petrić, 3-5).

## 1.4 Conceptual Frameworks for Understanding Foreign Poli

As is to be expected, the evolution of conceptual frameworks for understanding foreign pol has come in step with the evolution of theories in IR. Carlsnaes offers the most exhaust treatment of conceptual frameworks from ontological and epistemological perspectives. And will base our analysis in this section mostly on his review of literature, except where we ment our own inputs. Carlsnaes shows that the conception of foreign policy as an academic field had deep roots in the broader area of public policy not only in the United States, but also Europe since the seventeenth century. There a 'plenipotentiary' was invested with the full pow of independent action to carry on diplomacy in support of the foreign policy of the newly ari modern state. By implication foreign policy was regarded as a distinct area from all ot domains of public policy. It was more important than them since it was concerned with highest and national interests of the state, and by that very fact was sought to be kept beyo the scrutiny of the people. The reigning idea of 'secret diplomacy' made any democratic con of a country's foreign policy preposterous. The situation of irresponsibility and lack of accountabi of plenipotentiaries is brought out in Sir Harold Nicolson's reference to a view of delegates the Vienna Congress of 1815 as: 'mere hucksters in the diplomatic market, bartering the happin of millions with a scented smile' (Seaman, 2002:1). The causes and consequences of the F World War and the experiences before and after it convinced statesmen like Woodrow Wil that the traditional secretive activities called diplomacy must be put end to. And he raised slogan of 'open covenants openly arrived at'. In spite of the fact that the Wilsonian vision r with abject failure in the build up to the Second World War, its impact remained, and wh foreign policy analysis became academically established in the post-War years, two m implications of this Wilsonian project supplied the liberal democratic approach to the study foreign policy. The first was how to make the governmental institutions responsible for formulation and implementation of foreign policy more efficient and more accountable. T second was 'why and how public values and interests' should be applied to every stage formulation and implementation of foreign policy.

Even while this institutional and policy specific focus on foreign policy was striking roots the USA in the immediate post-War years, a second tradition, having roots in Europe, nea dislodged it, to leave a far more powerful and lasting imprint on the later development of t field. It was Realism, and its most famous spokesman was Hans J. Morgenthau. The insight and other Realists brought to the subfield of foreign policy analysis was that in the linking the concept of power to that of interest one could find a universal and timeless explanation the behaviour of particular states.

But both the liberal democratic and the Realist approach received a jolt after the behavioural turn in American social science and IR. Its deep impact on institutionally minded resear stemmed from its efforts to shift the focus of research from an idiographic and normati exercise, concerned with study of unique incidents from stated or unstated value premises, a nomothetic venture, concerned with deduction of general laws, which aimed at generati

hypotheses to later test them for verifiable empirical generalizations. The academic ferment generated by this fundamental theoretical and methodological shift finally led to the emergence of a research tradition known as comparative study of foreign policy (CFP). The behaviouralist credentials of CFP could be seen in its efforts to analyze foreign policy in terms of distinct acts of behaviour instead of purposive state action in the Realist vein, as also in its focus on events. The enthusiasm in CFP of collecting data on such events and their analysis for accumulating testable empirical generalizations about foreign policy behaviour fell short of its goal of establishing a truly 'scientific' approach to the analysis of foreign policy. It became increasingly apparent that the goal of a unified theory and methodology grounded in aggregate analysis had become problematic both empirically and analytically.

However, CFP did not overshadow a tradition of foreign policy analysis which took processes involved in foreign policy or the sociological and psychological factors influencing foreign policy behaviour as its focus. Theoretical lead in the former aspect was provided by Snyder, Bruck and Sapin's pioneering monograph on decision making (1954). It facilitated a sophisticated research programme where the following strands were most visible.

- Studies concentrating on small group dynamics as in the writings of C. Herman, Irving W. Janis, Philip E. Tetlock, etc..
- The 'bureaucratic politics' approach which owes its fame to Graham T. Allison's study of the famous Cuban Missile Crisis.
- Study of foreign policy-making in the light of cybernetic processes.

In the latter aspect of psychological and sociological factors, Michael Brecher's work on Israel and Robert Jervis's work on perceptual factors generated a stream of research on cognitive and psychological factors generated a long series of studies till date. This prompted James Rosenau to say somewhat prematurely that CFP had achieved the status of 'normal science'. For, even much later foreign policy analysis was subject to a near total lack of sub-disciplinary identity. As a result while some practitioners like V. M. Hudson and C. S. Vore wanted 'a hundred flowers to bloom', some others like L. Neack and fellow authors hailed the opening of 'conversational space' between the approaches as harbingers of 'new vistas'.

Belying the fears of a number of scholars, Realism withstood the behaviouralist challenge quite well, in spite of the centrality of power as an unobservable and immeasurable datum in realist theory. The quarrel between them was reduced to methodology. And after Realism also got methodologically divided, particularly with the publication of Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* (1979), the quarrel lost its acerbity. So, while summing up the tendencies of a half century of foreign policy analysis, Carlsnaes discovered two broad traditions in conflict. The first, a receptacle or container of diverse irreconcilable approaches centered round cognitive and psychological factors, bureaucratic or neo-institutional politics, crisis behaviour, group decision-making processes, and transnational relations, was brought together by Carlsnaes under the rubric *Innenpolitik*. In one sense, it means according primacy to domestic factors, where this primacy becomes the binding cement of many variants of this approach. Taking a different view,

a broad version of Realism would not deny the importance of domestic factors in the formulation of foreign policy, but would give much more methodological weight to material systemic level factors which Carlsnaes calls *Realpolitik* for the sake of linguistic similarity.

This evidently perpetuates the conventional boundary between the domestic and the international which a comprehensive study of foreign policy may try to avoid on empirical and theoretical grounds. Carlsnaes, therefore, wants to start his classification of conceptual frameworks of foreign policy from the ontological and the epistemological perspectives, as these are not tied to the substance of foreign policy. The ontological dimension debates the question whether social scientific explanations ought to be reduced to the 'properties or interactions' of freely acting individuals, or whether they should be pitched at the level of social structures acting beyond such individual agents, in short whether to adopt a holistic or an individualist perspective. Contrasted to it, the epistemological dimension asks whether social structures of agency should be studied through objectivist or interpretivist perspectives. While the former relies more on explanation from the outside and takes a positivistic stance, the latter prefers understanding from the inside and takes a hermeneutic orientation. Carlsnaes capture their intersections in the study of foreign policy in a fourfold matrix of 'rock-bottom perspectives in the study of foreign policy'. This is given below.

**Table 1 A**  
**Matrix of Foreign Policy Perspectives**

ONTOLOGY		EPISTEMOLOGY
Holism	Objectivism Structural perspective	Intepretativism Social-institutional perspective
Individualism	Agency-based perspective	Interpretative actor perspective

Source, Carlsnaes, 'Foreign Policy'

We will now try to deduce and/or tease out approaches from the matrix given above from Carlsnaes

### 1.4.1 Approaches Stemming from a Structural Perspective

Among approaches rooted in a structural perspective the main are **Realism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and Organizational Process Approaches**. We start with the first.

#### 1.4.1.1 Realism

In this section we are not going into a detailed discussion of Realism here but pick up what may be called a 'signature argument' of Realism, to indicate why it figures so prominently in any structural perspective. Navari says that Realism was first used in political discourse to denote

the doctrine that universals exist outside the mind. In political theory, however, the term has come to be reserved for the theorists of *raison d'état* or *Realpolitik*. It denotes a school which holds that there are real forces operating in the world beyond our immediate perceptions of them, that these forces are revealed by the historical process and that the able practitioner takes account of these forces and incorporates them into his political conceptions and his political acts (Navari, 1982: 207). Thus, Realism passes the test of structuralism because this concerns the whole of international politics and looks at its dynamism from the perspective of international system. And, despite the failure of Neo realism to predict the end of the bipolar system post Cold War. It still continues to be accepted as a viable approach particularly in the US, but also elsewhere. In fact many IR scholars think it perfectly possible to formulate a theory of foreign policy from the Neorealist perspective, and some actually point out that contrary to their denials Neorealists frequently dabble with analyses of foreign policy. Thus, Gideon Rose (1998) claims that altogether four theories of foreign policy can be deduced from different brands of Realism in terms of their views of the international system, view of the units, and their causal logic: *Innenpolitik*, Offensive Realism, Defensive Realism, and Neo-classical Realism. *Innenpolitik* theories of foreign policy give importance to domestic independent variables, while Offensive Realism prioritizes systemic variables. Pursuing a Waltzian Neorealist logic, Offensive Realism, the most famous exponent of which is John Mearsheimer, argues that since the international system inevitably breeds conflict and aggression, states are forced to adopt offensive strategies. The proponents of Defensive Realism also regard it as a systemic theory, but still argue that though systemic variables exert causal effects on state behaviour, they cannot provide complete explanations of all state actions. Deemphasizing the role played by the international distribution of power, some scholars highlight the importance of the source, level, and direction of threats seen through the lenses of variables of technology, geographical closeness, offense capabilities and perceived intentions as different but relevant variables. The point they want to make is that states going in quest of security can do it in a relatively calm manner save in rare cases, and that security is pursued by putting counterbalances to threats in such a way that conflict is avoided. Maintaining distance from both Offensive and Defensive Realists, Neoclassical Realists link with the classical roots of their perspective, and posit that the influence that systemic factors would exert on a nation's foreign policy is more indirect and complex than Neorealists believe, and their workings cannot be understood except taking into count factors intervening at the unit level. The four positions can be summarized as in Table 2.

Table 2

## Four Realist Theories of Foreign Policy

Theory	View of International System	View of Units	Causal Logic
Innenpolitik Theories	unimportant	highly differentiated	internal factors —> foreign policy
Defensive Realism	occasionally important anarchy's implications variable	highly differentiated	systemic or internal —> foreign policy incentives factors (two sets of independent variables in action, causing 'natural' and 'unnatural' types of behaviour)
Neoclassical Realism	important: anarchy is murky	differentiated	systemic —> internal —> foreign policy incentives factors (independent (dependent variables) variables)
Offensive Realism	very important: anarchy is Hobbesian	undifferentiated	systemic incentives —> foreign policy

Source: Gideon Rose, 'Neoclassical Theories of Foreign Policy'.

#### 1.4.1.2 Neoliberal Institutionalism

It was Stephen Krasner and his pioneering book *After Hegemony* that brought the Neoliberal Institutional theory to the forefront of the research agenda of International Relations. Afraid that Neorealists might rule out liberal institutionalism just by denying the premises of state action that the approach rested on, Krasner decided to create an avenue that will preempt neorealist attack. For this he sought to import three elements from Realist analysis of state behaviour into liberal institutionalism. First, against the grain of liberal institutionalism, he contended that states were not driven by any idealist propensities of self-abnegation or effacement. Rather they were rational egoists bent on maximizing their utilities. Secondly, he hit harder at the idealistic and normative underpinnings of liberal institutionalism that harmony and cooperation are not the major marks of world politics, since conflicts are all too often seen in it. Thirdly, Krasner embraced a 'systemic' approach to 'black-box' the state, to argue that domestic state-society relations and non-state actors are secondary in world politics. This is because non-state actors 'continue to be subordinate to states' (Hobson, 95-6).

Though Neoliberal Institutionalism is not normally considered an approach to the study of foreign policy, Carlsnaes points out that the typical concerns of Neoliberal Institutionalism have as much relevance for the study of foreign policy as the theoretical concerns of Realism and Neorealism possess. Besides, since Neoliberal Institutionalism is contraposed to Realism as an alternative, it can by that very fact be considered as an alternative approach to analysis of foreign policy. But just like Realism, Neoliberal Institutionalism is also in essence a 'structural,



systemic and "top down" view', and like Realism it also takes states as the principal actors and egoistic utility optimizers in an anarchic international system. So, it becomes necessary to spell out what distinctive lens it offers in viewing foreign policy. According to Carlsnaes, for both Realism and Neoliberal Institutionalism foreign policy-making entails a process of constrained choice by rational, purpose-driven states. But while for Realists this constraint comes from the distribution of power resources facing decision-makers, for Neoliberal Institutionalism the source of the constraint is the anarchic international system. But even if this system breeds uncertainty and resultant security concerns, it is open to institutional supply of information and common rules in the shape of functional regimes. This makes international cooperation in quest of certain state preferences possible even under anarchy. So, Axelrod (1993) and Keohane (1993) argue that certain ingrained characteristics of the international sphere facilitate positive outcomes in the shape of cooperative foreign policies.

#### **.4.1.3 Organizational Process Approaches**

Even though unlike Realism and Neoliberal Institutionalism Organizational Process Approaches (OPAs) are not structural approaches of a systemic kind in the normal sense, still they operate 'structurally', though on a lower plane. Here the structural factor propelling state behaviour is not external to it, but internal. Here scholars seek a 'top-down' view on the sub-systemic plane, and explore on the one hand the relations between the states and its agencies, and on the other the relations between the agencies and the individuals, to see how in each case the latter keep the demands of the former in reckoning. The sub-systemic structure and the role of agencies have been brought out best in Graham T. Allison's classic work *Essence of Decision*, where this is the second of three possible models or lenses on foreign policy decision making. We will say more about it and the other two in our last module. Suffice it to say here that with deep roots in organization theory this model views foreign policy decisions not in terms of instrumental rationality, but as organizational outputs that do not aim at optimization. Irving Janis's notion of 'groupthink' is another variant of this approach (Janis, 1983). But still others move beyond it to stress on the interaction between group dynamics and broader organizational cultures and processes of socialization in the making of foreign policy.

#### **.4.2 Approaches Grounded in an Agency-Based Perspective**

In these approaches the focus is on the cognitive and psychological features of individual decision makers, and has drawn criticisms from various sources. But this has not been able to stop or arrest the steady growth of research in this area. Here the rational choice assumption shared by both Realism and Neoliberalism which holds that individuals are in essence adaptable and open to the imperatives of structural change is questioned, to posit that they are rather immune to them because of their ingrained beliefs, their way of processing information and a host of other personality traits and cognitive characteristics. This has given birth to what may be called Psychological Cognitive Theory

### **1.4.2.1 Psychological and Cognitive Approaches**

Evolving from its earlier focus on attitudes and attitudinal change based in theories of cognitive consistency, psychological analysis passed through what is called a 'cognitive revolution'. The view of the individual as a passive actor, which characterized the previous works, gave way to a new view where the individual was regarded as not a flexible agent but as a problem solver. New concepts emerged to describe and explain his mental processes, like 'operational codes', 'cognitive mapping', 'attribution theory' and 'image theory'. The area became enriched with studies like that of changes in the attitudes of key decision makers in America between 1944 and 1947 and of mistrust between the two superpowers during the Cold War (both by Deborah Larson), and many other studies in the areas of perceptions and behaviour in Soviet foreign policy; cognitive study of the Carter administration; role of historical comparisons in foreign policy making; information processing, cognition and perception in foreign policy decision making; impact of leadership characteristics like beliefs, motivations and decisional styles in the pursuit of foreign policy, etc.

### **1.4.2.2, Prospect Theory**

A very significant addition to cognitive and psychological approaches is prospect theory, which says that decision-makers arrive at their choices not by maximizing their expected utility as claimed in rational choice models, but proceeding from a reference point frequently defined by the status quo, and that they are risk-reluctant with respect to gains and risk-willing with respect to losses. It means that they give higher value to avoidance of losses than to probability of gains, and measure both losses and gains from that reference point. Still another addition to cognitive and psychological approaches is the insight of learning theory in foreign policy which is steadily growing.

### **1.4.2.3 Bureaucratic Politics Approach**

Carlsnaes includes Bureaucratic Politics approach, which is the third model of Allison's famous study of the Cuban missile crisis and which we will deal with more elaborately in Module IV, among approaches based on an agency perspective. He thinks it should be freed from the unnecessary association with the Organizational Process model, mainly because it is grounded in an agency-oriented than a structural view of the field. Since it shows individual players engaged in bargaining games with their competing preferences, it does not present policy decisions as outputs of organizational processes, but as 'resultants' of the 'pulling and hauling that is politics'. Of course, it has some affinity with rational choice models since its main concern is to show why the 'resultants' differ from what any person or group preferred. But here the reference point is not the preferences, but the power, skills and accomplishments of supporters or opponents of the action being considered. And the power is not in the first instance personal but bureaucratic, since the actors engaged in bargaining are tied to sectional and factional rather than individual aims and objectives. This is the source of the famous aphorism that where one stands depends on where one sits.

#### 1.4.2.4 Liberal Approach

The last approach from the agency based perspective that Carlsnaes mentions is the Liberal approach. Initiated by Rosenau, other leading European scholars, and Peter Katzenstein in their studies on the role of the domestic structures in foreign policy, developed by scholars like Matthew Evangelista, Thomas Risse-Kappen and others, this approach was brought into the IR agenda by Andrew Moravcsik. The challenge to Neorealism and Neoliberalism that this approach holds out is based on three central assumptions. These are:

1. The priority of societal actors over political institutions, in the sense that in a 'bottom up' view of the political system individuals and social groups are the first, in having determined their interests without prior political determination, and then pursuing them through collective efforts and political action.
2. In essence state preferences reflect the interests of a subsection of society, in the sense that these are defined by state officials and are pursued by them in terms of these interests.
3. State behaviour in the international system is shaped by interdependent state interests, which means constraints stemming from preferences of other states.

Moravcsik claims that all three strands are correlated with this or that branch of liberalism. While the first, ideational liberalism, relates to the emergence of domestic social demands, the second, commercial, deals with how these demands are translated into state preferences. The final, republican liberalism, focuses on consequent configurations of state preferences in international contexts.

#### 1.4.3 Approaches Rooted in a Social- Institutional Perspective

Here we shall talk about approaches from a social-institutional perspective, which are ontologically holistic, but epistemologically interpretivist. Social Constructivism, the major approach in this perspective, is more of a meta-theoretical position for general social science than a specific approach in IR. But still it has been making theoretical inroads in IR. Because of the wide spectrum of views contained in it, it has 'thinner' and 'thicker'—meaning softer and stronger—versions. The 'thinner' version is spearheaded by Alexander Wendt and by 'modern' constructivists like Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, John Ruggie, Peter J. Katzenstein, Thomas Risse-Kappen, Martha Finnemore etc. The 'thicker' version is led by 'modernist linguists' like Friedrich Kratochwil and Nicholas Onuf, who first made the term current in IR; 'discursive' constructivists such as Henrik Larsen, Ole Waever, and Jennifer Milliken; 'postmodernists' such as Richard Ashley and R. B. J. Walker; and finally feminist constructivists like Spike Peterson and J. Ann Tickner. Both the versions are equally represented in *The Culture of National Security* (1969), edited by Katzenstein. Here the role of norms and identities in world politics is questioned with reference to both Neorealism and Neoliberalism by several authors, and the concept of national interest which is accepted without question in conventional explanations of national security is also problematized. In an article, Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald made clear the thrust of social constructivist account of foreign policy when they said that non-use of nuclear and

chemical-biological weapons is not induced or explicable by rationalist analysis but by the development of prohibitory norms that made these weapons unacceptable means of mass destruction. Similarly, in another article Martha Finnemore shows that humanitarian behaviour as a typical foreign policy response of modern times is inexplicable through Realist and Liberal theories, since they have no immediate geostrategic and/or economic benefit for the intervening power, and hence cannot be understood without reference to the changing normative context through redefinition of norms. In still another article, Audie Klotz analyses the role of new international norms of racial equality in bringing about an international embargo in South Africa. Among discursive constructivists, Larsen focuses on the 'framework of meaning' inside which foreign policy is made and 'interests and goals are constructed'. Milliken shows how discourses as 'systems of signification' construct social realities, and how even so-called common sense and policy practices offshoots of discourses. From this we move on to a perspective which is both individualistic and interpretative.

#### **1.4.4 Approaches Rooted in an Interpretative Actor Perspective**

The basic and starting point of this approach/perspective, as put by Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, is that understanding starts from reconstructing meanings at an individual level, on the Weberian line of 'subjective understanding' ('verstehen'), by analyzing decisions from the standpoint of the decision maker through reconstructing their reasons. From this standpoint the foreign policy behaviour of states should be seen in terms of how individuals in positions of power perceive and analyze situations. Collective action is a sum total of individual actions. Besides saying this, Hollis and Smith make a distinction even within their hermeneutical position between interpreting individual actions by reference to social rules and causal meaning, which yields a top down approach, and interpreting collective policy through their individual elements, which yields a bottom up approach. Since the top down approach has been adequately dealt with in the discussion of the social institutional perspective, Carlsnaes confines himself to the bottom up view in this section. He finds the historical antecedents of this approach in the pioneering work of Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, originally published in 1954, and focusing systematically on the actual decisions of foreign policy decision makers. A better exemplar and illustrator of this approach is provided by Philip Zelikow and Condoleeza Rice's well researched study of German reunification through a hermeneutic, inside representation of the innermost moves of the topmost foreign policy elites of the United States, the Soviet Union, West Germany, East Germany, Britain, and France, to bring out the thinking of these elites.

#### **1.5. Other Typologies of Conceptual Frameworks of Foreign Policy**

There are other typologies of conceptual frameworks that are narrower than and to that extent different from Carlsnaes's elaborate endeavour. Stephen M. Walt, in his widely appreciated survey of the field in the journal *Foreign Policy*, took Realism, Liberalism and Idealism (Constructivism) as the three main paradigms for the study of foreign policy behaviour. Each paradigm is elaborated by Jack Snyder in the context of the post 9/11 context of American foreign policy in the following way. We will see that each of them provides a separate and different lens for Post-9/11 Us foreign policy;

Table 3

### Three Paradigms and the Analysis of Post-9/11 US Foreign Policy

Theories	Realism	Liberalism	Idealism (Constructivism)
<b>Core Beliefs</b>	Self-interested compete for power and security	Spread of democracy, global economic ties and international organization strengthen peace	International politics is shaped by persuasive collective values, culture and social identities
<b>Key Actors in International Relations</b>	States which behave similarly regardless of their type of government	States, international institutions and commercial interests	Promoters of new ideas, transnational activist networks, and nongovernmental organizations
<b>Main Instruments</b>	Military power and state diplomacy	International institutions global commerce	Ideas and values
<b>Theory's Intellectual Blind Spots</b>	Does not account for progress And change in international relations or understanding that legitimacy can be a source of military power	Fails to understand that democratic regimes survive only if they safeguard military power and security, some liberals forget that transitions to democracy are sometimes violent	Does not explain which power structures and social conditions allow for changes in values
<b>What the Theory Explains About the Post-9/11 World</b>	Why the United States responded aggressively to terrorist attacks, the inability of international institutions to restrain military superiority	Why spreading democracy has become such an integral part of current U.S. international Security strategy	The increasing role of polemics about values; the importance of transnational political networks (whether terrorists Or human rights Advocates)
<b>What the Theory Fails to Explain About the Post-9/11 World</b>	The failure of smaller powers to militarily balance the United States; the importance of non-State actors such as al Qaeda; The intense U.S. focus on	Why the United States has failed to work with other democracies through international organizations	Why human rights abuses continue, despite intense activism for humanitarian norms, and efforts for international justice

Source: Jack Snyder, 'One World, Rival Theories'

## 1.6 Problems and Possibilities of Synthesis of the Conceptual Frameworks

In this section we will discuss the needs for, difficulties before and possibilities of a synthesis of the different conceptual frameworks. The multiplicity of conceptual frameworks in the study of foreign policy that we have summarized in the sections above (after mainly Carlsnacs). The shortcomings, 'blind spots', and failure of any one single conceptual framework or approach that becomes evident when applied to the analysis of any major foreign policy response to crisis,

bring out the need for evolving a synthetic approach to foreign policy analysis (FPA), even though this is more easily said than done. This is because in most cases the approaches stem from opposed ontological, epistemological and normative positions and presuppositions. One can attempt to smoothen the distinction between 'explanation' and understanding/interpretation', which stems from the Weberian binary of *Erklären* versus *Verstehen* or the modern binary of 'objectivism/positivism' and 'interpretativism', to resolve one set of problems. This was done by Weber himself in his conception 'reflexive sociology'. But the claims of holism and individualism which are at the roots of top down or bottom up approaches can hardly be reconciled. Another set of problems stems from the distinction between the 'inside' and 'outside' of the state. Peter Katzenstein and others have tried to turn the link between domestic structures and foreign policy actions as an 'integrative bridge'. Matthew Evangelista has covered the literature on this very well in his article (1997). Peter Gourevitch, borrowing Waltz, calls this prioritizing of *Innenpolitik* as 'second image reversed' (1978). But, as pointed out before in this section, this path is full of problems. Apart from keeping unstated the points where the domestic or the international predominated, it tended to perpetuate their divide.

So, any effort at synthesis has to be made at a broad, meta-theoretical level that would cut through the mutual exclusions. Carlsnaes, talks of an analytic framework which will use a tripartite approach, comprising the intentional, dispositional and structural dimensions of foreign policy action. The pathway would be as follows: structural dimension → dispositional dimension → intentional dimension → foreign policy action. While analytically distinct, each is closely linked to the other, and the next step comes into play after the potentials of the previous step is exhausted. He adds by way of conclusion that a comprehensive conceptual framework of FPA should keep space for accounting for the dynamics of foreign policy change, exploration of the role of ideas in the explanation of foreign policy, and an awareness of the agency-structure *problematique* (Carlsnaes, 2002: 331-49).

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## 1.7 Summary

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In this Unit we have first talked about the controversies over the status of foreign policy analysis as a subfield in the discipline of International Relations. After that we have offered multiple definitions of foreign policy, and then have analysed the nature of foreign policy with their help. We have also touched upon the conceptual frameworks of foreign policy stemming; from structural, agency based, social institutional, and interpretative actor perspectives. We have teased out the different approaches to the understanding of foreign policy under the rubrics of different perspectives. After that we have shown how Realist, Liberal, and Constructivist lenses on foreign policy sensitize us to different aspects of US foreign policy after 9/11. Finally, we have shown how a synthesis between these perspectives with different normative and empirical assumptions can be attempted at a metatheoretical plane. We hope that with these a student of open and distance education can make a small beginning towards a theoretical understanding of foreign policy. Finally, though a short list of suggested readings are attached, still, since this Unit

has been written with the help of many other books, articles and web sources, an aspiring student should try to consult them in future

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## 1.8 Questions

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### Essay Answer Type

1. Would you consider foreign policy analysis as an integral part of the theoretical field of International Relations? Argue your case.
2. Comment on the changing status of foreign policy as a major area of IR.
3. Discuss the nature of foreign policy with the help of useful definitions.
4. Show how conceptual frameworks of foreign policy can emerge from an intersection between the ontological binaries and epistemological boundaries and tell one major thrust of each of the conceptual frameworks.
5. What are the approaches to foreign policy analysis rooted in an agency-based perspective?
6. Show how Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism can sensitize us to and provide different lenses on the trends of Post-9/11 US foreign policy.
7. Identify the problems and prospects of a synthesis of conceptual frameworks of foreign policy.

### Medium Answer Type

1. Give six definitions of foreign policy, and analyze their strengths and limitations.
2. Comment on the controversy between Innenpolitik and Realpolitik as alternative perspectives on foreign policy analysis.
3. Evaluate Realism as a perspective of foreign policy analysis.
4. Compare Realism and Neoliberal Institutionalism as approaches to foreign policy analysis.
5. Analyse approaches to foreign policy rooted in a Social Institutional Perspective.

### Short Answer Type

1. Comment on the Organizational Process Approach to foreign policy.
2. Write a short note on psychological and cognitive approaches to foreign policy.
3. Compare Prospect Theory with psychological and cognitive approaches to foreign policy.
4. Write a short note on Bureaucratic Politics approach to foreign policy.
5. Write a short note on the Liberal Approach to foreign policy.
6. Give a brief outline of approaches anchored in an Interpretative Actor Perspective.
7. Why is synthesis of conceptual frameworks of foreign policy possible only at a meta-theoretical level?

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## 1.9 Suggested Readings

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1. Calsnaes, Walter, 'Foreign Policy', in Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons, *Handbook off International Relations* (London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: 2002),

2. Snyder, Jack, 'One World, Rival Theories', *Foreign Policy* 145 (November-December 2004): 52-62.
3. Petric, Ernest, *Foreign Policy: From Conception to Diplomatic Practice* (Leiden; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013).
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## Unit 2 □ Determinants of Foreign Policy

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### Structure

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### 2.1 Objectives

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In this Unit, we will talk about the determinants of foreign policy. Of course, while saying determinants we would not convey any deterministic sense. After reading this Unit students will be able to grasp—

- The importance of permanent objective factors that influence foreign policy.
- The importance of impermanent subjective factors that influence foreign policy.
- The role of geography in itself and as generative of distinctive forms of geopolitics in foreign policy.

- The contribution of natural resources of a country to the complexion of its foreign policy.
- The share of economic development among these objective factors.
- The influence of the political tradition of a country in the formulation of its foreign policy.
- The contribution of the domestic and international milieu in shaping the contours of foreign policy.
- The role of military strength in foreign policy.
- The importance of intangible factors like national character in the shaping of the foreign policy of a country.

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## 2.1 Introduction

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In this unit we will look at foreign policy just as a dependent variable and find out what internal factors, described in our last unit as *Innenpolitik*, and external factors outside the political system condition, influence and shape the foreign policy of a State. That means; as we have said just above, we would look at determinants not in a deterministic way. This analytical flexibility is partly imposed by the fact that foreign policy 'is never uniquely determined by one factor or a set of factors, but is the result of the interplay of a large number of factors that affect the formulation of policy in different ways in different circumstances'. Some of these factors are relatively permanent or stable in nature and have to be accepted as given by foreign policy makers, and by that very fact are 'more basic or unchangeable determinants of policy than others.' There are, however, other more variable factors; institutional or non-institutional factors, and even 'the personal role of the decision makers which are no less important in the making of foreign policy than the basic determinants. To analyse the foreign policy of a country we must focus on the domestic and internal environment in which the policy-makers operates and the relevant variables, permanent or impermanent in nature.

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## 2.2 Geography and Natural Resources

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Among the permanent variables the geophysical ones dominate, which means that we have to deal very first with geography and natural resources. Geography includes location, size, topography, state boundaries, population, climate, hydrography, soil, etc. If we ask 'how free are decision-makers to act', or look at the freedom of a policy maker to act from what Frankel calls a 'determinism-voluntarism' continuum (1971: 147-49), then the importance of geography becomes immediately visible. To this we first turn. Holsti stated the case of geography in a very lucid way. We quote him below.

Socioeconomic and security needs are clearly related to geographical and topographical characteristics. Natural endowments are not distributed evenly around the world. Some states are richly endowed with resources (think of the billions of dollars of oil wealth in some of the small Arab states); others are resource-poor. Some states are relatively isolated or distant from the major centers of military

power, and therefore relatively free of security threats. This was the case of the United States in the nineteenth century and remains the case for some of the small South Pacific island states today. It is not difficult to expand at length on the opportunities, vulnerabilities, and constraints that geographic and topographic characteristics have on different countries' security, welfare and autonomy problems (Holsti, 1995: 256).

It is clear that in his treatment of geography Holsti stresses natural resources and location more seriously than any other factors, and he is quite right in doing so. All through the history of international relations we have seen the deep significance of state location. The island location of Britain and her insularity from Continental Europe helped her immensely to build an overseas empire and to rely on a navy both in defense and offensive action. The strategic location of the US helped her to follow a beneficial isolation under the Monroe Doctrine, through which she consolidated her dominance in both the halves of America. But the same geographic position made her deeply concerned about developments in Western Europe, which was, across the Atlantic, her first line of defence, as about those in Japan. For Japan too location turned her into one of the major shipbuilding nations of the world. Russia's landlocked status induced her to seek access to the Baltic and the Black Sea. The location of Poland as a buffer State between Russia and Germany, as that of Belgium between Germany and France always entangled them in all wars of their neighbours. The bifurcated location of Pakistan on either side of India created an element of insecurity that ended only after her dismemberment. The political and cultural isolation of Spain from the rest of Europe owes in no small measure to the Pyrenees. Likewise, the relative ease of invasions of Italy from the north compared to greater difficulties of invasion from the south owed to the topography of the Alps. The English Channel proved a great obstacle both to Napoleonic France and Hitler's Germany. The Babel Mandeb and the Suez Canal as also the Straits of Malacca have had much influence on the international importance of Aden and Singapore. The lands and tracts around the Dardanelles, the Bosphorus, the Strait of Gibraltar have witnessed ceaseless military and diplomatic activities. Small islands like Tahiti, Yap, Madagascar, Ceylon, and erstwhile Formosa have experienced disproportionate strategic importance just because of location. For India the barriers provided by the loftiest mountain range of the Himalayas on the north, the vast sheet of water of the Indian Ocean to the south, and the sub-Himalayan hills and jungles in the eastern frontier gave her an insularity that was only broken by the land frontier around the Khyber Pass, now in Pakistan. And her situation at the centre of the Great Asian arc that stretched from Aden to Tokyo made it certain even in ancient times that she would remain important in the history and politics of Asia even in her geographic insularity (Bandyopadhyay, 1979/2000: 28-31).

## **2.2.1 From Geography to Geopolitics**

### **2.2.1.1 Ancient Beginnings of Geopolitical Thought**

Geography as a factor in foreign policy was recognized as long back as in the days of Kautilya and Aristotle. In his iconic *Arthashastra* Kautilya informs us about the geographical region the

King or Vijīgīṣu will have to conquer to make his empire safe: 'In that the region of the sovereign ruler extends northwards the Himavat and the sea, one thousand yojanas in extent across' (*Arthashastra*: IX/1/18). A modern commentator says that this conquerable geographical area is unrealistic. For, thousand yojanas measure about nine thousand miles which extend far beyond the entire Indian subcontinent. He deduces from the views of different commentators that Kautilya's words are to be interpreted liberally to mean the Indian subcontinent excluding the southern part. He also guesses that Kautilya wanted Vijīgīṣu to conquer this area because Alexander's invasion 'might have generated the awareness among small states' that without a kingdom of imperial dimensions Bharata would not be able to withstand foreign invasion, let alone witness any 'rapid expansion of trade' and 'free flow of goods' without feudatory barriers (Basu, 2014: n.p.). Aristotle also placed importance on geography as a determinant of foreign policy. He argued that 'the inhabitants of the colder countries of Europe are brave, but deficient in thought and technical skill and as a consequence of this remain free longer than others, but are wanting in political organisation and unable to rule their neighbours' (Bindra, 1988: 35). But systematic thinking on geography as a factor in foreign policy formulation did not develop until the early 19th century. French philosopher Victor Cousin propagated rather a rigid form of deterministic geographical thinking, which had few takers later. But geopolitics as essentially a dynamic concept, describing the relationship between space and power came up in its place.

### 2.2.1.2 Beginnings of Modern Geopolitics: Mahan, Mackinder, Haushofer

German geographer Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904) coined a term 'anthropogeographic', which was a synthesis of geography, anthropology and politics, and a precursor of geopolitics. The term *geopolitics* was first employed by another Swedish geographer, Rudolf Kjellen (1862-1922) to spell out the geopolitical bases of national power. He upheld an organic theory of the state, which claimed that states, like animals in Darwinian description, are bound by a relentless struggle for survival, and must expand in space or perish. But though all of them did not use the world geopolitics, it was the writings of three persons that laid the basis of classical geopolitics. They were: Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, American Naval Officer and historian; Sir Halford Mackinder (1861-1947), British geographer; and Karl Haushofer (1869-1946), German General, geographer, strategist and Far Eastern traveler (Dougherty and Pfalzgraff, 1990: 59, 64-5). In their formulations and in that of many others to follow in the next hundred years and more, geopolitics continued to acquire new meanings and overtones. Gerard Tuathail says that for 'Kjellen and other imperialist thinkers' it was 'that part of Western imperial knowledge that dealt with the relationship between physical earth and politics'. In the writings of German strategists it was associated with the infamous Nazi search for *Lebensraum* (habitat or breathing space). After being discredited and shelved for long, the concept surfaced again in the later period of the Cold War to signify the global competition for the control of the land masses, water bodies and strategic resources of the world; and in the post-Cold War period it meant 'comprehensive visions of the World political map ... the "big picture" ' that 'offers a way of relating local and regional dynamics to the global system as a whole'.

Mahan offered a form of oceanic geopolitics geared to the foreign policy goals of the USA. Mackinder offered a landmass based version of geopolitics for the benefit of the UK, which advised it to keep an eye on the 'geographical pivot of history' or 'heartland' in the control of Russia and later the Soviet Union. Haushofer offered a theory of German encirclement. Nicholas J. Spykman, eminent founder of Realism, offered a version of Realist geopolitics. In his two articles written in the late 1930s—'Geography and Foreign Policy' (1938) and 'Geographic Objectives in Foreign Policy' (1939), as also in his posthumous book, *The Geography of the Peace* (1944), based on his lectures, maps, notes and correspondence, he discussed how size, world location and regional location influenced foreign policies of nations. We would deal with Spykman in more detail since his depiction of the relationship between geography and foreign policy is grounded in Second World War and post-War international realities.

For Spykman, geography is important because 'geographic area' of a state provides its 'territorial base', both for wartime and peacetime activities. Though historically strong states have been large states, still the exceptions of Venice, Holland and Great Britain, which had ruled large empires through the control of the sea, proved that large size 'is not strength but potential strength', and could be an asset or liability, shaped by 'technical, social, moral and ideological development, ... the dynamic forces within a state, ... the political constellation of the past, and ... the personality of individuals.' Size also needed to be strengthened by 'effective centralized control', which in turn depended on 'existence of an effective system of communications from the center to the periphery'. This was why Incas, Persians, Romans, French, Chinese and Russians built highways, roads and canals, and modern nations add railroads and airports, to knit together larger areas. Location was even more important than size in shaping the foreign policies of nations. 'The facts of location' do not change, though their significance does with 'every shift in the means of communication ... routes of communication ... technique of war, and in the centers of world power'. So, the full import of location can be understood only by placing an area at the intersection of two systems of reference: one geographic, which provides facts; the other historical, which provides their evaluative criteria.

Spykman showed that the regional dimension of location classified most states into three types: 'landlocked states', 'island states', and states with both land and sea frontiers. Their security threats, from immediate neighbours, other naval powers, or multiple sources were also determined by location. France, Germany and Russia were primarily land-oriented powers, although they possessed both land and sea frontiers. Accordingly their land neighbours were sources of their security problems. Great Britain, Japan and the US were island states desiring sea power. The US could pass off as an island because she was not encumbered with any security problems from Canada and Mexico, her immediate land based neighbours. But China and Italy, because of their joint sea and land frontiers possessed a mixed land-sea perspective, based on their global and regional location. In Spykman's view states could never ignore geography. Neither the skill of the Foreign Office, nor the resource of the General Staff could help avoid them, because 'Geography does not argue. It simply is'.

Spykman's second article analyzed the patterns of expansion of states both historically and geographically, for, only a large time-scale could show up states as 'struggling power organizations'.

Spykman's historical examples of expansion contained (i) those of states along nearby river valleys for routes of communication (Egypt on the Nile, Mesopotamia on the Tigris and Euphrates, China on the Hoang-Ho, the US on the Mississippi and Missouri); (ii) those of landlocked states for access to the seas and oceans (Babylon's and Assyria's for the Mediterranean, Balkan powers' for the Adriatic, Russia's for ice-free ports); (iii) those of island states for conquest of nearby coastal regions (Great Britain in the western coast of Europe, Japan in the eastern coast of China); (iv) those for gaining control of sea-routes for economic and strategic purposes (Great Britain, Japan, Holland, the US); (v) 'circumferential and transmarine expansion' of some states for dominating marginal or inland seas (Greece's of Aegean, Rome's of the Mediterranean, America's of the Caribbean); and (vi) those for rectification and control of frontiers for further expansion (Russia, Rome Empire, Mongol Empire, Germany, the US). These expansionary patterns, soon manifest in Hitler, Mussolini, and Imperial Japan, were not going to change just because some international organization was watching. And just a few months after this article was published Hitler's invasion of Poland started the European phase of the Second World War and its subsequent internationalization. And when the world was in full swing and America had started throwing her weight about, Spykman wrote *America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power* (1942), to trace out the course of America's foreign policy from the perspective of geopolitical realism.

While analysing the geopolitical position of the US in the Western Hemisphere, in the transatlantic zone, in the transpacific zone, and in the world at large, Spykman noted how from a narrow stretch of territory along the eastern sea-board of Central North America, the US developed into a gigantic continental power dominating the entire landmass in the centre of North America, starting from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean, through a host of internal and external factors, the last of which was a disunited and benign Europe. In the transatlantic zone she was placed in regard to Europe in much the same way as Great Britain was positioned in regard to the Eurasian continent, the interested third party. Through ages Britain opposed any power threatening the continental balance and traditionally anchored coalitions of European powers that counterbalanced any one of them. It was only in the First World War that Europe had to elicit the intervention of a non-European power to thwart Germany's ambitions for continental hegemony. But the 'power foundations of the political structure of Europe' had been so rudely shaken that even in the 1930s Europe was no longer a self-balancing geopolitical system. Drawing his geopolitical lessons from what Hajo Holborn called the 'political collapse of Europe', Spykman questioned America's isolationism and later minor tinkering with her Neutrality Act. Being abreast of Germany's challenge to the European balance of power, and Haushofer and his associates' vision of *geopolitik*, Spykman explained how Germany was going about organizing the European land mass stretching from the North Sea to the Ural mountains 'on a continental basis as the economic heart of the great "living space" and the foundation of the war potential' for any inter-continental competition for power; and how the Near East, key to the routes to the Indian Ocean and the oilfields on which European economic life was dependent, were going to be recast as semi-independent states controlled by Germany. Even Africa was part of the plan, to be economically managed and politically controlled, as provider of strategic raw materials and link

across the Atlantic to South America. If Germany achieved control of the continent and defeated it then she could add to the economic resources of the entire European mainland, the easy access to the oceans that could make the Western Hemisphere and the US vulnerable. So the US had no option to placing her entire economic resources, materiel of war, and manpower to tilt the scales of a predominantly 'European power struggle' (Spykman,2008: xi, xiii, xv, and xxv; Cohen, 2009: 22-3).

### 2.2.1.3 Modern Geopolitics

In the wake of criticisms from all quarters because of its deterministic nature, geopolitics underwent many transformations. One was the sharp ecological twist that Harold Sprout (1901-1980) and Margaret Sprout (1903-2004) gave to geopolitics. Unhappy with the unidimensionality and determinism of traditional geopolitics, and aware of the grave effect of the uneven distribution of human and non-human resources on human activity, the Sprouts focused on the environment or milieu as a multi-dimensional system in which perceptions of key political leaders about environmental conditions, or their 'psychomilieu', as well the objective conditions would be explored. This would help analyze the *interrelationship* of geography, demography, technology and resources, where perceptual variables and quantitative factors like population and territory would find equal importance (Sprout, 1964: 35, 67-9). The environmental switch away from geopolitical theorizing continued after the Sprouts. As late as the mid-1970s George Liska tried to explain the dynamics of equilibrium in the international system through geopolitical factors, to arrive at the somewhat platitudinous finding that a recurrent pattern of interrelations in the European system has been conflict between continental and maritime states. Robert Holt and John Turner have traced out the impact of insularity on foreign policies by comparing the foreign policies of Britain, Ceylon and Japan. Richard Merritt worked on the impact of noncontiguity on integration of political units, to arrive at the finding that the noncontiguous polity is reliant on the external environment for maintenance of communication links among physically disconnected areas. This frequent dependence makes them more sensitive to shifts in the international environment, and more preoccupied with application of international law to inland waters, territorial and high seas, air rights, and land access, as seen in the problems and responses of Malysia, Pakistan, the United Arab Republic, and the erstwhile West Indies Federation (ibid, 70-1). But none of these critiques and identity-changing twists and turns of geopolitics have led to its demise as a school. Though after the Second World War the term geopolitics became unfashionable, in the 1970s Henry Kissinger, US Secretary of State as well as well known realist thinker, exhumed and revived the term almost all by himself, by employing it as a synonym for the US-USSR global competition for a favourable balance. This meaning of geopolitics continued well into the later years of Cold War and encapsulated the global contest between the US and the USSR for supremacy over the states and the strategic resources of the world. Since then the concept of geopolitics started attracting new academic interest, as foreign policy decision makers, international statesmen, epistemic communities and plain academics sought to cut through the mazes of the post-Cold War world political maps. As Tuathail explains the reasons behind the reemergence of geopolitics:

One reason why geopolitics has become popular once again is that it deals with comprehensive visions of the world political map. Geopolitics addresses the "big picture" and offers a way of relating local and regional dynamics to the global system as whole. It enframes a great variety dramas, conflicts, and dynamics within a grand strategic perspective offering an Olympian viewpoint that many find attractive and desirable. Furthermore, while unavoidably textual, it nevertheless promotes a spatial way thinking that arranges different actors, elements, and locations simultaneously on a global chessboard. It has a global cachet — global both in a geographical (worldwide) and a conceptual (comprehensive and total) sense— and appears more visual than verbal, more objective and detached than subjective and ideological. In addition, geopolitics is of interest to certain people because it seems to promise unusual insight into the future direction or international affairs and the coming shape of the world political map. Many decision makers and analysts come to geopolitics in search of crystal ball visions of the future, visions that get beyond the beclouded confusion of the immediate to offer glimpses of a future where faultlines of conflict and cooperation are clear. In a shrinking and speeding world of intense time-place compression wrought by telecommunication revolutions, and globalizing economic networks and webs, the desire for perspective offering "timeless insights" is stronger than ever.

Of course, what is coming back to life is not the discredited imperialist geopolitics or detested Cold War geopolitics, but what Tuathail calls a 'new geopolitics', an outgrowth of the post-Cold War world, which tries to apply a Mackinder-like 'god's-eye-view' to the emerging geopolitical order 'dominated by geo-economic questions and issues', a world where the globalization of economic activity and the global flows of trade, investment commodities and images are remaking states, sovereignty, and the geographical structure of the planet.' Some other geopoliticians have shifted their gaze away from obsolete territorial struggles of states to troubling transnational problems of terrorism, nuclear proliferation, clash of civilizations etc, while still others want to view the politics of the spaceship earth through the lenses of 'environmental degradation, resource depletion, transnational pollution and global warming'. Still others equate geopolitics with ecopolitics. For some practitioners this 'new geopolitics' has replaced an 'international geopolitics from above of hegemonic states' with a 'localized geopolitics from below'. The 'new geopolitics' is also 'critical geopolitics' in good measure. This is because it seeks to expose the 'hidden politics' of geopolitical knowledge, and in place of presenting geopolitics as 'an unproblematic description of the world political map', it wants to present the discourse of geopolitics, which is 'a culturally varied way of describing, representing about geography and international politics' (Tuathail, 2003:1-3).

Of course, when applied to our concern with foreign policy, geographical or geopolitical thinking has to be freed from all determinisms, and rather than resorting to monocausal explanations we have to look at it from an agency-based perspective. Holsti shows the possibilities of this through the example of Japan. In the 1930s, Japan was greatly troubled by a disproportion between a growing population and constriction of resources. The depression generated intense



social misery coupled with constraining practices on the part of major industrial countries and hindered the efforts of the Japanese to use extensive trade to secure vital raw materials and energy resources. These factors were the sources of the idea of military conquest of Manchuria that began in 1931 and finally of the creation of a East Asia 'Co-prosperity Sphere', around Japan. Under the leadership of the military the Japanese sought to address their nagging welfare problems through military means. A single cause explanation of this foreign policy behaviour would have stressed Japan's island location, high rate of population growth, and poverty of resources, and claimed that it was these which forced Japan to go to wage war. Even some arguments were available to lend credence to this explanation. But before citing them one should remember that confronted with largely similar bottlenecks after the Second World war Japan thought up different solutions. These were reliance on the United States for her military needs; proactive export-led growth coupled with investment of substantial public resources in research, and development and education. Even though the problems were essentially similar, responses differed. There were choices and alternatives as there are in any policy situation. Geographic and topographic factors might have influenced them, by narrowing their number down. But they could never have determined them. Geographic realities are deeply revalued by technological innovations. The safe and strategic isolation of the United States were ended by the arrival of long-range bombers and ICBMs, and compelled Canada and the US to evolve completely new strategies to cope with the challenges created by them. Likewise, the future possibilities of alternative energy resources may radically restructure the costs and benefits of industrialization for and vulnerabilities of many developing countries, and deeply affect the economic and diplomatic clout and advantage of OECD countries (Holsti, 1995: 256).

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## 2.3 Economic Development

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After geography economic development is the second most crucial 'determinant' of foreign policy. Except for fully developed states, GDP growth rate greatly influences and defines the chances of a state developing into a major power. Questions about how fast a state would be able to develop its military capability required for its security, about how long a political system would remain viable can only be answered in the light of the state's growth rate and of course its distribution. The mode and trajectory of economic development of a country would indicate the extent of a state's capacity to give foreign aid, the extent of a state's dependence on foreign aid, as also what Bandyopadhyay calls 'the boundary conditions within which such aid is to be sought and secured (2000: 48).

The level of economic development of a country as the source of its foreign policy or at least of the independence of its foreign policy is proven by the fact that the great significance of the foreign policy of the United States for all the countries of its world, in other words its international impact, stems as much from its status as an economic superpower as from its position of a military superpower. As a recent book on American foreign policy candidly admits, 'Given that the United States is a superpower whose foreign policy will have a major impact on the

prospects for war and peace in the twenty-first century, a better understanding of the polarizing role of ideology on its foreign policy is urgently needed' (Gries, 2014: 9). The same words of independent foreign policy and independent impact hold true for the foreign policies of the OECD countries too. All of them have less reason to match their foreign policies to international constraints. But this was not always the case. After the Second World War the European economies which received foreign aid under the Marshall Plan had definitely their freedom in foreign policy making eroded. So, many of them had to gear their foreign policies to the priorities of NATO. But after the European economies got over their dependent status, Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) became a contender with NATO. The tension in their relations is brought out by the following quote from a book on the future of NATO after 2000, in the context of humanitarian interventions:

Because future operations will likely be conducted with non-NATO nations, it would seem desirable to have the principle of humanitarian intervention or defense of values accepted at the widest possible level. The natural framework will be the OSCE, which in theory unites like-minded states committed to democracy ... However, the OSCE, ... has excluded enforcement action from its array of possibilities, and has never conducted the peacekeeping missions that were agreed in 1992. The United States takes the view that if it was to participate in peacekeeping, this would most likely have to be under NATO, even though an OSCE-led operation would have the advantage of Russia being an equal participant and not a guest (Borawski, 19:54).

Even from this small quote the message is clear that the US and the NATO is recognizing the option of advantage of the OSCE, in the backdrop of a rejuvenated and autonomy conscious Europe. NATO is clearly keeping in mind the sensibilities of European foreign policies.

The level of economic development of a country largely determines its position in respect of the foreign aid regimes present in contemporary international politics—in short, whether it is a donor or a receiver. This is important, because the foreign policies of an aid donor and an aid receiver, the foreign policies of a successful State and a failed state would vary in significant ways. An aid donor would experience greater freedom in foreign policy making than an aid receiver. Foreign aid empowers the donor state and keeps the recipient bound. Even in studies that highlighted the ethical values of the foreign aid regimes of the world all through the Cold War, like that by Lumsdaine had to admit that 'foreign aid to the newly independent states was first developed to keep them out of the Soviet Camp and that this continued to be an important part of the motivation behind the foreign aid programs of Western governments (Lumsdaine, in Pratt, 2003: 64).' Clearly, in this case it restricted the foreign policy freedom and options of recipient states.

It is because of these reasons that economic development often becomes the goal of foreign policies of emerging and developing powers. Commentators on Chinese politics point out that 'the foremost national priority' under Deng Xiaoping was China's economic development interests, and 'for the first time in China's modern history economic modernization became the primary goal for national development' (Zhao, 1996: 62). It is easy to say that in this 'micro-macro

linkage approach', which places such high value on economic development and modernization, innenpolitik and realpolitik are inextricably related. Economic development is clearly linked to achievement of superpower status. In the case of Russia also the growth of the Russian economy has led to an increase of her global power and influence in a way and taking such forms that has been both unexpected and unpalatable to the United States (Oliker et al, 2009). Of course, as we shunned determinism with respect to geographical factors geographical factors, in the case of economic development too any overemphasis should be avoided. While analysing the internal impulses behind Gaullist foreign policy of France, a commentator pointed out that 'starting from a position of weakness, it 'sought to recreate the 'zero-sum conditions of mercantilism, so that French power could be increased as the power of other states', but warned that 'Domestic economic growth offers only a partial explanation of [these] foreign policy goals' (Morse, 1973: 29- 30).

### **2.3.1 Determinants of Economic Development**

#### **2.3.1.1 Economic Growth and Beyond**

What are the determinants of economic development in their turn? This is an area where scholars from diverse areas from macroeconomics to political science have enlightened our intellectual horizon, but economics has clearly dominated. From Lewis's theory of economic growth (Lewis, 1955), Rostow's politics of economic growth and 'stages of growth' (Rostow, 1971, 1991), to Barro's cross country empirical study of the determinants of economic growth from a macro-economic perspective (Barro, 2001), there are different perspectives on it. But though in neoliberal economics annual rate of growth or GDP is taken as the sole criterion, not all economists agree. From a neo-Marxist, structuralist perspective Nurkse argues that economic development 'has much to do with human endowments, social attitudes, political conditions, and historical accidents. Capital is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of progress. (1970:1)' Kaldor, an international authority on taxation who had much to do with India, said that any 'study of the dynamics of economic growth leads beyond the study of psychological and sociological determinants of these factors.' (Kaldor, 1955: 180) Even Rostow himself admits that the 'economic decisions which determine the rate of growth and productivity of working force and of capital should not be regarded as governed by strictly economic motives of human beings' (Rostow, 1952: 12).'

#### **2.3.1.2 Population and Economic Development**

In the case of India, Bandyopadhyay has discussed certain 'basic compulsions' of economic growth and development from what he calls 'a national power perspective, such as population, natural resources, and technology. Regarding population he shows it mostly as an inhibiting factor. 'Other things being equal', he definitively says, 'a state with a large population is at a disadvantage as compared with a relatively small population', and compares India unfavourably with the USA and the Soviet Union in this regard. He show shows how rate of growth inhibits the 'whole process of economic development', by leading to perpetual food deficits, through

large scale emigration to other countries, by necessitating the creation of a large army and the cost of equipping it (2000: 50-3). But this position can be accepted only with many qualifiers. With right type of leadership, political programmes, economic strategies and an overarching ideology a huge population can be turned into an asset, not only as a source of military strength. From the perspective of military logic Mao Zhe Dong said in a 1949 speech that 'It is a very good thing that China has a big population. Even if China multiplies her population many times she is fully capable of finding a solution'. While saying this he trashed Malthus, by showing 'the realities in the Soviet Union and the liberated China after their revolutions.' He affirmed that 'Revolution plus production can solve the problem of feeding the population. ... of all things in the world, people are most precious. Under the leadership of the Communist Party, as long as there are people, every kind of miracle can be performed'.

This attitude, in spite of its problems and limitations, was epitomized in a five-character slogan, 'Ren Duo, Liliang Da', or in English, 'With Many People Strength is Great' (cited in Shapiro, 2001: 31). Of course Shapiro has quoted Mao to show his instrumental attitude to people as cannon fodder or nuclear victims. But that does not change the edge of the point. This is more so because even in post-reforms China under Deng Xiaoping population continues to be seen as resource. In a major military publication 'comprehensive national strength' is seen to be constituted by 'three kinds of capabilities and nine essential factors'. The capabilities are 'international contributions, survival and coercion', and the essential factors are 'actual economic strength, scientific and technological strength, political stability, educational level, military strength, foreign-policy capability, culture, *population* and territory', population is even now thought to be a resource (Gurtov and Byong-Moo, 1997: 21). Sometimes, however, population is not brought under economic development, but is regarded by Chinese foreign policy analysts as one of the three elements of 'basic power', the other two being resources and national unity, while economic power has industrial, agricultural, scientific and technological, financial and commercial components. That big population is not an unmixed evil is also brought out by the case of India. Because of her huge population and the phenomenal growth of the middle class, India has become a covetable market for industrial giants, which gives her foreign political or economic policy considerable leverage. As Varma shows, in the post-liberalization phase of India's economic policy the perceptions about the middle class changed. The size of this class was varyingly estimated, ranging 200 to 500 million. As Varma assesses its weight:

This 'liberalization' package, tailored to make a key player in the 'globalized' economy suddenly put the spotlight on the middle class for an entirely different reason: its ability to consume. If India was to open up to the world markets, it was essential to know how much it could buy. The segment with the largest concentration of purchasing power was the middle class. Its consumerist prowess has therefore to be accurately gauged. This exercise was important not only for the Indian government which used to advertise the strength of the Indian market to the economies of the developed world, but also for the latter, always sensitive to newer pastures for the sale of their goods and technologies' (Varma, 2007: 178). Of course 'India has the largest number of out-of-school children in the world', but it has also 'one of the world's largest reservoirs of trained and skilled manpower', (Varma, 2004: 114-15) which is not

only a domestic resource for economic development, but is also one of its significant export items.

### 2.3.1.3 Natural resources in Economic Development

Regarding natural resources this much is sufficient to say that as a basis for industrialization, which is the most important avenue to economic development, natural resources is a factor that influences directions of foreign policy. This is precisely why a large and varied supply of *natural resources or its absence decides the independence of the* foreign policy of a state. The USA (coal, copper, lead, molybdenum, phosphates, rare earth elements, uranium, bauxite, gold, iron, mercury, nickel, potash, silver, tungsten, zinc, petroleum, natural gas, timber, world's largest coal reserves accounting for 27% of the world's total), the erstwhile Soviet Union (for Russia alone wide natural resource base including major deposits of oil, natural gas, coal, and many strategic minerals, reserves of rare earth elements, timber), and also India (coal, fourth-largest reserves in the world; iron ore; manganese; mica; bauxite; rare earth elements; titanium ore; chromite; natural gas; diamonds; petroleum; limestone; arable land) cannot but have greater leeway in their foreign policy than countries that have only a little of them. While India is a South Asian giant in terms of natural resources, Pakistan (land, extensive natural gas reserves, limited petroleum, poor quality coal, iron ore, copper, salt, limestone), Bangladesh (natural gas, arable land, timber, coal), Sri Lanka (limestone, graphite, mineral sands, gems, phosphates, clay, hydropower), Nepal (quartz, water, timber, hydropower, scenic beauty, small deposits of lignite, copper, cobalt, iron ore), and Bhutan (timber, hydropower, gypsum, calcium carbonate) are poor pygmies, with resultant constraints for economic development. You can compare them with Anquilla (salt, fish, lobster), Cayman Islands (fish and beaches), and Bouvet Island (none), and their foreign policy impacts (CIA, n.d.).

All over the world natural resources will continue to influence foreign policy for another reason. Given the depletion of world resources to a worrying extent, even primary producers will continue to have some amount of economic development and foreign policy leeway, as evidenced in the burgeoning academic field of resource politics. Natural scarcities as also contrived scarcities, as by the OPEC since the early 1970s in respect of oil, and the wars provoked by oil politics in the Persian Gulf and Iraq since the 1990s, are pointers to these.

### 2.3.1.4 Technology in Economic Development

While talking about technology, I have to warn you that technology is both a facilitator of economic development and a constraint on it. The USA is and the erstwhile Soviet Union was a technological superpower, as are countries like Japan, Germany and the OECD countries, and of late China. These are all world technological leaders, with high impact foreign policies. In India dependent, backdated technology resulting from import substituting industrialization (ISI) and the resultant 'Hindu rate of growth' (coined by Raj Krishna) had definitely slowed the rate of increase of economic development. But even when better technology is available, it is a matter of economic rather than technological policy. Mowery and Rosenberg point out that instead of 'focusing exclusively on the conditions affecting the supply of research and

development', one should look at the 'utilization of research findings and their translation into commercial innovation. It is only through this conversion of research into innovation that the economic payoffs from scientific research are realized, and recent history suggests that strength in research alone may be insufficient to guarantee that the economic benefits of research investment will be realized by the nation making the investment' (1995: 3). In a sense Mowery and Rosenberg are saying only what was said a long ago by Schumpeter, when he said, in the context of the Industrial Revolution, 'The last candidate is technological progress. Was not the observed performance due to that stream of inventions that revolutionized the technique of production rather than to the businessman's hunt for profits? The answer is the negative. The carrying into effect of those technological novelties was of the essence of that hunt. And even in the inventing itself ... was a function of the capitalist process which is responsible for the mental habits that will produce invention' (2013: 110). This will make technology a product of the social, economic and cultural system of a country, rather than a natural outgrowth of natural resources.

### **2.3.1.5 Pattern of Growth as a Factor of Economic Development**

Another important aspect of economic development, to be distinguished from what Bandyopadhyay strangely calls the 'basic compulsions' discussed above, is pattern of growth. Bandyopadhyay rightly points out that economic development can happen under widely divergent conditions, ideologies and political systems. It has happened under *laissez faire* in England, America and many European countries, under free enterprise and later Fascism in Germany, under state controlled free market since the Meiji period in Japan, in a centrally planned economy in the Soviet Union and China. Of course economic development in such diverse circumstances entails different types of economic, social and political disciplines. From the point of IR the pattern of growth is important to the extent it gives a rough idea about the long run viability of economic growth. Here too there are many false ideas, and the concept of economic development is not without ideological elements. The 'Hindu rate of growth' of 3.5 percent per annum from 1950 to 1980 is frequently cited to indicate how badly India has done. But Schumpeter had said long back, in the context of his argument that economic factors alone would not cause the downfall of capitalism, that even with 'available output' of a net 2 per cent (compound interest) between 1870 and 1930 had 'made certain things available to the modern workman that Louis XIV have been delighted to have yet was unable to have', and with a 2.5 per cent rate of increase, capitalism would be invincible (ibid: 63-71). He takes many pages to explain why capitalism will finally fall. We cite him mainly to say that even the 'Hindu rate of growth' has not been placed in proper perspective, when compared with a 'Third World' growth rate of 4.9 percent per annum during the same timeframe, and the world growth rate of 4.01 per cent in the same time span. It was not too low as the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States sets to applying the brakes when growth rates come near 3.5 percent, in fear of inflation and uptight labour markets. Now, why is 3.5 percent inadmissibly high in America and abysmally low in India, he rightly asks (Woo-Cumings, 310).

Our answer is that the factor which makes rate of growth enough or insufficient is population

or rather the growth of its rate. And while decrying the 'permit quota raj', the ISI type of industrialization and dirigisme for the 'Hindu rate of growth', we should remember that between 1950 and 1965 India's industrial growth rate was a healthy 7 per cent. Anxieties about the permit quota raj choking growth overemphasized the drop in the rate of growth in industry after 1965, to 3.5 per cent between 1965 and 1980. Those who raised a hullaballoo about it did not care to see, or rather to reveal that this drop in growth rate, for which India had earned this aphorism, ended in the 1980s in 7.9 percent per annum (ibid). The drop after 1965 was caused by many factors, climatic and sociopolitical, including the drought years of 1964 and 1965 and the political turmoil partially caused by it. And those who decry India's pattern of economic growth based on state control would do well to remember the words Rob Jenkins, one of the foremost authorities on economic reforms in India, that 'the highly dirigiste policy itself may have facilitated the smooth transition to reforms, by 'nurturing the democratic institutions' and then 'dismantling it without fatally undermining either the reform effort or democracy itself (Jenkins, 211).

Bandyopadhyay drew theoretical lessons from the history of economic development in the most successful countries to point out how constitutional constraints, the role of the State, and the ideology of economic development shaped the trajectory of development in India. But we are not centrally concerned with it here. We are passing on to the diplomacy of economic development, and his arguments that his third factor of economic development that this diplomacy must concern itself with internal and external security, an appropriate strategy of foreign aid and foreign trade. But we are not proposing to enter into these bye lanes for fear of losing track.

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## 2.4 Political Tradition

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It is but natural that the foreign policy of a country would be greatly influenced by the political tradition, both ancient and recent, of a country, It is not clear why Bandyopadhyay thinks this determination is more likely in newly independent countries like India (ibid, 69), because this proposition is equally applicable to countries which have existed for long as nations. Is it possible to understand the foreign policies of the UK, France, other countries of Europe and the USA without considering their centuries-long accent on liberalism and democracy, or is it possible to understand the present foreign policy of Germany in isolation from its traditional goal of dominating Europe, with or without liberalism? The weight of historical tradition is best brought out by Marx in these famous words:

Men make their own history, but not as they please. They do not choose the circumstances for themselves, but have to work upon circumstances as they find them, have to fashion the material handed down by the past. The legacy of all the dead generations weighs like an alp [mountain] on the brains of the living. At the very time when they seem to be revolutionizing themselves and things, when they seem to be creating something perfectly new— in such epochs of revolutionary crises, they are eager to press the spirits of the past into their service, borrowing the names of the dead, reviving old war cries, dressing up in traditional costumes,

that they make a braver pageant in the newly staged scenes of world history' (*Eighteenth Brumaire*: 23).

Almost the same feeling is conveyed by Nietzsche, though in a sharp, pessimistic twist:

For as we are merely resultant of previous generations, we are also the resultant of their errors, passions and crimes; it is impossible to shake off this chain. Though we condemn the errors and think we have escaped them, we cannot escape the fact that we spring from them (Nietzsche, 1873: 21).

In the case of India an idealist view of politics and power, an idealist approach to internationalism, anti-imperialism and anti-racialism, Asianism and rejection of Western democracy and communism have been identified by to be the most fertile sources of her foreign policy orientations (Bandyopadhyay, 69-81). Others have traced the sources of India's non-alignment policy in her ancient religious and cultural history (Rana, 1976).

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## 2.5 Domestic and International Milieu

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Any treatment of the domestic milieu as a determinant of foreign policy in isolation from the external context is methodologically naïve. Speaking in the context of American foreign policy Nielson says that since the course of foreign policy is to a great extent shaped by the 'personality, character and psychological traits in whose hands the consequences of decisions rest', it is inescapable that 'the internal, domestic determinants of foreign policy' would be 'as important as the external, foreign challenges or crises that arise to compel decision. Unquestionably, then, 'the foreign environment is an extraordinarily complex nexus of international context and domestic milieu ...' (2000: 4-5). But since we have dealt with *Innenpolitik* as an approach in the first Unit, and would deal in the next Unit with the domestic sources of foreign policy in detail, we are not devoting more space to it in this section.

The importance of the external/ international milieu/ environment as a determinant of foreign policy is timeless and universal, though unlike stable determinants of 'basic power' such as geography or natural resources, international milieu is an unstable determinant. This is because a country's foreign policy has of necessity to operate in an international environment prone to frequent and often unpredictable changes, and has to adapt continually to these changes, which continually emerge as inputs for decision makers. This situation is best illustrated in the history of diplomacy of European balance of power system between the eighteenth and the first two decades of the twentieth century, where we find any two or three of the five great powers continually aligning with one another against the remaining two in frequently shifting alliances. But the external or international milieu has greatly changed in the last twelve decades because of many factors. These are:

- the postwar emergence and evolution of the bipolar system, its crises and disappearance;
- the resultant changes in great-power politics;
- development of highly sophisticated and lethal weapons of mass destruction, including conventional arsenals, nuclear stockpiles and chemical and biological weapons, as also



- a continuous though limited nuclear proliferation;
- incessant growth of international legislation and proliferation of laws, and gradual development of the United Nations as a universal body of limited effectiveness;
- rapid technological advances and their impacts on the powers of nation states;
- end of classical imperialism, onset of continuous decolonization and steady emergence of weak, puny and not so puny nation states and their political development.

The importance of the external milieu for foreign policy can be stated in narrower and more concrete terms. Consider whether a state will or will not react to a communist revolution, populist upheaval or army coup in a neighbouring state; to a growing dispute between two friendly nations either just across the border or situated afar; nationalization of banks, industries, or waterways by another country; devaluation or inflations in still other nations; and sudden and sharp changes in dollar or yen values. It definitely will. But the impact of the international milieu comes not through itself but from its perception by the policy makers. Leaders of the realist school of thought rightly posit that the basic determinant of a country's foreign policy is the perception of the policy leadership of the external, international milieu, especially the distribution of powers among states. This is as much true of the US leadership's perception of the Sino-Soviet rift resulting in a sea change in the US foreign policy towards China, as of the Bangladesh liberation struggle and resultant changes in the South Asia power structure resulting in substantial shifts in India's foreign policy. The subversion of the Bhutto Government in Pakistan and the subsequent military dictatorship led General Zia-ul-Haq, the murder of Mujib-ur-Rehman in Bangladesh, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the US rearming of Pakistan in its wake and perceptions of these by the Indian policy makers brought about the twists and turns of Indian foreign policy in the 1970s and 1980s. Likewise the BJP led NDA government's perception of the threat posed by a nuclear-armed China, and its not too secret supply of nuclear material to Pakistan was the basic cause of the second Pokharan testing of nuclear devices in May 1998.

The impact of the external milieu on foreign policy making becomes important in another way for foreign policy making. Litwak points out in the context of American foreign policy toward 'rogue states' that '[g]iven the importance of the international environment on the target state, external actors must carefully assess the impact of their policies on the country in question. This issue was at the heart of the transatlantic dispute over policy towards Iran during the 1990s (i.e., the Clinton administration's comprehensive containment versus the EU's "critical dialogue")'. The issues that were debated were: if the tough, hawkish approach adopted by the US stand had created domestic pressures that culminated in the election of Mohammad Khatami to presidency, or if the US policy of punishing and isolating Iran had borne unusual fruits of pushing Iranian nationalists toward the theocratic regime'. According to Litwak, the 'questions surrounding this specific case underscore the general need for external actors to evaluate the influence of the international environment, and, in particular, the impact of their policies on the target state' (Litwak, 2000, 95).

Any discussion of the external milieu would remain incomplete if we do not mention the role of international and global processes. As Hoyle points out, 'Beyond the influence of public opinion within a single state, the emerging international system will require FPA to give greater

attention to cross-national processes that influence decisions. Although much of the current literature focuses on how domestic society, governmental politics, and foreign policy processes affect a particular state's foreign policy choices, greater emphasis will need to be placed in the future on the role of world opinion, the cross-state influence of domestic actors (state A responding to state B's public), and the activities of globalized citizens'. Hoyle points to two directions of the influence of world public opinion being a source of concern for policy makers. While the belief of President Woodrow Wilson that the force of post-World War I world public opinion would compel states to adopt more peaceful foreign policies based open international agreements openly arrived at proved utopian if because it was premature, then on at least two occasions President Dwight D. Eisenhower administration felt it opportune to change their preferred foreign policy choices. First, the decision Eisenhower and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, taken very early, to eschew the nuclear option due to constraints imposed by world opinion, informed the deliberations about use of nuclear weapons during the Indochina and Taiwan Straits crises. Secondly, while deliberating about the US policy towards the Offshore Islands in the Taiwan Straits in years immediately preceding the 1954 crisis the Eisenhower is on record to have feared that being dragged into a major war here will fall foul of world public opinion.

Hoyle also thinks that if the world continues to be more globalized, and obstacles to the free movement of persons, things, and ideas are progressively removed, 'members of the public are likely to become more aware of and concerned with the substance and processes involved in policymaking in foreign countries'. In Doyle's view economic interdependence under conditions of globalization will increase the salience of the international environment understood as other states and even influential individuals. In a situation where the final decisions of multinational corporations depend on 'the choices of governments and individuals from across the globe' utility optimizing individuals are legitimately expected to make financial and investment decisions after a look at the state of the economy and politics in these countries. Ever since the global financial crisis of 1997-98 (and we may add the global meltdown of 2007-08), it has become clear that state economies are largely dependent on a good number of individuals who are expatriate and stateless in respect of their financial allegiances. Foreign policy makers in all countries have to take into reckoning their attitudes. Doyle shows that state-based actors have already started to keep in view 'globalized forces and internationalized actors (for example, bond markets, international investors, tourist travel money, global norms and so on)', since successful foreign policy making needs anticipating and reacting to changes in them. In consequence, FPA cannot avoid responding to 'this chain of events by focusing even more on cross-national bureaucratic, public, interest group, and decision making dynamics'. While still focusing more on governmental actors in decision making situations, their concern with how these actors act and interact should remain enlightened about 'the broader contexts of these expanded processes'.

Doyle also points out that a large section of the well-informed world public would also make use of this 'transformation in context'. It has been recognized by experts that on a large number of issues stretching from landmines to labour standards, environment policy to free trade, citizens of the world have started reflecting on and reacting to in line with their reading of world opinion

and have sought to constrain the choices of their national leaders. The mind-boggling development in ICT has enabled individuals to execute their own foreign policy decisions, as evident during the US-China discord in 2001 over the spy plane incident in which Internet attacks on US websites by Chinese citizens and attacks on Chinese websites by US citizens registered their forms of protests (Hoyle, 166-67).

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## 2.6 Military Strength

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Even though military strength is a dependent rather than independent variable, being the upshot of a country's economic strength and development, it is an important facilitator of a country's foreign policy. The realists view survival and security as the two dominant goals of foreign policy and view military strength as its surest protector and guarantor. While deciding whether a country is a superpower, middle level power, or emerging power, its military strength remains a crucial consideration, though economic power is slowly substituting it. A leading scholar and US government adviser on China had said much early that 'while political and economic factors will greatly influence China's ability to play the role of a major power in the future, its military position relative to other major powers will be even more important in imposing limits of foreign-policy choices Peking can consider. In short, the realities of military power will be a fundamental determinant of Peking's posture and policies in the future, as in the past, especially in a broad strategic sense' (Doak Barnett, 2001:273). It is not without reason that there are a host of international rankings of states, whether in terms of their global firepower index (GFP), or in terms of strength of militaries. In the former while calculating for each State its power index (PwrIdx), geographical factors, natural resource reliance, limits of naval capabilities and current economic health of the country are taken into account, but nuclear capability, landlocked status of the country and current political/military leadership are not taken into account. The GFP ranking is based strictly on each nation's 'potential conventional war making capabilities across land, sea or air in 2015. While compiling and measuring 50 different factors against each other in a sophisticated formula, it also incorporates values related to penalties (such as high oil consumption), bonuses (such as low oil consumption). In this measure the GFP of top ten countries are US (PwrIdx 0.1661), Russia (PwrIdx 0.1868), China (PwrIdx 0.2341), India (PwrIdx 0.2695), United Kingdom (PwrIdx 0.2743), France (PwrIdx 0.3065), South Korea (PwrIdx 0.3098), Germany (PwrIdx 0.3505), Japan (PwrIdx 0.3836), and Turkey (PwrIdx 0.4335) ([www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp](http://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp)). In the second ranking of strongest militaries, measured in terms of manpower, tanks, aircraft, nuclear warheads, aircraft carriers, submarines, and budgets, the top ten countries are The United States, Russia, China, India, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Turkey, South Korea, and Japan ([www.businessinsider.com/35-most-powerful-militaries-in-the-world-2015](http://www.businessinsider.com/35-most-powerful-militaries-in-the-world-2015)). If we add to these two lists another of the top ten countries in terms of total inventory of nuclear warheads, Russia (8000), US (7300), France (300), China (250), UK (225), Pakistan (100-120), India (90-110), Israel (80), North Korea (6-8) ([www.mapsofworld.com](http://www.mapsofworld.com) > *World Top Ten*), then we can make the following deductions:

- In the first list, many countries have greater GFP than the two superpowers, which can only mean that the superpowers depend more on nuclear weapons than on conventional ones for deterrence.
- Strongest armies are a better indicator than GHP, since it includes nuclear firepower too.
- Even small countries can afford and maintain strong armies, for security purposes.
- Threatened countries like Israel and North Korea resemble superpowers in their reliance on nuclear capabilities, also for deterrence purposes.
- But for Israel and North Korea, the three rankings more or less match.

The bottom line of all these are that military strength is accepted as a tool of carrying forward foreign policy choices.

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## 2.7 National Character

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Every textbook on foreign policy making in India after Bandyopadhyay (2000) will have a section on national character in determinants of foreign policy, although there are problems with the concept. In the realist view the national character approach has at least three underlying questionable assumptions:

- The individual citizens of any nation partake of a common psychological make-up, personality or a system of norms or values which set them apart from citizens of other countries.
- This national character lives on without substantial changes over long periods of time.
- There is a clearly identifiable relationship between individual character and national goals (Organski, 1968: 87).

Actually, immediately after the Second World War, 'national character' became a fashionable concept but was later rejected because of its personifying implications. All through the Cold War the potent combination of realism and hard-nosed social science left little room for such an anthropomorphic, impressionistic and vague concept. The eminent British historian Christopher Hill famously said in his 1989 Conway Lecture that, '[t]o resort to national character as an explanation means that you have no explanation: national character changes with history' (Hill in Dumbrell, 1998: 29). But later the concept was retrieved from stigmata. Bandyopadhyay says that objections to the concept are mainly methodological, mainly its non-amenability to empirical analysis. But that is a rectifiable vice, since 'national character can be defined and studied empirically, factoring in cultural relativity, and thereby helping overcome most of the methodological objections of the concept. After that analysts can show how 'the perceptions, reactions, and behaviour-patterns of decision-makers, diplomats, members of international delegations and negotiating teams, have acted and do act as important inputs in policy making.

Bandyopadhyay then marks out specific attributes of the national character of select countries. For American national character they are 'the worship of wealth and power', 'individual initiative and resourcefulness', and as some competent scholars allege 'racial prejudice of white Americans

Consequently, in his view American leaders and masses are unlikely to support a global foreign policy strategy that will promote non-hierarchical equality of nations, 'collectivist or quasi-collectivist development patterns elsewhere'; and a 'truly anti-racist foreign policy' in any part of the world (120-21). Dumbrell adds other attributes. These are, 'optimism about human behaviour and perfectibility, a pragmatic belief in the solubility of the world's problems', 'a notion of deliverance from evil', 'faith in technology', 'American public ethos of commitment to capitalism and democracy', and finally a notion of 'national mission'. This national mission originated in a Puritan legacy of building up a 'city on hill' and spreading it beyond the frontier and well into the Philippines and the Caribbean. It is Dumbrell shrewdly suggests the 'complex', combining in it 'elements of racism with a commitment to anti-colonialism' (Dumbrell, 1998: 29-30). All these features of American national character or what is also known as 'American exceptionalism' have significantly influenced American foreign policy from time to time. Morgenthau also pointed to 'individual initiative and inventiveness' as essential aspects of American national character. For the British it was 'undogmatic common sense', while for the Germans it was 'discipline and thoroughness' (Morgenthau, 1948/1966:131)

Bandyopadhyay also described 'elementary persistence, worship of governmental authority, and fear of the foreigner' as 'relatively stable attributes of the Russian national character'. It is not clear if he is remembering or quoting Morgenthau without acknowledgement when writing it, for while pointing to 'striking proof of the persistence of certain intellectual and moral qualities' Morgenthau points to this worship of government authority in two episodes. In the first, documented by Bismarck in 1859, a sentry was seen guarding a spot in the royal garden during Emperor Alexander II's reign without knowing why. Asked by the emperor what he was guarding he simply said 'Those are my orders'. After many inquiries the curious Emperor gathered that he was the last in a long line of sentinels guarding nothing. After seeing a 'snowdrop in bloom unusually early' tsarina Catherine (reigning from 1762 to 1796) wanted a sentry posted on the spot, lest it be plucked. The guard was continuing since that time 24x7 for must-have-been more than 63 years counting from the last. Bismarck's comment is that beyond amusing implications, 'they are an expression of the elementary force and persistence on which the strength of the Russian nature depends in its attitude to the rest of Europe. It reminds us of the sentinels in the flood at St. Petersburg in 1825, and in the Shipka Pass in 1877; not being relieved, the former were drowned, the latter frozen to death'.

In the second episode, reported by *Time*, a Russian soldier marching on twelve German prisoners of war down 'Potsdam's slushy Berlinerstrasse' allowed a German woman who had suddenly sighted her son among them to come near him, hug him and even pushed them toward the sidewalk to escape, all the time pointing his Tommy gun towards them. But when mother and son were delirious, the spectators were bewildered, and the eleven nonplussed prisoners trudged on, he suddenly thought for a little moment; pushed a side-walking German youth into the group to the dismay of the passersby and terror of the new recruit; and now thoroughly relaxed lighted his pipe. Morgenthau says with great perception that 'Between these two episodes a great revolution intervened, interrupting the historic continuity on practically all levels of national life. Yet the traits of the Russian national character emerged intact from the holocaust

of the [communist]. Even so thorough a change in the social and economic structure, in political leadership and institutions, in the ways of life and thought has not been able to affect the “elementary force and persistence” of the Russian character which Bismarck found revealed in his experience’ (Ibid, 128-30).

Speaking of Indian national character Bandyopadhyay points out a few important things:

- Dominance of ‘non-polarized, non-dialectical modes of thought’ in the ‘culture and belief system’ of the great majority of Indian people.
- The admissibility, in their minds, of an ‘amorphous mass of relative truths and realities all reducible to one ultimate truth’, ranging from ‘the metaphysical non-duality of the Creator and the cosmos, God and man, through the ethical non-duality of good and evil to the empirical non-duality of different religious, cultural, social, and even political systems’.
- The reflection of this unique culture and belief system in the complex caste system of India.

As a result, Hindus, non-Hindus, atheists and agnostics, partaking of this belief system fully or partially, or sharing a different culture and belief system cannot escape its effect. Even as an agnostic, or at best a marginal Hindu, Jawaharlal Nehru was influenced by these while formulating India’s non-alignment strategy. ‘For the non-recognition of the absolute duality of phenomena coming down through India’s trackless centuries to constitute an essential attribute of the Indian national character, would be inconsistent with the acceptance of bipolarity as a global reality’ (Bandyopadhyay, 121-23).

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## 2.8 Summary

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In this Unit a fairly comprehensive account has been given about the major factors that constrain or help foreign policy decision makers to delineate the specific foreign policies of countries. We have mentioned geography, economic development, political tradition, domestic and international milieu, military strength, and national character as, separate determinants of foreign policy. But two things should be remembered here. First, there may be many other factors that at different times may acquire salience. Second, these factors do not operate in isolation. They interact with, interpenetrate and cross-fertilize in ways that generate the dynamics of foreign policy making. This is a fascinating area, which we hope our students will be enabled to understand through this short exegesis of the ‘determinants’. Finally, though a short list of suggested readings are attached, still, since this Unit has been written with the help of many other books, articles and web sources, an aspiring student should try to consult them in future.

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## 2.9 Questions

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### Essay answer type

1. Discuss the role of geography and natural resources in general shaping of the foreign policy of a country.
2. Write a short essay on geopolitics as an expression or manifestation of the role of geography in foreign policy.
3. Why would you accord a prime role to economic development as a determinant of foreign policy?
4. Point out the main components of economic development as a contributory factor in foreign policy making.
5. In what ways does the political past of a country influence its present foreign policy?
6. Comment on the role of the political tradition of a country in the shaping of its foreign policy.
7. How does the international milieu mould the foreign policy of a country?
8. In what ways does the national character of a country influence its foreign policy?

### Medium answer type

1. Point out the main contentions of Mackinder regarding the important of geography in foreign policy calculations.
2. Underline the major propositions of Spykman on the context of geopolitics in foreign policy.
3. Analyse the main features of 'new geopolitics'
4. Identify the main components of economic development.
5. Analyse the major components of the international/external milieu.
6. Show why national character is a contested term and how the contestations have been resolved.

### Short answer type

1. Comment on the way Holsti looks at geography as a determinant of foreign policy.
2. Comment on the early recognition of geography as an important factor in foreign policy.
3. Show the main features of early modern geopolitics.
4. Write a short note on Mahan's geopolitics.
5. Write a short note on population as a factor in economic development.
6. How important is technology as a source of economic development?
7. What is the role of the middle class in foreign policy today?
8. Analyse the importance of 'pattern of growth' in economic development.

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## 2.10 Suggested Readings

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## Unit 3 □ Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy, Interest Groups and Bureaucracy

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### Structure

- 3.0 Objectives
- 3.1 Introduction
- 3.2 Role of Public Opinion
- 3.3 Role of the Parliament, Congress and Other Central Legislature in Foreign Policy
- 3.4 Political Parties
- 3.5 Bureaucracy
- 3.6 Interest Groups
- 3.7 Summary
- 3.8 Questions
- 3.9 Suggested Readings

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### 3.0 Objectives

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This Unit focuses on what we referred to in the first theoretical Unit as *Innenpolitik*, and what we mentioned in passing in the second Unit as domestic milieu, to be treated in more detail in the next Unit, which is here. After reading this the student is expected to understand:

- Why it is a truism to say that public opinion is a crucial domestic source of foreign policy even in democracies.
- Why and how public opinion is rendered ineffectual in influencing foreign policy formulation even in formally democratic systems by media controls.
- How public opinion can be unshackled in a democracy to provide a check on features of foreign policy considered undesirable.
- The important role political parties play in giving desired directions in all senses of the term to the foreign policy of a country.
- In what ways interest groups and pressure groups control the direction of foreign policy in a country.
- How important is state bureaucracy in the formulation, guidance and implementation of the foreign policy of a country.

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### 3.1 Introduction

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You must have noticed that in the last unit we did not discuss the domestic milieu as a determinant of foreign policy because we kept it in reserve for the present unit. But after having referred to *Innenpolitik* in the theoretical chapter on conceptual frameworks for understanding foreign policy, it will be legitimately expected of us that we treat in detail the domestic sources of foreign policy. This is even more legitimate because we indicated at the very outset of this module that the first comprehensive theoretical treatment of foreign policy analysis appeared in the volume on policies and policy making in the eight- volume Sage Handbook of Political Science in 1975. The suggestion was clear in this that foreign policy is just one of various public policies, and domestic and foreign policy are inextricably interlinked. Bandyopadhyay rightly says that 'far from being a matter of free choice', public opinion bears the indelible imprint of various domestic factors. We have indicated in the last Unit after Nielson that since the course of foreign policy is to a great extent shaped by the 'personality, character and psychological traits in whose hands the consequences of decisions rest', it is inescapable that 'the internal, domestic determinants of foreign policy' would be 'as important as the external, foreign challenges or crises that arise to compel decision. Robert Putnam would not even hear of any doubts about the importance of these domestic factors. As he says, 'It is fruitless to debate whether domestic politics really determines international relations, or the reverse. The answer to that question is clearly "both, sometimes". The more interesting questions are "When?" and "How?" (Putnam, 1988: 427)'.

In this Unit we will dwell upon those internal factors. Some scholars, as for example, Bandyopadhyay mention them together as 'political institutions' (2000:127). We are starting with public opinion.

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### 3.2. Role of Public Opinion

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While proposing to begin our discussion of public opinion, I appreciate that you might well wonder with some justification that since we have already spoken of public opinion in the last section in international or global contexts, if bringing it in for discussion again would not be a little repetitive. But it would really not be repetitive, dear student, since here we are speaking only of domestic public opinion.

The belief that public opinion does, or rather should, have a role in the making of foreign policy is, like everything in IR, subject to the liberal-realist debate. A normative sanction of the role of public opinion in the conduct of all public policies, including foreign policy was part of the liberal tradition, which drew support from the doctrine of popular sovereignty as a potent check on the abuse of power. This liberal doctrine is as old as Jeremy Bentham, who puts public opinion, or rather the 'Public Opinion Tribunal', at the centre of the policy making process as the panacea of problems of government. His 'Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace' put a premium on removal of all concealment in the conduct of external affairs. In his words, 'That

secrecy in the operation of the foreign department ought not to be endured in England, being equally repugnant to the interests of liberty and those of peace'. James Mill's case for the role of public opinion is that every man endowed with reason is used to 'weigh evidence and to be guided by its preponderance'. So, when 'various conclusions are, with their evidence, presented with equal care and equal skill, there is a moral certainty, though some few may be misguided, that the greatest number will judge aright, and that the greatest force of evidence, wherever it is, will produce the greatest impression' (Holsti, 2004: 3-4). This belief was given empirical verification by Rousseau. As he claimed in the *Letters from the Mountains*, 'Injustice and fraud find protectors often; but never is the public one of them. It is here that the voice of the people is the voice of God' (Miller, 1984: 108). In the same vein, Kant's logic was built around the constraints that republican and non-republican regimes face when deciding to wage war. The former are expected to be more reluctant, since the people who are to defray most of the costs will be more cautious about getting embroiled in it. But the conditions will be vastly different in non-republican governments, where 'the easiest thing in the world is to declare war'. This is because the king is no 'fellow citizen, but the nation's owner, and war does not affect his tables, his hunt, his places of pleasure, his court festivals and so on'.

This liberal stance on public opinion was continued in the 19th century by William Gladstone and in the 20th century by British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin, who in a Kantian vein saw in the 'common man' the 'greatest protection against war'. But the liberal position was logically opposed by the realists because of their pessimistic view of human nature whether alone or in collectivities and their distrust of institutional arrangements for promoting international cooperation in an anarchical system. According to realists, statesmen are prone to viewing relations with other nations as mere means. But the public is more likely to view these relations as ends and to detest alliances with brutal dictatorships. Hence, public opinion would only be an obstacle to the construction of a thoughtful and consistent foreign policy. Founding fathers of the USA, such as Alexander Hamilton and the authors of the Federalist Papers also had this distrust of the wisdom of the general public long before modern realism emerged. And Tocqueville, the official philosopher of America, put the seal on the governmental control of foreign policy. After conceding that it is 'very difficult to ascertain, at present, what degree of sagacity the American democracy will display in the conduct of ... foreign policy', he made his general comment that 'As for myself, I do not hesitate to say that it is especially in the conduct of their foreign relations that democracies appear to be decidedly inferior to other governments' (all in Holsti, 2004: 5-7).

It is because of these tensions that the Latin phrase, 'vox populi vox dei' has mixed connotations today. It was first penned in a letter written to Frankish emperor Charlemagne by his adviser Alcuin. It means literally that the voice of the people is the voice of God, and politically that opinion of ordinary people is expressive of God's will and hence deserving of obedience. But the term does not carry the sanctity that it might have had in earlier days. A dictionary of allusions says that the 'phrase is often used negatively, in the sense that the popular voice may not be wise and good and may in fact be the lowest common denominator but is nevertheless an irresistible force' (Merriam-Webster, 1999: 560). Of course, the concept of public opinion is both imprecise and slippery. Frankel reminds us that though 'public opinion is the term most frequently

employed for the people as a whole in their political role', still it is 'an ill-defined term. We rarely ask the three questions why we accept the majority rule, how we ascertain what public opinion is, and whether we speak of national and local public opinion.

Why *is* domestic public opinion considered to be an important source of foreign policy? The most obvious but significant answer has been provided by Frankel who says that foreign policy decision-makers 'are much more intimately connected with their domestic than with their foreign environment'. The reason of this connect is that they are integral part of the former through internalization of its values, socialization in the national culture and, and constant exposure to the influences and pressures operating in domestic policy. Because of this it 'is unnecessary to postulate a democratic ideology or a theory of the "general will" to acknowledge the ultimate importance of the people as a whole'. Even in totalitarian systems the importance of the people has been seldom discounted. But the role of the people in the formation of foreign policy can come in two different ways, 'either as an unorganized whole, or through leaders, intermediaries and sectional interests'. So, while looking for the domestic sources of foreign policy the structure of public opinion in each country, which varies for every country, needs close study.

For Frankel unmediated public opinion is important because while only organized groups or leadership can have positive influence on the conduct of foreign policy, 'the people as a mass exercise an important negative influence through the climate of public opinion or what Gabriel Almond calls "the mood", which prescribe the limits within which public opinion can be shaped'. Such mood often defines the range of constriction or elimination of practical choices that may leave the decision-maker with prohibitions alone without any alternatives. Here we see the operation of 'power of a vague but very real nature' shorn of 'any clearly defined responsibility'. Frankel points out that when statesmen are confronted with 'an intractable public mood', while dealing with an international conflict, they may see their efforts and hopes to settle the issue utterly frustrated. It happened in the case of the dispute between Austria and Italy over South Tyrol since 1915. Similar bottlenecks may arise when the same government is faced with two strongly determined publics favouring or opposing a move. This happened during the release of Jomo Kenyatta, political activist and President of Kenya Africa National Union, and arrested for his role in the Mau Mau rebellion, in August 1961. It was demanded by the Kenyan Africans, but was staunchly opposed by the white settlers and other conservatives, leaving the government dithering. Also when the public is divided on an issue, Frankel points out, ascertaining the factional strengths of the sides becomes problematic, as happened during the debate over Britain's entry into the Common market in the early 1970s. For us the negative importance of public opinion and its divisiveness in foreign policy is brought out by the helplessness of our decision-makers in the issue of Kashmir, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and China. The dilemma of the present Prime Minister regarding Pakistan and Nawaz Sharif is a case in point.

Though the importance of public opinion for foreign policy making first gained recognition after the development of modern democracies, it was when new researches were providing new insights into domestic democratic institutions it that also became apparent that public opinion has played or plays a role even in non-democratic orders. David Hume has famously said in his essay on 'The First Principles of Government' that the maxim that government is based on

opinion 'extends to the most despotic and most military governments'. Still, so long as foreign policy remained the preserve of governments and diplomats, role of public opinion remained only partially influential. It did not have full flow till the later stages of the First World War, and assertion of the fast growing labour force regarding greater popular control of foreign policy as a 'key to liberal peace'. The new force was permeable to foreign endorsements of their role. President Wilson gave language to it when he offered to mediate on 18 December 1916, and candidly admitted that war-aims had not been clearly spelt out by either side. Trotsky went one over him to voice an explicit appeal to foreign public opinion, when after arriving at the Brest-Litovsk negotiations he distributed leaflets for German soldiers to question the role of their government. Wilson did the same trick when appealing to the Italian people to resist the imperialist ambitions of their government. And since then propagandist use of the other publics or other's public has become standard foreign policy practice.

Frankel also points out that for some internationalists public opinion has become so crucial that they have invoked it at critical moments, as did Lord Cecil, when introducing the Covenant of the League in the House of Commons on 21 July 1919. 'The great weapon', that he said they relied upon, 'is public opinion, and if we are wrong about it, the whole thing is wrong'. But Frankel reminds us here that any robust entry of public opinion into foreign policy has some clear limits. The first of these is the need to inform the public, and the failures of the printing press in playing this (Frankel, 1971: 70-72). These shortcomings of the media have been much rectified today as a result of the growth of the electronic media and the internet and communications technologies (ICT). A book on mediatised information on foreign policy shows the shifts in importance of the sections of the media:

Beginning in the late 1960s or early 1970s, television replaced newspapers as the American public's preferred source of news and public affairs information. In the 1990s, cable television surpassed network television as the main source because of its continuous availability. The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press surveys showed that approximately 90 percent of Americans reported getting most of their news about 9/11 Operation Iraqi Freedom from television. Forty five percent cited cable television for 9/11 versus 50 percent who mentioned cable as their main source of news on the Iraq War. Finally, the internet emerged as a major news source after 9/11. Five percent of Americans cited it as a main source of information about the terrorist attacks, a figure that rose to 11 percent during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Variety and timeliness were two of the most important reasons American internet users gave for seeking information online (Larson, 2004: 20).

But have the limitations of the media in guiding the people on questions of foreign policy disappeared to a significant extent after these? A simple affirmative answer seems elusive. Some fifty six years back Sir Ivonne Kirpatrick had said from his experiences in the BBC and the Information Department of the Foreign Office that provision of satisfactory information services in a democracy in peacetime is nearly impossible because of three reasons, such as (i) 'the invincible ignorance of the public'; (ii) the problems of a public service to match the vibrant, incisive services from commercial sources; and (iii) uncertainties of assured finance

over long periods. Today, the information revolution caused by the sections of media mentioned above has added the problem of disinformation to that of misinformation. Misinformation comes from two sources: (i) poverty, illiteracy, poor information and ICT infrastructure and the 'digital divide' that vertically divides the Indian population. For poor people it is just impossible to access information on the Web, because of these factors, even if we do not mention the language problem. Language is important. As Larson points out 'the mere fact that Aljazeera-net is an Arabic language Web site has a profound influence on who read its pages and with what impact.' Larson shows that ever since the domination of English as the principal language to access its site gradually decreased to admit other languages, the importance of culture and language in interpreting international incidents became evident. As it came out in the Pew survey of public attitudes, against an overwhelming show of sympathy for America after the 9/11 attacks, favourability ratings of the US started declining after 2000 in 19 of the 27 countries where trends were available. Of course antipathy was greatest in the Muslim countries. Still the overall trend of decline was widespread and touched even avowed allies like South Korea, which witnessed a five percent drop in favourability ratings in two years (Larson, 21-22).

The few words above hint not only at the shift in the centre of gravity or information for different wings of the media but also at the possibilities of bias and disinformation in coverage of the news by the media. News can be manipulated in ways that a government would win consent for all its foreign policy moves, including those most contentious. Matthew Baum shows how even before the 9/11, during America's 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, the 2003 war against Iraq, and the war on terrorism, even 'soft news' coming from programmes like 'Today's Entertainment', Oprah Winfrey chat and many light programmes brought 'war to the masses'. And TV news channels excelled in the art of 'building audiences', even making war an entertainment. As Danny Schechter, former producer of 'CNN and ABC's 20/20' puts it:

It started with the Gulf War—the packaging of news, the graphics, the music, the classification of stories . . . Everybody benefitted by saturation coverage. The more channels, the more a sedated public will respond to this . . . If you can get an audience-hooked, breathlessly awaiting every fresh disclosure with a recognizable cast of characters they can either love or hate, with a dramatic arc and a certain coming down to a deadline, you have a winner in terms of building audience' (Baum, 2007:1).

After showing how the cruise missile attacks against six suspected terrorist sites in Afghanistan and Sudan began on August 20 1998 at 1.30 p.m. just three days after President Clinton testified before a federal grand jury for his sexual escapades with White House intern Monica Lewinsky, Baum shows how the American government sought to mould public opinion in favour of the strikes. The extraordinary timing of the strikes, designed to synchronize with the prime time of most of the world TV channels, the strikes were aired not only on traditional news programmes, but on top of 'these and other hard news outlets, a variety of entertainment-oriented, soft news programs also covered the missile strike story'. As a result, in the opinion polls more than two-thirds of the people supported the attack. In these polls sixty percent of the Americans did not think that the strikes were diversionary tactics for distracting attention from the Clinton-Lewinsky

scandal, although 40 percent did think that this was at least one of the considerations. According to Baum the responses of the media and the public to these missile strikes 'illustrate a number of potentially important changes that have taken place over the past several decades in how the mass media cover major political stories like foreign policy crises, and as a result, in how and what the public learns about such stories. Before the 1980s the public knew about foreign policy issues mostly from the elite press or the nightly newscasts of major broadcast networks, or little before that, from radio newscasts or information provided in discussions among civic organizations. But today, with the erosion of links with such civic organizations and the tendency of the modern man of what Putnam calls 'bowling alone', people have been far more exposed to such mediated propaganda. Baum says, 'many politically inattentive Americans actively avoid politics and foreign policy except what is covered by their soft news programs'. While a change in public perceptions could have important implications for foreign policy, the problem according to Baum, has been how to induce, apart from the 'attentive public' or 'issue public' the sadly ignorant masses to engage in public and foreign policy discourse. He says that if a good portion of the public could be weaned from soft news media then it would have increased the diversity or heterogeneity of public opinion (ibid, 2-4).

But is it possible in the backdrop of aggressive framing of news by the government and the media regarding the state's projections of power? Entman shows how in the US media cheered American victories over small time dictators in Grenada or Panama but seldom looked into the most contentious areas of American foreign policy. Entman made three propositions from his 'cascade model' of news framing about the limitations of public opinion in matters of foreign relations. I am quoting them verbatim:

1. The public's actual opinions arise from framed information, from selected highlights of events, issues, and problems, rather than from direct contact with the realities of foreign affairs.
2. Elites for their part cannot know the full reality of public thinking and feeling, but must rely on selective interpretations that draw on news frames.
3. Policy makers relentlessly contend to influence the very news frames that influence them (Entman, 2009:125).

So we see that public opinion as a domestic source of foreign policy is a complicated thing. We agree with Frankel that 'Public opinion is too important to be left by any government to find its own level'. So control is inevitably exercised over information since the 'democratic notion is that if society cannot be transformed without the compliance of the untutored masses, then these masses can be educated' (Frankel, 1971: 75-6). But, from what we saw from the American experience, the task of educating the public can be left neither to the government alone, nor to the corporate-controlled media, which are new champions of world capitalism. Governmental control is not safe because, as we have shown earlier in the case of the 1998 missile attack, the state manufactures opinion and consent. The manufacturing can be seen from the way the timing and packaging of information by the government. When reporters pressed inquiries about the Bush administration's timing in presenting their case for the Iraq war, Andrew Card, the Chief of Staff answered with chilling candour that 'from marketing point of view, you don't



introduce new products in August' (Harold, 2007). Scholars have anxiously noted how over the past two decades a global commercial media system has emerged and developed with great speed and is increasingly shaping the 'direction and control of national media in much of the world. They have further shown how this globalized commercial media is owned and/or controlled by ten transnational media conglomerates of mostly American origin, coupled with another forty odd big North American and Western firms dominating niche or regional markets. Acting as an essential component of the globalizing market economy, and wedded to corporate-friendly and consumerist values, this media system has or has developed some structural deficiencies that limit its service to democracy and self-government, let alone its capacity to promote independent public opinion (Herrmann and McChesney, 1997:189-90).

Confronting this corporatization of the media with the alternative media or the social media is still a very unequal game. But till the game is won, public opinion will remain fractured, shackled and ineffectual to stop strong states pursuing aggressive foreign policies. In the context of the Gulf War, media framing of which we have already discussed above, Hackett shows that critiques of it that questioned the master narrative, not taking into account the evocative slogan 'No blood for oil —was pushed to the margins in the mainstream press, and found much better expression in alternative papers'. As a support for his argument, Hackett writes:

'Only there did one find police harassment of protesters as a significant news topic — reversing the Enemy Within frame— extended discussion of the internal politics of the antiwar coalition as a movement with traditions and complexity. Alternative media were more likely to seek a broader context, which departed from the master narrative and to access voices otherwise marginalized' (Hackett, 1997:158).

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### **3.3 Role of the Parliament, Congress and Other Central Legislatures in Foreign Policy**

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Among the domestic sources of foreign policy, the central legislature comes next, being the greatest embodiment of mediated public opinion. We will call it central legislature in this section, and not Parliament, because all democratic governments do not have a parliamentary setup. But that does not mean that we will evade the rich literature on parliamentary control over foreign policy even where the term applies. We have to start with Britain, the original home of parliamentary sovereignty. Here parliamentary sovereignty found its fullest expression. Swiss theorist Jean-Louis de Lolme says that 'It is a fundamental principle with the English lawyers, that Parliament can do everything except make a woman a man, or a man a woman' (Memoirs, 1779). Sir William Blackstone tones down the claim only a little. Let us produce below parts of what he says after quoting Sir Edward Coke:

'The power and jurisdiction of Parliament ... is so transcendent and absolute, that it cannot be confined, either for causes or persons, within any bounds. It hath sovereign and uncontrollable authority in the making, confirming, enlarging, restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving, and expounding of laws, concerning matters of all possible denominations; ecclesiastical or temporal;

civil, military, maritime, or criminal; this being the place where that absolute despotic power which must, in all governments, reside somewhere, is intrusted (entrusted) by the Constitution of these kingdoms. All mischiefs and grievances, operations and remedies, that transcend the ordinary course of the laws, are within the reach of this extraordinary tribunal. It can change and create afresh even the Constitution of the kingdom, and of parliaments themselves, as was done by the Act of Union and the several statutes for triennial and septennial elections. It can, in short, do everything that is not naturally impossible to be done; and, therefore, some have not scrupled to call its power, by a figure rather too bold, the omnipotence of Parliament.'

From this one can easily make the mistake that the Parliament has absolute power over the framing of foreign policy. But that is not the case. This is because though the British Constitution is unwritten, there are, as Ian Brownlie says, 'certain cases in which there is a certain level of entrenchment', causing great controversy among public lawyers in the UK. The possible exceptions of parliamentary sovereignty arising from such entrenchments are: Parliament can do anything or everything but make a man a woman or vice versa i.e. can do whatever they like to do which is naturally impossible

- The Act of Union with Scotland (1707), which at least legally implies that all parliamentary legislation inconsistent with the Act is invalid.
- The Statute of Westminster, 1931, in respect of the powers of the United Kingdom regarding Commonwealth countries.
- The European Communities Act, 1972, even though its authority is a matter of convention.

These entrenchments are sometimes overlooked in another respect. As Brownlie points out what is often missed is that 'the United Kingdom has certain quasi federal aspects. These are often missed ...' For example, 'for certain purposes the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands are not part of the United Kingdom. Because of this, when the question of accession to the European Common market arose, the Channel Islands conducted their own negotiations ... they gave a mandate to the negotiators, but they took their own view. Without their separate consent the British government could not have the authority to negotiate.' Apart from these constraints on parliamentary sovereignty, it should be recognized that the principle which runs through and overwhelms the British constitution is the cabinet system and its dominance. Sydney and Beatrice Webb called it 'cabinet dictatorship' in their book *A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain* (1920). Lord Hewart of Bury called it 'cabinet despotism' in his book *The New Despotism* (1929). G.W. Keeton called it the abdication of the Parliament in his book *The Passing of Parliament* (1952). Apart from these radical critiques of parliamentary sovereignty, we can point to Sir Ivor Jennings' comparison of the British political system with the French system in this context. He rejected the common assertion that in Britain 'the cabinet system enables Parliament to control the government. That may be true of France, where any government is necessarily a coalition, and where real deference is shown to the opinions of the committee of the legislature'. But in Jennings' view, 'It is not true in the United Kingdom. The cabinet, or department under the control of the cabinet, formulates the policy, and Parliament must either accept the policy or risk a dissolution. ... Under the two-party system this is obvious, at least so far as the House of Commons is concerned. The cabinet contains the leaders of the party

having the majority in the House of Commons. It places the policy before the House, and expects the party to vote in its favour. If the party does as it is told, the cabinet's majority is assured. No matter what the Opposition may say or do, the policy is definitely determined and cannot be overridden' (Jennings, *The Law and the Constitution*).

As Browlie deduces from this, 'this preponderant power of the cabinet, even when there is minority government... is a condition affecting the role of Parliament in all spheres, and not least in foreign affairs. It limits the role of Parliament *fundamentally*. Moreover, even within the ruling party, the isolation of the cabinet restricts the role of members of Parliament in policy-making'.

Apart from cabinet control, another feature of the British system that limits parliamentary control over foreign policy is the executive discretion inhering in the Crown, which actually means the cabinet government and the civil service. Described as 'prerogative power', this executive power extends to declaration of war and employment of force, membership of international organizations, recognition of states and governments, the conclusion of treaties, and in former times annexation of territory. There is a measure of parliamentary check in the exercise of such prerogative powers, inasmuch as the cabinet and individual ministers are accountable to Parliament for decisions that have been implemented. Still, the workings of external relations are arranged in such a way that parliamentary questions and debates will be limited to retrospective evaluation of policies already implemented. Even the 'Ponsonby' rule which enjoins that texts of international agreements will be placed before both Houses of Parliament for 21 days before ratification is not binding according to Jennings.

Besides such structural factors it should be remembered that in the constitutional practice of the United Kingdom in the 19th century Parliament was not meant to control foreign policy. There is no reference to it in Walter Bagehot's classic text *The English Constitution* (1867). The principle of secret diplomacy in practice until 1914 and beyond it, kept foreign policy beyond the reach of the elected representatives of the people even in countries with ancient representative institutions. The paradox of the position would be clear from the statement of Harold Nicolson and its distance from practice:

'The diplomatist, being a civil servant, is subject to the foreign secretary; the foreign secretary, being a member of the cabinet, is subject to the majority in the Parliament; and Parliament, being but a representative assembly, is subject to the sovereign people.'

But the sovereign people were not interested. As Nicolson points out, even in 1918 when public interest in foreign policy and peace negotiations were at its highest, the people failed to demarcate policy, and separate what was legitimately under its control in negotiations, from that were not. And even after 1918 there were no marked changes in this regard. Parliament accepted the Versailles Treaty draft presented by Lloyd George with only four dissenting votes. Even the soft Ponsonby Rule fell dormant till its restoration by the Labour Government in 1929. Of course there have been historical moments when Parliament woke up to its potentials. For example, the opposition in 1935 to the leaked news about the projected Hoare-Lavall Plan to appease Mussolini at the cost of Ethiopia nipped it in the bud. An even better example was the decision of the Parliament to substitute ill-reputed Chamberlain by Churchill in 1940. But, for all

practical purposes, it is the entrusted minister who makes foreign policy with the help of counsellors in civil service, especially the Foreign Office personnel, and cabinet committees including standing committees like the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee and the Economic Policy Committee in which Parliament has no presence. Officials in the Foreign Office enjoy considerable powers in this (Browlie, 1980:1-10).

Almost the same words apply in the case of other Parliaments, sometimes with greater force. Regarding the French Parliament (*Parlement française*), consisting of the Senate (*Sénat*) and National Assembly (*Assemblée nationale*), Jean Pierre Cot says that 'no sector has been affected by the decline of Parliament as much as foreign policy. The exercise of parliamentary control has, in effect, been deeply prejudiced in France, and this prejudice has worsened under the Fifth Republic, both with regard to the function of control over foreign policy and with respect to ... judicial authorization' or 'ratification of treaties' through Art. 53 of the French constitution ...'. Cot says that compared to the 1946 constitution, which conferred broad powers on the Parliament, the 1958 constitution 'restricts and gags Parliament. Cot traces this decline to the Gaullist conception of Parliament and its relations with the government. As an example he brings his personal experience as a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French Parliament. He writes,

'Foreign policy does not interest Parliament. To show an interest in foreign policy is a political move. It is the best way to lose one's electoral district. Thus foreign policy debates arouse no interest. As a result the Foreign Affairs Committee is a friendly club ... which meets once a week to talk of this and that. ... Foreign affairs debates are expressly forbidden because it would be inconvenient to bring the functionaries of persons responsible for French foreign policy before the committee directly. This interdiction is not set by law, but by the joint will of the government and the president of the Foreign Affairs Committee.'

Cot tells an anecdote to illustrate the situation. During the oil crisis of the early 1970s a new minister of foreign affairs appeared before the committee to answer questions on increasing oil prices and their problems. 'These he answered basically by saying that the question was quite complicated and that it was not only his own concern but the concern of many others as well. When told that one of the others concerned, in this case the Secretary General of the Elysée, he then summoned, he 'said in reply that there was no question of summoning a civil servant let alone one attached to the President of the Republic who, as everyone knows, is not responsible even if he in fact runs the affairs of the state'.

Cot shows the decline also in the matter of authorization with regard to conclusion of treaties. Article 53 of the constitution enumerates the types of treaties or international agreements which Parliament can have an active role before or after ratification. 'In other words, parliamentary intervention is no longer justified by a formal criterion (the existence of a treaty needing ratification in order to enter into force), but by a material one (the subject matter of an international agreement).' And even this is one of the rare provisions of the 1958 constitution which 'extends the competence of the Parliament in foreign policy matters' (Cot, 1980:11-12).

Compared to Parliaments, the US Congress has much greater role in the making of foreign policy. This is because, as David Leyton-Brown rightly points out, 'The constitution of the Uni-

States assigns power over foreign policy to both the legislative branch (congress) and the executive branch (the president). Fisher points out how segments of foreign policy are assigned 'to Congress, the President, and to the President working in conjunction with the Congress'. Examples of this constitutional division of foreign policy powers are many.

- The Congress has the power to declare war, but the President is the commander-in-chief.
- The President commands the armed forces, but the Congress has the power to raise and support armies, grant funds for creating and maintaining a navy, and design regulations for military forces.
- The Congress monopolizes the power of the purse and the power to regulate commerce, as a reminder of the political conflicts in 1787.
- To complicate matters further, the constitution empowers the President to make treaties, but makes this power subject to advice and consent of the Senate. Since treaties need appropriations to be effective, the House of Representatives can limit the scope of treaty commitments (Fisher, 1988: 149-50).
- The Senate has power over Presidential appointments including ambassadorial ones. Of course, since the World War II, the Senate has been hesitant to resist or block Presidential appointments aggressively. As Rosati and Scott point out, one recent study found that of 618 total nominations from the hundredth Congress, to the one hundred fourth Senate opted for signing on the dotted line for 564 or 91 percent. But the process of Senatorial confirmation has become long-drawn and cumbersome over the years, and partisanship has been affecting the process to a greater extent. It has been pointed out that 'some senators routinely take advantage of their leverage to foil presidential nominations if they consider that the nominees are out of step with existing congressional majorities. Others regard advice and consent not as a mere formality but as an important constitutional weapon guarding the independence of Congress from the executive branch'. The cancelled nominations are not insignificant. They include: (i) initial appointment of Theodore Sorensen as director CIA by President Jimmy Carter (dropped after reaction from the political right and the conservative senators); (ii) nomination of John Tower as Secretary of Defense by President George W. Bush (denied by Senate); (iii) appointment of Anthony Lake, national security adviser as DCI by President Clinton, rescinded by him after stiff Republican opposition; (iv) appointment of John Bolton, as UN ambassador through the unusual process of recess appointment to avoid congressional opposition (Rosati and Scott, 2011: 314).

Scholars view the role of the Congress in the framing of the US foreign policy differently. As Leyton-Brown points out:

'During the first twenty-five years after World War II, the congressional role in foreign policy progressed through four relatively distinct phases described as accommodation, antagonism, acquiescence, and ambiguity, but the president generally took the leading role throughout the period. Then in the 1970s, largely because of mounting dissatisfaction with the executive secrecy and abuse of power associated with Vietnam and Watergate, but in part because of internal

changes within the legislative branch, congress began to assert itself strongly in the foreign policy area, imposing restrictions on presidential action and initiating new policy objectives. More recently, the early 1980s have brought a seeming retreat from that assertive role, as a variety of measures have been enacted to repeal certain restrictions imposed in the previous decade and to increase presidential flexibility. The important question remaining is whether these policy reversals mark a decline in the importance of the role of congress, or whether a qualitative change in the role of congress occurred in the 1970s, such that for the foreseeable future legislative-executive relations will be marked by an assertive congress' (Leyton-Brown, 1982-83:59).

What Leyton- Brown called the assertive role of the Congress was its temerity in the 1970s 'on a number of fronts to reverse publicly the decisions of the president and the foreign policy experts of the executive branch, to impose prohibitions and restrictions on future actions, and to mandate new policy behavior'. The areas which bore records of such activism were: 'military activity, arms sales, intelligence operations, trade, aid, nuclear proliferation, human rights, and surveillance of executive agreements' (ibid, 60). But has the retreat which Leyton-Brown discovered in the 1980s really happened? There is enough scope to have a different opinion. For example, Fisher contends that the 'constitutional relationship between the President and Congress in foreign affairs' came alive 'in an extraordinary set of hearings in 1987' when 'the congressional investigation of the Iran-contra affair' started, i.e. when 'Congress examined the actions of the Reagan administration in selling arms to Iran and using profits from those sales to assist the contra rebels in Nicaragua'. While for a month millions of Americans switched on their TV sets to watch the progress of the story, the hearings made it clear that quite a good part of the Iran-contra affair was occasioned by serious misconceptions about executive-legislative roles in foreign policy. 'Key witnesses testified that foreign policy was the exclusive domain of the president. They regarded congressional involvement, by its very nature, as an illegitimate interference with executive branch responsibilities.' But the testifiers forgot that against such presidential arrogation of foreign policy powers, Congress had taken up the President's administration before it, when in 1981 the Reagan administration tried to have its own separate ways in foreign affairs, in the dispute over the consequences of Canadian investment and energy policies for American Commerce. The issue was clearly in the constitutional ambit of the Congress, empowered by the constitution 'to regulate commerce with foreign nations'. But the administration denied vital documents to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce citing Attorney General William Finch's reason that the documents were either vital to the 'deliberative process' going on in the executive branch or involved 'sensitive foreign policy considerations'. The Congress could however, procure the documents after a subpoena to bring the Secretary of the Interior under contempt proceedings.

Moreover, provoked by the abuses of presidential power in the Iran-contra episode, the Congress reasserted its power, in the following manner, in the language of Fisher:

'Bills have been introduced to tighten congressional controls on covert operations, especially by requiring the president to notify Congress and members of the National Security Council. If the president decides to authorize a covert action, he must prepare a written finding, distribute

it to the proper parties, and take steps that all findings are preserved as official records. Findings are to be prospective, not retroactive. To prevent private parties from engaging in personal forays into foreign policy, Congress is considering amendments to strengthen the Neutrality Act. Enactment of new criminal penalties would remind executive officials and private citizens that violating congressional policy runs the risk of fines and jail sentences' (Fisher, 150-59).

But even these evidences are not enough to evaluate and assess the role of the US Congress in foreign policy making, because they depend on express instances of how Congress has queered the pitch of the executive branch in isolated cases and do not focus on the pervading influence of the Congress on the foreign policy process. These conventional studies fail to separate policy- as- outcomes from policy-as-the-process. By using the insight provided by 'New Institutionalists', Lindsay shows how 'Congress changes the structure and procedures of decision making in the executive branch in order to influence the content of policy'. In this context he assesses the impact of 'five procedural innovations' brought in by Congress in the domain of defense and foreign affairs: (i) the Office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation in the Pentagon; (ii) the legislative veto on arms sales; (iii) congressional participation in trade negotiations; (iv) the conditions attached to US security assistance; and (v) the requirement of reporting thrust upon the intelligence outfits. On the basis of investigation in these five areas, Lindsay suggests that 'studies of Congress's role in foreign policy need to pay more attention to how members of Congress use procedural innovations to build their policy preferences into the policy- making process' (Lindsay, 1994: 281-304). Lindsay also points out that may be we are assessing the Congress's role in foreign policy making from an altogether wrong angle. 'Most efforts to assess congressional influence look at the ability of Congress', says Lindsay, 'to generate and pass its own substantive policy proposals. Using legislative success as the benchmark, Congress does not appear to matter much. Despite the many changes in American politics over the past two decades, Congress generates relatively few of its own foreign policy proposals; the initiative on foreign policy continues to reside in the White House. Congress's influence over decisions appears no better. Although congressional foreign policy debates are more fractious than they were twenty-five years ago, the House and Senate remain reluctant to deny a president's foreign policy requests or to pass alternative policies of their own.'

But, according to him this almost negative answer to the question— does Congress matter — comes from looking at the role of the Congress from merely its ability to legislate in foreign policy matters. The legislative track record would only yield a partial story. This is because:

'Congress influences policy through several indirect means: anticipated reactions, changes in the decision-making process in the executive branch, and political grandstanding. Indeed, the same factors that frustrate congressional attempts to lead on foreign affairs encourage legislators to use indirect means to influence policy. Attention to these indirect means suggests, contrary to the argument made by pessimists, that Congress often exercises considerable influence over the substance of U.S. foreign policy' (Lindsay, 1992-93: 607-09).

But, however may we look at it, US Congress has far greater role in foreign policy making than the British, French and other parliaments. Before we end this section we should point out that the Indian Parliament is no exception to this rule. Article 246 of the Indian Constitution

empowers the Parliament to legislate on all aspects of foreign affairs. But as in other parliaments all over the world, cabinet control mires parliament's role in this. The most important link between parliament and making of foreign policy was the 'Consultative Committee of Parliament on External Affairs'. Originally created in colonial India in 1854, the prefix 'Informal' was dropped from it in 1969. During Nehru's times it was mostly a 'passive and one-way communication between the government and parliament, rather than the other way about', says Bandyopadhyay (2000:161-63). Nehru's high political stature and wide knowledge of intentional politics contrasted with the members' lack of knowledge in matters international made it inevitable. But still Nehru took them in confidence, which cannot be so easily said about his successors. As a more recent commentator says, 'The Consultative Committee has no authority or responsibility. At best, the members can make recommendations to the minister, but he is not under any obligation to obey their advice or suggestions. The meetings do, however, serve a useful purpose. Since the proceedings of the meetings are confidential, ministers can give details of international situations and India's foreign policy which cannot be disclosed elsewhere. Ministers also use the meetings to explain the government's stand on certain issues of foreign policy which are likely to be of interest to Parliament. This information is valuable to Parliament in that it allows them to debate and utilise parliamentary procedures in the House with an intelligent background and therefore a more powerful argument' (Sita Ramachandran, 1996: 25).

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### 3.4. Political Parties

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It is natural that the role of political parties would figure in any discussion of the foreign policy making of a country. Except in autocratic, fascist, dictatorial or totalitarian systems where a single party takes the place of the entire governmental apparatus and its decision-making hierarchy, the role of political parties in foreign policy cannot be ignored. In Western democracies the limited, though important, role played by political parties stems from the fact that it is they who send elected leaders to legislatures and act as intermediaries between the leaders and the general public. The position of the government and its constituent party in a parliamentary cannot differ for a great length of time without dislodging the government from power. When presidential primaries or party conventions decide on presidential candidates, their foreign policy positions are matters of concern. In parliamentary systems party caucuses often determine the contours of foreign policies to be pursued by the government. The government needs to consider the views on foreign policy not merely of the ruling party, but of opposition party or parties too, to carry the House with it (Frankel: 81). In countries where the two-party system is in place, there is a progressive effacement of difference between the two parties on key issues, which includes all domestic policies, let alone foreign policy. This makes their difference in positions on foreign policy immaterial. This non-difference between parties is brought out revealingly in the case of England in an immortal song in the Gilbert and Sullivan opera, which goes like this:

'I often think it's comical  
How nature always does contrive  
That every boy and every gal



That's born into the world alive  
Is either a little Liberal

Or else a little Conservative' (W.S. Gilbert, *Iolanthe*, 1882, Act 2)

But this was the position when in England the Labour party was yet to arrive. After its birth the difference between the Conservative and the Labour Party became more distinct, but not much. True, Labour has always sought to project an internationalist view of itself, anchored in socialist views of class struggles on an international plane. But studies have come out that show that sympathy of the Labour Party for Indian independence was always lukewarm. In 1950s the differences between the foreign policy stances of the Conservatives and the Labour were sharp and bitter. For instance, the Labour strongly criticized the British government's invasion of Suez Canal in 1956, but we can pit against it the consensus between the Labour and the Conservative leadership about the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

In modern times it has cultivated relations with socialist parties in Europe. Here its membership of the Progressive Alliance of the Socialist and Democrats in the European Parliament comes handy. By contrast the Conservative Party has projected a more Atlanticist view of itself, based in a closer relation with the United States, deeper relations with the Commonwealth countries and a measure of Euroscepticism or distrust of EU as the base of British identity. But this difference is perhaps overdrawn, if we use the decision of the 'new' Labour Party of Britain, led by Tony Blair, to join forces with the USA to start on an invasion of Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 2003, misleading the country on non-existent Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), as a test case. Even when Labour's popularity was on a downslide after this decision, as shown in opinion polls, the Conservatives had little leeway to capitalize on this. The reservations of the Liberal Party about this which reflected the anxieties of a substantial segment of the 'issue public', including common voters, only increased the concerns of a large number of Tory MPs about the disquiet shared by both supporters and party activists about being dragged into an unnecessary war. But Duncan Smith, the Conservative leader who later became the Secretary of State in the David Cameron ministry, gave his party absolutely no room for manoeuvre. He shared Blair's concerns about WMDs. Actually, on a previous visit to Washington in 2001, he had made amply clear to his peer hawks in the American administration that after Afghanistan, Iraq should be second on the list. So, many Tory MPs might have supported Blair, though grudgingly, unhappily, unenthusiastically' in the words of Cameron (Bale, 2011:172).

So, on crucial questions of security there is not much difference between the Conservative Party and the Labour Party at present. This has to be. Actually, as Manners and Whitman point out, in the whole of Europe 'party political orientation of the government in shaping foreign policy' is steadily losing relevance. An emergent 'party political consensus over the issue of EU membership and foreign policy objectives' is the reality. What is remarkable is not its emergence but the speed at which it has consolidated over the last three decades and a half. As they remind, 'There are smaller political parties and groups on the far left and far right of most domestic EU political spectra (for example, the Communist party in Portugal and Freedom Party in Austria), which hold more extreme views on foreign policy and EU issues'. We could add here the British Nationalist Party and the UKIP (UK Independence Party). Still the major

parties are united on questions of foreign policy, however they may differ in their public pronouncements. And according to Manners and Whitman three factors are responsible for this. First, the progressive sway of neo-liberal ideas or market fundamentalism all over Europe after the 1970s, which has levelled the political-economic philosophical beliefs of the parties. Secondly, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the East European socialist regimes, and the diminution of an ideological and political alternative. And thirdly, experience of 'participation in EU's dual-decision-making procedures (in the areas of external relations and CFSP', or Common Foreign and Security Policy, which has altered the hopes and perceptions of many of the European political parties (Manners and Whitman, 2000: 255). These explanations are plausible. In the case of the UK we have seen how the Thatcherite reforms of the 1980s, which broke the earlier consensus between the Labour and the Conservatives in matters of economic policy, became the source of a new consensus in the 1990s, after Labour accepted most of the changes brought in by Thatcher.

In the case of the USA the role of the political parties in foreign policy is governed by a principle called 'bipartisanship'. Though after World War II the Republicans had longer control of the White House, and the democrats of the Congress, it was this bipartisanship that explained the workings of American foreign policy. The origins of this bipartisan approach lay in the turbulent international environment America faced in the 1940s and 1950s, and the resultant need of a unified approach to foreign affairs, for the requirement of national security. The aphorism 'Politics stops at the water's edge', suggested by Republican senator Arthur Vandenberg in 1947, and willingly accepted by the Truman administration, meant that Americans would show a united front to other states how much they disagree on their home turf. While the exact meaning of the phrase remained imprecise, it involved two distinct though complementary kinds of cooperation. The first refers to 'unity in foreign affairs' and focuses on the extent to which majorities in each of the two parties support policy initiatives. The second concerned the practices and procedures required to bring about this unity. McCormick says that it means collaboration in both the process and outcome of foreign policy making.

Started in the beginning of the Cold War, this bipartisanship meant for McCormick the following things:

- Both Democrats and Republicans came to cherish similar foreign policy goals: robust national defense, active involvement in global affairs, and uncompromising anticommunism.
- This bipartisanship covered the 'policy planks' that each party carried in its national platforms during the Cold War period.

Of course this bipartisanship was often exaggerated. Even during the halcyon days of idolized bipartisan cooperation there were nagging bipartisan divisions, on issues like foreign aid, military aid, defense spending and trade issues. And in the last phase of the Vietnam War bipartisanship wore off to a great extent, and from the 1980s partisan divisions became even more evident. Besides, academic research is closely questioning the degree to which bipartisanship ever worked, especially in the domain of foreign policy outcomes. And, anyway, by the time Ronald Reagan assumed president's post, foreign policy got thoroughly polarized on party lines. A

foreign policy consensus re-emerged after 9/11. But, after the Iraq war was waged this consensus degenerated into a partisan divide between or among the public and inside the Congress. (McCormick, 2010: 473-88).

We end this discussion of American political parties by quoting a famous utterance by Cecil V. Crabb which many have cited: 'The two important factors that may be expected to favor the achievement of bipartisan cooperation in foreign affairs are the non-ideological nature of American political parties and the absence of strict party discipline in congress' (King, 1986: 87). Still all this puts into perspective the considerable role that political parties play in American foreign policy.

In countries where political parties are not non-ideological, the position is different. A foreign policy consensus of the English or American type of bipartisanship was unavailable in erstwhile West Germany, i.e., the Federal Republic of Germany. As Paterson shows, the reason was the externally imposed bifurcation of Germany. Since the international treaties governing this bifurcation concerned legacies of the World War II, bipartisanship was impossible. And German governments have been forced to define and redefine their relations with other states of the international system. Thus, the SPD opposition (Social Democratic Party) in the 1950s spoke against treaties with the West. Likewise, the CDU/CSU opposition (Christian Democratic Union of Germany and Christian Socialist Union of Bavaria) in the late 1960s and 1970s resisted treaties with the East, arguing that they unduly jeopardized the sovereignty of the republic and bedevilled the reunification option. Besides, Paterson points out that the link of 'a political party with a corresponding doctrinally determined foreign policy has a long tradition in German historical writing (1981: 227-29).

Against so much written about foreign policy consensus in modern Britain and the United States, one needs also to point out that political parties have an abiding interest in foreign policy for domestic considerations. Robert Putnam argues that foreign policy is the converging point of two-level games in which the political leadership is simultaneously engaged in a two-level strategy: domestic search for power by aggregating interests, and international efforts 'to maximize their efforts to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments' (Putnam, 1988: 434).

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### 3.5. Bureaucracy

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In this section we will talk about the role of the bureaucracy in the formation of foreign policy. Contrasted with Parliament/Congress/ National Assembly or other central legislatures, bureaucracy is an arm of the executive, and it has always played a role in all types of policy making, including foreign policy. In his studies of bureaucracy, Max Weber compared the performance of Prussian bureaucracy in foreign policy making in the decades before the War, with that of the British Foreign Office run by politicians, to the advantage of the latter in his article 'Parliament and Government in a Reconstructed Germany.' In this article, published in *Gesammelte Politische Schriften* or *Collected Political Miscellanies* (1921) he traces the grievous mistakes of German

foreign policy during this time to the mistaken policy of a political system 'which promotes *men with the outlook of officials* [bureaucrats] to positions where independent political responsibility is needed' (Beetham, 1985: 78). Today, however, the role of the bureaucracy in foreign policy signifies a completely different type of research without any anchor in normative theory.

In this fairly long tradition of empirical research, the first wave, manifest in the works of the early 1960s by Roger Hilsman, Samuel Huntington, Michel Crozier, Richard Neustadt, and Warner Schilling, focused on bureaucracy via a political perspective on foreign policy making to provide 'crucial insights into how and in what ways process determined the content of policy, or how the manner in which decisions are made controls the types of decisions that are made. From their writings Art teases out five distinct propositions that impinge on a bureaucratic perspective on foreign policy making. The first four of them derive from the internal 'structural conditions or constraints' that influence foreign policy making, while the fifth is a logical corollary that throws light on the content of the policy deriving from the process. We are producing the highlights of these five propositions below in own words a little different from Art:

- Political power, understood as the capacity to make someone do something that he would not else have done, is widely distributed at the national governmental level. In this sense there is no single locus of sovereign power or monopoly of power in Washington. There are at best 'separated institutions sharing powers' (Neustadt).
- Inside these 'quasi-sovereign powers' (Schilling) are entrenched partners in the policy process possessing divergent views on what they would want to materialize on any policy question, and their divergences flow at least partially from their different positions.
- Political leadership within and among these institutions is exercised through persuasion rooted in the skill with which leader makes use of the limited power that his position affords him. Since no one has a monopolistic control over power, and this power is mostly 'blocking power', the task of any co-sharer in getting anything done lies in convincing other participants that what he is suggesting that they do is what is in their best interest.
- So, 'making of foreign policy in government... is essentially a political process, even when it takes place entirely inside the government, screened from the voter's view, or even when it takes place entirely within one agency of the government' (Hilsman). It is entirely a matter of forging inter-institutional consensus and support for a policy among partners who could queer its pitch.
- The birthmark of this process is telltale in the upshot or outcome, reflecting in the content the requirements of the conditions under which it was made, the prices paid for the agreement, and the clear merits of the resultant policy.

These crucial insights sensitized readers to the consequences of the process for the substance, warned them that it would be wrong to look at the impact of policies pursued by other nations on the US to make a meaning of America's responses, and re-impressed on them the significance of the political context of foreign policy in the sense of reconciliation of the conflict of goals and the means to achieve them in the domestic area of bargaining, negotiation, compromising, and consensus construction. Generally, they warned that though 'politics stops at the water's edge', a lot occurred on the sandy road to it.

What the scholars said was however never more sonorous than their silences, i.e. what they did not say, which were as follows:

- There is no need to ignore the Congress's impact on foreign policy, even if its role was reactive to executive initiatives, given the importance of lobbies and anticipatory functions.
- The perspectives of the policy partners, their stances on different issues, and ensuing conflicts over policy flowed exclusively from the institutional positions that the participants held. Rather the significance of the fundamental assumptions that incumbents brought to their jobs was considerable. Of course, some conflicts have institutional roots, because different government institutions and organizations performed peculiar responsibilities both for norms and for aptitudes, generating divergent interests and perspectives for common problems.
- The nature of the policy process does not overshadow the images that participants possess of the international environment when they weigh one policy choice against another. Rather images are basic, process is subordinate to them.
- The upshot of the political policy process is never wholly unintended by many or most of them in spite of its compromised nature. Rather, since participants plan their actions keeping in view what is needed to get a policy accepted; compromises are conscious; contenders know that what they want and what they would most possibly get are two different things; and the compromise is consciously sought for, the exact nature of the compromise would retain vital parts of the initial intent.
- The processual aspect of policy cannot afford to oversee the impact of domestic factors on foreign policy, including the electoral constraints of the policy makers and their accountabilities to their electorates (Art, 1973: 467-72).

It is against these contentions and silences of the 'first wave', that Art proceeds to show what is new in the 'second wave' of the processual approach to foreign policy via the bureaucratic politics path. But since he contends that much that is said here is not altogether new, let us see first what the 'second wave' theorists themselves said. This group of scholars who wrote mostly in the 1970s, sought to transform foreign policy analysis into a 'normal science' in Thomas Kuhn's terms, where after statement of theory, significant facts will be identified and matched with it. The best statement of this new wave is found in Allison's path-breaking book on the Cuban Missile Crisis, named the *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (1971). In this book Allison proposes to analyse the famous crisis through three lenses that sensitise and also desensitize us, and provide conceptual blinkers, to certain types of data. The objective is to expose the limitations of what he calls the Rational Actor Model (RAM), which is an apt statement of the traditional, state-centric or state-as-actor approach to the study of foreign policy. Dissatisfied that many 'analysts and ordinary laymen attempt to understand happenings in foreign affairs as the more or less purposive acts of unified, national governments ... personify and speak of their aims and choices', and see foreign policy as 'governmental choice', Allison presents two other alternative models that drastically alter the analytical focus. Even if the traditional approach has its uses, for Allison they must be supplemented if not replaced by a Model 2 or the Organizational Process Model (OPM), and a Model 3 or the

Bureaucratic Politics Model (BPM). In the latter two models the frames of reference have shifted to the governmental machine, to the organizations and political actors active in the policy process, in a modern refashioning of Snyder's decision-making framework. The second model starts from the assumption that 'government consist of a conglomerate of semi-feudal, loosely allied organizations, each with a substantial life of its own'. Seen as this, foreign policy is just 'outputs of large organizations, functioning according to standard patterns of behaviour', instead of being reasoned choices of unified governmental actors. When critics objected to the demarcation by saying that Model II and II were not all that different, OPM was merged by Allison with BPM, in a later article written with Morton Halperin, 'Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications' (1972)

While organizational theory and sociology provided the moorings and insights of Model 2, Allison's Model 3, called the Governmental or Bureaucratic Politics Model was clearly anchored in Political Science. Contrasted with RAM, the BPM does not focus on just one unitary rational actor, but on many actors or players 'who focus not on a single strategic issue, but on many diverse international problems as well; players who act in terms of no consistent set of objectives but rather according to various conceptions of national, organizational and personal goals; players who make government decisions not by a single, rational choice but by the pulling and hauling that is politics'. BPM eschews the conventional distinction between domestic and foreign politics and claims that the latter shares many of the identifying characteristics of domestic politics. Thus many tools and approaches of Political Science are applicable here. Predictably, foreign policy is seen here neither as governmental choice nor as organizational output but as a 'resultant' of various bargaining games among the players. Allison would consider foreign policy 'explained' by a 'model 3 analyst', only when he has found out, 'who did what to whom that yielded the action in question'.

As can be seen, in BPM it is a large conglomerate of large bureaucratic organizations plus a number of actors who make foreign policy. The former have crucial relevance for foreign policy because of two reasons:

- It is they who produce outputs that shape the situations in which policy makers engage in decisional games. Among these outputs are: the information that bureaucracies supply to governments, the foreign policy options that they place before the government as a menu for choice; and the standard operating procedures (SOP) which structure the mode of implementation of foreign policy decisions.
- Bureaucracies are prone to developing common attitudes and shared images, which play a huge role in organizing how a specific foreign policy question or happening is perceived by foreign policy makers. Bureaucracies regularly impose the prism of their shared attitudes and images on a foreign policy even while studying it for policy framing. For example, the same event will be judged by the Treasury from the budgetary angle, by the Department of Defence from the national security angle, and by the Foreign Office from the point of view of intentional relations.

Besides, true to the tautologous aphorism, 'where do you stand depends on where do you sit', coined by a bureaucrat during the Truman administration and famous as Mile's Law,

bureaucracies borrow their influence on foreign policy from their positions in the power-structure of the state and government. These positions also have ingrained interests, whether of increasing bureaucratic influence in the domestic political arena, enhancing their resources, or augmenting their ability to fulfill their declared missions and in this way promoting their prestige among the peer group. These interests, serving the organizational wellbeing of bureaucracies qua bureaucracies may not only not coincide with national interests, but may even undercut and override them. BPM is claimed to be relevant not only for explaining foreign policy within individual states, but also for foreign policies among states (White in Taylor, 1984:153-55; Alden and Amnon, 2012: SI-33).

Preston and Hart deduce an operational definition of the BPM from these features. These involve both structure and process, as stated below:

1. There are multiple bureaucratic actors in the policy making arena (structure).
2. These actors have diverging and conflicting interests, and they are involved in multiple game contexts with one another, requiring cooperation in areas of disagreement because of the necessity for future policy interaction (structure).
3. Power relationships between these actors are diffuse; for example, some institutional, bureaucratic, or inner-circle actors are more powerful than other actors in certain policy contexts, and not as powerful in others (structure).
4. Interaction is characterized by continuous 'pulling and hauling' and bargaining between (clusters of) actors (process).
5. Decisions are reached by bargaining, coalition formation, and compromise building between different parties (process).
6. Decision outcomes tend to be sensitive to temporal slippage (e.g., time gaps and delays between decision-making and actual implementation) and content slippage (e.g., post-decisional modification of the content of the policy) (process) (1999: 55).

One of the most devastating analytical and empirical criticisms of the BPM has been done by Art, whom we have referred to above. We need to go a little more into his exposition of the conceptual inadequacies of Allison's model. For, the chain of arguments is intricate. Art deduces three propositions from Allison's third model that are essential for it to stand the test of criticism.

- 'Organizational position determines policy stance, or "where you stand depends on where you sit" [we have already referred to it above]'
- 'In foreign policy, governmental decisions and actions do not represent the intent of any one figure, but are rather the unintended resultant of bargaining, pulling, and hauling among the principal participants.' Another point that results from this is: 'The sum of behavior of representatives of a government relevant to an issue is rarely intended by any individual or group'
- 'Organizational routine, SOPs, and vested interests can affect the Presidential implementation of policy much more than they can its formulation'

Regarding the first proposition Art asks a fundamental question: 'If each man is "committed to fulfilling his responsibilities as he sees them," do different men who occupy the same seat over time see the responsibilities of the office in the same way? If not, then what is the relative

weight of position in policy stance? How constraining are the top positions in our government bureaucracy for the roles that senior participants who fill these positions choose to play? 'senior players' are the most powerful participants in the policy process, but if their stances on issues are not correlated with their organizational affiliations, then of what use is the first proposition for analysis and prediction?

As for the second proposition Art's comment is that 'In one fundamental sense this proposition is descriptive of what goes on in our governmental machinery. No analyst could deny that this is pulling, hauling and bargaining by the principal participants involved in a given issue.' But the question the proposition leaves unanswered is 'how much difference all the pulling and hauling and bargaining actually makes; or, to put the matter more carefully, under what circumstances and in what issue areas does all the commotion make a significant difference?'

Art further comments that the bureaucratic paradigm can be of much use in explaining foreign policy formulation only if it can start with the assumption that Presidential choices do not in a big way bind the hands of senior executive players in pursuing their own preferences. But the paradigm will achieve very little if we have to accommodate the amendments about Presidential powers it has made in proposition two. For, once we make room for the amendments, simple logic makes us accept two corollaries, which throw into disarray the utility of the second proposition. These are:

- When senior executive players are divided in their policy positions, the President will make use of this division, to have considerable leverage in doing what he has always wanted to.
- When senior executive players are divided in their policy positions, the President, if at all decides to respond to bureaucrats' pressures, will respond to those demands that he thinks will hurt him politically in not so doing.

The first corollary has an uneasy echo of the old divide-and-rule strategy which maintains Presidential flexibility in foreign policy. The second stresses that it is not the preferences of senior players that are important but rather the President's identification of who outside the executive branch, means members of Congress, will support these bureaucrats. So a close scrutiny of the second proposition makes the bureaucracies too much dependent on the President's considerations. Moreover, by conceding to the power that accrues to the President from executive divisions, corollary one throws into uncertainty the claims of proposition two. 'reminding us of the President's need to anticipate the Congressional reactions that stem from the sharing of powers, corollary two makes us dubious of the unintended aspect of proposition two'.

Art points to other problems of the second proposition that compel us to look away from 'internal mechanics of government' to external constraints perceived by the President, through some questions. These are: (i) Just how frequently and over what issues do partners disagree in their policy stances? (ii) How often it occurs that partners are in one voice against Presidential preferences? (iii) How often and over what issues do partners not disagree over the direction of action to be taken? In his view these 'queries raise again the significance of mind-sets in foreign policy formulation. If shared images dominate senior players' outlooks and if they



truly shared', then there is little merit in asserting that governmental actions are the resultants of pulling, hauling and bargaining'. In a situation where organizational commitments fail to draw players apart, and where 'the images they share' rather pull them in one direction, we are not talking about multiple players, but about what Allison describes a 'unitary purposive actor'.

Taking up proposition three which says that 'Organizational routine, standard operating procedures, and vested interests can affect the Presidential implementation of policy much more than they can its formulation', Art wonders where this proposition takes us to. Assuming that 'Presidential intent can be subverted by bureaucratic implementation', the difference that the initial decision makes becomes problematic. If bureaucracies can really control the 'detail and nuance' of policy, then it follows that the bureaucratic paradigm is equally effective if 'its validity with respect to policy formulation is close to nil'. The questions that arise here are if (a) acceptance of proposition three nullifies the criticisms of propositions one and two; (b) if our understanding of proposition three depends heavily on how we answer three additional questions. The questions are: (i) 'how important are the initial acts of Presidential choice?'; (ii) 'how much slippage is there between intent and output?'; and (iii) 'how detrimental is the slippage to the success of policy?'.

Art considers these questions very difficult to answer in the abstract, because answers to these, particularly to the last two, are determined largely by the particular circumstances underlying the decision in question. Still he makes three general points that place the significance of the third proposition in a proper frame. The first is that 'the initial act of choice is crucial, no matter how the choice is implemented'. The second is that 'the slippage' between Presidential preference and organizational output is substantial in only those issues that President deems least important, and most insubstantial in those that he considers most important. Art claims that this point is a logical consequence of the third proposition, which implies that 'organizational procedures can cause slippage, but they do not automatically or mechanically do so'. Rather, if and to what extent they do so is heavily reliant on 'the President's degree of determination' to allow them. He shows that the fact that slippage 'is inversely correlated with a Presidential commitment to make his decision stick', is borne out by Allison's own finding of this inverse correlation in his study of Presidential control in the Cuban missile crisis blockade.

Regarding the third question Art asserts that slippage is not equally consequential or harmful in all types of policy issues. For certain decisions like Lyndon Johnson's decision to deploy an ABM system in 1967, all which is important for the President is that a positive choice has been made. The details of implementation are of secondary importance and slippage is irrelevant. In certain other decisions slippage can be detrimental, unless Presidential commitment preempts it. But in a third type of decisions the President can be perceived as welcoming slippage and leaving ambiguities in his decision to that end as in the MLF (multilateral nuclear force) decision by Kennedy in 1963 and continued by Johnson in 1964.

Art does not claim that his arguments have rendered null and void the first and second propositions of BPM, but have generated 'serious doubts about the internal consistency and logical implications of the approach'. If the arguments stand scrutiny, the paradigm would be found deficient on both counts. To further test the theory, 'it is necessary to examine the record

of American foreign policy by issue area in order to determine the fit of the paradigm to the record'. Without attempting to do this here, he identifies them as (a) three issue categories that have been chosen: 'decisions to intervene with military force'; (b) 'decisions marking major policy shifts'; and (iii) 'decisions revolving primarily around institutionally-grounded matters'. In the first group he places the decisions of military intervention in Korea (June, 1950), Vietnam (1961-65), Cuba (October, 1962), and Dominican Republic (April, 1965). In all these cases the importance of Presidential decision and identical mentality of the bureaucrats rendered them 'non-decisions'. In the second group, in which Art places decisions that signified a fundamental transformation of American foreign policy in a major departure from the past, fall decisions like 'the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the NATO alliance, massive retaliation, flexible response, the 1972 detente with Russia and China, and the SALT I treaty', Presidential preference and the operation of kindred mind-sets are also manifest, rendering bureaucratic politics insignificant. Against these two types of decisions, which represented a broad consensus of the Presidential and bureaucratic establishment, Art places the third group of decisions, 'those that have direct immediate, clearly predictable results for the structural set-up of institutions and for their long term prosperity-those decisions which we may call the 'bread and butter choices' relevant for the long-term competitive position of an institution'. Art finds that these decisions involve various degrees of shared power, like in decisions involving 'the roles and missions of the military services ... career advancement in the foreign service or in the uniformed military, budgetary allocation decisions, or those regulating the instruments by which institutions will carry out the tasks assigned to them (like weapon systems for the services regarding the roles and mission of the military services).

From all these arguments Art reveals two fundamental weaknesses of the BPM. The first is its soft-peddling of 'the influence (or weight) of both generational mind-sets and domestic politics on the manner in which top decision-makers approach foreign policy'. The second is its overly 'sloppy, vague, and imprecise' nature 'as presently constituted to make its use worthwhile'. His conclusion is 'too many constraints of a non-bureaucratic nature' must be taken into reckoning before the paradigm can start functioning and, even after we have done so the paradigm will explain precious little (Art, 472-86).

There have been other scholars who have critiqued the BPM in the American context. Stephen Krasner has critiqued it as misleading, dangerous, and compelling: misleading because it obscures the power of the President; dangerous because it undermines the assumptions of democratic politics by relieving high officials of responsibility; and compelling because it offers leaders an excuse for their failures and scholars an opportunity for innumerable re-interpretations and publications' (Krasner, 1972: 160 and *passim*). Lawrence Freedman questions the model or methodological considerations for making a false distinction between RAM and BPM through an overdrawn dichotomy between logic and politics (1976: 434-49).

Of course, there have been supporters of the BPM too. In the context of the American Hostage Rescue Mission in Teheran, after student revolutionaries took the American Embassy under seizure in November 1979, Steve Smith showed the applicability of the model even for crisis decision making. He shows how in the decisions taken at three meetings on 22 March, 11 April

and 15 April 1980 by a selected group of people, 'participants adopted positions that reflected their location in the bureaucratic structure' (Smith, 1984-85: 9-25). And there have been attempts to redefine and refine the approach to bring it in step with reality. Preston and Hart have sought to apply the model to President Truman's decision to intervene in the Korean crisis in 1950. Bemoaning the lack of theoretical progress of the model and attributing this stagnation mainly to treating bureaucratic politics as an independent variable, he urged a refocus of attention on bureaucratic politics as a dependent variable. In such a view one would search for the 'impact of leader characteristics (need for control and sensitivity to the context) on the nature of bureaucratic politics within particular administrations'. His view is that different types of leadership styles generate different types and degrees of bureaucratic politics. To show this Preston and Hart have focused on Lyndon Johnson's leadership style and US policy making in Vietnam, through a psychological lens. For instance they set about to find out to what extent 'the measurable personal characteristics of Johnson' helped shape the 'advisory systems structures and processes' that deeply influenced the 'nature of information processing, advising and decision-making on Vietnam between 1965 and 1968' (53-98).

Some critics of the BPM have argued that the model may be applicable to American foreign policy-decision making process but the general applicability of the model is suspect. We have focus on the American situation for two reasons:

- The role of bureaucracy in foreign policy-decision making comes out clearest in the American case.
- Even known detractors of Allison's model like W. Wallace have pointed to the 'interrelationship between the structure of the policy-making machinery and the direction of policy'. Wallace emphasizes the rigidity that the administrative apparatus bring to bear on policy, and enumerates the organizational characteristics which lessen their responsiveness to political oversight and direction, which encompass organizational allegiances, entrenched routines, the love for tradition and continuity, and the impulses of a prestigious Diplomatic Service with its norms of behaviour that its exalted status breeds. When he does this he is at least making a soft statement of bureaucratic politics in foreign policy-decision making. This becomes particularly apparent when he points to 'the high morale and prestige of the British Civil Service, and its successful resistance to the by-passing of its regular procedures by political channels, which makes the problem of organizational inertia particularly acute for policy-makers in Britain' (Wallace cited by White, 1974:154).

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### 3.6. Interest Groups

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In this section we will talk about the role of interest groups in the foreign policy of any country. But we will use the two words 'interest group' and 'pressure group' interchangeably, because in the literature on foreign policy or even in the literature on Political Science and Sociology they are used interchangeably. The greatest difficulty in studying the role of interest groups in foreign policy of any country is their sheer number, diversity and resultant resistance to classification.

The very title of S.E. Finer's path breaking book, *Anonymous Empire: A Study of the Lobby in Great Britain* (1958), brings out the problem of classification. James McCormick says the one reason why it is difficult to identify them in the US is that as American foreign policy has shifted away from traditional security concerns to include economic, environmental and social issues, 'foreign policy interest groups have increased exponentially ... because such groups often form, lobby, and then disband, it is difficult to track their exact number at any given time'. So estimates differ widely. In one count nearly 11,000 firms or groups were lobbying toward the end of the last decade in Washington, and the number of people in their employ striving to influence the policy process was 17,000. In another account culled from the worldwide growth of NGOs the number was put at anywhere between 5,600 and 25,000, and could even range to a hundred thousand, though not all of them were engaged with foreign policy (McCormick 68-69).

However, in spite of the extremely varied nature of interest groups, classification is important and one of the earliest and theoretically minded efforts has been done by Harold Sprout. He divides foreign policy pressure groups in America into two broad classes: 'official' and 'unofficial'. The reference to official pressure groups betokens great theoretical insight because normally we look for interest groups and pressure groups outside the government as outfits that bring pressure to bear on them. But for Sprout official pressure groups are important because in spite of a relatively free hand in foreign policy making, 'a President and his lieutenants are constantly forced to assume the roles both of Congressional lobbyist and of public propagandist'. This is why the White House and executive departments form and finance expert and organized publicity bureaus, often within the Department of State. Sprout mentions by way of example the Division of Current Information, designed to maintain continuous contact with the press in a bid to 'manufacture public opinion.' Taking his innovative idea of official pressure groups a little further, Sprout says that 'an administration has a strategic advantage over unofficial official pressure groups which is peculiarly evident in the sphere of international relations'. By way of example he shows how the chief executive and the Congress go about imposing strong censorship over opinion, and resort to propaganda. He also refers to normal modes of administrative and legislative pressure, and refers even to political parties as pressure groups, though we are not going to dilute our discussion with them. Instead we would focus on his sub-type of foreign pressure groups within the official category. From his observation of American politics of the early 1930s, Sprout finds them quite influential in American politics, as revealed in committee investigation into official and unofficial Nazi propaganda in the US. Sprout comments that 'these foreign sources of pressure range from governments to private business corporations and individuals', 'foreign embassies and consulates', to foreign 'journalists, scholars and men of letters'. Sprout is very perceptive about the role of foreign embassies and consulates in foreign policy. For him while inwardly 'Foreign embassies and consulates within the United States are well-known centers of foreign propaganda', foreign 'journalists, scholars and men of letters' also exert inward pressure, even 'American diplomatic and consular officers abroad are foci of foreign pressures seeking to influence opinion and policy within the United States'.

But Sprout rightly thinks that unofficial domestic pressure groups easily preponderate over all

other groups taken together in exerting pressure on and influencing America's foreign policy making. Since a bare headcount of them will take pages and a detailing of their activities will take volumes, he just gives a look at their broad types. We are stating them below:

- A 'group of organizations, some of them well-financed and highly influential, devoting all or a portion of their resources to fostering respect for American ideals and traditions', such as 'patriotic societies', 'veterans' organizations', 'essentially economic organizations (such as the American Federation of Labor)'. They were engaged in propaganda activities designed to arrest the 'spread of Communism and other alien doctrines', prevent any rapprochement with the Soviet Union, deportation of harmful un-Americans, and adoption of stringent immigration laws to stop entry of unwelcome outsiders.
- A loose bunch of organizations sometimes collectively labelled 'the peace movement', generally critical of right wing nationalism and military and naval preparations. Their activities differed. Some wanted to bring the United States in step with the goals and activities of the United States in step with those of the United Nations.
- In the economic sector a 'confusing array of individuals and groups, organized and unorganized, all seeking political intervention to promote or to protect their interests in foreign countries.' These comprised 'exporters and importers, bankers and manufacturers, speculative concessionaires, shipping interests, and various philanthropic and humanitarian groups'.
- There were economic nationalists and internationalists. In the former were 'a vast and motley aggregation of individuals, business corporations, and trade associations', who had united under the banner of economic nationalism, meaning protection of their business enterprises from foreign competition stemming from reduction of tariffs and other strategies of exposure. Arraigned against them were the economic nationalists, dedicated to freer international trade, comprising, 'a majority of professional economists, financial institutions, shipping interests, importers, and an increasing number of large-scale manufacturers anxious to promote exports of their products'.
- A 'variety of philanthropic and humanitarian interests have put pressure on statesmen to promote republican government, democracy, and the benefits of our material civilization in the so-called backward countries of the world'.

It will be seen that though Sprout was writing in 1930s, still but for the fading of the economic nationalists as a consequence of the economic liberalization the composition of pressure groups in the United States has remained largely similar. Only it has become more complicated. For example, while McCormick says that the numerical proliferation of interest groups has been accompanied by a diversification of their types, some of the ones he mentions were referred by Sprout too. Let us see the quote below:

'Foreign policy interest groups include some traditional lobbying groups, such as business groups, labor unions, and agricultural interests, with their principal focus on international trade issues (although increasingly these groups take stances on a broad array of other foreign policy concerns as well), and they now also include several newer groups that are active on foreign policy. These groups include religious communities, veteran organizations, academic- think tanks, ideological organizations (such as Americans for Democratic Action ...ADA), and single-issue

interest groups (e.g., United Nations Association of the United States), Union of Concerned Scientists, and Americans against Escalation in Iraq).<sup>7</sup>

To this list McCormick adds possibly the oldest and perhaps the most influential of interest groups in the US, namely, ethnic interest groups. These groups mainly seek to reorient US foreign policy to the interests of the country of their own origin or those of their ancestors. Often sharing international linkages that complement the work of domestic ethnic groups, they are subject to additional scrutiny by the government, but are nonetheless important. Sometimes foreign country lobbies appeal to like-minded American ethnic groups to broaden the horizon of their country's foreign policy. Among them McCormick names the Jewish lobby, the Cuban lobby (no more important today after normalization of US-Cuban relations), Greek, Turkish and Armenian lobbies, the African American lobby, the Indian lobby etc. (McCormick, 2012: 68-8). We do not have enough space to cover their activities in influencing American foreign policy and their success. Students may peruse our suggested books to know more. But to give just one example, everyone knows the degree to which America's policy on Israel and the middle-east generally has been evolved in response to the pressure of the Jewish lobby.

But how important are interest groups generally in foreign policy making? Basing the analysis on the effectiveness of interest groups in foreign policy during the Cold War period Wittkopf et al, make the following points:

- Interest groups normally have a greater influence on domestic policies than on foreign policy issues, because the foreign policy elites are still now protected in American politics because of the demands of national security and are to that extent impervious to domestic political pressures.
- In moments of crisis their influence is insubstantial because of the enormous power of the President in foreign policy, which increases manifold during these times.
- Their impact is greater in non-security issues of foreign policy, particularly those with economic overtones and long-term implications.
- The influence of interest groups varies in inverse proportion to the security of the issue and their impact is likely to be higher in less important issues.
- Interest groups exert their influence mostly through the deliberative process that takes place through the Congress.
- Influence of interest groups rises when congressional concern with interest groups gathers momentum.
- Influence of interest groups increases at election time, when congressional or presidential candidates become more perceptive of and responsive to their voices.
- True to the beautiful expression of the director of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) that 'A lobby is a night flower', which 'thrives in the dark and dies in the sun', interest group influence is greatest in policy issues or areas that touch on a small part of the society, do not come into limelight or are not covered extensively by the mass media.
- Influence relationships between government and interest groups are mutual and reciprocal though here the government influences more than it is influenced.

- Single issue groups are more influential than big, national, multi-issue, wide-angled groups, but face this problem that their influence zone is limited to discrete policy issue.
- Quite often interest groups seek to mould public opinion itself rather than the minds of policy makers. In these situations they become ineffective because mass attitudes are more difficult to manipulate than isolated policies,
- Sometimes interest groups aim at maintaining inaction or policy status quo, by acting as 'veto groups'. But their impact is far less in such cases, since interest groups are more effective as pro-changers than no-changers. (Wittkopf et al, 302-03).

But Wittkopf et al contend that in the post-Cold War situation many factors have widened the area of influence of interest groups. They quote McCormick to identify these factors as follows:

- o Congressional reforms, which have re-enthused interest groups and widened their access to deliberations of Congress.
- o The increase in partisan and ideological divisions in the American people that has increased the chances of interest groups to act as champions of them.
- o The rise of new groups (such as foreign lobbies, religious lobbies, environmental lobbies, think tanks and isolated single-issue lobbies) in proportion to the changes in the contours of foreign policy, which have changed the nature of interest group participation in foreign policy making.
- o The increase in the relevance of trade and commercial issues, over and above entrenched national security issues, which has provided interest groups fresh new issues to struggle for.
- o A shift in the locus of decision-making from small coterie engaged with crisis decisions towards broad-based involvement of others in structural decisions, as for example those of the objectives and strategies of defence policies (ibid, 303).

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### 3.7. Summary

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So, in this unit we have largely focused on the domestic sources of foreign policy, and have discussed in turn the roles in foreign policy of public opinion, of Parliament, Congress and other central legislatures, political parties, bureaucracy, and interest groups. What we have tried to convey to students is that for foreign policy domestic sources are as important as external and international sources as contributory factors. We hope that what we have elaborated in this unit and the previous units will help students to better grasp the points we will make in the final unit on foreign policy decision-making.

### 3.8. Questions

#### Essay answer type

1. Do you think public opinion really plays a role in influencing foreign policy? Argue your case.
2. What are the constraints on public opinion in a modern democracy which limit its role in the foreign policy formation of a country?
3. Does the British Parliament play any meaningful role in the foreign policy making in Britain? State your reasons.
4. What are the constraints on the British Parliament in exercising its sovereign role in the foreign policy making of Britain?
5. What is the role of the American Congress in the foreign policy formation of that country?
6. Do you think that American Congress plays a greater role than the British Parliament in the making of foreign policy? If so, how?
7. How important are political parties in foreign policy making in England and the United States?
8. Analyse the Bureaucratic Politics Model of foreign policy making in the American context. Is it true to say that the model is inapplicable in Britain?
9. Assess the critiques of the Bureaucratic Politics Model.
10. What are the major types of foreign policy interest groups in the United States, and how important are they in American foreign policy making?

#### Medium answer type

1. Do you think aggressive framing of news by the government and the media serves to manufacture public opinion? Argue with reasons.
2. Is the British Parliament losing out to the Cabinet in the control over making of foreign policy? Argue.
3. Comment on 'bipartisanship' in the context of the role of the Congress's in foreign policy making.
4. Show how the role of the Congress in American foreign policy making has evolved in the last three plus decades.
5. Analyse the role of the American President vis-a-vis Congress in foreign policy making.
6. Do you think that in countries where political parties are not non-ideological, their role in foreign policy making suffers from their compliance?
7. What are the major propositions of Graham Allison's Bureaucratic Politics Model of foreign policy analysis?
8. Summarize the criticisms of the Bureaucratic Politics Model by Robert J. Art.
9. Explain why interest groups are major players in the foreign policy field of a country.



### Short answer type

1. Write a short note on the classical view of the importance of public opinion in the making of foreign policy.
2. Has television and the Internet aggravated the problem of the disinformation of the public? Argue.
3. Is corporatization of the media an obstacle to independent public opinion? How can this corporatization be combated?
4. Comment on the role of the French Parliament in the making of foreign policy.
5. Is the Indian Parliament any exception to the general decline of the Parliament as a maker of foreign policy?
6. How has the Gaullist conception of Parliament and its relations with the government affected the role of the French Parliament in foreign policy?
7. How have the Conservative Party and the new Labour Party come round to a common view of British foreign policy goals?
8. Comment on the 'first wave' of thinkers who pointed out the importance of process as bureaucracy in American foreign policy.
9. How do the supporters of the Bureaucratic Politics Model argue its relevance in the face of criticisms?

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### **3.9 Suggested Readings**

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## Unit 4 □ Decision Making in Foreign Policy

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### Structure

- 4.0 Objectives
- 4.1 Introduction
- 4.2 Not Pure Decision Making Discourse
- 4.3 The Situational and the Cognitive Aspects of Decision-making Joined: the Synder Scheme
- 4.4 The Intellectual or Cybernetic, Psychological, and Cognitive Aspects of Foreign Policy Decision Making
  - 4.4.1 The Informational or Cybernetic Viewpoint
  - 4.4.2 Cognitive Process in Foreign Policy Decision Making
    - 4.4.2.1 Beliefs, Perceptions, Images and Operational Codes: Building Blocks of Cognitive Mapping of Decisional Elites.
    - 4.4.2.2 From Beliefs to Schema
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- 4.5 Who Finally Decide(s) Foreign Policy?
- 4.6 Summary
- 4.7 Questions
- 4.8 Suggested Readings

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### 4.0 Objectives

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- In this Unit we will focus more on the *process*, than the protagonists or participants of foreign policy decision making. The thrust would be on foreign policy decision making *process*.
- This does not mean that we will shun the discussion of *who* are the ones who make foreign policy decisions. We will only concentrate more on *how* they take the decisions.
- We will show that this process, or *how*, has two aspects, *situational* and *cognitive/psychological*. We will focus more on the latter, but would not ignore the former.
- We will rather show how the 'who' is integrally related to 'how'.

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## 4.1 Introduction

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After writing about the conceptual frameworks for understanding foreign policy making in Unit 1, the determinants of foreign policy in Unit 2, and the domestic sources of foreign policy in Unit 3, we are now ready to concentrate on the actual 'making' of foreign policy, to shift from 'who makes it?' to 'how do they make it?'. In the last three Units we have seen that though the Head of the State (in Presidential systems) or head of the government and his cabinet (in Parliamentary systems) were the main actors in foreign policy decision making, a host of other (f)actors like the Parliament, the Congress, political parties, bureaucracy and interest groups influenced the outcomes. Public opinion often set the parameters. Still the final decision rested with the executive wing of the state. In this unit we will refer again to the actors mentioned before, and others. But then we will show the mental processes through which decision is made. In the very beginning of this Module we pointed out that in the stupendous eight- volume Sage Handbook on Political Science, foreign policy appeared not in the volume on International Politics, but in that on 'Policies and Policymaking'. This Unit would best explain it why it was so.

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## 4.2. Not Pure Decision Making Discourse

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However, in this Unit we are not indulging in pure theories of decision- making. Even if the readers have not read about them elsewhere, this is not the place to do it. For, we are not concerned here with decision-making of ordinary mortals but of those who can sometimes change the fates of large bodies of mankind, of countries and continents. So, I would just briefly mention here that the 'rational', 'rational-deductive' or 'synoptic' approach of decision-making which started with John Dewey and found many takers in the late nineteenth or early twentieth century is accepted by none today. It consisted of first selecting goals, then searching for means to them, then again calculating the costs of means, and finally choosing the means which cost least for reaching these goals. In the latter half of the twentieth century Herbert Simon exploded the myth of such rational decision-making through his two concepts of 'bounded rationality' and 'satisficing' in his books *Administrative Behavior* (1947) and *Models of Man: Social and Rational* (1957). I hope you all know this, just as you might know that it was Charles E. Lindblom, who went one more over Simon to overturn the neat pattern of adjusting means to ends, in his two articles, separated by almost twenty years, 'The Science of "Muddling Through"' (1959)", and 'Still Muddling, Not Yet Through' (1979), and in his book *The Policy Making Process* (1968). Now rational decision-making gave over to 'marginal incrementalism', in which the time sequence of means and goals were discarded, and every 'good' decision was a consensual decision. Even the modicum of rationality remaining in this 'marginal incrementalism' was taken away by Lindblom in his book, co-authored with David Braybrooke, *A Strategy of Decision* (1963), where the means-ends path was completely obverted. Very often means were used to choose goals. Problem-solving was never rational and at one go, but involved repeated attacks and 'nibbling' and that too from multiple centres. The preposterousness of letting means

choose goals, and discarding rationality was later sought to be redressed by Amitai Etzioni in his famous article 'Mixed-Scanning: A "Third" Approach to Decision-Making' (1967), where he used the technique of meteorological observation to synthesize both the rationalistic and the incrementalist approaches, to utilize their points of strength, while avoiding their weaknesses. As he says, 'a broad angle camera ... would cover all parts of the sky but not in great detail'; and 'a second one', presumably not so wide-angled, 'would zero in on those areas revealed by the first camera to require a more in-depth examination.' Etzioni's conviction is, 'While mixed-scanning might miss areas, in which only a detailed camera could reveal trouble, it is less likely than incrementalism to miss obvious trouble spots in unfamiliar areas' (Etzioni, 1967: 388-89). We quoted him in this terse commentary on decision-making literature only because, as we will later see, most of the elite decision-makers use a form of 'mixed scanning', either because of situational or cognitive constraints.

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#### **4.3. The Situational and the Cognitive Aspects of Decision-making Joined: the Snyder Scheme**

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No discussion of foreign policy decision-making can start without the first theoretical writing where the situational and cognitive aspects of foreign policy decision making were presented as a combined focus. It was done in Snyder et al in their seminal monograph on foreign policy decision-making (Snyder, 1954). The original Snyder scheme which was published in 1954, dealt a heavy blow to the contemporary 'state centric', 'state-as-actor', or 'billiard-ball' model of International Relations and to what much later Allison would call the Rational Actor Model (RAM). But just where was the Snyder scheme innovative, apart from its demolition of 'state centric' analysis? This can be explained only through referring to the method of analysis and explanation which characterized foreign policy studies before the publication of this monograph. At those times foreign policy analysts resorted to a 'historical-descriptive methodology' and considered their task complete after explaining the external behaviour of the state in terms of what Ralph Pettman so felicitously called 'contextual imperatives' associated with geography, history, economics, and politics. That means they assembled these contextual realities or the factors that we have discussed in the second Unit as the determinants of the foreign policy of an individual state and left it at that, so impactful were these realities. External rather than internal factors were deemed relevant as determinants of state behaviour. So, in a context where survival of the state was considered the supreme goal, these 'contextual imperatives' provided a list of components of national power. Linking these components or elements to state behaviour often generated a deterministic explanation. Merely still photographs were sought to be presented as a movie, though without persistence of vision. Statesmen were viewed as mere agents adjusting these realities to external crises. So, if an analyst was capable of identifying them, his or her task of explaining a particular state action was done. A systemic perception or view, close to Realism, and premised in a mechanical and uniform conception of nation-states in their external relations, dominated foreign policy discourse. Snyder's Decision Making Approach

challenged and changed all this. In the backdrop of wide discontents against the situation, the Snyder scheme, in James Rosenau's words, 'served to crystallize the ferment and provide guidance— if not legitimacy— for those who had become disenchanted with a world composed of abstract states with a mystical quest for single-cause explanations of objective reality' (Rosenau, cited in Taylor, 143). Though Snyder too admitted once that the chief merit of his approach lay in its 'heuristic value' he was not always so diffident. Very often he complained that the foreign policy making analysts did not know what they were doing, implying that he knew best what they should have done.

Be that as it may, rooted both historically and methodologically in the behavioural movement, which sought to reify the abstraction of the state and favoured small group analysis, Snyder momentarily announced that 'State X as actor is translated into its decision-makers as actors'. Though their 'model is a fictional state whose characteristics are such as to enable us to say certain things about all real states, regardless of how different they may be in some ways', their state is nothing but a skeletonised essence of the policy framework of the American state. Though the authors admit the necessity of the future typology of states in terms of basic political organization, range of decision-making systems and strengths and weaknesses of decision-making systems, this has been left for others to accomplish. Diagram 1 of the work which details the Internal Setting of Decision Making and the External Setting of Decision Making and how they influence the decision maker's definition of the situation, is basically the American policy process, denuded of all the socio-economic peculiarities, so that every state of the world would fit in the model.

But even so, the model immediately broke the myth of the state, by reducing it to its official decision-makers. The implication that fallible human beings, rather than abstractions, would from now be the object of study, opened the possibility that their actions and reactions and general conduct would be systematically and scientifically studied and measured. Apart from these, certain other elements, aspects and propositions of the Snyder scheme posed a serious challenge to the state centric rational actor model. These are as follows:

- Foreign policy is composed of certain 'decisions', made by identifiable 'decisions-makers'. So, the behavioural activity meriting explanation is making of decisions.
- The concept that is essential in this explanation is the decisions-maker's 'definition of the situation.
- The analyst has, accordingly, to stress on the domestic or societal sources of foreign policy decisions.
- Also necessary is an emphasis on the 'external setting' as it gets filtered into the decision-making process.

And the decisions-making process itself has the potential to be an important, independent source of decisions.

Contrasted with traditional analysis of foreign policy analysis, the treating of foreign policy as a sum total of discrete decisions was a refreshingly new way of approaching the study of foreign policy. For, the analytical reliance on 'objective realities' lessened to the extent the subjective perceptions of decisions-makers became the focus of researchers seeking to explain

state behaviour. Even the elusive concept of national interest could now be reduced to the subjective perceptions of decisions-makers.




Fig. from: *The Decision Making Approach to the Study of International Politics*, Ed. by R. Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Borton Sapin, p. 201, 1962.

Together with this, the stress on *Innenpolitik* also represented a significant point of departure from conventional foreign policy analysis. In the famous box diagram which summarized the conceptual framework of Snyder, the most relevant decisional sources in the national and international systems were divided into the 'internal setting of decision-making' (box A) and the 'external setting of decision-making' (box F), juxtaposed horizontally and linked by a two way arrow. Three elements in box A were the (i) 'nonhuman environment'; (ii) 'society', (iii) 'human environment, culture, population'. Three corresponding elements of box B were the (i) 'nonhuman environment'; (ii) 'other cultures'; (iii) other societies; and (vi) 'societies organized and functioning as states'; 'government action'. In the diagram just below box A is box B of 'social structure and behaviour', constituted by the (i) 'major value orientations', (ii) 'major institutional patterns', (iii) 'major characteristics of social organizations', (iv) 'role differentiation and specialization', (v) 'groups: kinds and functions', and (vi) 'relevant social processes', further sub-divided into (a) opinion formation, (b) adult socialization. Box A and box B are also linked by two upward and downward arrows, meaning they influence and are influenced by each other. Box C is the



decision making process itself, and is connected by a downward arrow with box B. Below box C is the box D which is 'action', connected by two upward and downward arrows with box C, and is also linked with box B (Snyder, 1954).

What was the theoretical impact of this picture? While in traditional analysis the domestic setting was taken for granted and foreign policy was presumed to start where domestic politics ended, and the state boundaries were taken as the ultimate barrier both for descriptive and analytical purposes, now it became imperative to look within the 'hard shell' of the billiard ball, which was for once disaggregated. Once attention shifted from the abstract state to its official decision-makers, external factors or 'realities' became one set or the range of factors that collectively constituted the 'situation' that the decisions-makers perceived and defined. Both these and internal factors became two 'settings'. Apart from clarifying how the domestic sources were before neglected by the analysts, the box diagram also demonstrated how the decision making process itself is a crucial variable, acting as a filter between external and internal settings and the decisional responses. Of course, while taking the internal setting and the decision making process as two sets of stimuli that provided structure and substance to the choices of decisions-makers, and provided an intrastate dimension to foreign policy explanation which was hitherto neglected, this diagram was subject to a severe limitation. It ignored the impact of a third category which is called the domestic environment, comprising public opinion, political parties, pressure groups, legislatures, the military-industrial complex, and the domestic political system. At least the third category was not sufficiently separated from the second.

As an explanation of the foreign policy decision making process the Snyder scheme remained a victim of a few weaknesses:

Despite all claims it could not tear itself away sufficiently from the state-centric model. In spite of all tall talk about the 'total relevant institutional environment' as a source of foreign policy decisions, it provides a rather restrictive view of the decision making process, since 'only those who are government officials are to be viewed as decisions-makers or actors'. But Hilsman, whom we referred to in the last Unit, in the section on bureaucracy, pointed out that many others apart from the persons who occupied 'duly constituted official positions' took part in the foreign policy decision making process. So, reactions to the elements of Snyder scheme, rather than Snyder's own framework became important for understanding foreign policy decision making.

Besides, the thrust of Snyder's analysis was the situational context, and even there limited. So, the post-1954 thinking about how to comprehend the foreign policy decision making process set about subdividing the decision making process into what some called 'sub-processes'. Three of them were identified: 'intellectual', 'social-organizational', 'political'. The 'social-organizational' and 'political' sub-processes we have already discussed in the section on bureaucracy and anyway, and for the time being let us talk about the intellectual sub-process of decision making.

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#### **4.4. The Intellectual or Cybernetic, Psychological, and Cognitive Aspects of Foreign Policy Decision Making**

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The intellectual sub-process which two scholars describe as the 'analytic aspect of decision-making ... performed largely by individuals and groups thought processes' (Robinson and Majak,

cited in Taylor, 152), has become itself a burgeoning field, with psychological and cognitive aspects. Our students will remember that in the very Unit 1 of our module, dealing with conceptual frameworks, we briefly referred to psychological and cognitive approaches. Now we are going to deal with them in some more detail.

#### 4.4.1. The Informational or Cybernetic view point

But before we enter into psychological or cognitive approaches, let us have a look at Karl W Deutsch's cybernetic framework in the context of foreign policy decision making (Deutsch 1989). Deutsch starts with the warning that if we have to comprehend how states set about to pursue what their leaders consider their goals or interests, they must first know how a state controls its behaviour. For, self-controlling mechanisms are essential for systems that want to be considered cybernetic. Now, all 'self-control involves the continuous mixing, blending, analyzing and selective use of three separate streams of information': (i) 'the stream of messages from the outside world'; (ii) 'stream from the actor's own system and resources (which tell of the status); and (iii) 'the stream of messages recalled from the memory'. So, for Deutsch an autonomous or self-steering system must have in itself fully 'operative information-processing structures', or 'channels' which will do the required task of combining and balancing these streams. Only when any self-steering system, from lower to higher levels of organisms and organizations, from a personality system to a government, is equipped to perform this task, can it 'find, gain, and maintain its autonomy, selfhood and freedom'. Deutsch seems to imply that these are the definitional aims of foreign policy.

If, essentially, decision-making involves combining new information with old memories, then we have to know the sources and kinds of memories most relevant for foreign policy. Deutsch rightly says that while the lion's share of the memories of individuals is stored in their heads, the memories of states are dispersed in many places. Lesser state memories are gathered in the heads of state or in heads of high officials, of state elites and of the politically relevant strategists. 'But the really important memories are stored in the heads of the entire population, and in the culture and language'. Our students will remember that in the Unit 2 on determinants of foreign policy we have called them as the political tradition. These 'stores of words and images and cultural and moral preferences' may contain ingrained prejudices and predilections toward certain kinds of responses—biases or predispositions that they themselves are unaware of even at the moment of responding to certain external events. These memories find their secure place of storage 'in maps, pictures, monuments and libraries; in diplomatic reports and policy memoranda in organizations; in laws and in treaties'. Deutsch points out that the government or its specialized agencies like the CIA have far better stocks of these larger files of memories and great resources to draw upon. If they can locate in them the relevant information speedily and accurately, the decision will be better.

Deutsch imagines a situation where a message reaches the United States Government about an unforeseen political crisis in another country. The assigned officer in the State Department will have to recollect all the relevant facts about the crisis standing on his feet, even if not literally. The recollections will include the geographical location of the country, the economic-political and military situations obtaining there, the number and importance of American interests involv

there in terms of private and public investments, the place of the country in America's broader political, economic and strategic calculations, the numbers and types of resources in terms of bases, troops, airplanes, missiles, warships and other military deployments stationed nearby; and the actual and potential allies in the area. Even after having marshalled all these facts, the officer cannot recommend any decision without taking into reckoning the domestic political opinion on the issue reflected in the crisis, the positions of the President, and the Congress on the issue, the stated likes and dislikes of the dominant domestic interest groups, the preferences of the media and finally of the electorate.

To compensate the shortfalls of personal memories, the officer can call upon files containing earlier reports; memoranda of current policies; draw upon other written sources; discuss the issue with peers in the State Department and other fellows in civil and military agencies; report the matter to people higher in the bureaucratic hierarchy, who in turn may refer it to the President of the United States. The President for his part will go back to his own memories and remembered images, be guided by his prejudices and predilections that may be finally decisive. Among them all these people are drawing from the immense storehouse of the salient memories of the government and the society to reach a decision. After touching upon how this memory game was let loose in the case of the Korean crisis of 1950, Deutsch reminds of another complication. All these memories may not point to the same direction, as they did not in the Korean crisis. To complicate matters, incoming information may conflict with stored images. Moreover, specific decisions reached through such intermix of current messages and recalled memories are never inevitable, but are rather contingent. Even though some decisional outcomes may be likelier than others, the whole process is essentially 'probabilistic and combinatorial'. To explain why it is so, Deutsch reminds us of the multiplicity of decision makers and decision elements, something that we have already discussed in Unit 3. But what we consider worth quoting here are three the images he uses of the foreign policy decision making process. The first is of the 'pinball machine'; the second is of the 'random walk model', and the third is of the 'gambler's ruin'. Let us quote him here for the first:

'The making of foreign policy thus resembles a pinball machine. Each interest group, each agency, each important official, legislator, or national opinion leader, is in the position of a pin, while the emerging decision resembles the end-point of the path of a steel-ball bouncing on the board from pin to pin. Clearly, some pins will be placed more strategically than others, and on the average they will thus have a somewhat greater influence on the outcome of the game. But no one pin will determine the outcome. Only the distribution of all the relevant pins on the board — for some of many pins may be so far out on the board as to be negligible — will determine the distribution of the outcomes. This distribution often can be predicted with fair confidence for large numbers of runs, but for the single run — as for the single decision — even at best only some probability can be stated. To ask of a government of a large nation who "really" runs it — presumably from behind the scenes — is as naïve as asking which pin "really" determines the outcome of the pinball game'.

One may very well say here why we are citing it as a cognitive process of a psychological kind when Deutsch is clearly referring to the situational context of foreign policy decision making, which we are soft-pedaling in this Unit. We are doing this because for Deutsch the mind

of the decision-maker is also like a pinball board. As he says:

'A similar combinatorial process, resembling some ways our pinball game, also may be going on in the mind of any individual political leader or decision maker. He is likely to receive many different messages from the outside world, all bearing on the decision he must make; and he may recall many different items from memory — both memories of facts and memories of preferences — which bear on his decision. No outside observer, nor indeed the decision maker himself, may be able to say which single outside message, or which single item recalled from memory, decisively influenced the way in which he finally made up his mind, and the course of action he chose.'

This is a very important quote for our students. If no outsider can say which 'single outside message, outside message' or 'which single item recalled from memory' prodded the decision maker to make the final decision, then analysis of foreign policy decision making is hamstrung from the very start. Of course, Deutsch assures us here that the situation would not be so murky in a multiple-game situation. He again invokes the imagery of the pinball machine. 'Though it is difficult to predict the outcome of a single run on a pinball machine, it is not nearly so hard to predict the distribution of a series of such runs.' Deutsch says that the situation is similar to a dice game, in which prediction of the numerical value of any single throw of the dice is impossible, but if one keeps on throwing the dice, then on the basis of reasonably reliable mathematical odds, one can derive 'number seven about one-sixth of the time and the number twelve about one thirty-sixth of the time'). So, information about the probability distribution of outcomes on gambling devices, as the pinball machine mentioned here, may provide one rational strategy for gambling. From this Deutsch argues that even rough 'knowledge of the probability distribution of the decisions of a political leader, or of a political organization, government, or a nation, is to know something about what we call their political "character" and it could provide 'the basis of a rational strategy that could be pursued in regard to their politics'.

Deutsch does not deny to governments the capability to pursue a 'goal state', but points out that governments may pursue it deliberately or in a machine-like manner. In both cases they proceed by simple trial and error, using information gained through both positive and negative feedback. But Deutsch takes care to point out that as in foreign policy decision making so in other areas, all the behaviour of governments, political leaders or interest groups are not necessarily purposive. This is because of any reasons ranging from the finiteness of human faculties, singly or collectively, or, in the language of cybernetics because of limits of system capacities. Long ago, in his classic work *Nerves of Government*, Deutsch introduced four sub-concepts of feedback: 'load', 'lag', 'gain', and 'lead'. Of these 'load' refers to the overall intake of information at any given point of time. Load capacity is determined not only by the number and types of channels available for the 'receptors' and the 'effectors', but also by their 'responsiveness', 'fidelity', 'background notice' etc. Deutsch says:

'At all levels — among individuals, groups, and nations — the communication channels and messages directing them towards their goals are not the only ones that impinge on their behaviour. Indeed several goals and several streams of messages from both without and within, may be competing for the limited available communication channels and for the time and the attention

of the decision makers. Some of these coming inputs may be relatively random; and all of them may increase the confusion within the decision-making system and the overload on its channels, facilities, and personnel. This can result in making some part of its outputs relatively random, and hence, cause the whole input output cycle to be much less predictable in the distribution of its results.'

Deutsch says that this randomness results from many factors. First, all decision makers rely to some extent on their components, which may not be wholly controllable. There can be behavioural changes whence a crucial component fails or otherwise changes. He cites this as the reason why people like their leaders to be of sound body, mind and temper. Since decision makers also rely to a great degree on their environment, which comprises the actions of their neighbours, partners and rivals, and on the happenings within the 'larger suprasystem' in which their decisional unit is located, each of them might pursue a path the result or which was not to anyone's desire. He invokes his second image 'the random walk model' to explain the resultant randomness of behaviour. Here, 'a drunken man is staggering around the broad, flat ledge of a cliff. While he is taking repeated steps at a random, a mathematician, terrified about what will happen if the drunkard oversteps the edge, but too pre-occupied to actively help, watches from a distance to chart and predict his progress. An element of predetermination happens in the case. The intoxicated man can start a move only from where he stands, and can take only one step at a time. Partly negating this determinism an element of probability also works. As the steps are random, they are not possibly going to be in the same direction. More probably they will frequently change directions and quite often reverse them. The mathematician can only chart his movements employing 'stochastic' processes [incidentally for our students 'stochastic' means having a random probability distribution or pattern that may be analyzed statistically, but may not be predicted precisely]. He may be able to say how likely it is that the drunkard will come back to his original position within a certain number of steps, which part of the ledge he may be moving about at any given point of time, how probable it is that he will overstep the ledge and meet death. But he can say nothing more. Our students can substitute this imagery with a popular rural game 'budī chonyā' (touching the oldie) or 'hāndi fātāno', smashing the earthen pot. Both games are to be played blindfolded.

Aside from the game proper what is more important is Deutsch's application of the game to foreign policy decision making and to international relations. For, its implication is pessimistic for the researcher. I will quote Deutsch again for a long one:

'The random walk of the drunkard has more than a little in common with the policies of great nations and with the march of history on earth. At every step, the walk starts from a position given at that time; it contains an ineradicable random element, which may be either large or small in its effects; and it is subject to modification by persistent deterministic causes, biases and influences, which can do much to change the distribution of probable outcomes, but usually cannot make any single outcome certain. Similarly, national policies and historical processes can only start at any one point of time, and from what is given then and there. They too are subject to persistent influences, biases, and causal processes, ranging from economic conditions to political preferences to technical constraints and to the power and resources of particular actors, both within and among nations. Of course, they reflect purposive behavior, and often the

deliberately chosen strategies of different participants. But they often include many random nearly random elements.'

For Deutsch, the sources of this randomness of the behaviour of decisional systems are from: (i) unpredictable behaviour of many parts within some or all the interacting sub-systems or systems; (ii) conflicts or discords among various actors, whose strategies may outdo one another and generate outcomes preferred by none; and (iii) the interaction among different system levels, where 'the temper or headache of a leader in one country', gets connected with 'a national crop failure in another', and all of these again are embroiled with 'a worldwide business recession or monetary crisis'.

If all this is not enough to make rational foreign policy decision-making or its analysis a cry, Deutsch's third image about 'gambler's ruin' definitely does it. Deutsch says that inasmuch as contemporary international politics partakes much of gamble, 'the makers of foreign policy all the way down to the active and interested citizens in a democracy— need to be familiar with the basic idea underlying the mathematical calculation of what is termed *gambler's ruin*'. Since in prolonged games of chance, gamblers who have small reserves are almost surely ruined by changes in fortunes much before the game ends, and cannot avail of any future profitable run. The gambler with poorer resources is hardest hit by any adverse run of luck. The higher the hazards and the greater the variations of the fortunes of the game, the greater is the likelihood of the ruin of the smaller player. From this Deutsch makes the deduction that the larger country, here the gambler, 'with the greater resources can afford more accidents and mistakes and still stay in the game, while the gambler with scant reserves, must be very skilful, and indeed very lucky, to survive'. Really, if the game is protracted enough, the bank is quite likely to beat him in any circumstance. Deutsch applies this image for both the conventional and nuclear warfare between large and small countries, in which smaller countries are clearly at a disadvantage.

Applying these images to the field of foreign policy making, Deutsch warns responsible policy makers to 'work within these limitations' and advises their countries not only to give them more 'generous resources and reserves for expected and unforeseen contingencies', but also to give them with broader margins of safety. This is because, the lesson of the 'random walk model' is that if the steps of an actor or decision-maker 'are likely to be random, he had better stay well away from the brink of the abyss'. Besides, while responding to the moves of 'the adversaries, they can stay mindful of the imperfect knowledge and control and probable random elements among the actions taken by the other side ...'

Here it stands to reason to see that smallness need not always mean irreversible incapacity. The limited capability of a small actor can and does admit of augmentation by way of strategic borrowing of resources from other centres of power. (e.g Pakistan relying so heavily on US aid and subsequently on China.)

We should clarify to our students that what Deutsch is doing here is sketching a model of foreign policy decision-making amidst uncertainty, using the cybernetic concepts of feedback and load. He optimistically claims that 'Models of probabilistic processes can do more for understanding and making of foreign policy than furnish us with general philosophical advice which we have anyway eschewed in this Unit. Rather the models 'can tell us what initial factors, relationships, probabilities, and rates of change we need to know or need to estimate; what model of the process they imply; and, if the model should be reasonably realistic, what m

cely consequences ought to be expected and what less-likely-but-still- quite-possible alternative outcomes ought to be provided for' (Deutsch, 1989: 81-96).

## 4.2. Cognitive Process in Foreign Policy Decision Making

Ever since the field of analysis of foreign policy decision making became a theoretical endeavour, in place of the earlier historically oriented case studies, a large body of researches based in psychological or social- psychological perspectives emerged. While the first generation studies of foreign policy decision making stressed on the numerous psychological traits of key decision-makers, shortly later attention shifted to their perception, cognition and information-processing. An argument for a 'cognitive process model' of foreign policy decision-making analysis was first used as early 1976 by Ole Holsti, mainly as a critique of Allison's bureaucratic politics model (BPM), which we have dealt with in some length in Unit 3. Holsti's critique of Allison's BPM was that Allison's work did not reveal any significant correlation between bureaucratic role and decision-making. To quote him, 'Whether or not a leader defines a situation as a "crisis", perhaps depends on at least in part on basic beliefs about the political universe and these will not always correspond to or be predictable from his role.' This called for a study of the 'minds' of key decision-makers. Holsti showed that many scholars have applied the 'cognitive process model' of foreign policy decision-making with greater success in understanding foreign policy decision-making than was facilitated by recourse to the bureaucratic politics model.

There have been many objections to the approach of 'cognitive mapping' of the minds of elites for understanding foreign policy decision-making. One objection against the model was that much of the existing research dealt with a single decision-maker. But Holsti pointed out that there have been some researches that dealt also with relatively larger samples of elites. One more objection was that it dealt with motivation, which Morgenthau said, in his iconic *Politics among Nations*, was as elusive as quicksilver. But motivation is not as untouchable in understanding foreign policy making as Realists would have it. For, even Snyder and his associates treated motivation as a major determinant of decision-making in their scheme, to facilitate a better linking of the 'setting' and the 'unit', and highlighted such things as personality, perception, values, learning, and attitudes of the decision-makers. But here again analysis was pitched at a general level that the question of how to conduct this motivational analysis was left unexplained (Snyder in Rosenau, 247-53). Although the original decision making framework drew both on the psychological and sociological variables in its application to the Korean decision, the latter far outweighed the former (Holsti, 1976: 24).

### 4.2.1. Beliefs, Perceptions, Images and Operational Codes: Building Blocks of Cognitive Mapping of Decisional Elites

We should warn our students here that even before the 'cognitive process model' appeared, there were elements and concepts shared by it with other approaches that could be brought under the rubric of the 'cognitive process model'. For example, Boulding (1956) introduced his concept of 'image', and Holsti (1962) launched his concept of 'belief system', just to show how perceptions of decision-makers were related to their foreign policy choices. The new

thinking so much pervaded the foreign policy decision-making area that it became simplistic to contend that decision-makers do not respond to the 'real' world but rather to 'images' of it, though this image may not correspond to the reality. Jervis, possibly the greatest authority on the importance of perception in international politics, warns decision-makers that even logical thinking does not make one immune to misperception: 'The process of drawing inferences in the light of logic and past experience that produces rational cognitive consistency also cause people to fit incoming information into pre-existing beliefs and to perceive what they expect to be there' (Jervis, 1976: 143). Elsewhere he is even more forthright about it, 'Actors must remember that both they and others are influenced by their expectations and fit incoming information into pre-existing images'. The pitfall that results from the 'actor's lack of knowledge of this influence is that it may induce him 'to prematurely exclude alternative perceptions and grow too confident of his views ...' Moreover, Jervis points out, 'because people underestimate the impact of established beliefs and predispositions, they are slower to change their minds than they think they are'. So, these people are prone to magnifying 'both the degree to which they are sensitive to variations in others' behavior, and the ease with which they can influence others' images of them'.

The situation becomes very tricky for decision-makers when 'preexisting beliefs so strongly color perceptions'. This is because, 'the success of an actor's efforts to convince others to accept a desired image of him and his behavior will be in direct proportion to the degree to which this image is compatible with what others already believe' (Jervis, 410). Our students can understand the full import of the sentence if they remember President Bush Jr.'s dilemma in making over his democratic image after the Iraq invasion.

Two other concepts quite in keeping with the 'cognitive process model', but which predate it, are the concepts of 'psycho milieu' or psychological environment of individual decision maker and 'operational milieu' or objective environment, associated primarily with Harold and Margaret Sprout (1956). While differentiating them, the Sprouts meant the former as 'the milieu perceived and reacted to by a specified individual' and the latter 'as the milieu in its total relations to the individual as this would appear to an individual who sees all and knows all' (Sprout and Sprout 1965: 136). As early as in the mid- 1960s, Sprout and Sprout understood the deep relevance of the difference between the psychological environment and objective environment for foreign policy analysis. As they wrote,

'Instead of drawing conclusions regarding an individual's probable motivations and purposes on the basis of his environmental knowledge, and his intellectual processes linking purposes and knowledge, on the basis of assumptions as to the way people are likely on the average to behave in given social context, the cognitive behavioralist— be he narrative historian or systematic social scientist— undertakes to find out as precisely as is possible how specific persons actually did perceive and respond in particular contingencies' (ibid, 118).'

Here Sprout and Sprout are clearly anticipating cognitive process as an alternative to foreign policy analysis.

Some textbook writers mention other attempts to observe and scrutinize the behaviour of decision-making groups while involved in their very act of decision making— ranging from quantitative and qualitative content analyses of decision-makers' statements and observations, or



documents, in which their perceptions were reflected; simulation of decision-making situations; intensive interview of key decision makers; and close study of the psychology of key decision-makers (Taylor, 148-49). For example, Holsti's famous case study of the 'belief system' of John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, who almost single-handedly fashioned US foreign policy towards the Soviet Union between 1953 and 1959, first in an article, and then in a book (1962), revealed better the reasons behind America's Cold War foreign policy than many detailed histories. Holsti quoted Quincy Wright to specify what he was doing:

'The relationship of national images to international conflict is clear: decision-makers act upon their definition of the situation and their images of states— others as well as their own. These images are in turn dependent upon the decision-maker's belief system, and these may or not be accurate representations of "reality". Thus it has been suggested that international conflict is not between states, but rather between distorted images of states'.

So, Holsti first all of construes Dulles's statements between 1953 and 1959 into 3,584 'evaluative assertions', and then classified them into one of four types: (i) '*Soviet Policy*: assessed on a friendship-hostility continuum (2,246 statements)'; (ii) '*Soviet Capabilities*: assessed on a strength weakness continuum (732 statements)'; (iii) '*Soviet Success*: assessed on a satisfaction-frustration continuum (290 statements); (iv) '*General Evaluation of the Soviet Union*: assessed on a good-bad continuum (316). From a content analysis of these evaluative statements Holsti constructed the Dullesian image of the Soviet Union, built in the trinity of atheism, totalitarianism, and communism, capped by the deep belief that no enduring social order could be erected upon such foundations' (Holsti, 1962: 244, 246-47, *passim*).

Later, Holsti used the concept of 'operational code' to unravel the cognitive process of Dulles's decision-making. The concept of 'operational code' was first coined by structural-functionalist sociologist Robert K. Merton in his classic article 'Bureaucratic Structure and Personality' (1940). It was brought into the field of political psychology by Nathan Leites, in his classic two-volume study of *The Operational Code of the Politburo* (1951) and *A Study of Bolshevism* (1953). In the latter book he stretched the meaning of the word operational code used by Merton in his sociological approach to decision-making to include components of psychology and psychoanalysis. A decade and half later Alexander George wondered about the oblivion Leites's article had fallen into in his review article 'The "Operational Code": A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-making' (1969), and attributed the neglect of Leites's work to the extreme complexity of his argument. He simplified the approach and reduced it to five philosophical and five epistemological questions. We do not have time and space enough to discuss them, and even if we had, we would not tax the receptivity of our students beyond limits. What is rather more important for them to note is that Holsti used George's simplification of Leites's operational code to show how apart from cognitive factors, situational characteristics would leave room for beliefs to influence foreign policy decision-making behaviour. Because of ambiguity, paucity of information and its complexity situations may be liable to a multiplicity of interpretations, and the beliefs of a conveniently located key decision-maker in defining and selecting options are also significant. Hence, Holsti sought to construct an operational code typology that would share the following characteristics with a social-psychological theory of cognitive consistency. The main unit of analysis is an individual's

decision-making constrained by his belief-system. The basic concepts are philosophical and instrumental beliefs, belief system, and foreign policy strategies and tactics, and the defining mode of inference is the principle of logical consistency. Its two corollaries are: (i) beliefs are prone to confirm one another to gradually congeal into a belief system; and (ii) in defined circumstances beliefs constrict the range of choices to shape the final decision.

Walker says that from his reworking of George's operational code, Holsti synthesized the case studies of decision-making inspired by George's (1969) article and defined new lines of inquiry into the cognitive consistency, the psychodynamic origins, and the behavioral consequences of operational code belief systems'. The American decision-makers, case studies of whose decision-making behaviour were influenced by George's article are: John Foster Dulles, Frank Church, Arthur Vandenberg, Dean Acheson, Henry Kissinger, James F. Byrnes, J. William Fulbright, and Mark Hatfield. Holsti analysed these case studies afresh to ascertain if the findings confirmed the existence of consistent belief systems that accorded with his operational code typology. But since none of these case studies had used quantitative techniques of content analysis to any appreciable degree, Holsti's attempt at validation had to rest content with indirect evidence (Walker, 1990:403-10).

#### **4.4.2.2 From Beliefs to Schema**

While Political Scientists after Holsti were making much of belief systems of elites for a new approach to foreign policy decision making analysis, some psychologists were finding them backdated. For, ever since the 1970s psychologists were finding schemas more fruitful for the study of foreign policy decision making of elites. And in their view schemas helped to look at aspects of foreign policy decision making that a monomaniac focus on belief systems missed. Deborah Welch Larson argues that schemas provide better lenses for the study of foreign-policy making, since as a meta-construct, located 'at a higher level of analysis, schemas encompass belief systems as well as specific examples and analogies. As such, schemas can help to bridge the gap in research on cognitive structures between political science and social psychology. Now what constitutes the difference between belief systems and schemas? Larson quotes Milton Rokeach to define a belief system as 'the total universe of a person's beliefs about the physical world, the social world, and the self. By contrast, the 'operational code belief system is a set of beliefs about the political world, including philosophical beliefs about the nature of politics and instrumental beliefs about the best way to achieve one's goals'. While schemas share some common features with belief systems, in containing general information of the world, Larson quotes many psychologists to argue that a schema is rather a cognitive structure that stands for knowledge about a concept or type of stimulus, together with its attributes and the relations among these attributes. 'It is an abstraction from experience with a subject, rather than a definition or a collection of cases'. Larson adds himself that 'Schemas may differ from belief systems not only in organization but in content. Schemas include specific instances, exemplars, and analogies as well as the more abstract knowledge found in belief systems'. Its distinction lies in its recognition that 'people frequently approach problems not by applying abstract propositions

but by drawing examples from their experience'. By way of example, Larson reduced political issues and problems into simple stories or scripts, where he 'liked to compare the Soviets to various Hollywood producers he had negotiated with as head of the Screen Actors Guild'.

Larson considers historical analogies as important components of schemas, since even acknowledged experts decision-making of sometimes resort to historical analogies or simplistic slogans. Even veteran decision-makers like Robert McNamara frequently used historical analogies to simplify the Vietnam War situation. The tendency was shared by other top decision-makers like McGeorge Bundy, Dean Rusk, Walt Rostow, Arthur Schlesinger, and James Thomson. Their flair for historical analogies stemmed from the fact that they were renowned academicians in the disciplines of history and politics before taking up decision-making assignments. So, they often made inappropriate and confusing comparisons between Vietnam and Korea, Munich and Malaya (Larson, 1994:17-21).

#### **4.4.2.3 Continuity and Change in Belief Systems**

As we are drawing towards an end of our discussion of the cognitive mapping of foreign policy decision making elites, we should warn our students that taking their beliefs and belief systems as fixed and invariant, without paying attention to the continuities or discontinuities in them may often provide a distorted picture. Jerel Rosati has shown that while many analysts of President Jimmy Carter's foreign policy decision making have contended that the Carter Administration had no 'coherent and consistent image of the international system', other analysts argued that the Carter Administration always had a belief system and an image of America and other states, but they changed with the time. After starting with an 'optimistic and complex view of the world', it became embittered and cynical with time, primarily in response to manifestations of 'Soviet expansionism'. Rosati explains this change of belief system for the worse in terms of the 'image dissensus' of the President, the national Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and the Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance (Rosati, 1988).

#### **4.4.2.4 Cognitive Process Model: Policy Orientation and Back to Future for Inductive Complexity**

Before we wind up the discussion of the cognitive process model of foreign policy decision making, we would like to tell our readers two final things. The first is that this model does not merely aim at delineating the process through which elite decision-makers arrived at their decisions. At the same time it aims at a policy-orientation and some prediction. The concern with policy orientation has been stated by Schapiro and Bonham sufficiently clearly:

'The choice of a cognitive process approach to foreign policy decision-making is based only partly on the expectation that it is a way to build a comprehensive theoretical framework which will allow us to explain and predict decision makers' responses to international events, including crisis decision-making and some situations that involve the dynamics of planning and anticipation. A variety of theoretical orientations, perhaps even a personality trait approach, might also yield predictive accuracy. The choice of a cognitive process approach is related to our long-range goal

for research — namely, recommendations for policy planning and execution in international polities’.

The component of prediction or projecting ‘back into the future’ (I am borrowing the term from John Mearsheimer out of context) comes out from the following quote from Holsti, cited by Bonham and Shapiro:

‘Essentially, then, it is by projecting past experience into future decisions that human beings make decisions; and statesmen, in this respect, are not exceptions. Foreign policy decisions, like other human decisions, imply not only an abstraction from history, but also the making of “predictions” — the assessment of probable outcomes’.

Bonham and Schapiro think that the inductive search for experience which the model accommodates as one of its components comes from the realization ‘that decision-makers, in the absence of firm beliefs about new events, tend to rely on past experience’. To that extent, academicians turned decision-makers, whom Larson wonders at for comparing Vietnam with Korea and Munich with Malaya (see 4.4.2.2), were not doing anything abnormal.

The second thing we want to tell our readers is that the issue of cognitive complexity versus simplicity is very important for the cognitive process model. Starting from the research finding that cognitive complexity is positively correlated with ‘the accuracy of an individual’s predictions about people’s behaviour’, i.e. ‘the more complex their perceptual discriminations, the better their prediction’, Bonham and Schapiro make the important point that, ‘to the extent ... an individual is more complex or differentiated in the way he views the power configuration in the international system, he is apt to consider a broader range of approaches to conflict management’ (Bonham and Schapiro, 1973:147-74).

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## 4.5 So, who finally decide(s) Foreign Policy?

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Dear readers, I know that even after this definitive switch from the situational to the cognitive aspects about the foreign policy decision-making process, you would want to know who finally take(s) the final foreign policy decisions. And you know yourself that in the backdrop of wide disparities between political systems in which decision-making systems are embedded, and the wide array of approaches to decision-making and their differential thrusts, this is a very difficult question to answer. Still some scholars have sought to tackle even this question. Herman and Herman (1989) seek to answer this question in a very innovative way. They claim that the wide literature of foreign policy analysis has identified three major alternative types of ultimate decision units: (i) ‘predominant leader’, i.e. a single leader possessing the power to make the final choice, disregarding the opposition; (ii) ‘single group’, comprising people, all members of a single body, and authorized to collectively choose a plan of action in direct, physical interaction, and elicit compliance; and (iii) ‘multiple autonomous actors’, a decision-set, in which the relevant actors are ‘separate individuals, groups, or coalitions, which, if some or all concur, can act for the government, but no one of which by itself has the ability to decide and force compliance on the others; moreover, no overarching authoritative body exists in which all the necessary parties are members.’

Herman and Herman enjoin upon the analyst the task of classifying into one of the three

categories the actors who are empowered to take decisions in foreign policy. He however, reminds us that while in some countries for all foreign policy matters, the decisional system may be same, in many other countries the nature of the decisional unit depends upon the type of the issue under reference, or is tied to the changes in the nature of the regime. For example, the President may take an independent and spontaneous decision when asked an uncomfortable or unforeseen question in a press conference with impunity (predominant leader). But, in a matter of military preparedness, the initial decision may be taken by the joint Chiefs of staff, to be sent to the titular commander-in-chief only later (a single group). But in some others cases, like the conclusion of a treaty with a foreign government, the decision may require joint consultations between the President, his executive branch advisers and the Senate (forming a multiple autonomous actor). They have also provided a unique method of finding out if the decisional unit is the predominant leader, a single group, or a multiple autonomous actor on the basis of an integrated decision tree.

First, the analyst is to begin by identifying an immediate substantive problem that has been brought to the attention of the regime (step 1). Then he has to ask if in the regime's leadership there is a single individual with the power/authority to deploy or keep in reserve the regime's resources in the issue area under consideration, irrespective of the opposition of others (step 2). If the answer to this question is negative, then the analyst does not have to proceed anymore. If however the answer to this question is affirmative, the analyst has to ask if the leader has shown in the past keen interest and involvement with foreign policy issues (step 3). If the answer to this question is negative, the analyst has to ask again if the current foreign policy issue is seen by the regime leadership to be of critical importance for the well-being of the regime or society, and if it calls for 'high level diplomacy and protocol' (step 4). If the answer to this question is again negative, the analyst has to ask again if the immediate issue is related with a matter known to be of the personal interest or benefit to the leader (step 5). If the answer to this question is again negative, the analyst has to stop his search for the predominant leader. But if the answer to this question is affirmative, the analyst has to pose another question: after formulating the general policy guidelines required for coping with the problem, does the leader maintain regular, active participation in the decision process (step 6)? If the answer to this question is again negative, the analyst has to stop his search for the predominant leader. But if the answer to this question is for a change affirmative, the analyst has to ask if the leader regularly accommodates chosen others as part of the decision-process all through the time the issue is on agenda and gives them veto power over the decision (step 7). This step is so decisive that whether the answer to this question is affirmative or negative, the decisional unit is the predominant leader.

For knowing if the decisional unit is a single group or a multiple autonomous actor, the analyst has to ask other questions. To know if it is multiple autonomous actors, the analyst can keep some questions in a vertical order. These are: if the problem as defined is part of 'an issue area for which there is only one known dominant policy group' (step 8); if at a time when a foreign or defence problem is seen to be critical for the well-being of the regime or the society, he can find one group that has the final say about whether the regime's resources will be committed or withheld in dealing with the problem (step 9); if 'the policy-groups likely to be involved with

the immediate problem' are ordered in such a hierarchical manner in their relations with one another that we find 'somewhere in the chain of command one group' that make an authoritative choice of committing or withholding the regime's resources (step 11); and if there are 'two or more separate actors (groups, organizations) who do not combine into a single unit' and none of the actors can unilaterally, i.e. 'without the concurrence of one or more others' deploy or withhold the regime's resources in tackling the problem (step 14). If all the answers up to question at step 11 are negative and only the answer to question 14 is affirmative, we have clearly a decisional unit of multiple autonomous actors.

But if the answers to the questions in step 8 and 9 are yes, the question then that arises is 'Is the current problem perceived to be critical?' If the answer to this question is no, the analyst has to re-pose the question at step 11. If the answer to that question is yes, he has to raise the question kept in reserve, i.e., the question at step 12: 'Is everyone within the regime whose support is essential to commit or withhold the regime's resources for coping with the immediate problem a member of the same policy group, such that a group decision cannot readily be altered by outside opposition?' If the answer to this question is yes, and the answer to the question at step 14 is no, then the question kept in reserve at step 13 is to be raised, namely, 'Is the issue area of which the immediate problem a part one in which the regime is dependent upon the approval of an external (foreign) entity?' If the answer to this question is no, we have a single group as the decisional unit. But if the answer is yes, we are reverted back to multiple autonomous actors as the decisional unit (Herman and Herman, 1989: 363-73).

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## 4.6. Summary

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In this Unit 4 we have first touched upon pure theories of decision-making from rationalistic theories to mixed-scanning. Then we have elaborated the Snyder scheme where situational and cognitive aspects of foreign policy decision making were presented as a combined focus. After saying a few words about its constraining situational determinism we have shifted to the analytic aspect of decision-making, meaning the psychological and cognitive aspects of it. Before entering the cognitive area proper we have discussed Karl W. Deutsch's cybernetic framework in the context of foreign policy decision making, which offers many important insights into the linking of memories and messages to foreign policy decision-making. While analyzing the 'cognitive process model' of foreign policy decision-making, we have shown how it attempts 'cognitive mapping' of the minds of elites. We have discussed beliefs, perceptions, images and operational codes, the bricks of the cognitive mapping of decisional elites. We have shown how a switch from beliefs to schema can generate better insights into foreign policy decision making. We have also explained why any lack of attention to the tension between continuity and change in belief systems can be dangerous. And finally we have given you a series of clues about how to find out who decides in matters of foreign policy in different political systems.

## 4.7 Questions

### Essay answer type

1. Write a critical essay on the Snyder scheme as an approach to decision-making.
2. Assess the position of Richard Snyder in foreign policy decision-making literature.
3. Trace out the main points of Karl W. Deutsch's cybernetic framework in the context of foreign policy decision making.
4. Discuss the Cognitive Process Model of foreign policy decision-making.
5. Assess the theoretical stature of Ole Holsti in foreign policy decision-making theory.
6. How is a student of foreign policy decision-making going to find about who decides in foreign policy decision-making of a country?

### Medium answer type

1. Point out the revolutionary significance of the Snyder scheme as a solvent of state-centrism in the analysis of foreign policy decision-making.
2. Elaborate the box diagram in the Snyder scheme.
3. Show how Deutsch stresses on streams of memories and messages as components of foreign policy decision-making.
4. Spell out the role of beliefs, images, and operational codes in foreign policy decision-making.
5. Why would you say that there is a strong inductive component in the Cognitive Process Model of foreign policy decision-making?
6. Comment on Sprouts' concepts of 'psycho-milieu' and 'operational milieu' as precursors of cognitive mapping.
7. To what extent is the complexity of the decision-maker's mind helpful in foreign policy decision-making?
8. Write a brief history of the 'operational code' as a tool of cognitive mapping of the minds of foreign policy elites.

### Short answer type

1. Write a short note on rationalistic, incrementalist and 'mixed-scanning' based approaches to decision making.
2. Comment on the weaknesses of the Snyder scheme as an explanation of the foreign policy decision making process.
3. Show how Deutsch compares foreign policy decision-making with a pinball game.
4. Write a short note on what are the origins of randomness in foreign policy behaviour according to Deutsch, and what method he suggests to control it.
5. Differentiate between beliefs and schemas as components of the cognitive mapping of foreign policy elites.
6. How important is the policy orientation in the Cognitive Process Model of foreign policy decision-making?
7. Comment on the sources and importance of perception and misperception in foreign policy decision-making.
8. How important are 'belief systems' in shaping decision-makers' minds?

9. What role do 'images' play in foreign policy decision-making?
10. Define 'schema'.
11. Define 'misperception'.
12. Name the theorists who have written in the field of foreign policy decision-making.

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#### 4.8. Suggested Readings

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## **Paper-VII**

### **Module-4**

## **International Relations**

### **Foreign Policy of India**

- Unit 1  Factors conditioning Foreign Policy of India
- Unit 2  The Making of India's Foreign Policy
- Unit 3  The Evolution of India's Foreign Policy
- Unit 4  India's relationship with neighbouring countries and beyond

Paper-VII

Module-4

International Relations

Foreign Policy of India

Unit 1 - Factors conditioning Foreign Policy of India

Unit 2 - The Making of India's Foreign Policy

Unit 3 - The Evolution of India's Foreign Policy

Unit 4 - India's relationship with neighbouring

countries and beyond

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# Unit 1 □ Factors conditioning Foreign Policy of India

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## Structure

- 1.0 Objectives
- 1.1 Introduction
- 1.2 Foreign Policy -meaning, evolution and approaches
- 1.3 Geographic/strategic factors conditioning India's foreign policy
- 1.4 Domestic and Foreign operational environment of India's foreign policy
- 1.5 Indian foreign policy- A product of surrounding environment?
- 1.6 Summary
- 1.7 Questions
- 1.8 Suggested Readings

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## 1.0 Objectives

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The present study focuses on the following:

- 1. The meaning, evolution and approaches of Foreign Policy in India.
- 2. Different factors conditioning the Foreign Policy of India.
- 3. An analysis of the domestic environment which guided the foreign policy of the country.

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## 1.1 Introduction

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Policy is the framework or guideline within which any action is taken and foreign policy is the framework guiding a country's engagement with other countries and also organizations beyond its territory. Foreign policy is a necessary activity of any country as every country has to engage with all other countries if it has to sail smoothly in the given inter-state system and more so in the period of rapid globalisation. For its meaningful existence in the international political system, each country has to have a framework or guideline for such activities in the sphere of trade, economics and other form of interactions. Foreign policy of any country is the point of interaction between the domestic political system and the international political system. Rosenau (1987) has called foreign policy a "bridging discipline" with "limitless boundaries" that must deal with the "continuing erosion of distinction between domestic and foreign issues, between the socio-political and economic processes that unfold at home and those that transpire abroad." In this context foreign policy of a country is not a simple set of policies and programmes formulated to protect and promote the national interests of a country but a complex of

decisions taken under ever changing pressures of the 'domestic' and 'foreign environment. So foreign policy is both policies and decisions at the same time. While foreign policy is a reflection of the 'grand vision' or 'long term goals' or the 'philosophy' of a country regarding its position in the international political system, foreign policy decisions are ad hoc responses, responses which are more or less within the framework of the declared policies, and sudden changes of behaviour of other countries in the system. Foreign policy in this way can be studied from 'systemic' (international) and 'sub-systemic' (domestic or regional) level of analysis. While the former focuses on foreign policy decisions at particular events, the latter covers foreign policy of a country in general. While the former addresses 'change', the latter addresses 'continuity'. Way back in 1968, F.S. Northedge in a seminal article on 'The Nature of Foreign Policy' stated that "Foreign policy constitutes an endless dialogue between the powers of continuity and powers of change". Foreign policy has been the focus of scholarly attention for long, and James Rosenau is one of the pioneers in attempting to understand this complexity of 'linkage' in the making of foreign policy. An important dimension of studying foreign policy is its relevance in the minds of the citizens of a particular country. Foreign policy is seen as a specialized activity undertaken these days by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) of the respective countries and there is not much interest about it among the ordinary citizens at large unless it is related to the neighbouring countries. So foreign policy becomes lively for ordinary citizens only when the country is attacked by some external forces or when the bordering countries are involved. Otherwise it is about the domestic policies of a government that the citizens take keen interest and not the foreign policy. So both at the macro/systemic level and micro/sub-systemic level foreign policy making addresses the problem of linkage - in the former it is about the 'domestic' and the 'foreign' while in the latter it is about 'the specialist' and 'the ordinary citizen'. Hence any understanding of foreign policy is complex as it must take in account the various undercurrents in the making of foreign policy.

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## 1.2 Foreign Policy -meaning, evolution and approaches

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Foreign policy is a guide to management of foreign relations, which happens to be a highly interactive activity that involves continuous communication and feedback. The study of foreign policy is not a new phenomenon. As long as there have been political units engaging in relations with other political units, people have thought about and studied the problem of relations with the other or foreign group. While international relations focuses on the inter-state relations spheres, comparative politics uncovers the political sociology of a particular nation-state vis-à-vis others. Foreign policy is a mixture of both the perspectives - while the nature of political sociology conditions it, the inter-state relational sphere provides the space for its operation.

The 'foreign policy problem' can be defined in a number of different ways at the level of academic debate, but it remains remarkably constant at the level of substance. Broadly construed it concerns the set of constraints and stimuli faced by a foreign policy system, and extends to the system's ability to reorganize and respond to the situations with which it is faced. A

Kenneth Waltz has argued: "What is wanted in foreign policy is not a set of simple attributes but instead a nice balance of qualities: realism and imagination, flexibility and firmness, vigour and moderation, continuity of policy when policy is good and the ability to change direction when new international conditions make new departures desirable, adaptability of policy without destruction of its coherence or dependability". Five qualities - clarity, consistency, continuity, compatibility and adaptability- can be used as a series of yardsticks against which to judge the overall quality and the specific qualities of foreign policies on a comparative basis, either across time or across countries and issues.

In the words of Roy. C. Macridis, "Two approaches to foreign policy have vied with one another in Western thought at least since the days of the French Revolution. One is the *ideological* approach, according to which the policies of states vis-a-vis the rest of the world are merely expressions of political, social and religious beliefs. In this approach, foreign policies are classified as democratic or totalitarian, liberation or socialist, and peace-loving or aggressive. The second approach to foreign policy is *analytical*. At the heart of this viewpoint is the proposition that policy rests on multiple determinants, including the state's historic tradition, geographical location, national interest, and purposes and security needs". This set of approaches studies foreign policy from the sub-systemic level with a focus on the internal/domestic political system of a country and the pressures and influence on the making of foreign policy. The other set of approaches - namely *Realist*, *Liberal* and *Marxist* - study foreign policy from the systemic/international level. While the Realist foreign policy is an endless search for hegemonic power, the Liberal foreign policy aspires for peace in international political system with the development of international norms and institutions. The Marxist approach to foreign policy is designed to counter and then to put an end to the unequal capitalist market economy model through revolutionary solidarity for a humane and just world order. These sets of approaches have varying relevance as different state actors individually design the direction of foreign policy, determine the foreign policy goals and develop the methods of achieving such goals. All these approaches are essential to grasp the complexity of foreign policy in its totality. Foreign policy is an area of statecraft. In the context of complexities in understanding the meaning, nature and approaches to foreign policy, one can think of foreign policy as foreign affairs strategy and diplomacy as a useful tool or tactics of that strategy. The foreign affairs strategy is determined by the second set of approaches (systemic) while the nature of diplomacy is determined by the first set of approaches (sub-systemic). This change from policy to strategy makes foreign policy study much more attractive in its particular manifestations (foreign affairs strategy) as against the abstract generalized lofty ideals(overall foreign policy).

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### 1.3 Geographic/strategic factors conditioning India's foreign policy

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In the words of Jayantanuj Bandopadhyay, "Foreign policy is never uniquely determined by any one factor or set of factors, but is the result of the interplay of a large number of factors

that affect the formulation of policy in different ways in different circumstances. Some of the factors are relatively stable and have to be taken as given by the makers of foreign policy, and can, therefore, be regarded as more basic or unchangeable determinants of policy than others. In the case of India the situation is very interesting. The geographical space that was naturally belonging to India suddenly got demarcated time and again through partition and the Indian subcontinent was redrawn to accommodate three independent countries. The geographical factors conditioning Indian foreign policy revolves around the South Asian subcontinent with the Indian Ocean and the Himalayan frontiers.

India is the largest country in the South Asian region. Its features of size, population, resource economic development, scientific and technological advancement, military strength, etc. are quite disproportionate in comparison with those of other countries of the region. It occupies nearly seventy-six per cent of the area of the total region. Geography has provided India a central position, as it shares 4046 km land border with Bangladesh, 3310 km with Pakistan, 1752 km with Nepal and 587 km with Bhutan, apart from a maritime border with Sri Lanka. India has major or minor border disputes with all these countries except Bhutan. No other country of the region shares border with any other country except India. Today, India's influence and proximity produce stress and strain in its relations with neighbours providing them no alternatives but to treat India with objectivity and adroitness rather than the emotion-charged populism employed in the conduct of neighbourly policies. An age old precept says that what is near should be dear to us and this should be so too in dealings with a group of countries like India's neighbours who are near not merely geographically, but in other ways too, in terms of culture, language, religious customs and manners, being offshoots of a common history, race, civilization and culture. As yet difficulties have arisen. This in a way is not surprising either, since a host of problems keep arising in inter-state relations with immediate neighbours.

Indian Ocean is gradually becoming a geostrategic sea lane in the post cold war period marked by increasing presence of extra regional power base in it. While China's interest in this sea lane is much hyped, one can notice a renewed vigour on the part of United States to manifest its strategic partnership in the region. Thus India's position in the Indian Ocean region is of seminal importance to settle the geopolitical balance of the region. Indian footprints in world politics is expanding, particularly so its 'footprints' in the Indian Ocean and its littoral. China appears to be pursuing a policy of encirclement of India, relying upon its military advantage along the Sino-Indian border and its 'all-weather friendship' with Pakistan. To the south, China attempts to complete this circle by sea. Its so called 'string of pearls' strategy is a three-pronged approach to check US naval power in the Indian ocean and to achieve strategic maritime advantage over India. Meanwhile, India's posture involves the construction a series of naval bases/berthing points along its sea lanes to the Middle East, the improvement of its diplomacy throughout the Indian Ocean area, and the rapid attempt to build a 'blue water' navy to project its power effectively. In recent years China has notably increased its presence in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea. The Indian Ocean region is becoming an important front in China's naval strategy, and India's presence at the centre creates a clear challenge with which China must deal. India's response has been to work at developing its diplomacy throughout the area, building

and modernizing its military capacity, and developing its ability to project power more effectively.

The Himalayan Mountain range possess itself as a natural boundary to India but with the development of science and technology bridges, roads and highways are being constructed across the mountain ranges particularly by China. India's loss of strategic segments of high Himalayas and part of Karakoram to Pakistan and China in 1947-48 put China and Pakistan into advantageous position in the region. And later on, both augmented the strategic gains by opening of Karakoram Highway (KKH). The KKH, not far from the Line of Control (LoC), is strategically key asset for the China and Pakistan. This highway along with the Chinese road running in Aksai Chin provides major avenues of collaboration against India by troops of all weather friends China' and 'Pakistan'. Besides roads and rail links, Beijing and Islamabad are ready to construct oil and gas pipeline across Karakoram to connect Gwadar to land-locked Xinjiang. Beijing is planning to extend the newly launched Golmud-Lhasa rail link up to Xigaze, south of Lhasa and from there to Yatung, a traditional trading centre situated at the mouth of the chumbi valley just a few kilometers away from strategic Nathu La pass. Anticipating the China's strategic gain across the Sikkim, India approved a long pending proposal of rail link for this landlocked Himalayan State. The project, expected to be completed by 2015-16, will provide much-needed rail connectivity to Sikkim with the rest of the nation.

Hence it can safely be remarked that the geographic/natural surroundings of India also creates strategic problems more than opportunities and foreign policy is primarily designed to combat such problems/hindrances and through negotiations and strategic partnership change those problems into opportunities. But as of now the hugeness and growing power of India are cited as being a course of tension for some of its South Asian neighbours while Indian Ocean and Himalayan mountain ranges are emerging as a sphere of sharp confrontation between India and other extra-regional powers, particularly China. It must be noted that while in its West India is always doubtful about the effect of Pakistan-Afghanistan axis, in its North, India is always under the specter of a Chinese aggression into its territory. And here foreign policy making in India is very crucial as it has to take note of the geographical/strategic ramifications of its surroundings because any miscalculated management of the geographical location can be strategically detrimental for India so far as geopolitics and geo-economic of the South Asian region is concerned.

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## **1.4 Domestic and Foreign operational environment of India's foreign policy**

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According to G. Modelsky, The foremost task of foreign policy analysis must be to throw light on the ways in which states attempt to change, and succeed in changing, the behaviour of other states. In the words of Joseph Frankel, "Environment (or, interchangeably, setting) is used as a description of all enviroing factors. Theoretically, the environment of foreign policy decisions is limitless, it embraces the whole universe. Any domestic matter may impinge on foreign policy and require adjustment; .. The elements of the environment can be graded into three categories,

according to their relevance. Most of the innumerable elements pass unnoticed; some potentially important ones are noted and recorded, to a certain extent by the decision-makers themselves but more fully and systematically by their subordinates; finally, when a concrete matter comes up for consideration, environment tends to be to what the decision-makers consider relevant for that particular matter”.

The domestic environment of making of India's foreign policy consists of India's political system - its history and political tradition (among others important being tolerance, secular tradition, democratic politics, the political party system, the federal set-up, religious divide, ethnic differences etc), the level of economic development. On the other side the foreign or international environment consist of the balance of power in world politics (the cold war and then the post-cold war setting, the 9/11 incident and reorientation of global balance of power between the terrorists and the 'democratists', the emerging multilateral world order) the international institutions and norms (the United Nations, global concern over climate change), the nuclear issue, the role of extra-regional powers in the South Asian region and the international solidarity movements and forums (NAM, G-77, BRICS, IBSA, SCO). These environmental influences kept on changing and so to Indian foreign policy directions.

Political tradition of India can be traced back to the influences of Kautilya's realist approach and the idealist approach of Asoka. Later the non-violent element was called into the tradition under Gandhi's leadership. However the overall element of tolerance and peace led independent India to begin with a foreign policy of 'peaceful settlement of international disputes and peaceful coexistence'. The democratic political culture led foreign policy orientation to be anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, anti-racism and democracy promotion. With this preliminary elements India followed a non-aligned path during the Cold war period to gain independent foreign policy. Being a multi-religious and multi-cultural country, India has been in friendly relations with the Arab and Muslim world as well with the Buddhist(Sri Lanka, Bhutan) and Hindu states(Nepal) in its surroundings. Critical is India's relationship with Pakistan and Israel, particularly due to the domestic political pressures of nationalist fervor exerted by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The federal set-up in India has for long been a hindrance to continuing a friendly relationship with Sri Lanka because of the Tamil issue in Tamil Nadu and of late even in its dealings with Bangladesh the West Bengal government is putting hurdles for forwarding relationship. Indian foreign policy was framed under the ideology and structure and inner compulsions of political parties coming to power in India. Indian National Congress mostly influenced by Nehruvian vision of non-alignment, pro-Soviet tilt of Indira Gandhi, learning experiences of Rajiv Gandhi, the economism of Narasimha Rao and the pan-Asianism of Manmohan Singh formulated foreign policy that was described as 'independent'. Bharatiya Janata Party came to power share as a major partner of Janata Coalition in 1977 and then under the rubric of NDA in 1998 and then presently in 2014 on its own. BJP started with genuine-nonalignment policy in 1977 by rectifying the pro-Soviet tilt and entering into engagement with the United States and also Israel. Later it heralded a new nuclear doctrine for India and went to war with Pakistan in 1998 and presently to mend fences with the neighbouring countries. The BJP aimed to make Indian foreign policy assertive and 'independent'. The socialist and communist



parties have been in the opposition for most part of independent India barring the experience of United Front government in 1996 and UPA 1 (2004-2008) experience. These parties throughout battled for 'genuine independent foreign policy' and to bring back the overarchal vision of 'non-alignment' to stop toeing US directed path particularly in post cold war period. Thus in their aspiration for 'independent foreign policy' the political parties were moving in opposite directions in India! On the other side the claims of economic development was also influential in framing foreign policy. While to prioritize self-reliant economic development, India adopted non-aligned path during cold war period, the balance-of-payments problem in the mid 1980s led India to adopt the IMF directed Structural Adjustment Policy (SAP) ultimately resulting in opening up the economy to global market forces in the post cold war period. The need of stable external relations for the sake of economic growth forces India to maintain a modicum of non-adversarial relations with China keeping the political border skirmishes in the background. At the same time India has to set its diplomatic posture right to engage with booming economies like United States, Japan, Germany, Singapore and with emerging economies like Brazil, South Africa, Australia and with stable economies like Russia.

The international environment conditions the foreign policy of any country but more so that of India because from its independence under the leadership of Nehru India wanted to be seen as one of the important powers (earlier moral, presently economic) in world politics. At first the cold war bipolar world order (1945-1989) forced India to adopt a non-aligned path, later the unipolar world order (1990-2001) forced India to engage more with the United States and finally the nascent multipolar world order (2001 after 9/11 terrorist attack on United States till date) forced India to widen its network of partnership bilaterally as well as with important regional organizations like ASEAN and EU. Thus the global balance of power set the context for formulation of Indian foreign policy. India under the leadership of Nehru went ahead with solidarity movement of Third World Afro-Asian countries particularly expressed through the non-aligned movement (NAM) as well as the Group of developing countries of the Third World in the form of G-77. India has always been a peace-loving nation and as such played important role in peace-keeping missions of United Nations and has been eyeing a permanent seat in the UN Security Council for long. India has been leading the campaign for the developing countries of the global South against that of the North in various norm settlement summits regarding issues of global commons like environment and that was reflected recently at the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit in 2009. India has long been a votary of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and has refused to sign the CTBT Agreement. India's declared nuclear policy is that of 'no-first use' in wars or war like situation and in normal times use this energy for civilian purpose. Since 2008 the Indo-US Nuclear Treaty also known as 123 Agreement has given rise to many apprehensions, particularly due to a clause in the Agreement envisaging direct control of operation of India's nuclear units by nuclear suppliers group(NSG) under the leadership of IAEA(International Atomic Energy Agency). Indian foreign policy making has been highly influenced by the role and influence of extra-regional powers in South Asia, particularly that of United States and China. The US-Pakistan axis of 'silent friendship' and China's desire to influence the entire region surrounding India through its 'String of Pearls' strategy(by which several joint collaboration ports

are being created in neighbouring countries circling India) has been an irritation for India. India is always on its toes to balance its foreign policy in the light of the shift in recent US policy from Bush government's 'Af-Pak strategy' to Obama government's 'Asia-Pacific strategy', from viewing India as an 'emerging power' to declaring it as an 'emerged power' and the shift in Chinese strategy from Hu Jintao's 'soft power' to Xi Jinping's 'hard power' and the Chinese strategic continuity of patronising Pakistan (by even providing military-technological aid) and of keeping alive the border dispute and intruding Arunachal area of India. A troubled neighbourhood is very disturbing for any country like India's stature to concentrate on its foreign policy to aspire for a global role. In this the lasting bilateral disputes with Pakistan and Bangladesh is a spoil sport for the South Block(home to Ministry of External Affairs). Particularly India's bilateral dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir issue has so often led to in full fledged war or proxy war and hostility on the border areas, even as massive terrorist attacks in India (attack in Parliament in 2001 and in Mumbai in 2008) has been a long standing irritant for Indian foreign policy makers.

Thus both the domestic and foreign operational environment conditions Indian foreign policy to a large extent but the degree of prioritizing the influence of one over the other cannot be deduced clearly because the internal and external are closely related. As Rosenau mentions "*Linkage* is the basic unit of analysis which is any recurrent sequence of behaviour that originates in one system and is reacted to in another. *Policy outputs* are defined as those sequences of behaviour that originate within a polity and that either culminate in or are sustained by its environment, whereas *environmental inputs* are considered to be those behavioural sequences in the external environment to which the policy outputs give rise. Similarly *environmental outputs* are those sequences of behaviour that start in the external environment of a polity and that are either sustained or terminated within the polity, whereas *policy inputs* are those behavioural sequences within a polity to which environmental outputs give rise. Some outputs, conventionally called foreign policy, are designed to bring about responses in other systems. These are called *direct policy outputs* or *direct environmental outputs*, depending on whether the intentional behaviour was designated by a polity or its environment or vice-versa". So it is clear that on specific issues specific factors condition the foreign policy making of a country and India is no exception.

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## 1.5 Indian foreign policy-A product of surrounding environment?

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Any discussion on Indian foreign policy to-date used to begin and end with the idea of Non-alignment. This idea is so influential that it has been the running philosophy, the guiding programme and the framework of foreign policy in India. A critical question can about the degree of innovation in the non-alignment policy. More than innovation it is a response, a strategy to the then prevailing bilateral world order. The merit of non-alignment lies in the desire for being independent in foreign policy making. The much talked about Gujral-doctrine of 'non-reciprocity' in neighbourhood foreign policy was within the Nehruvian framework and a response to win over the disturbed neighbourhood at that time. Scholars argue that India has a China policy, an

American policy, a Pakistan policy but no foreign policy at all! A good foreign policy must want to achieve for a country three interrelated things - security, prosperity and prestige. On these yardsticks Indian foreign policy has failed as its security is hampered time and again through infiltration and terrorist attacks, its prosperity is abysmally partial to a section of upper echelons of society and its prestige has got stuck in a largely moral and partly economic power image and not elevated as a political power. In an evolutionary perspective it can be said that Indian foreign policy lacks any long term policy and strategic depth. It is a bunch of adhoc responses addressing the emerging domestic and foreign environment of policy making.

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## 1.6 Summary

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Indian foreign policy has evolved over the years under the impact of its location, shape and size, domestic and foreign operational environment. While the geographical environment is given and static, the domestic and foreign environment is operational and changeable. While geographical location has given a strategic position for formulating Indian foreign policy, the domestic and foreign environment has forced Indian foreign policy makers to constantly change their strategic focus from one country to another, from one region to another. History and tradition, political system, party structure, level of economic development are some of the elements of domestic environment where foreign policy has to operate. On the other side global power equation, changing nature of world order, relationship with major countries, disturbing neighbourhood, nuclear policies and international institutions creates the international environment where Indian foreign policy is to be recognized. Thus while Indian foreign policy has been hailed for its moral posture based on non-alignment it is also criticized for over-emphasizing this position to the extent of becoming redundant to offer new approach and outlook for the present times which have outlived the time for which non-alignment idea was offered. Foreign policy makers aspire to find support in the domestic operational environment and appreciation in the international operational environment. For Indian foreign policy both operational environment has been highly demanding and as a result reduced Indian foreign policy to specific strategies rather than prioritized long term goals.

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## 1.7 Questions

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### Essay type questions

1. Define foreign policy. Identify the changing nature of Indian foreign policy.
2. Analyse critically the geographical factors influencing the making of Indian foreign policy?
3. Explicate the ways in which Indian foreign policy has been conditioned by its operational environment.

### Medium type questions

1. Do you think that Indian foreign policy is innovative. Justify your answer.
2. What are the principal features of the Indian foreign policy.

### Short type questions

1. Identify the problems relating to foreign policy in India
2. Write short notes as—
  - a. Approaches of foreign policy
  - b. 'String of Pearls'

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## 1.8 Suggested Readings

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1. G. Modelsky, *Theory of Foreign Policy*
2. Roy. C. Macridis & Kenneth W. Thompson, *The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy Publication*
3. James. N. Rosenau(ed.) *Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems*, The Free Press, New York, 1969
4. F.S. Northedge (ed) *The Foreign Policies of the Powers*, Faber and Faber, London, 1968  
Joseph Frankel, *The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision Making*, OUP, 1971. Kenneth Waltz, *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics*, Boston, Little Brown, 1967
5. Jayantanuj Banddopadhyaya, *The Making of India's Foreign Policy*, Third Edition, Allied Publishers, New Delhi, 2003

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## Unit 2 □ The Making of India's Foreign Policy

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### Structure

- 2.0 Objectives
- 2.1 Introduction
- 2.2 Foreign Policy making - context and actors with special reference to India
- 2.3 India's foreign policy making - the decision making structures
- 2.4 India's foreign policy making - personalities involved
- 2.6 India's foreign policy making - processes and institutions
- 2.6 Summary
- 2.7 Questions
- 2.8 Suggested Readings

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### 2.1 Objectives

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The present study helps us to know

1. The context and actors of the making of Foreign Policy.
2. The decision making structures of the Foreign Policy.
3. Personalities involved and their contributions in the making of foreign policy in India.
4. Different institutions involved in the making of foreign policy in India.

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### 2.1 Introduction

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Foreign policy of any country has some uniqueness about it. This is primarily because behind the making of foreign policy there are two simultaneous objectives- to achieve success at the international sphere and to achieve consensus at the domestic level. Behind the making of other policies like social, economic, educational, defence etc. the objective is to achieve domestic consensus. These policies are made within the country and for the citizens of that country. Foreign policy on the other hand is made with an eye on its application to other countries, institutions, organizations, groups and individuals beyond its territories. Foreign policy includes foreign trade policy, immigration policy and certainly foreign diplomatic policy. Making of any policy of a country is a political as well as a specialized activity. But in addition to it, foreign policy making is an activity that demands strategic thinking, sophistication, wisdom, intelligence and innovation. Most importantly, mistakes in domestic policy making can be rectified under political pressures by withdrawal of policies or by taking collective responsibility to withdraw from office and face elections. But in foreign policy once a misguided policy is formulated the prestige, stature and position of the country in the international sphere becomes questionable

forever as there is no second attempt in foreign policy. It should be coherent and finalized once and for all.

William Wallace argues that the characteristic which distinguishes *foreign* policy from *domestic* policy is that it is intended to affect, and is limited by, factors outside the national political system as well as within it. Students of foreign policy are all agreed in stressing the importance of the international environment in limiting the choice of alternatives available to policy makers. Studies of domestic politics more often deal with the substance of foreign policy than the process. Foreign policy area is marked by a motivational gap between the citizen and the policy-maker that is not nearly so pronounced in the domestic area. Domestic issues arouse the public and the government alike, but only rarely is the public activated by questions of foreign policy. The implications of this gap are manifold. It means that on most foreign policy issues officials are likely to be far ahead of citizens in terms of their perception, comprehension, and concern. The gap also means that in the foreign policy area officials are confronted with a herculean task of consensus-building whenever they need domestic support for their endeavours abroad. Christopher Hill argues that the relationship between the domestic and the foreign is always in flux; but it is still crucial to our understanding of politics, that is, what has been done, what can be done, and what should be done in inter-state relations.

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## 2.2 Foreign Policy making - context and actors with special reference to India

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According to A. Appadorai, it is useful to use two terms, 'foreign policy' and 'foreign relations', to cover the whole range of the relations of a nation with other nations. The foreign policy is the sum total of the principles, the interests and objectives which a state formulates in conducting its relations with other states. Foreign relations are the actions that a state resorts to in pursuance of the foreign policy formulated, such as declaration of war, conclusion of peace, the signing of treaty, giving or accepting aid, recognition of a state, establishment of diplomatic relations, and carrying on negotiations.

'Foreign policy phenomenon' one writer concludes 'are the unwanted stepchildren of political systems'. Looked at as an aspect of domestic politics, foreign policy may usually be seen as an 'issue area' characterized in developed states, like other issue areas, by a distinctive set of values at stake and by distinctive institutions, actors and roles. The domestic process of foreign policy, then, constitutes a distinctive area, follows a distinctive pattern, and involves a distinctive set of actors playing distinctive roles. But it *is* a political process; and the participants in the process are drawn from a wider circle than the executive alone.

By foreign policy as an issue area Rosenau means all the controversies within a society that, at any moment in time, are being waged over the way in which the society is attempting to maintain or alter its external environment. The attempt to exercise control over the environment constitute "foreign policy", whereas the controversies engendered by the attempts (or lack of them) comprise the "issue-area". Once the attempt is no longer controversial, either because it

comes to be accepted or because changes in the external environment allow it to be modified or abandoned, then the issue-area is diminished accordingly. Contrariwise, new issues are considered to enter the area whenever developments in the environment occasion controversy within the society over how it should react. Foreign policies are regarded as issues within the area only if the controversy over them persists and extends to major segments of the society's governmental organization or to segments of its public. In other words the focus is on national political systems and not on international systems. One is interested in the processes through which national systems undertake to cope with their external environment and not in the process which transpire in the environment.

In India the foreign policy making is done in the context of a highly politicized domestic environment where with the change of government all policies are changed in general. While the change in mood after elections and expectations from new government makes such policy shifts acceptable to a large extent in the domestic sphere, the international political system do not expect a total shift of a country's foreign policy rather continuity and change is the maxim. In India although formally the making of foreign policy is scheduled at the hands of Ministry of External Affairs but in reality the External Affairs Minister cannot go beyond the policy framework of the government that in turn is dictated by the political party in power which has a general inclination to reverse or reorient policies drastically of the previous government/party in power. This was seen in cold war period between the Congress government and the Janata government regarding approach to United States and the then Soviet Union. But due to the exigencies of the post cold war world order, between various governments in India foreign policy directions was not reoriented drastically. The Look East policy, neo-liberal market economy, Asian solidarity, engagements with all major powers - the general foreign policy guidelines of the first post cold war period Congress government was followed to a large extent by the successive governments.

So while the important context for foreign policy making in India is the contemporary nature of the world order, the actors involved in this policy making range from the inter-ministerial institutions like the PMO (Prime Minister's Office), National Security institutions and intelligence agencies; processes like the electoral process and its influence as well as the role of media in setting the tone of domestic political process, decision making structure of Ministry of External Affairs and most importantly the personality of various Prime Ministers in office.

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### **2.3 India's foreign policy making-the decision making structures**

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In the words of Professor Jayanatanuja Bandopadhyay, "in a parliamentary democracy foreign policy like domestic policy is the prerogative of political executive. The Foreign Office, like other departments of government, is primarily responsible for carrying out the directives of the former. But on account of the far-flung and highly complex nature of foreign policy in modern world, the Foreign Office has to perform a much greater informative and advisory role vis-a-vis the political executive than any other department....In 1947 the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations came into existence through the amalgamation of the

Departments of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations...In 1949 the appendage "Commonwealth Relations" was dropped and the Ministry of External Affairs in its present form was thus born."

The decision making of foreign policy takes place in the Ministry of External Affairs headed by the Minister of External Affairs. The Ministry of External Affairs is largely located in South Block, a building that also houses the Prime Minister's Office and the Ministry of Defence built on the top of the Raisina Hill in New Delhi. Next in the hierarchy of the Minister of External Affairs during the Nehru era was the Secretary-General. When, after Nehru's death, Lal Bahadur Shastri became Prime Minister and appointed Sardar Swaran Singh as whole time Foreign Minister in 1964, the post of Secretary General was considered redundant and subsequently abolished. Since then the Foreign Secretary has been the head of the Foreign Office.

The decision making structure in the making of foreign policy is the structure of the Ministry of External Affairs as a whole. The hierarchy at the Ministry of External Affairs includes the following stages: Under Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Director, Joint Secretary, Additional Secretary and Secretary. At the head of the Ministry of External Affairs in the political executive, consist of the Minister of External Affairs (at present in 2014 is Sushma Swaraj) and the Minister of State for External Affairs (at present in 2014 is Gen. V.K. Singh). Below the level of the political executive is the bureaucratic structure of the Foreign Office headed by the Foreign Secretary (at present in 2014 is Sujatha Singh) whose status is that of first among equals among Secretaries. In 2014 there are four Secretaries including the Foreign Secretary in the form of Secretary [West - (Navtej Singh Sharma)], Secretary [Economic Relations(ER) and Development Partnership Administration(DPA) - Sujata Mehta], Secretary [East - (Anil Wadhwa)]. Below the four (4) Secretaries there are three (3) Additional Secretaries, namely Additional Secretary(IO), Additional Secretary as Chief Coordinator of Indo-Africa Forum Summit, Additional Secretary as Financial Advisor. In the rank of Additional Secretaries there is one Special Secretary, namely Special Secretary (Americas). Earlier the number of Secretaries and Additional Secretaries were five each but now it has been reduced and diversified. In a descending order of status there are a large number of Joint Secretaries and Head of Divisions. The divisions are in turn of two specific varieties - 'specialized and support divisions' like Administrative, Security, Economic and 'territorial divisions' like Africa, East Asia, Europe. The main source of information regarding happenings in foreign states and other international developments at the disposal of the Ministry of External Affairs is the large network of Missions and Posts maintained by it abroad. The Foreign office at the capital which controls the administration and supervises the work of the Missions and Posts represents a two way transmission between the latter and the Foreign Minister and the Cabinet. At home, Ministry of External Affairs is responsible for all aspects of external relations. Territorial divisions deal with bilateral political and economic work while functional divisions look after policy planning, multilateral organizations, regional groupings, legal matters, disarmament, protocol, consular, Indian Diaspora, press and publicity, administration and other aspects.

The decision making structure of Indian foreign policy also involves the staffs of Indian



Foreign Service. In recent years, the intake into the Indian Foreign Service has averaged between 8-15 persons annually. The present cadre strength of the service stands at approximately 600 officers manning around 162 Indian missions and posts abroad and the various posts in the Ministry at home. As the Pillai Committee on Indian Foreign Service rightly observed, "It is a primary duty of the Foreign Service to maintain a continuous supply of information to the Ministry of External Affairs by means of accurate and perceptive reports on current events and discernable trends over the entire range of our interests....and needs to be supplemented by interpretative analysis and by advice as to a change or modification of policy which may appear warranted by the situation."

An important part of the decision making structure through which the decisions are transmitted to the public is the office of the Official Spokesperson and Joint Secretary (External Publicity) which is the interface of the Ministry of External Affairs with the media. There is in 2014 Syed Akbaruddin as the Official spokesperson and the Joint Secretary followed by one (1) Director, one(1)Deputy Secretary, two(2) Under-Secretaries, two(2) Officers on Special Duty, and eight(8) Publicity Officers.

Through this layered hierarchical decision making structure of Indian foreign policy political diplomacy, economic and cultural diplomacy propaganda or external publicity, policy and personnel planning are carried out.

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## **2.4 India's foreign policy making – Personalities involved**

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In any parliamentary political system like India due to collective responsibility of the cabinet the Prime Minister leads the government and becomes the first-among equals and becomes the ultimate decision maker. Jayantanuja Bandopadhyay argues that "the personalities of the ultimate decision makers are a major casual variable in the system and process of decision making in foreign policy. Their leadership qualities, behavioural traits and above all their need for political survival and consolidation of power inevitably influence the formulation and implementation of foreign policy." Formally the personalities involved in the making of foreign policy in India are the Minister of External Affairs and the Foreign Secretary but it is the Prime Minister who charts the direction and framework for foreign policy making and hence it is the Prime Minister whose personality needs to be looked at a greater detail. However one thing must be borne in mind. The Prime Minister is the product of the political system, i.e. the support he/she gets through electoral mandate also conditions the reflection of his/her true personal traits in the making of the policies of the government. Important thing to notice is that for the international community the government of a country is known by the name of the Prime Minister like Nehru government, Indira government or Modi government. So the personalities of Indian Prime Ministers and their reflection on foreign policy making is an interesting reading.

Indian foreign policy was architected by Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister and External Affairs Minister of independent India. Nehru had done serious thinking on the draft of independent India's foreign policy during the time of the Interim Government in 1946-47. Nehru's

ideological thinking ranged from Fabian socialism to socialism and communism to Gandhian non violence. A devout nationalist freedom fighter and lover of the tradition and culture of his own society, particularly his deep knowledge of Indian philosophy made Nehru at the same time deeply committed internationalist, and visualized a unified mankind in a cooperative international order. Nehru defined idealism as the 'realism of tomorrow' and maintained that foreign policy ought to be approached in a spirit of 'realism'. Nehru's intellect, philosophical and ideological flexibility, oratory and argumentative skills made him to take a firm grip on the making of foreign policy of the country. Nehru was votary of peace, of independence from foreign yolk particularly economically and for Asian solidarity. Nehru marked his and India's moral footprint in the history of world foreign policy making through his idea of nonalignment. During Nehru's tenure the defeat in 1962 China war made him to realize at the end of his life that India prioritizing nonalignment was living in an artificial world in this modern world order.

The kind of personality that Indira Gandhi had developed made it more or less inevitable that the socialist rhetoric that she acquired in her youth (in close association with her father Pandit Nehru) would be used by her mainly as an instrument for her own political survival and the consolidation of her own political power. With the help of this rhetoric she obtained the crucial support of most of the leftist forces in the country during the critical early phase of her Prime Ministership, secured majority within the Congress during the split of 1969, rationalized the increasing anti-American and pro-Soviet orientation of her foreign policy. In the desperate situation of 1971 with Chinese warnings for not getting involved in liberation of East Pakistan and USA's bonhomie with West Pakistan, India went ahead with Indo-Soviet friendship Treaty, a historical and strategic necessity of the time reflecting Indira Gandhi's personality and political style. In tune with her diplomatic maneuvering skills, generally authoritarian political style and built in sense of insecurity, Indira Gandhi led the strategic thinking in military intervention to free Bangladesh and sudden announcement of unilateral ceasefire to prevent internationalization of the issue, the 1974 nuclear tests to strengthen Indian military capability in the face of dual pressure of USA and Soviet Union, Sikkim's merger to India and frequent change of Foreign Ministers.

Rajiv Gandhi's inexperience, immaturity and authoritarian style in handling political power (due to lack of confidence for suddenly stepping as Prime Minister of India after his mother Indira Gandhi's untimely tragic death) got reflected in his foreign policy directions and decisions in several cases - frequent reshuffling of his Cabinet and Foreign Ministers without any valid reasons, his exclusive handling of military exercise Operation Brasstacks without much communication with Pakistan resulting in a war like situation, military intervention in Sri Lanka civil war in favour of the government and against the people of Indian origin, projection of power through military involvement in Maldives, his futile attempt to go along with talks with Pakistan without much result (Benezir Bhutto even after several rounds of talk supported the *jihad* of Kashmiri people).

P.V. Narasimha Rao confronted the post cold war order with his soft personality, pragmatic knowledge of politics (experienced veteran Congressman) and timely decision making ability. With these traits Rao opened Indian economy, concentrated on development of Indo-US relations.

and kept India important in changing world. I.K. Gujral as a seasoned diplomat, wide knowledge of foreign affairs and with Nehruvian lineage, first as foreign minister and then as Prime Minister tried to settle much neglected area of neighbor relationship in South Asia with unilateral step.

Atal Behari Vajpayee was a well read man with knowledge of Indian culture and civilization but at the same time was an ardent follower of the Sangh parivar with ultra-Hindu nationalism. With such a diverse personality having two contradictory elements - knowledge (reflected in his strategic move to strengthen Indo-US friendship) and loyalty (reflected in two things - (a) close associates like Brajesh Mishra was both National Security Advisor and Principal Secretary to Prime Minister, (b) in line with RSS reflected hatred to Muslim community), Vajpayee made many interesting decisions in foreign policy scene. Winning Kargil war, nuclear explosions Pokhran-II, Agra Summit and Lahore Bus diplomacy was part of that contradiction - threat and friendly gesture together.

Manmohan Singh, the noted economist, was the longest serving Prime Minister at a stretch after Nehru. 'The Accidental Prime Minister', as he is now popularly designated (thanks to the title of Sanjay Baru's book), Manmohan Singh was a gentlemen per excellence having high academic acclaims and deep loyalty of his Party (Congress) to the extent of being dictated by the Party President and publicly overruled by Party Vice President. With Montek Singh Aluwahila as his close economic advisor, Manmohan Singh truly liberalized Indian foreign policy with economic openness to the extent of allowing FDI in retail sectors, going ahead with treaty with United States (Indo-US Nuclear Treaty) at the face of stern opposition at domestic sphere and made India a true 'trading state' by making India party to most multilateral forums. But as his personal trait, India under his leadership was having a gigantic presence in world affairs but with no real political role.

In May 2014 Narendra Modi became the Prime Minister. His strong personality, rootedness in Indian society and culture, experience leadership qualities for more than ten years as Chief Minister created lot of expectation from him in domestic policies but not so much in foreign policy. However it is in foreign policy the Modi has started to surprise all by inviting SAARC premiers to be present in his sworn-in ceremony, choosing Bhutan and Nepal as first destination as Prime Minister, giving final warning to Pakistan to opt for shedding diplomatic ties or supporting separatism in Kashmir, through silent strong messages to China and United States by trying to build alternative network in the form of developing BRICS and building friendly SAARC environment.

Indian foreign policy making was done under the leadership of varying personalities - idealist humanist Jawaharlal Nehru, authoritative Indira Gandhi, inexperienced and non-visionary Rajiv Gandhi, soft pragmatic Narasimha Rao, sensible Gujral, realist and strategic Vajpayee, loyal Manmohan Singh and prudent Modi. As a result Indian foreign policy directions were diverse and interesting.

## 2.5 India's foreign policy making - processes and institutions

Foreign policy making in any country involves some stages - the context (foreign and domestic environment), the actors (the personalities who frames and implements) and the mechanism (process and institution). The foreign policy decisions are arrived at after several rounds of thinking - strategic and informative. So the decision is a process and the spheres of the process are inter-ministerial institutions involved. There are two major inter-ministerial institutions which play a major role in India's foreign policy making - Prime Minister's Office which grew out of the older Prime Minister's Secretariat. It was given its present name by Morarji Desai when he became Prime Minister in 1977 and replaced the PMS. Mildly present during Nehru's time PMS was raised to great stature under Indira Gandhi, ebbed with less power and got renamed under Morarji Desai and after that slowly and gradually became powerful, the most under Rajiv Gandhi. The steady growth in the power of the PMO with regard to the making and implementation of foreign policy under Atal Behari Vajpayee, even bypassed the Ministry of External Affairs. With the UPA government, the MEA has been made powerful than the PMO in matters of foreign relations much to the credit of the External Affairs Minister like Natwar Singh, Pranab Mukherjee, Anandlal Sharma and Foreign Secretaries like Ranen Sen, Shiv Sankar Menon, Shyam Saran and others. However with Modi government in place the trend may get reversed given the stature and personality of Prime Minister Modi to deal everything by his thumbnail. The balance between PMO and MEA depends on the strength of the government and personality of the Prime Minister.

The other relatively new inter-Ministerial institution which has a bearing on foreign policy is the National Security Council (NSC). Although it had been technically set up first by Prime Minister V.P. Singh in 1990, it was launched with vigour and strength by the NDA government in 1998 and the Joint Intelligence Committee which used to be the apex body of intelligence set-up was converted into the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS). The NSC is chaired by the Prime Minister and Defense, Finance and External Affairs Ministers and Deputy Chairman of Planning Commission (but with Modi government's decision to abolish Planning Commission this member will not be there henceforth) are its other members. NSC comprises the Strategic Policy Group, the National Security Advisory Board and a Secretariat represented by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). It was run with much fanfare during the NDA and UPA government but the assault on Indian security like plane hijacking in 1998, attack on Parliament in 2001 and the gruesome terrorist attack in Mumbai in 2008 orchestrated remotely by ISI in Pakistan placed the relevance this NSC under critical scrutiny. It was criticized as a non-functional body. In addition, India's elaborate intelligence organization has a crucial role to play in the making of India's foreign policy. Still India has a National Security Advisor (NSA) and presently it is Ajit Kumar Doval.

In India the Intelligence Bureau (IB) of the Ministry of Home Affairs was for many years responsible for both domestic and foreign intelligence. In 1967 Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) emerged as the sole provider of information about external developments. The primary mission of RAW includes aggressive intelligence collection via espionage, psychological warfare, subversion,

sabotage and assassinations. RAW has been active in obtaining information and operating through third countries like Afghanistan, the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, Myanmar and Singapore. RAW obtains information critical to Indian strategic interests both by overt and covert means. The data is then classified and filed with the assistance of the computer networks. International business houses, information technology sector and media centres can easily absorb RAW operatives and provide freedom of movement. A task force report prepared by a New Delhi based security think tank highlighted that RAW operatives have inadequate non-official cover for overseas operations. Nonetheless, the swift overnight operation of India's border security forces in dismantling terrorist camps close to India-Myanmar border owes a lot to inputs from RAW and other allied agencies.

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## 2.6 Summary

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The making of Indian foreign policy is a political process that gets reflected in the keen interest that Prime Ministers take in foreign policy decisions to reflect their personal capacity to deal with various countries and their eagerness to extend that control to the Ministry of External Affairs sometime through the PMO and at other times through the NSC. With a large and detailed hierarchical structure of foreign policy decision making as seen in the MEA, and a well coordinated set of Indian Foreign Service personnel, the foreign policy making process is cumbersome but at the same time it has the potential to produce more flawless foreign policies through repeated checking and analysis. One can say that while in personalities Nehru stands tall with his moral and innovative foreign policy directions, in institutions and process of foreign policy decision making it is the MEA that matters most.

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## 2.7 Questions

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### Essay type questions

1. Identify and analyse the functions of major actors in the making of Indian foreign policy.
2. Attempt a detailed evaluation of the functioning of the institutions of foreign policy making.

### Medium type questions

1. Describe in detail the decision-making structure of Indian foreign policy.
2. Analyse critically the role played by different personalities in the making of Indian foreign policy.

### Short types questions

1. Write the recommendations of the Pillai Committee.
2. Write short notes on :
  - a. Look East policy
  - b. Prime Ministers Office and Foreign Policy of India.

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## 2.8 Suggested Readings

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1. William Wallace, *Foreign Policy and the Political Process*, Macmillan, London, 1971
2. Rosenau, James. N., ed. (1967): *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy*, Free Press, New York A. Appadorai, *The Domestic Roots of India's Foreign Policy*, 1978
3. Jayantanuj Baddopadhyaya, *The Making of India's Foreign Policy*, Third Edition, Allied Publishers, New Delhi, 2003.

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## **Unit 3 □ The Evolution of India's Foreign Policy**

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### **Structure**

- 3.0 Objectives**
- 3.1 Introduction**
- 3.2 India's foreign policy - an evolutionary perspective**
- 3.3 India's foreign policy -the foundational principles**
- 3.4 Non-alignment and India's foreign policy**
- 3.5 Critical estimate of non alignment in Indian foreign policy**
- 3.6 Summary**
- 3.7 Questions**
- 3.8 Suggested Readings**

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### **3.0 Objectives**

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This Unit Seeks to explore the following:

1. How foreign policy evolved in India over the years.
2. The underlying principles of India's foreign policy.
3. NAM as one of the basic feature of foreign policy.
4. A critical assessment of NAM.

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### **3.1 Introduction**

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Foreign policy of a state is said to be rooted in its national interest. National interest may be defined in materialist terms such as preserving a country's territorial integrity or promoting its economic well-being or continuously expanding the state's power base as the Realists would have it. But according to some scholars the term also accommodates a set of values or an array of principles which provide the framework for the pursuit of a more down-to-earth national objective. India attained independence in 1947 and became part of the international comity of sovereign nations. There has been a certain visible consistency in India's foreign policy since the time it became independent. However owing to the changes both on the national and international front, India's foreign policy has been adapting and adjusting as well. In the opinion of Baladas Ghosal, independence as one of the goals of a country's foreign policy does not mean protection of one's sovereignty or territorial integrity and survival of the state only, but it also means avoidance of dependence and a government's ability to exercise its autonomy in the determination of its own policy. In certain cases it also means restoration of rightful place and natural position in regional and global leadership. Jayantanuja Bandopadhyay mention that

democratic socialism was the ideology of the Indian freedom movement, the Indian National Congress which was in power for nearly four decades after independence, and particularly Jawaharlal Nehru, the main architect of India's foreign policy. The major resolutions of the Congress on foreign affairs were all drafted and piloted by him. In the Interim Government of 1946-47, as well as afterwards, he was in charge of External Affairs. As early as 1947 he said, for example: "Whatever policy we may lay down, the art of conducting the foreign affairs of a country lay in finding out what is most advantageous to the country. We may talk about peace and goodwill and mean what we say. But in the ultimate analysis, a government functions for the good of the country it governs and no government dare do anything which in the short or long run is manifestly to the disadvantage of that country. Therefore, whether a state is imperialist or socialist or communist, its Foreign Minister thinks primarily of the interests of that country." Nehru attempted to present a synthesis of idealism and realism in Indian foreign policy when he said, "we propose to look after India's interest in the context of world cooperation and world peace, in so far as world peace can be preserved." Indian foreign policy has been in favour of world peace and a humane and just world order free of inequality -both economic and political.

### **3.2 India's foreign policy - an evolutionary perspective**

India's international relations highlights the notable imprint of its past that India had opened up through trade and other cultural exchanges over centuries and also importing ideas like peaceful co existence. Such historical linkages have made India 'a naturally prominent, if not yet a central actor in international relation'. Post independence, India made all out efforts to work with other developing nations while avoiding the divisive designs of cold war bipolarity. Non-alignment as a doctrine and as a movement cemented this relationship, to a great extent.

The early 1990s constituted a watershed in international relations in several senses (unipolar world, disintegration of Soviet Union and loss of a long standing ally, economic globalization) which confronted India with a new strategic environment demanding fresh policy initiatives. Domestically, the earlier one party majority government gave way to the era of coalitions in India even at national level and their potential implications for the field of foreign relations still remained uncertain. The shifts in Indian policy to structure her economy from the search for an autonomous economic policy( 1947-66) to a toxic mix of autocracy and socialism (1966-90) to reforms, globalization and growing interdependence (1990 onwards) focusing on India's aid imperative and in turn India's own contemporary foreign aid programme in her immediate neighbourhood and mostly in Africa. The economic challenges facing Indian foreign policy relate to energy and food security, unpredictable economic consequences of manifest instability in Middle East, China's accelerated economic growth, domestic rural-urban disparities and falling public delivery system, local consequences of global warming and climate change.

India gained considerable credit in the G-20 during the 2008-9 economic crises with more creativity and calculated risk-taking and thus India's economy provides an opportunity for new beginnings in Indian foreign policy. In the present multipolar world India is seen as an 'emerged



power' with its 'emerging' role receding to the background. India is increasingly becoming a 'busy' player in international networks of political and economic dimensions. The changing global order necessitated paradigmatic changes in Indian foreign policy without affecting India's national interest. Much of the current dynamism in India's recent foreign policy can be attributed to the consequences of India's economic reform since 1991. The heated domestic political debate on India's foreign policy today is less about the technical details of specific issues, and more about the painful process of adapting to new situation heralded by globalization, recession in the capitalist world, rise of global terrorism, climate change and human rights violation. Indian foreign policy in an evolutionary perspective is a journey from nonalignment to multiple alignments, from economic isolationism to economic engagement, from a reactive foreign policy to a proactive foreign policy and from a fixed philosophical framework of policy to ad hoc strategic policy decisions.

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### **3.3 India's foreign policy -the foundational principles**

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India from the very outset made a conscious effort to keep its foreign policy choices anchored in certain guiding principles which included non alignment, opposition to colonialism, imperialism and racialism; peaceful coexistence, disarmament and engagement with the United Nations. All these principles arguably bore the personal stamp of the ideological beliefs and functional style of India's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru who is credited with being the architect this normative edifice.

Non-alignment is a significant feature of India's foreign policy. At the time of India's independence, the world was divided into two camps headed by two superpowers namely the Soviet Union and the United States. India chose to keep away from both of them. The adoption of this policy has not in any way hampered India's friendly cooperation with other countries. It has also not prevented India from taking an unbiased view of the various political events. Through this policy India has not only kept the option open to develop its relation with various countries but also was able to secure all types of aids from countries. So influential has been this policy that most of the countries of Asia and Africa after attaining independence preferred to adopt it.

India bore the brunt of British colonialism for nearly two hundred years which largely accounted for its impoverished and backward state at the time of independence. On attaining freedom, therefore it extended persistent support to national liberation movement across Asia, Africa and Latin America and used the United Nations and other international bodies for championing the cause of anti-imperialist struggle. In this connection Nehru's decision to obtain Indian membership of the British Commonwealth raised a storm of protest but probably this move was to buy security in the then turbulent world for India without being a part of entangling alliances. After the disappearance of traditional colonialism and imperialism, there emerged neo-colonialism and India continued to support struggles against it as well. It strongly supported the demand for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and also sought to promote cooperation

among the developing countries so that they could withstand the pressure of neocolonialism.

India's opposition to racial discrimination or apartheid in any form was no less complementary to its anti-imperialist stance than its dedication to the ideal of universal brotherhood. India was the first country to raise the issue at UN arguing that it contravened the principles of the UN Charter and Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Thus the end of apartheid regime in South Africa in early 1990s must have been a moment of triumph for Indian foreign policy as well. In subsequent years, India took up the cause of the Blacks in the United States and African population of Rhodesia. Some national and international celebrities like Shilpa Shetty, Salman Rushdie and Kiran Desai revealed that they encountered situations of overt or covert racial assaults abroad which underscore the continuing relevance of the anti-racial plank of India's foreign policy.

Along with the adoption of the policy of non-alignment, India tried to promote the spirit of cooperation and peaceful coexistence among the states professing different ideologies. It developed an intimate relationship with China, Nepal, Yugoslavia and Egypt. Nehru's emphasis on promotion of world peace found expression in the Panchsheel (or the five principles), - mutual respect for territorial integrity or sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in domestic affairs of another country, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence. These were formulated by Nehru in the context of Tibetan crisis between India and China in 1954 but their long term roots lay in the time tested India's religious tradition and cultural values for goodwill and tolerance to all religions (sarva-dharma samabhava). These tenets of peaceful coexistence and cooperation for peaceful and amicable settlement of all international questions continue to act as the guiding stars of Indian foreign policy in the new millennium. The considerable restraint exhibited by India's policy makers following the grisly terror attacks - evidently masterminded from Pakistani soil in Mumbai in late 2008 may be cited as its most recent instance.

India as a peace loving country has shown a great faith in the United Nations by extending support to the UN actions and Indian troops have played active role in peacekeeping operations in Middle East, Cyprus, Congo and Zaire. Apart from promoting peace through the UN, India has actively participated in the various programmes initiated by its agencies like ILO, UNESCO, UNICEF, etc. Ever since the early 1990s India has been making though unsuccessfully so far a strong bid for its inclusion as a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

India has all along been a genuine supporter of disarmament for two different reasons. First, India regards disarmament as important to end prevailing international tension. Second, it prevents unproductive expenditure on arms, releasing resources that can be used for development and improvement of socio-economic condition of the people. Thus India has lent support to various efforts of UN and other international agencies in favour of disarmament and arms control agreements.

In analyzing the foundational principles of Indian foreign policy the point is not that these principles, formulated more than sixty years back, are in any way fixed or unchanging. Rather the point is that this value matrix continues to furnish important keys to understanding and analyzing India's foreign policy even in the twenty-first century.

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### 3.4 Non-alignment and India's foreign policy

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Nonalignment was Prime Minister Nehru's sterling contribution towards an autonomous and independent foreign policy. For him, India's primary concern in the international arena was to consolidate its newly earned freedom and keep open its options in foreign policy. As the heir to a great civilizational heritage, it had every right to speak its own voice. Its huge size of subcontinent proportions also ruled out any assumption of client status in international relations. But this did not imply a posture of neutrality, i.e. a policy of indifference or passivity to the external world, as was followed by the United States in the nineteenth century. Rather it called for rising above the compulsions of a polarized global order and asserting independent judgment consistent with the country's national interest. "Nonalignment", Nehru explained, "means not tying yourself with military blocs of nations or with a nation. It means trying to view things as far as possible not from the military point of view though this has to come in sometimes, but independently and trying to maintain friendly relations with all countries." How decisive Nehru's determination to remain ideologically independent - in a world torn into two vast and ideologically opposed blocs - was for the policy of nonalignment can best be understood from the following observation of Nehru in Indian parliament in 1955: "The world seems to be divided into two mighty camps.... We have chosen our path and we propose to go along it, and to vary it as and when we chose, not at somebody's dictate or pressure... Our thinking and our approach do not fit in with this great crusade of communism or crusade of anti-communism."

The immediate backdrop of formulation of the nonalignment principle was the division of the world into two hostile power blocs after World War II, one led by the USA and western powers and the other dominated by Soviet Union in the context of the Cold War. Nehru felt that development and deliverance from poverty and backwardness constituted the primary object of a newly independent country. Becoming member of a power bloc would mean getting drawn into the struggles between the major powers, a sure recipe for the deviation from the basic objective of fighting poverty, illiteracy and hunger. Thus Nehru turned into a staunch critic of all alliances including the Baghdad pact, Manila Treaty, SEATO or CENTO which he regarded as detrimental to India's national interest. But staying out of military blocs, as already mentioned, did not imply passivity or neutrality; it stood for freedom to decide each issue on its merits, to weigh what was right or wrong and then take a stand in favour of the right. That the policy of nonalignment was closely related to the domestic milieu was obvious to Nehru who explained this relationship in 1960 in the following words - "The internal policy and foreign policy of a country affect each other. They should, broadly be in line with each other, and have to be integrated. By and large, there has been in India an attempt at this integration." The bulk of the Indian people would have regarded an alliance with either of the two power blocs as a betrayal of Indian freedom movement and as the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of a democratic state Nehru could not afford to ignore this basic fact. At the same time, nonalignment helped the process of state-building in India by harmonizing and stabilizing the diverse political forces in the country, in addition to helping the process of economic development. Nehru disclaimed any

personal credit for the policy of nonalignment. In his own words: "It is completely incorrect to call our policy 'Nehru's policy'. It is incorrect because all that I have done is to give voice to the policy. I have not originated it. It is a policy inherent in the circumstances of India, inherent in the past thinking of India, inherent in the whole mental outlook of India, inherent in the conditioning of the Indian mind during our struggle for freedom, and inherent in the circumstances of world today. I come in by the mere accidental fact that during these few years I have represented that policy as Foreign Minister..."

A major function of nonalignment was promotion of New Delhi's economic interests: by not tying India to any one bloc, the principle enabled it to develop economic ties with the countries of both sides of the divide as and when needed. It was possible to procure capital and technology, machines and food from the western countries. India also relied especially after 1954, on the Soviet Union for building up her public sector industries. Similarly, for military equipment too, India cast its net far and wide across the Cold War divide which ensured that excessive dependence on any one country was avoided and better bargains could be struck since potential partners knew that rivals existed. Finally though nonalignment was theoretically opposed to bloc formation, its inexorable logic led to the birth and consolidation of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) which brought about a hitherto unprecedented solidarity among the Third World states with India perceived to be their natural leader. For these developing countries, NAM was endorsement of the principle of maximum national autonomy in foreign policy which enabled them on the one hand to act as a buffer between the two military blocs and to concentrate on the other hand on socio-economic development on the domestic front. India on her part from the 1950s to the 1990s carved a niche for herself as a leader of the Third World and other developing nations, commensurate with its obligations towards the UN and the NAM.

India's approach to NAM has undergone a considerable shift since the 1970s. At that time the question of developing India was how to secure technological progress and economic cooperation, together with securing a progressive political base with a Southern alliance. While there is no doubt that the NAM platform and India's early leadership provided an opportunity for India to enhance its global political influence beyond its contested regional one, as well as enabling it to obtain political support for national progress, the role of NAM was somewhat limited on the front of economic and technological development. Strong internal contradictions in the 1970s, gradual liberalisation in the 1980s, and opening up in the 1990s had further propelled a new consolidation of upper class interests in India to seek new alliances with the Triad (the US, the EU, and Japan), as well as cooperation to help resolve its internal and external contradictions. The shift is evident in the Indian influence on the decision-making of NAM and its increasingly moderating and conservative influence. Thus, in 1979, it opposed the Cuban proposal of a linkage of NAM with its natural ally, socialism; in 1989, it was the leader in the formation of G 15 for cooperation on economic development with the West; in 1992 it opposed the Malaysian proposal to boycott the West over the iniquities of the international economy; and in 2007 it negotiated a nuclear treaty with the United States, issued a joint statement on the relevance of NAM, entered the G 20, and later agreed with the G 20 measures in response to the financial crises of the last decade.

Foreign policy of every country aspires to be autonomous and independent and nonalignment was the method by which Indian foreign policy was able to achieve that in the cold war period. In this period whenever the government in power entered into agreement with some countries the policy of nonalignment was reiterated to set the policy course right by entering into agreement with some other countries as well (Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971 was balanced by Indo-US Treaty of 1977). In the post cold war period the bonhomie between India and United States was criticized by citing the history of India's nonalignment policy. In the evolution of Indian foreign policy nonalignment acted as a referee to 'discipline' any deviations/tilt in foreign policy.

### **3.5 Critical estimate of nonalignment in Indian foreign policy**

The end of Cold War in early 1990s created obstacles for the nonalignment movement as some countries were not quite sure about the future direction of NAM in terms of its strategy and long term viability. Critics of nonalignment argued that the group also included countries that openly allied with Soviet Union, such as Cuba. Nehru was also faulted for being too idealistic and devoid of realism and not quite pragmatic in securing India's national interests. It is also mentioned in some quarters that NAM is dead and it has no relevance in post cold war period. In reply to this criticism, it must be borne in mind that NAM is both a strategy and a movement. While as a foreign policy strategy it may be outdated with the arrival of a unipolar world, as a movement for a just and humane world it is more relevant now than ever before after the financial crisis of 2008 highlighting the fatigue of late capitalism.

According to Jayantanuja Bandopadhyay, there is no reason for NAM to lose its relevance or to dilute its activities in the new international system dominated by the USA and its allies. It can still play a major role in international relations in at least three important ways. In the first place, it can be a major international forum for counter hegemonic resistance against the western powers on the part of the Third World states. Secondly, it can spearhead the movement of the Third World states for the restructuring of international economic relations along with such other Third World forums such as G-77. Finally, it can take initiative both inside the UN General Assembly and outside, to organize an international movement for the democratization of UN and empowerment of the Third World states within the UN system. "The nonalignment movement", says Jayantanuja Bandopadhyay, "should therefore remain a long term instrument of India's foreign policy, both for preservation and promotion of India's national interests, and for promoting the common global economic and political objectives of the Third World."

In the new millennium, the task for a nonaligned country like India is manifold which are as follows: - (a) the nonalignment movement must give meaning and substance to the notion of political sovereignty through true economic sovereignty (b) continuous struggle against domination, exploitation, war, poverty, illiteracy, subjugation of women (c) struggle for the establishment of a balanced system of international economic relations (d) call for a revolution of a different kind - to enable those who remained marginalized at the bottom to avail opportunities promised by the Millennium Goals of the UN. Recent shifts in the NAM proposals on its role and strategy in the new world order open up distinct possibilities for the renewal of a Southern Front. Its condemnation of the imperialist strategy of the United States at the Kuala Lumpur meeting and the subsequent

gravitation of the NAM on a stronger footing, which could now propel a positive agenda for the renewal of South-South solidarity especially while reopening the WTO Doha Round.

In the new millennium it is not difficult to locate an urge on New Delhi's part to find a place among nations who count most in world affairs, i.e. an aspiration to major power status. This aspiration is clearly different from the subjective desire for global leadership expressed during the early years of the Nehru regime or the moral superiority claimed throughout the Cold War period. This is a period of multipolar world and particularly in the vicinity of Indian neighbourhood surrounding Indian Ocean it is a bipolar balance between China and United States. This is a situation which is referred by some as a 'new Cold War' between China and US that necessitated a 'new NAM' and also a new nonaligned policy for India to pursue. It is through the positive neutral role through nonalignment that India can balance both US and China with its engagement with various countries and organizations across the globe.

India's move from moral high ground of non-alignment, third world leadership to adjust to a new post-cold war order by exploring alternative policies to rise like in its demand for restructuring of UN Security Council and a more confident India shifted from universalism to individualism cementing a place in 2004 in a small high-powered group at the WTO called the Five Interested Parties - along with the USA, the EU, Brazil and Australia. Backed by new global philosophy of 'cooperative pluralism' India is seen to play a positive role in issue like climate change and having new diplomacy in new forums (G 20) like finance diplomacy. However Malone mentions that India's table manners in these multilateral bodies are constrained by the pulls of domestic politics. While other countries are not immune to the push and pull of domestic politics, India's challenge remains that it has not yet developed a habit of conciliating domestic pressures with a results-oriented stance in some multilateral institutions. Being an honest reader of Indian foreign policy, Malone tries to understand 'What kind of a world power, with what aims, and in partnership with what others, will India seek to be?' and concludes that some of what was impossible for India in the 1950s is on offer today, for example, a seat at the high table of international financial and economic diplomacy. Given the recent splintering of international relations into a genuinely multipolar system, India will likely organize its multilateral and even some of its bilateral diplomacy in years ahead through issue-driven ad hoc coalitions and in some cases evanescent groupings of countries. Its re-emergence, particularly if it manages its significant domestic challenges with success, will be one of major shifts of the twenty-first century.

A critical evaluation of nonalignment in Indian foreign policy should not relegate nonalignment to the background as a policy suited to yesteryears' bipolar world order. Nonalignment policy must be understood in a strategic and positive way as a method for connectivity without entanglement. It is the prime task for Indian policy makers to propagate the new meaning of nonalignment in the present context to create a domestic consensus for such a policy as was during the period of Nehru for a nonaligned policy.

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### 3.6 Summary

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Indian foreign policy is rooted in its rich civilizational and cultural heritage of accommodation, tolerance and pluralism. These provide the base for the foundational principles of Indian foreign

policy. Architected by Jawaharlal Nehru these principles have withstood the test of time and place. Anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism (seen now as anti-neocolonialism), anti-racism (seen now as anti-discrimination of any form), disarmament, faith in international forums like United Nations, peaceful coexistence (more true now with menace of terrorism looming large) and nonalignment are principles that a foreign policy of any country should follow with earnestness in a divisive, violent, unequal and military power based world. The nonalignment stance of Indian foreign policy must be redefined to suit the present complex nascent multilateral world in post 9/11 period and the global resurgence of India as a political power can only come through following a sustained independent and nonaligned foreign policy.

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### 3.7 Questions

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#### Essay type questions

1. Evaluate the basic principles of Indian foreign policy.
2. Distinguish between non alignment as a strategy and as a movement in foreign policy.

#### Medium type questions

1. Do you think that the principles involved in foreign policy of India are relevant today. Justify with reasons.
3. Attempt a critical estimate of nonalignment as a foundational principle of Indian foreign policy with special focus on post cold war world order.

#### Short type questions

1. Name the countries of G-20.
2. Write short notes on—
  - a) New International Economic Order
  - b) Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

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### 3.8 Suggested Readings

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1. Sam Moyo and Paris Yeros (ed.), *Reclaiming the Nation: The Return of the National Question in Africa, Asia and Latin America*, Pluto Press, London 2011
2. David M. Malone, *Does the Elephant Dance? Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy*, Oxford University Press, 2011, New Delhi.
3. Annek Chatterjee, *World Politics*, Pearson, New Delhi, 2012
4. Mohammad Badrul Alam, Basic Determinants of India's Foreign Policy and Bilateral Relations in Rumki Basu(ed) *International Politics: Concepts, Theories and Issues*, Sage, 2012, New Delhi.
5. Partha Pratim Basu, India's Foreign Policy: Foundational Principles, *Politicus*, Departmental Journal of Asutosh College

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## Unit 4 □ India's relationship with neighbouring countries and beyond

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### Structure

- 4.0 Objectives
- 4.1 Introduction
- 4.2 Foreign Policy of India- the relationship with neighbouring countries
- 3.3 Foreign Policy of India- Toward United States and erstwhile Soviet Union and Russia
- 4.4 Foreign Policy of India - connectivity with European Union
- 4.5 Summary
- 4.6 Questions
- 4.7 Suggested Readings

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### 4.0 Objectives

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The major objectives of this unit are:

1. To understand the relations which India shares with her neighbours.
2. To analyse India's Policy towards United State and erstwhile Soviet Union and today's Russia.
3. To explore India's growing relationship with the European Union.

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### 4.1 Introduction

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The foreign policy of a country in action refers to the concrete set of connectivity that the country has been able to establish with the countries and organizations in the world at large. These connections can be of two types bilateral and multilateral. This two set of connections sometime goes parallel and the irritations in one can be sorted out in the other. For instance India and China may be bilateral problems but BRICS and SCO are certain forums in which these can be sorted out. Similarly Indo-Pak bilateral disputes have been addressed in the sidelines of various UN and SAARC Summits. When the bilateral connections are established within the region it is known as bilateral relations with the neighbouring countries. For India the region in which it is located is South Asia comprising eight countries being institutionalized members of SAARC. However the growing influential presence of China in its neighbourhood compels any analysis of India's relationship with neighbouring countries to include Indo-China relations as well. A very important part of foreign policy in action is the networking with major powers of the world. India seen as a legitimate 'emerged power' at present (after President Obama



claimed it in his address in the Joint session of Indian Parliament in 2012), is also getting involved in a major way with regional organizations across the world as if India is the 'Trading State' (to borrow the title of the book of Richard Rosecrance) of 21<sup>st</sup> century. The crucial question is to what extent India's national interest are being protected and promoted through these negotiations.

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## 4.2 Foreign Policy of India- the relationship with neighbouring countries

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The all-pervasive position of India in South Asia made India the core country in South Asia with her neighbours forming the periphery. India occupies the centre stage due to the widespread disparity between it and the neighbouring states. Other nations of South Asia, viz. Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Maldives are directly or indirectly dependent upon India due to the latter's dominant position in the region. In such a complex situation it is very important on the part of India to have bilateral relationship with these neighbouring countries in a manner to create trust, faith and friendship. India appeared to follow a policy of good neighbourly relations on a long term basis with the installation of the United Front government in 1996. The government took concrete steps towards resolving contentious bilateral issues with neighbouring countries. India's initiatives to improve its relations with its neighbours began with Bangladesh. Prime Minister Gujral admitted that relations with Bangladesh constituted the most difficult dimension of India's regional policy.

India and Bangladesh are interdependent mainly because of the geopolitical location. For long, Bangladesh has considered itself strategically vulnerable to India because the giant neighbour occupies most of the land border. In a way this uneasiness is reciprocal because Indian strategists always talk of Bangladesh's physical domination of 'chicken's neck' - India's narrow and tenuous land corridor linking its troubled North-eastern region. Thus in India's strategic horizon, Bangladesh on its own merit, occupies an important place. Strategic importance of Bangladesh increased further after India embarked upon 'Look East policy' to expand its economic and strategic linkages with the ASEAN region and beyond. Since the inception of Bangladesh, the Indo-Bangladesh relationship has been a love-hate relationship in which the tide of love was interrupted often due to the change of government in both the countries. Thus regime factor compatibility is a major influential factor. Other important domestic factors are the reflexive nationalism attitude vis-a-vis the other, federal politics, impact of trade and investment, influx of illegal immigrants, the issue of terrorist camps, issue of sharing of water of Ganges and Teesta rivers, the issue of enclaves across the border (Teen Bigha corridor) and other related issues. India's cooperation with Bangladesh government for the containment of Chakma insurgency is likely to pave way for more harmonious relation like the commencement of regular Kolkata-Dhaka train service from 2008 did. The recent period of Narendra Modi and Sheikh Hasina governments in both the countries indicate the making of *strategic geopolitics* whereby the two countries in this phase is expected to view more of themselves as neighbours than as geographical

hurdles where soft border issues like enclaves and demarcation of water and land areas will be settled and hard border issues like migration and water-sharing will be resolved to a large extent.

The signing of Indo-Nepal Treaty of Friendship India in 1950 (subsequently revised in 2006) established the framework for the historical ties between the two countries. India and Nepal are associated by their culture and religion, but their history and geography divide them into two. Nepal is a land-locked country and was for long under the Rana rule. India played a key-role in 1951 in the conclusion of a tri-partite agreement that put an end to the rule of Ranas and restored the power of the king. After universal adult franchise based general elections in Nepal of 1980s Indo-Nepal relations enhanced further. In 1996, India signed the Mahakali River Water Treaty with Nepal with the purpose of building up barrages that would facilitate better movement of goods and people from one side to another and it also allowed Nepal to trade through the Chittagong area of Bangladesh. On the issue of sovereignty claim over Kalapani, an enclave in the tri-junction of India, Nepal and China, Indo-Nepal differences were tried to be settled through joint working group of experts. Indo-Nepal joint commission was set up to review economic ties, ensure prioritization of hydro-power projects plants in Nepal, deal with concern over ill treatment of people of Indian origin in Nepal, set up of joint task force to study the problem of floodwater, combat terrorism and enhance cooperation in energy, security, border management. Those are the main goals of Indian policy towards Nepal. India's policy has been to support Nepalese yearning for a free and liberal democracy and with the recent visit of an Indian Prime Minister after 17 long years; Modi has struck a chord of trust with the Nepalese.

Indo-Bhutan relationship is relatively trouble free, compared to other bilateral relations in the region. According to the Indo-Bhutan Treaty of 1949, at least theoretically, Bhutan is required to consult India in the conduct of its external relations. After the renewal of Indo-Bhutan Treaty in 2007 Bhutan took independent charge of its foreign and defense policies. The Prime Minister of India in his visit on 2008 assured that India will stand by the Himalayan country as a factor of stability and support. For nearly a decade, militants of north-east India have taken unauthorized shelter in the territories of Bhutan. But despite Indian persuasion, joint Indo—Bhutan army operation is yet to take place. India is the largest single donor to Bhutan receiving 20% of India's MEA's annual budget and Indian aid accounts for 60% of its Bhutan's fifth five year development plan. India is also the leading trade partner of Bhutan and on the basis of 1972 Indo-Bhutan Trade Treaty the latter enjoys complete free trade with India. Modi chose Bhutan to be the place of his first foreign visit as Prime Minister to instill further confidence in Bhutan to create a new paradigm for intergovernmental cooperation in the areas of water security and environmental integrity.

Sri Lanka attained independence from the British Empire in 1948. Since then there has been a struggle between majority Sinhalese and minority Tamils culminating in a civil war that accentuated since 1983 with armed hostility between Sri Lankan government and LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) resulting in a massive influx of Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka to Tamil Nadu in India. In 1985 Indo-Lanka Accord was signed between Rajiv Gandhi and Jayawardhane making possible for India to play a key role in shaping the political future of Sri Lankan Tamil minority. As part of the agreement, a large contingent of Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF)

was sent by Delhi in 1988 which backfired and India faced severe criticisms from Sinhalese as well as the Tamils. So in 2008 when the final confrontation took place between LTTE and Sri Lankan government, India refrained from intervention. Meanwhile India has signed free trade agreement with Sri Lanka with effect from 2000. India is fifth largest export destination for Sri Lankan goods and they are part of multilateral forums like SAARC and BIMSTEC. India's policy towards Sri Lanka is to enhance commercial ties and ensure that Sri Lankan government provides humanitarian relief to those affected by the civil war and uprooted ensure rehabilitation of uprooted Tamils in post-Prabhakaran phase of Sri Lankan situation.

We may now turn to another island state, Maldives which increasingly vital to India's oceanic security. The bilateral treaty signed on 8th August 1949 provides the framework for India-Maldives relations and is guided by the principle of beneficial bilateralism which is about mutual appreciation and of concerns and interest by the two countries, and equal respect and sympathy for each other's sensitivities. This is evident in the amicable way both the countries demarcated their maritime boundary by adopting the median line principle in 1976. Maldives is vulnerable due to its geostrategic position and absence of necessary military strength to protect its security. Over the years India has provided a variety of assistance and played a greater role in its infrastructural development. Many area of cooperation were worked out in 1990 at the first India-Maldives Joint Commission meeting like assistance on arresting greenhouse effect and training civil servants to man the country's foreign office, use of India's satellite (INSAT-ID) for the reception and recording of meteorological data. India's policy to Maldives is to promote the goodwill in the existing bilateral visits through high level diplomatic visits of leaders.

Bitter hostilities and tensions darken India-Pakistan bilateral relations since their independence in 1947. Over the last 60 years it has led to several wars and conflicts which cast a pall over the region. These enmities are deeply intertwined with their domestic politics and have now acquired a serious nuclear dimension since the summer of 1998. In spite of this highly sensitive background, Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs), both military and non-military have been initiated by both sides. In 1965 war broke out between the two countries over the Kashmir issue. In 1971 India supported East Pakistan independence movement against West Pakistan. Following the 1971 war the ceasefire line in Kashmir was redefined by 1972 Shimla Agreement as the Line of Control (LOG). India had to face a virtual 'Kashmiri intifada' in 1989 backed by Pakistani Army and Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI). The nuclear explosions of 1998 undertaken by India to expose Pakistan's clandestine nuclear militarization programme was followed by a few nuclear explosions on the Pakistani side. This undoubtedly aggravated the relationships. The NDA government under Vajpayee tried to bring back normalcy by famous Amritsar-Lahore bus diplomacy in 1999. But Pakistan repaid this friendly gesture by sending armed invaders across the borders, thereby igniting the Kargil war to which an unprepared India, with great difficulty, gave a fitting reply, forcing the invaders to run back. The Kargil war of 1999 came to an end following hectic diplomatic activity and involvement of United States. In later day's events such as terrorist attacks on Kashmir Assembly, on Indian Parliament, killing of Abdul Ghani Lone, the leader of moderate Huriyat Conference are considered as a clear indication of the attempts made by Pakistan to perpetuate tensions within India. Such tensions marred Indo-Pak economic

connectivity to a large extent. The February 1999 Lahore Summit, April 2001 are high points of Indo-Pak diplomatic talks. Indian policy towards Pakistan is open ended - positive acts are appreciated while negative acts are dealt with strong measures. The present Modi government has reflected that very recently to warn Pakistan of shedding all diplomatic ties if it continues to have talks with separatist groups. That all this fell on deaf ears is proved by the recent Pak adventurism in Pathankot, over which uncontestable maternal evidence has placed Pakistan in an embarrassing position.

In the context of Indo-Pakistan dispute, the relationship between India and Afghanistan become important. Traditionally Afghanistan has been a cordial neighbor to India. With Afghanistan joining SAARC, following the SAARC Summit at Dhaka in 2005, the region acquired a fuller regional identity. Bilateral relations between India and Afghanistan have gained substantially during the year 2005 and 2006. The Prime Minister of India Dr. Manmohan Singh reaffirmed India's support to the goal of a sovereign, stable and prosperous Afghanistan. India's huge developmental aid to Afghanistan to restructure its economy and support for restoration of democracy in a post Taliban period reflects the nature of Indian policy to Afghanistan - to keep Afghanistan engaged bilateral to prevent development of formal Afghanistan-Pakistan relation relationship to a large extent for geo-strategic region. Steering clear of the military situation in Afghanistan India continues to make huge infrastructural investment in the country, thereby winning the good will of the Afghan people, while at the same time Indian personnel working there become easy targets of Pak-instigated terror attacks.

India-Myanmar relationship is deeply rooted in history as India was one of the leading proponents of Burmese independence and established diplomatic relations immediately after Burma's independence in 1948. The Indo-Myanmar relations during 1948-1952 were cordial due to a good relation between Nehru and Burmese leader U Nu as both were part of NAM, during 1962-1988 under General Ne Win Burma withdrew from NAM and chose policy of isolationism the relationship became frosty, due to military junta's anti-democracy stand and India's pro-democracy moves reflected through awarding Aung San Suu kyi, the pro-democratic high profile Burmese leader led to further downturn in the relation. India's policy to engage with Myanmar through its overall Look East Policy in various multilateral forums like BIMSTEC, BCIM and Mekong-Ganga Cooperation and agreement on India-Myanmar gas pipeline has made the relation uprising. Development of North East region, containing China's influence in Myanmar and to reach out to broader ASEAN group is the booster for India to have a proactive Myanmar policy.

India's relationships with People's Republic of China have been cordial since ancient times for civilizational linkages. In 1954 India concluded a treaty with China and recognized rather gratuitously China's suzerainty over Tibet. This treaty also expressed the determination of both the countries to have a friendly bilateral relationship on the basis of the Panchsheel -or the five principles of coexistence and the slogan was '*Hindi-Chini bahi bhai*'. In 1959 the doubt raised by China over established bilateral borders led to China's war on India (1962). For decades on the relationship of friendly euphoria was completely shattered by this unprovoked military attack from one of India's closest partners of the Panchsheel days. Subsequently China's support to Pakistan in 1965 and 1971 in Indo-Pak war and the issue of India's shelter to Dalai Lama

continued to mark a nearly nozen relationship. In 1988 Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China followed by the signing of joint statement in 1993, famous 'Peace and Tranquility Agreement' in 1995, Ten Agreements and a Joint Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation during Vajpayee's visit in 2003 and 'A Shared Vision for the 21st Century of China and India' during Manmahon Singh's visit in 2008 are important highlights of bilateral political networking. Contentious issues like Tibet, status of Arunachal Pradesh, border skirmishes by China defying McMahon Line remain as irritants in bilateral relationship. However on the economic front Indo-China trade has been on the rise in post cold war period to the extent that China has become India's number one trading partner. Thus India's policy to China has been that of '*congagement*' particularly in post 1998 Pokhran phase - containing China politically and diplomatically and engaging China economically.

According to David Malone, India faces a circular challenge: unless its neighbours in the region become more cooperative (and prosperous), India is unlikely to develop into more than a regional power, but it is true as well that it cannot be a global power unless it reaches beyond its neighbourhood. India's approach to its neighbours is too often reactive and at times dismissive. India has been trying hard in recent years to accommodate and tolerate neighbourly differences by elevating development discourse over the conventional security debate by linking geography with strategy keeping in mind China-South Asia relations but it is not yet such as to induce either awe or affection amongst those neighbours who matter.

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### **4.3 Foreign Policy of India- Toward United States and Erstwhile Soviet Union and Russia**

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Indian independence coincided with the emergence of two superpowers - the United States and the Soviet Union. Though India aimed at a balance in her relations with both the superpowers, it has not always succeeded in this endeavour. India's relation with the two superpowers has been influenced by the international politics and domestic demands as well.

For much of the Cold War days, India and United States remained 'estranged democracies' to use the words of Dennis Kux. But after the Cold War period they share a transformed relationship with bilateral ties elevated almost on all fronts so much so that some commentator prefer to depict them a 'natural allies'. During the Cold War period, a peculiar duality characterized Indo-US relation: USA gave economic assistance and support to India to prevent an economically stable and democratic regional player from turning communist; yet it always felt uncomfortable with New Delhi's policy of nonalignment which led it to find an ally in Pakistan. A significant breakthrough however was achieved in the early 1990s following the launch of Indian economic reform and toning down of the rhetoric of nonalignment by India as well as reassessment of USA's relationship with Pakistan following end of the Cold War. President Clinton's visit to the subcontinent in 2000 and during the tenure of George Bush(Jr.) the whole framework of Indo-US engagement was overhauled with the backdrop being commonality of interests stemming from the rise of global terrorism, need to balance the phenomenal rise of China, promotion of

democracy in the world and the search for new energy resources. Among the benefits from India's standpoint, USA acknowledged India's strategic significance within Asia as well as growing importance globally while its perception of terrorism -fuelled from across its western borders- was also accepted. Supply of high end defence-related technology and faster pace of military to military ties with heavy emphasis on joint training were other highlights of the relationship. The Next Step in Strategic Partnership Process (NSSP) launched in 2004, the completion of successful Open Skies Agreement and finally, the conclusion of civilian nuclear deal (2005) signed in the face of stiff domestic opposition in India lifted the relationship to truly majestic heights. Indo-US bilateral trade grew from 13.49 billion in 2001 to 31.917 billion in 2006(in US Dollar). President Obama's visit to India in 2010 and reference to India as a 'indispensable partner' instead of an 'ally' and pledge to support India's case as permanent member of UN Security Council shows the eagerness of US to have a fruitful bilateral tie with India particularly in the context of post 9/11 period.

David Malone, in analyzing Indo-US relation highlights three main parameters - ideology, strategy and values. The ideological differences of 1947-66, the strategic contradictions of 1967-89 (Bangladesh war, Pakistan and Afghanistan War) and rediscovering common interests since 1990s on economic and political factors, Pokhran-II and its impact, rediscovering common values, regional power balances(new South Asia policy of US was conceptual decoupling of India and Pakistan), a new world order because these days Malone declares that 'Washington often see India as a useful hedge against the rise of China, if not as a reliable ally in all of its global adventures. This makes clear how far India has come, and perhaps also how US-centered unipolarity proved but a fleeting consequence of the end of Cold War.'

India's policy has been to have a strong viable partnership with the United States for economic, political and geo-strategic reasons. Under Modi's tenure as Prime Minister from 2014 India is likely to get more attention from United States as reflected in the invitation of United States to Modi for an official visit in September 2014. In all fairness Indo-US relationship is likely to grow remarkable mature and dynamic.

The relationship between India and Soviet Union started on a good note. According to Ramesh Thakur, the Soviet assistance both economically, militarily and diplomatically strengthened the Indian state apparatus domestically and internationally. In the international arena India considered Soviet Union as a power having unequivocal status in comparison to China and US. Moreover the strong ideological differences with the US and the desire to contain People's Republic of China and more importantly emergence of India as a regional power in the subcontinent naturally attracted each other. During Sino-Indian war of 1962 Soviet Union assisted India with defense establishment like MIG-21 and other high altitude helicopters. During 1965 Indo-Pak war Soviet Union extended support to India against Pakistan that allied with China. ON Kashmir issue, Soviet Union supported India's stand time and again at international forums. The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation signed on August 1971 was considered to be a landmark bilateral treaty. In 1980 the Breznev Doctrine called for five mutual obligations- no deployment on foreign bases in Persian Gulf area, no threat of use of force, respect nonalignment, respect their rights and natural resources, no obstruction to normal trade exchanges.

In 1984 a defence agreement was also signed between them. By 1987-88 the trade relations reached 1.5 million Rouble and economic cooperation began to take multidimensional character as joint ventures in public and private sectors were sanctioned. India's policy with Soviet Union was highly influenced by the socialist thrust as reflected in the approach of Nehru and Indira Gandhi.

After the disintegration of Soviet Union and emergence of Russia, in January 1993, Boris Yeltsin the first President of Russia came to India and this visit was a watershed not only in bilateral relations but also in Moscow's worldview and its management of foreign affairs. In 1993 during Narasimha Rao's visit a landmark agreement called Indo-Russian Aviation Limited Cooperation was signed. In 1998 India and Russia entered into a major nuclear deal paving the way for the construction of nuclear power plant at Koodankulam in Tamil Nadu. In October 2000 India and Russia signed a Strategic Partnership Document wherein both the nations agreed that they would not join any military or power blocs and treaties that are likely to threaten each other's national security. During President Putin's visit in 2000 to India the relations in economic sphere further enhanced. Based on mutual trust and understanding, Indo-Russian relations are characterized by remarkable stability and continuity. During Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Russia, the two countries agreed to enhance bilateral cooperation in order to combat terrorism, including cooperation under the aegis of Joint Working Group on Afghanistan and the group on terrorism set up by the National Security Council of India and the Security Council of Russian Federation. Dimitry Medvedev's visit to India in 2010 apart from strengthening bilateral energy, security and economic relations also reflected Russian support for India's permanent seat at UN Security Council. An important dimension to India's foreign policy towards Russia was reflected in India's support to Russia's role during the Ukraine-Syria crisis in 2013-14 which shows that as against the Western power led by United States, India is keeping its option open to rally behind Russia in any confrontation between Russia on the one hand and US and EU on the other.

According to David Malone, the Indo-Russian relation growing out of India's Russian interactions, defence procurement, political similar values of liberal constitutional democracy, economics and trade attachment, energy interests centering around the gas pipeline project compels India due to geostrategic reasons to revive such relationship and unlike India's relationships with China and the United States, Delhi may well find itself becoming a dominant player in Indo-European and Indo-Russian relationship.

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#### **4.4 Foreign Policy of India—connectivity with European Union**

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EU-India relations date back to the early 1960s. India was among the first countries to set up diplomatic relations with the European Economic Community. Subsequently bilateral agreements were signed in 1973 and 1981. The 1994 cooperation agreement is a wide ranging third generation agreement that encompasses issues beyond trade and economic cooperation. India's partnership with EU is a partnership based on shared values and common commitment to democracy.

pluralism, multi-culturalism, human rights and religious freedom. The Commission Communication for an 'EU-India Enhanced Partnership' of June 1996 and June 2004 set out concrete proposals respect for to upgrade relationship to a strategic partnership. The Helsinki Summit of October 2006 envisages India-EU trade to reach its optimum potential with the conclusion of a bilateral Free Trade Agreement, Commissioner for European External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, Benita-Ferrero-Waldner and Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson have portrayed India as a country with enormous potential as a global player as well as a vital partner in the South Asia region. Since the 1990s India-EU bilateral relations have progressed from trade in goods, mostly in traditional sectors, and development and economic cooperation into a strategic partnership. The EU continues to be India's main trading partner accounting for one-fifth of her total trade as well as the biggest source of actual foreign direct investment into India. Germany, UK and Belgium are main EU trading partners of India. Mr. Benedetto Amari (Ambassador of Italy to India) in one of the Indo-EU seminar rightly said "India's relations with EU was a two way street and it is the levels of awareness and comfort which need to be raised to facilitate both sides into a stronger post-enlargement relationship".

The financial crisis that hit entire Europe in 2008 was a major setback for European pre-eminence in economic terms particularly in its bilateral relationship with India. In the post financial crisis period India is seen by EU as a most promising economic market partner to come out of the financial meltdown. Development cooperation between the EU and the countries of South Asia covers financial and technical aid as well as economic cooperation. Priorities include regional stability, the fight against terrorism and poverty reduction. In its dialogue with SAARC the EU has consistently affirmed an interest in strengthening links with SAARC as a regional organisation. This sentiment is equally consistently reciprocated by SAARC. The EU obtained the observer status in 2006 in SAARC Summits and can help consolidate the ongoing integration process through its economic presence in the region, its own historical experience of dealing with diversity, and its interest in crisis prevention. As the onus to ease regional conflicts in the region is mostly on India, the growing EU-India engagement, can be doubly beneficial - (a) India can learn can the techniques of European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) so that Indian regional policy can be modeled on it (b) EU's multi-level framework of governance could raise the prospects for regional reconciliation by transforming the meaning of sovereignty, identity, borders and security, all highly contested issues in conflict situations, for India and her neighbours.

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## 4.5 Summary

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Indian foreign policy has been a working example of managing wider connectivity and network both bilaterally and multilaterally since its independence. The main achievement of Indian foreign policy through this entire network is its ability to balance the relationship to an extent of keeping the independent formulation of foreign policy intact. India has a neighbourhood that is volatile and tensed particularly exemplified by Indo-Pakistan dispute. India's policy to its neighbouring countries has been directed to ease the tensions through initiation of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). India's relationship with neighbouring countries like Nepal, Bhutan



and Maldives are apparently cordial. With regime change in those countries, however, their perception of India may swing drastically. With Bangladesh and Sri Lanka the domestic political exigencies have affected India's policy formulation. With Pakistan, India's relationship has been on low ebb throughout with some few high points in diplomatic terms. In South Asian region India has to manage relationship with other countries keeping in mind the not so friendly presence of China. India formulates a *conengagement* policy with China and cordial enhancement with neighbouring countries to balance the situation. With United States, India's relationship is stable and strengthening day by day through various kinds of politico-defense and strategic agreements of partnership between the world's two most vibrant working democracies. With erstwhile Soviet Union and Russia the relationship that India maintains is one of well maintained linkages in diplomatic terms reflected in the Indo-Russian Friendship Treaty that has been the framework of such a fruitful relationship. India's growing relationship with European Union is an indication that India gives importance to multilateral alliances as well. Although India has bilateral ties with member countries of EU but it also engages with EU as a regional organization to boost its economic and strategic image in the world.

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## 4.6 Questions

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### Essay type questions

1. Critically analyse India's relationship with neighbouring countries with special emphasis on the role of China.
2. 'India and United States are indispensable allies in 21st century' - In the light of this statement discuss the evolution of India's relationship with the United States.

### Medium answer type questions

1. In the background of cold war and post cold war period, elucidate India's relationship with Soviet Union and later Russia.
2. Do you think that India is the dominant player in Indo-EU relationship? Give reasons for your answer.

### Short type questions

1. What is the current position of India in South Asia?
2. Write Short notes on—
  - a) SAARC
  - b) BRICS
  - c) Indian Peace Keeping Force

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## 4.7 Suggested Readings

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1. David M. Malone, *Does the Elephant Dance? Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy*, Oxford University Press, 2011, New Delhi.
2. Annek Chatterjee, *World Politics*, Pearson, New Delhi, 2012
3. Mohammad Badrul Alam, Basic Determinants of India's Foreign Policy and Bilateral Relations in Rumki Basu(ed) *International Politics: Concepts, Theories and Issues*, Sage, 2012, New Delhi
4. Partha Pratim Basu, India's Foreign Policy: Foundational Principles, in *Politicus*, Departmental Journal of Asutosh College, 2009



মানুষের জ্ঞান ও ভাবকে বইয়ের মধ্যে সঞ্চিত করিবার যে একটা প্রচুর সুবিধা আছে, সে কথা কেহই অস্বীকার করিতে পারে না। কিন্তু সেই সুবিধার দ্বারা মনের স্বাভাবিক শক্তিকে একেবারে আচ্ছন্ন করিয়া ফেলিলে বুদ্ধিকে বাবু করিয়া তোলা হয়।

—রবীন্দ্রনাথ ঠাকুর

ভারতের একটা mission আছে, একটা গৌরবময় ভবিষ্যৎ আছে, সেই ভবিষ্যৎ ভারতের উত্তরাধিকারী আমরাই। নতুন ভারতের মুক্তির ইতিহাস আমরাই রচনা করছি এবং করব। এই বিশ্বাস আছে বলেই আমরা সব দুঃখ কষ্ট সহ্য করতে পারি, অন্ধকারময় বর্তমানকে অগ্রাহ্য করতে পারি, বাস্তবের নিষ্ঠুর সত্যগুলি আদর্শের কঠিন আঘাতে ধুলিসাৎ করতে পারি।

—সুভাষচন্দ্র বসু

Any system of education which ignores Indian conditions, requirements, history and sociology is too unscientific to commend itself to any rational support.

—Subhas Chandra Bose

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